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Introduction
Before We Said “We”
Have you ever noticed, people can’t speak about Simone de Beauvoir 
without giving dates and mentioning ages?
It’s because she was always obsessed with real time.
geneviève brisac1
In teaching Beauvoir, the task is to help students read her historically 
without dismissing her as “dated.”
deborah nelson2
In rapidly changing societies all generations are transitional.
wini breines3
In the US, in Great Britain and Australia, in France itself, The Second Sex mat-
tered enormously at the outset of second-wave feminism. In memoir after 
memoir from the 1960s and 1970s, we read that this one book changed women’s 
lives: led them to withdraw their energies from the male-dominated left and 
invent consciousness-raising, to leave their husbands and abandon what Adri-
enne Rich called “the old way of marriage,”4 to see their culture, their families, 
their own bodies in new and challenging ways. Many of us who teach women’s 
studies today acknowledge this by assigning the book, or at least some care-
fully selected parts of it. Kate Millett: “Betty [Friedan] wasn’t the mother of us 
all. Simone de Beauvoir was.” Our Bodies, Ourselves: “The Second Sex was the 
1 “On ne peut pas parler de Simone de Beauvoir sans donner des dates, sans citer des âges, 
l’avez-vous remarqué? C’est qu’elle fut toujours obsédée du temps réel” (Brisac, “Beauvoir ‘en 
temps réel’: une écriture de l’instantané,” 58). Except where noted, all translations are my 
own.
2 Midwest Faculty Seminar on Simone de Beauvoir, University of Chicago, November 21–23, 
1996.
3 Breines, Young, White, and Miserable: Growing Up Female in the Fifties, 24.
4 Rich, “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Revision,” 43. For accounts of the effects The Sec-
ond Sex had on the marriages of two otherwise very different women, see Angie Pegg in 
Penny Forster and Imogen Sutton, Daughters of de Beauvoir, 53–65, and Marge Piercy, Sleep-
ing With Cats: A Memoir, 118.
© Meryl Altman, 2020 | doi 10.1163/9789004431218_002 
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first book many of us read that made us aware we were oppressed as females.” 
Michèle Le Dœuff: “The Second Sex was the movement before the movement.”5
But which Second Sex were they reading? For years I owned two editions of 
H.M. Parshley’s English version. One was a large-format work of serious phi-
losophy, undecorated except for some tasteful stripes, intended to be read at a 
library table: this is the text that functioned in my undergraduate Feminist 
Theory seminar to signify that women’s studies was a scholarly rigorous under-
taking, not some flaky fad.6 The other copy is a drugstore paperback. Its cover 
shows a crouching naked lady emerging from a vague and lurid yellowish haze. 
Blurbs emphasize its daring and titillating content, marking and marketing it 
as a Book About Sex:
[T]he most penetrating, frank, and intimate book ever written about 
Woman…. [A] Frenchwoman, who never loses sight of the needs and de-
sires of both sexes, has used her artistry and erudition to explore woman 
in each of her many dimensions. Her … highly original and stimulating 
conclusions have produced a book that overwhelmed reviewers….7
This change in presentation, from scandalous trash to ponderous tome, was a 
tribute to scholars and activists who worked to get Beauvoir taken seriously as 
a philosopher and thinker. And it is also a tribute to feminist advances, in and 
out of the academy, more generally: an intellectual woman, writing about 
women, is no longer exotic, risqué, miraculous, faintly terrifying. We tend now 
to see that early edition as a sexist misunderstanding, a joke in rather bad taste. 
But paradoxically, it was the earlier, trashier, version that inspired second-wave 
feminists. The yellow one, the “dirty” one, was the one they read.8
Readers from that time often mention The Second Sex alongside other 
books—Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar, Mary McCarthy’s The Group, especially Do-
ris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook—novels which sold very widely in the early 
1960s, and which share a paradoxical transitional status. These books kicked 
5 Boston Women’s Health Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book By and For Women, 60; Mi-
chèle Le Dœuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc., 57. See 
also now Miriam David, Feminism, Gender and Universities: Politics, Passion, and Pedagogies, 
103, 106, 111, 112, 116, 128, 130, 132, and 141.
6 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Parshley (1989).
7 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Parshley (1965).
8 The French, obviously, were reading it in French. But as Judith Coffin shows in a very interest-
ing article, “Beauvoir, Kinsey, and Mid-Century Sex,” even in France The Second Sex was often 
read and reviewed alongside Kinsey’s contemporaneous work, and was understood similarly 
to be a work dealing primarily with sexual matters.
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something loose for large numbers of women readers who were, or were about 
to become, feminists. All relied on newly frank (and painful) discussions of 
sexuality and emotional attachment; each also tended to foreground Politics 
with a capital P (in particular, the Cold War); but the personal and the political 
plots were split, opposed, not yet part of the same analysis, the same conversa-
tion. None of the novels can fairly be described as feminist. As Anna Wulf, the 
central character of The Golden Notebook, might say, I wouldn’t write that now. 
(In fact, Lessing and McCarthy both explicitly and angrily disavowed any con-
nection with the feminist movement when it re-emerged and attempted to 
claim them.) These novels speak from the social and psychological place that 
was Beauvoir’s when she wrote, in the introduction to The Second Sex, “women 
do not say ‘we.’”9
Soon, women would say “we,” would recognize that even the most intimate 
pain of living as a woman under patriarchy was, in Adrienne Rich’s phrase, 
“shared, unnecessary, and political.”10 Those who came of age politically in the 
1970s would draw on existentialist language and energy to mobilize for repro-
ductive freedom, equal pay, sexual self-determination, and a thousand other 
things. Beauvoir herself would move beyond the hope she expressed at the end 
of The Second Sex and participate in direct collective action, to the point where 
she insisted on being pictured on the cover of L’arc only as one member of her 
group: already a visible and committed woman of the left, she became a force 
for feminism.11
But not long after this the problem of not saying “we” was replaced by an 
awareness of the dangers of saying “we” too quickly, as in, “what do you mean 
we, white woman?” And in the United States, at least, The Second Sex soon be-
came a target, accused of a myopic lack of inclusivity that was said to charac-
terize the “second wave.” In 1988, Elizabeth Spelman’s highly influential Ines-
sential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought took an attack on 
Beauvoir as its starting point, drawing and quartering her for precisely the as-
sertion she had been unwilling, or unable, to make.
9 “Les femmes … ne disent pas ‘nous’” (Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe [hereinafter DS], 1:19). All 
references are to the French edition. As a general rule, I will refer to Beauvoir’s works un-
der their French titles, not least because the English titles by which they are known are 
often approximations. The exception is The Second Sex, which in the interests of consis-
tency will be called throughout by its English title. (So much of my discussion deals with 
its reception by Anglophone readers that either way would have been awkward, and this 
way seemed less fussy.)
10 Rich, “Translations,” in Diving Into the Wreck, 41.
11 Annie Sugier and Kahina Benziane, “Nos chemins se sont croisés,” 329.
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So the reception of The Second Sex has been caught between two paradoxes. 
First, how could a mass movement have been started by a book which barely 
sketches the possibility of collective action? And then, what are we to do with 
a book that does not speak of differences between women in the ways identity 
politics came to demand, but that nonetheless appears to have spoken to wom-
en of color around the world, from Lorraine Hansberry to Sara Ahmed, in a 
powerful way?
The relation between “I” and “we”—epistemological, ethical, political, 
 practical—has proved one of feminist theory’s stubbornest knots. For sound 
and healthy reasons, both pronouns often feel uncomfortable in our mouths, 
often sound poisoned in our ears. Yet for strong and healthy reasons, I/we con-
tinue to use and need them. This isn’t (just) an academic issue. Whenever 
I hear (or say) a sentence like “am I a feminist?” “am I still a feminist if?” “is 
feminism still about me?” “is feminism about me yet?” “is there a group I can 
join?” even, “isn’t there anything we can do about [whatever awful thing has 
happened that day]?” the same problem is being posed. Because I’m still hop-
ing the answer to all those questions is “yes,” for me and my students among 
others, I want to bracket the forms this issue has taken for the last three de-
cades or so, and go back behind and before “we” (and I) got into such a mess.
Even as we pursue the project of exegesis and analysis of Beauvoir as a bril-
liant and multifaceted theoretical thinker, a major philosopher of the twenti-
eth century, I think we should pay attention to what women saw in the yellow-
ish, and yellowing, version, the one they hid in their laundry baskets alongside 
The Golden Notebook.12 Taking her philosophical arguments seriously requires 
us to read them alongside the (then) more popular and (now) more suspect 
discourses with which readers sometimes confused them, and from which 
they often grew: “trashy” sex manuals, bad novels with romance plots, outmod-
ed psychoanalytic and sexological authorities, “human rights” talk, and—last 
but not least—existentialism. I think those first readers saw something more 
recent theorists, especially philosophers, have missed, or dismissed, or been 
embarrassed to mention: an energetic, passionate critique of the sorry state of 
most women’s sexual and romantic lives, and an argument that women’s op-
pression could be, should be, taken just as seriously as other ongoing strug-
gles for liberation. The biggest mistake we can make as readers, I think, is to 
try  and purge Beauvoir and other postwar women writers of the marks of 
such  prefeminist or even antifeminist discourses that were in her temporal 
12 See for instance Elayne Rapping, The Culture of Recovery: Making Sense of the Self-Help 
Movement in Women’s Lives, 4.
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 neighborhood, things she said that “we wouldn’t say now.”13 Instead, mapping 
their search among the languages available to them can help us find our way in 
ours.
In what follows, I’ve concentrated on three recurring aspects of Simone de 
Beauvoir’s thought—bad sex, lesbians, and “race and class”—which have in 
recent years been considered embarrassingly “of her era,” and which remain 
underdiscussed despite the current renaissance of serious scholarship on 
Beauvoir.14 Looking carefully at the parts of The Second Sex many readers skim 
or skip, and also at her other essays and autobiographical works, I provide a set 
of intensive, interdisciplinary readings that locate her writing in her own time 
and place, neither to accuse nor to excuse, but to clarify: to understand what 
she was doing then, hoping to show how she is still “good to think with” now. 
My aim is not to defend at all costs everything Beauvoir ever said or did, but to 
enable readers to agree or disagree with her in a non-anachronistic way by see-
ing what larger conversation her texts were part of, what key terms have 
changed their meaning, whom she was arguing with, what she could or could 
not have known. This requires a method that will strike some readers as digres-
sive, involving long excursions into (for instance) the arcana of early psycho-
analysis and the politics of decolonization. But I am ultimately less interested 
in where her ideas came from than in where they went and might still go.
...
This is a very good time to be working on Simone de Beauvoir. For one thing, 
after decades of lobbying by scholars dissatisfied with Parshley’s unsig-
nalled cuts and distortions, I can now finally add a third English version to the 
two copies of The Second Sex on my shelf.15 The new translation—imperfect, 
but complete—joins the ongoing efforts of the University of Illinois Press’s 
13 Indeed, the parts of the book that speak most powerfully to students today are not always 
the parts that we foreground in trying to push them to think about it as theory—which is 
why students who are assigned to read only the introduction, or only excerpts from it, are 
in my view missing out.
14 There are certainly other aspects equally worthy of similar excavation: in particular, her 
take on “the data of biology.”
15 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. Per-
haps my work will be especially helpful for Anglophone readers who encountered Beau-
voir first, or only, in Parshley’s translation: the Beauvoir I discuss here may not be the 
“Beauvoir” such readers know. For explanation of why a new translation was sorely need-
ed, see Margaret Simons, “The Silencing of Simone de Beauvoir: Guess What’s Missing 
from The Second Sex,” and Toril Moi, “While We Wait: The English Translation of The Sec-
ond Sex.” The new version has not been uncontroversial: see Moi, “The Adulteress Wife,” 
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 Beauvoir Series to make all of what Beauvoir actually said available to Anglo-
phone scholars, students, and general readers. Another good sign is the prolif-
eration of conferences in the United States and across Europe, plus many new 
anthologies that take her seriously as a thinker and a feminist theorist and also 
as a writer of fiction and autobiography.16 Googling the new translation on 
Amazon shortly after it appeared, I found the number one comment came 
from a male undergraduate, who gave it five stars, explaining: “It did what was 
necessary to my head.” It seems safe to point to a broad, interdisciplinary com-
munity of both academic and general readers for whom The Second Sex is far 
from a dead letter.
One could not always assume this. Activists and polemicist feminists of the 
1970s frequently built on and borrowed from Beauvoir, albeit selectively and 
often without attribution (as writers as different as Kate Millett and Christine 
Delphy have since acknowledged).17 But Beauvoir’s reputation was particularly 
ill-served, both in France and the United States, by feminist theorists in the 
1980s, who while continuing to appropriate her insights, also used her as a kind 
of transference fetish—idealized icon and/or punching bag—rather than re-
sponding to what she actually wrote. Pioneering correctives to this view were 
provided in France by the feminist philosopher Michèle Le Dœuff in 1989 and 
in the United States by Margaret Simons, through her own essays (collected in 
1999)18 and her work as an anthologist, editor of the Beauvoir Series, and gen-
eral inspiration. Further excellent work by the late Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, 
Karen Vintges, Sonia Kruks, Toril Moi, and others has now cleared the ground 
of sexist dismissals, and of Beauvoir’s own evasion of the title “philosopher,” 
and has done a great deal to rescue her work from the contradictory sets of 
misreadings that have dogged it: assertions for example that The Second Sex is 
both too essentialist, and insufficiently attentive to important differences 
and Nancy Bauer in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. My own more positive view ap-
peared in the Women’s Review of Books.
16 See Margaret Simons, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir; Elizabeth Fal-
laize, ed., Beauvoir: A Critical Reader; Christine Delphy and Sylvie Chaperon, ed., Le 
Cinquantenaire du deuxième Sexe; Claudia Card, ed., Cambridge Companion to Simone de 
Beauvoir; Emily Grosholz, The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir; Simons, ed., The Philosophy 
of Simone de Beauvoir; Lori Jo Marso and Patricia Moynagh, ed., Beauvoir’s Political Think-
ing: Critical Essays; Thomas Staudter, ed., Beauvoir cent ans après sa naissance: contribu-
tions interdisciplinaires de cinq continents; Kristeva et al., eds., (Re)découvrir l’œuvre de 
Simone de Beauvoir. Of these, the Chaperon and Kristeva volumes are particularly mas-
sive, international, and varied. See also now Nancy Bauer and Laura Hengehold, ed., 
Blackwell’s Companion to Simone de Beauvoir.
17 Forster and Sutton, Daughters of de Beauvoir, 22–23.
18 Simons, Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism.
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 between women and men, too connected to or too disconnected from “the 
body,” too French or not “French” enough, and so forth. I’m enormously grate-
ful for the detailed, lucid work of an international group of women who have 
taken up the task of understanding Beauvoir’s intellectual work as a whole and 
its relationship to wider traditions of philosophic thought.19
Thanks to these scholars, I can assume Beauvoir was a serious, careful, origi-
nal thinker, motivated by deep and clear feminist commitments, and move on 
from there. In particular, it is no longer necessary to defend Beauvoir against 
the idea that she was simply Sartre’s over-devoted acolyte, her work ruined by 
the influence of an apolitical, sexist, outdated philosophical system, her femi-
nism vitiated by a life as his devoted slave (or as a kind of grass widow).20 The 
question, “should The Second Sex ‘count’ as original philosophy?” has been suf-
ficiently answered in the affirmative that it has also been helpfully reopened: 
yes, she was a philosopher, but what sort of philosophy is this, and what else 
was she also doing? Nancy Bauer’s characterization of Beauvoir’s philosophic 
method is suggestive: “For her, the test of whether a philosopher’s work is wor-
thy of appropriation is not whether it is susceptible to correction but whether 
it provides one with a philosophical idiom, a set of terms and concepts that 
open up a way to do one’s own philosophical work.”21 I follow Bauer in pro-
posing that we read Beauvoir herself in precisely that way, but with the addi-
tion that not all the idioms she “appropriated” are philosophical—the book’s 
19 See especially Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex; Karen Vintges, Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir; Ursula 
Tidd, Simone de Beauvoir: Gender and Testimony; Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Mak-
ing of an Intellectual Woman and What Is a Woman? And Other Essays; Nancy Bauer, Sim-
one de Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism; Sara Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of 
Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir; Sonia Kruks, Retrieving Experience: 
Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics and Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of 
Ambiguity. Lori Marso, Politics with Beauvoir: Freedom in the Encounter, is a welcome ad-
dition to this group, although it was published too recently to fully inform my study.
20 This last idea particularly informed Deirdre Bair’s 1991 biography. (The phrase “grass wid-
ow” is Karen Vintges’s summary of Bair’s view.) Now available are a range of other inter-
pretations, including that her ideas were radically different from his, and better, but that 
she never explicitly signaled this (Le Dœuff); that she invented “Sartrean” existentialism, 
and he stole it (Fullbrook and Fullbrook); that she influenced his turn to the social after 
the war, although he never quite credited her properly (Kruks); that other philosophers 
(Merleau-Ponty, Hegel) were actually more important influences on her work than Sartre 
was (Heinämaa). All these views seem to me plausible and interesting; it is not my project 
here to choose among them, and I will be discussing Sartre only in so far as a contrast with 
his position clarifies Beauvoir’s.
21 Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 83.
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“mixed diction” is to my mind one of its strengths. In a way, what I want is to 
recover the true and fruitful weirdness of her work.
Twenty-five years ago, I began asking students to read the whole of The Sec-
ond Sex, in part because of its historical importance, but also because it seemed 
refreshingly free of that era’s paralyzing impasses (the question of feminine 
language, “difference” vs “equality,” difficulties with the category “woman” and 
“women,” etc.) and more directly connected to the students’ lived realities, to 
the questions they were asking themselves about sex, work, and life. My hope 
was that taking another look at Beauvoir could provide what scholars of Amer-
ican literature sometimes refer to as a “usable past.” That view has been con-
firmed by several prominent scholars, who have seen in Beauvoir’s concept of 
woman’s “situation” a healthy alternative to what Judith Butler called in 1990 
“the circular ruins of contemporary debate.”22 Literary theorist Toril Moi ar-
gues that Beauvoir avoided the “iatrogenic” problems of later feminist “theore-
ticism,” because she offered neither a feminism of equality nor a feminism of 
difference but a feminism of freedom; was neither wholly determinist nor 
wholly voluntarist with respect to “the body”; and took no interest whatever in 
the problematic distinction between sex and gender: she managed without it. 
Moi shows that in order to use her for our time, we need to first remember that 
she is not of our time:
Because contemporary English-language critics have read Beauvoir’s 
1949 essay through the lens of the 1960s sex/gender distinction, they have 
failed to see that her essay provides exactly the kind of non-essentialist, 
concrete, historical and social understanding of the body that so many 
contemporary feminists are looking for…. If many feminist critiques of 
Beauvoir strike me as fundamentally flawed … it is not so much because 
they misread Beauvoir’s position on difference (though some do), as be-
cause they utterly fail to grasp that Beauvoir’s political project is radically 
different from their own.23
Sonia Kruks makes a related, convincing claim that existentialist and phenom-
enological approaches, including Beauvoir’s, can bring back what was lost in 
subsequent “postmodern” and post-structuralist theory: crucial concepts of 
freedom and shared subjectivity. Kruks, Vintges and others also observe that 
22 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 8. Butler’s own up-
take of Beauvoir is rather more labyrinthine, as I’ll discuss briefly below.
23 Moi, What is a Woman?, 5, 184.
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advocates of post-structuralism have overstated their claim of dramatic rup-
ture with everything that came before.24
These analyses confirm my view that Beauvoir not only served as a repressed 
source for feminist arguments of the 1970s and beyond, but can serve as a good 
resource for feminism today. For instance, her failure to anticipate and sub-
scribe to the “identity politics” of the 1980s no longer looks like such a terrible 
mistake; and the lack of a clear demarcation between biologically given “sex” 
and socially constructed “gender” is no longer cause for derision or condescen-
sion to those of us who have been convinced (by such scholars as Anne Faus-
to Sterling and Judith Butler, as well as by several decades of changes to the 
life-world of the sex-gender system) that what we used to call “sex” is also inex-
tricable from social processes. Moreover, Beauvoir’s attention to the impedi-
ments to solidarity between groups of women is very much to the point. The 
intervening mist appears to be clearing.
And yet there is still work to do. As a general reader of feminist/gender/
sexuality/cultural theory, I find it irritating that so many people—including 
many feminists—still cite and credit Foucault, or Bourdieu, or Lacan, or Judith 
Butler, for key and groundbreaking ideas (such as the social construction of 
gender) where they could, should, cite Beauvoir. When I tell people what I’m 
working on, I still encounter puzzled expressions: “but Beauvoir didn’t have 
anything to say about race, so what is there to discuss?” On the other hand, 
those who do appreciate Beauvoir have sometimes over-emphasized her kin-
ship with later writers, and later strands of feminist theory or philosophy, to 
the point of distortion.
I worry particularly about attempts to “rescue” Beauvoir by emphasizing her 
positive statements about “being with others,” bringing her closer to the main-
stream “ethic of care” strand within American feminist philosophy, which 
seems to me very much at odds with what is most challenging and provocative 
in Beauvoir’s own thought.25 Similarly, attempts to show commonalities be-
tween Beauvoir and Irigaray, and/or between Beauvoir and Kristeva, ignore 
real and basic disagreement about embodiment, psychoanalysis, maternity, 
24 For similar arguments that the insistence on a sharp break between existentialist and 
“post-structuralist” French thought is not borne out by careful reading of a considerably 
more complex intellectual history, see Didier Eribon, Réflexions sur la question gay. Fou-
cault and Sartre now appear to have agreed about quite a few things (which may explain 
why they signed so many of the same manifestos). Perhaps Beauvoir and Butler will ap-
pear to feminists in the twenty-second century, not as succeeding and oppositional “phas-
es” of theory, but as overlapping interlocutors.
25 See in particular Debra Bergoffen, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phe-
nomenologies, Erotic Generosities, and my discussion in chapter 1 below.
Introduction10
and heteronormativity.26 Beauvoir lived long enough to have embraced these 
newer developments if she had agreed with them, which, as she said pretty 
clearly, she did not.27 As Le Dœuff observes, it is tempting to read Beauvoir 
selectively, in pieces; but as she also observes, it is a mistake.28 Christine Del-
phy pointed out, in opening the Cinquantenaire celebration: “Simone de Beau-
voir was a philosopher, not an interactive videogame. You have to read the 
book.”29
Meanwhile, what Bronwyn Winter forthrightly calls “idées bizarres”30 con-
tinue to appear, even in scholarly journals. Too much writing about Beauvoir 
still focuses on details of biography, in ways that range from hagiographic to 
passive-aggressive.31 Most disappointingly, the introduction to the American 
edition of the new translation reproduces all the old biographical clichés, 
mentions the work’s key ideas only to casually dismiss them as old-fashioned, 
and concludes by suggesting that the book might nonetheless be valuable to a 
new generation of readers as a “personal meditation.” Perhaps in the same 
spirit, the cover of this version shows neither a naked woman nor a dull  abstract 
26 A particularly curious case of apparent rapprochement is Julia Kristeva’s recent enthusi-
asm for Beauvoir—for instance, she figured prominently among the organizers of the 
Beauvoir centenary colloquium in Paris—while continuing to maintain her own quasi-
mystical ideas about maternity and sexual duality, which would have been anathema to 
Beauvoir. See for example Kristeva, “Beauvoir in China,” and “Beauvoir aux risques de la 
liberté.”
27 See for example her interview with Alice Jardine, published in Signs in 1979.
28 Hipparchia’s Choice, 55–57.
29 “Simone de Beauvoir, c’était un philosophe; ce n’est pas un interactive videogame. Il 
faut lire le livre” (Introductory remarks, “Colloque internationale: Cinquantenaire du 
 deuxième sexe,” Paris, January 1999).
30 Bronwyn Winter, “L’essentialisation de l’altérité et l’invisibilisation de l’oppression: 
l’histoire bizarre mais vraie de la déformation d’un concept,” 78.
31 Reference to Beauvoir’s biography and autobiography will also play a role in my own anal-
yses; what seems crucial to avoid is, not biography as such, but a triumphalist sense that 
biography determines ideas, that ideas have no life of their own; and also the temptation 
to second-guessing (“Beauvoir must have felt, though she never said”) to which work on 
women writers has been particularly prone.
I cannot here take account of all the post-Bair Beauvoir biographies, except to marvel 
that there are so very many of them, going over substantially similar ground. Hazel Row-
ley’s 2005 Tête-à-tête: Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre was in some respects an 
advance over Bair, whose book was riddled with factual errors and has been superseded 
by publications of private documents; but Rowley’s failure to document sources for much 
of her information means it cannot really be used by scholars. Kate Kirkpatrick’s Becom-
ing Beauvoir, while aimed at a general readership, does an admirable job of taking Beau-
voir’s ideas seriously. There is still no substitute for working directly with Beauvoir’s auto-
biographical texts, notebooks, and letters, which is what I have done.
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design, but a photograph of Beauvoir herself, gazing dreamily into the dis-
tance. The general impression is that Beauvoir is still very interesting, although 
Beauvoir’s ideas are not.32 This unfortunate view was made even more glaring 
during the Paris centenary colloquium of 2008, when a naked photograph of 
Beauvoir appeared on the cover of the Nouvel Observateur, igniting a contro-
versy that threatened to eclipse the serious work of the conference.33
Summing up the state of “Beauvoir studies” at the end of those meetings, 
Sylvie Chaperon saw a promising amount of attention to Beauvoir’s texts, but 
less engagement with Beauvoir’s feminist contentions than she would have 
liked; she also noted an absence of historical, sociological, and anthropological 
perspectives. Twelve years later, this still seems accurate to me. I would add 
that serious scholars still too often tend to approach Beauvoir from one or an-
other narrowly disciplinary perspective. In particular, there continues to be a 
split between a more philosophical way of appropriating Beauvoir’s concep-
tual legacy, and a more traditionally “lit crit” way of reading her texts. This was 
not a split she herself made—nor were/are these the only two options. Prop-
erly understanding Beauvoir requires, I believe, a fully interdisciplinary ap-
proach and a lack of embarrassment about crossing boundaries between high 
and low culture, philosophy and literature, literature and trash. The peculiar 
effectiveness of her texts (especially The Second Sex) in creating an “imagined 
community” of women and feminists has a lot to do with her lack of respect for 
disciplinary decorum and her successful negotiations between the intellectual 
and the popular, between the objective voice of the scholar and the voice 
which calls on us to identify as readers with a wide and contradictory array of 
subject positions, powerfully illustrated through literary, sexological, and anec-
dotal examples.
Sympathetic, intelligent commentaries on The Second Sex are still crucial 
because that text opposes, to the non-philosophical reader, a million opacities 
and resistances. One can only keep hold of part of it at a time. In its very opaci-
ties and resistances, though, lie its survival, its ability to engender a wide vari-
ety of fructifying and divergent feminist discourses, to always give us  something 
32 The British edition had a simple cover and a really excellent, clear historical introduction 
from veteran socialist feminist Sheila Rowbotham … but there’s a e-book on Amazon.co.
uk (apparently a bootleg of excerpts, pretending to be complete) that features a headless 
naked sweating woman with her hand in her crotch …
33 Agnès Logeart and Aude Lancelin, “Simone, la scandaleuse.” The true scandal was not 
simply that they published this photograph by Art Shay, which had already appeared in 
Hazel Rowley’s book, but that they had silently photoshopped it to make Beauvoir look 
thinner: thus not only continuing the long tradition of replacing women’s thought with 
women’s bodies, but updating it to enforce today’s anorectic and somatophobic version.
Introduction12
new. But reading Beauvoir “in pieces” is unusually unhelpful and misleading, 
not just because of the continental habit of the long ironic paraphrase (a habit 
she shares with, for instance, Foucault and Kierkegaard), but also because The 
Second Sex is, among other things, a catalog, an anthology of the worst that has 
been said and thought about women over some twenty-five centuries. Simi-
larly, reading her in paraphrase, or summary, misses her texture, her ambiguity, 
and her multivocality, the proliferation of the concrete, contradictory, and di-
verse. Her characteristic attitude toward authority was to test it against her 
experience, take what she could use, discard the rest of it (often without engag-
ing in controversy over what something “really means”), and then move on.34 
This basic inaugural gesture of feminist theory—“that sounds very smart, but 
something doesn’t feel right to me”—which was partly enabled by the disci-
plinary arrogance of the French philosophical tradition of which she had been 
such a successful student, but which she also partly invented and made new, 
may have been her greatest contribution to feminist modes of thinking, and 
thus to women’s and gender studies.
In understanding her work, I have tried to adopt a similarly open-ended 
method, with no intellectual tool or tradition ruled out a priori as inappropri-
ate or “not my field,” no aspect of the question set aside as “beyond the scope 
of this inquiry,” and no policing of disciplinary boundaries. But I do not see my 
work as a simple commentary. I agree with Genevieve Lloyd’s remark, apropos 
of Michèle Le Dœuff ’s work, that doing the history of philosophy is also doing 
philosophy,35 and I agree also with Christine Delphy that “the history of femi-
nist movements is not just the record of a struggle, it is a terrain of struggle in 
itself.”36
Volume 2 of The Second Sex opens with an important paragraph that has 
one foot in the past and another in the future.
The women of today are well on their way to overthrowing the myth of 
femininity; they are starting to affirm their independence in concrete 
ways; but they do not easily succeed in living as full human beings. Raised 
by women in a world of women, their usual destiny is marriage, which 
still subordinates them practically to the man; male prestige is hardly 
vanishing, it still rests on a solid economic and social foundation. So we 
34 One of her characteristic moves was to turn a prescriptive or “necessary” account into a 
descriptive, historically contingent one.
35 Genevieve Lloyd, “Le Dœuff and History of Philosophy.”
36 “Christine Delphy a dit, il y a bien des années, qu’écrire l’histoire du mouvement féministe 
n’était pas seulement documenter une lutte, mais c’était ‘un terrain de lutte en soi’” (Win-
ter, “L’essentialisation de l’altérité,” 96, quoting Delphy, “Libération des femmes an dix,” 9).
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must study woman’s traditional destiny carefully. How is a woman ap-
prenticed to her condition, how does she feel it, in what world does she 
find herself trapped, what escapes are permitted to her: that is what I 
shall try to describe. Only then can we understand what problems are 
faced by women who, burdened by the past they have inherited, are do-
ing their best to forge a new future.37
The end of this paragraph announces what would come to be called “social 
construction,”38 articulated just a page later in the most famous sentence 
Beauvoir ever wrote—“On ne naît pas femme: on le devient” (One is not born 
but becomes a woman). Also crucial is her simultaneous emphasis on both the 
“common background” women share and on “each woman’s singular exis-
tence,” the double focus (or, if you like, the dialectic) that animates her entire 
project. What I want to underscore now, though, is that she opens this second 
volume, “The Lived Experience of Women,” by locating writer and reader to-
gether in an instant of time that she describes as transitional, ambiguous, or 
split, a “today” which contains in itself both a “yesterday” and a “tomorrow.”
Should we see this as marking a particular post-war moment, an “in- 
between,” which is now historical, dated, past? We could then still hear the text 
making a good argument for its own continuing relevance: if in 1948 it was 
true that, even though things were changing, it was important to study how 
they had traditionally been, because the past is/was sedimented in the (then) 
37 “Les femmes d’aujourd’hui sont en train de détrôner le mythe de la féminité; elles com-
mencent à affirmer concrètement leur indépendance; mais ce n’est pas sans peine qu’elles 
réussissent à vivre intégralement leur condition d’être humain. Élevées par des femmes, 
au sein d’un monde féminin, leur destinée normale est le mariage qui les subordonne 
encore pratiquement à l’homme; le prestige viril est bien loin de s’être effacé; il repose 
encore sur de solides bases économiques et sociales. Il est donc nécessaire d’étudier avec 
soin le destin traditionnel de la femme. Comment la femme fait-elle l’apprentissage de sa 
condition, comment l’éprouve-t-elle, dans quel univers se trouve-t-elle enfermée, quelles 
évasions lui sont permises, voilà ce que je chercherai à décrire. Alors seulement nous 
pourrons comprendre quels problèmes se posent aux femmes qui, héritant d’un lourd 
passé, s’efforcent de forger un avenir nouveau” (Le deuxième sexe, 2:9).
38 Here she continues: “When I use the words ‘woman’ or ‘feminine’ obviously I am not refer-
ring to any archetype or any unchangeable essence; after most of my claims the reader 
should infer ‘in the current state of education and social custom.’ The point is not to set 
forth some eternal Truths, but to describe the common background from which every 
singular woman’s existence takes off.” [Quand j’emploie les mots “femme” ou “féminin” je 
ne me réfère évidemment à aucun archétype, à aucune immuable essence; après la plu-
part de mes affirmations il faut sous-entendre “dans l’état actuel de l’éducation et des 
mœurs.” Il ne s’agit pas ici d’énoncer des vérités éternelles mais de décrire le fond com-
mun sur lequel s’enlève toute existence féminine singulière.]
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 present, it would be no less worthwhile in 2020 to read a book about how things 
had been even earlier, in a time that in 1948 could already be labelled as “back in 
the day.” But “back in the day” turns out to be a moveable feast; her “today” is 
our “yesterday,” and our “today” is not quite the “tomorrow” she was hoping for.
Where am I, where are “we,” in this picture? What she is saying seems, on the 
face of it, simply true: things for women now, at least/especially for women 
who have had my kind of “luck,” are better than ever before. I’ve been able to 
make concrete my independence from the myth of femininity (I earn my liv-
ing, I have never needed to marry). And yet there are still people who have 
trouble treating women as human beings (including some members of the US 
government), women in the aggregate still don’t make the same money men 
make, and one still meets quite a few women who see emulating the myth of 
femininity as their best deal, practically and psychologically … and some of 
them may well be right. One almost wants to say with Faulkner, “the past is not 
dead, it is not even past.” (Or to say with Lessing’s Julia, “What’s the use of us 
being free when they aren’t?”)39 We’re so much better off than women “back in 
the day.” And yet …. That other women in other years have read this passage 
and said what I just said merely reinforces the vertigo:40 are we stuck in a time 
warp, or (to steal Kurt Vonnegut’s phrase) “unstuck in time,” free-falling? If we 
are, as Breines says, “in transition,” where are we going? Will we (or someone) 
ever get there?
39 Lessing, The Golden Notebook, 404.
40 For instance, Michèle Le Dœuff in 1989 (Hipparchia’s Choice, 3–6): more than a quarter of 
a century ago…
Chapter 1
Unhappy Bodies: The Frigid Woman in  
The Second Sex
How does a pile of rags the machinist wiped his hands on
feel in its cupboard, hour after hour?
Each day during the heat-wave
they took the temperature of the haymow.
I huddled fugitive
In the warm sweet simmer of the hay
muttering: Come.
adrienne rich1
We may find it irritating that The Second Sex was once marketed like a semi-
dirty book, with a naked woman crouching on the cover, or we may find it 
merely funny; but the characterization of it as a book about sex is not exactly 
wrong. Readers who have studied only excerpts may find this a surprising 
claim. Many women’s studies classes tend to assign just the introduction, for 
sound reasons: feminist theory since the 1960s could be described without 
huge exaggeration as a series of commentaries on that introduction, even 
when subsequent theorists have been only hazily aware of what Beauvoir’s text 
actually says. But even in Parshley’s truncated version, the book is 724 pages 
long, and the opening theoretical moves that have been subject to such intense 
exegesis are supported and deepened by a very wide range of empirical evi-
dence, concrete and detailed analysis, and phenomenological exploration of 
women’s experiences under patriarchy, including the private (or as the jacket 
copy puts it, “intimate”) experience of the female body and how it feels, from 
the inside out.
Still, anyone who purchased The Second Sex hoping for a dreamy afternoon 
in the company of the woman pictured on the cover was in for a disappoint-
ment, because the sex in The Second Sex is mostly bad sex. As a monumental 
catalogue of female sexual discontent, it is far from anomalous in Beauvoir’s 
œuvre. The first manuscript she ever completed and offered to a publisher, a 
short “novel in stories” that was later renamed Quand prime le spirituel, was an 
unsentimental, demystifying exploration of young women’s sexual frustration, 
1 Rich, “The Phenomenology of Anger,” 165.
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with a firm stance against the suffocating chastities of a Catholic milieu;2 
L’invitée, Le sang des autres, and most especially Les mandarins offered unsen-
timental fictional accounts of sexual dissatisfaction and its ravages; her late 
literary works, La femme rompue and Les belles images, deal candidly with what 
might be called the sexual silencing of the French wife; she returned to the 
question in her last autobiographical volume, La cérémonie des adieux. Com-
mentators have often focused on themes of masochism and jealousy, but a 
broader discussion of sexual dysphoria in Beauvoir’s fiction would have to in-
clude the difficulties young people have discovering and expressing their sexu-
ality; the problems women have interacting with comparatively undersexed 
men; the unsatisfactory nature of planned, deliberate sex. Her novels draw on 
both French and American modernist techniques to describe sex from a wom-
an’s point of view in a dispassionately concrete way that remains startling, 
even today.
“Tell me what you feel?” he said. “Tell me.” I remained mute. Inside me, I 
sensed a presence without really feeling it, as you sense a dentist’s steel 
tool against a swollen gum. “Do you like it? I want you to like it.” His voice 
sounded vexed, demanded an accounting. “You don’t? That’s all right—
the night is long.” … I unclenched my teeth….3
The Second Sex, too, importantly relies on fictional narrative to explore ques-
tions of women’s sexual unpleasure, quoting at length from writers as dispa-
rate as Dorothy Parker, Colette, and Mauriac for accounts of women’s lived 
sexual experience and, in the sections on “myth in five authors”—an inaugural 
moment for feminist literary criticism—demonstrating the willful male domi-
nation that underlies descriptions of the sex act in such apparently different 
writers as the ultra-Catholic Claudel and the would-be modernist iconoclast 
D.H. Lawrence.
But Beauvoir also makes serious use of scientific, expert “findings” about 
female sexuality, and frequently refers to something called “frigidity,” a concept 
that second-wave feminism would take great pains to discredit. Her discussion 
2 Written between 1935 and 1937, the novel, originally called Primauté du spirituel, was refused 
by publishers and only appeared in 1979.
3 “‘Dis-moi ce que tu sens? dis-le-moi.’ Je restai muette. Je devinais une présence en moi, sans 
vraiment la sentir, comme on s’étonne de l’acier du dentiste dans une gencive engourdie. ‘As-
tu du plaisir? Je veux que tu aies du plaisir.’ Sa voix s’irritait, elle exigeait des comptes: ‘Tu n’en 
as pas? ça ne fait rien: la nuit est longue’” (Les mandarins, 1:118–21). For fuller discussion, see 
Altman, “Before We Said ‘We’ (and after): Bad Sex and Personal Politics in Doris Lessing and 
Simone de Beauvoir.”
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leans heavily on the rather bizarre work of early psychoanalyst and sexologist 
Wilhelm Stekel, which has fallen into disfavor. So “frigidity” seems a good place 
to begin my exploration of what in this text is “dated” and what may still be of 
use. But although this chapter will look at what seems to be an anomalous, or 
even weird area in her work, something she did that “we wouldn’t do now,” my 
attempt to figure out what she was doing starts from the assumption that she 
knew what she was doing, that her choices were not accidents, that her text is 
coherent and marshals evidence toward a unified argument. I think that if 
readers, from the earliest reviewers to today, have not always found such coher-
ence, it is often because they were missing information that would help them 
understand the context, or unduly swayed by later political commitments of 
their own, or possibly both. (Whether we agree with the overall argument, or 
find the examples and analysis convincing, is another matter.)
But when I say The Second Sex is, indeed, a book about “sex,” what do I mean 
by “sex”? There’s been so much subsequent work done on the proper parame-
ters of that term: where “sex” stops and “gender” begins, which constructs the 
other, how to think sexual difference beyond the man/woman binary, and so 
on. This is far from irrelevant to the study of Beauvoir, or rather, what Beauvoir 
wrote is not irrelevant to it, particularly since she can be invoked on many 
sides of many debates. Most obviously, while the term “gender” was not avail-
able to her, what would later be called “social construction” theory certainly 
traces back to her foundational claim that “one is not born a woman, one be-
comes a woman.”4 And there’s more to explore: the chapter on biology, which 
has often seemed quite strange, deserves to be revisited in the light of post- 
binary, perhaps even post-human, ways of thinking about sex and gender, es-
pecially since much of the relevant material was missing or garbled in the old 
translation.5
But none of that is what I’m going to talk about here. When I say “sex” in 
what follows, I mean roughly, what people do in bed, and how they feel and 
think about that. When I say “sexuality,” I mean the whole complex of  emotions 
4 “On ne naît pas femme: on le devient.” The translation of this famous sentence remains con-
troversial. Parshley had “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”; the new translators 
have been criticized for dropping his indefinite article. In my own view, the French autho-
rizes a number of plausible and correct approaches, and what people do is a matter of how 
they interpret Beauvoir’s overall intention, rather than how expert their French may be. See 
Altman, “The Grand Rectification.” But see Moi, “The Adulteress Wife,” for a different view. 
The issue is exhaustively investigated in the 2017 anthology, “On ne naît pas femme, on le devi-
ent: The Life of a Sentence,” edited by Bonnie Mann and Martina Ferrari.
5 For relevant passages and discussion, see Altman, “Beauvoir, Hegel, War”; Elizabeth Fallaize, 
“A Saraband of Imagery”; Judith Butler, “Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex.”
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and ideas a person brings to that activity, based more or less on what they’ve 
learned from their culture. And when I say “bad sex,” I mean quite literally 
what happens when people engage in that activity and it doesn’t go well, it isn’t 
satisfying to one or both of them, in ways that may have both causes and con-
sequences that stretch beyond that actual bed on that particular day. Flat- 
footed as this may sound, my contention is that Beauvoir throughout her 
œuvre was profoundly interested in sex, and in bad sex, understood in just this 
way, and that (both as readers of Beauvoir and as feminists) we should be, too.
A fancier way to say this is that Beauvoir was interested in giving women full 
human subjectivity; that this importantly included sexual subjectivity; and 
that times when sex goes badly have a potential for unusual lucidity about 
what female sexual subjectivity is, and also what it could be.
Philosopher Sandra Bartky once observed that “[a]norexia nervosa, which 
has now assumed epidemic proportions, is to women of the late twentieth cen-
tury what hysteria was to women of an earlier day: the crystallization in a path-
ological form of a widespread cultural obsession.”6 Historically locatable be-
tween the hysteric and the anorexic, both of whom Beauvoir also discusses, 
the “frigid” woman, and the sexually miserable woman more generally, fulfills 
some of the same function in her work: as a hypostatized, overexaggerated, 
larger-than-life figure for the situation of women in her time, for the “normal 
female” (that monster) as society constructs her and then demonizes her. Such 
figures, and the moral panics that grow up around them, have been reclaimed 
by feminists in two (opposite) ways: as evidence of the damage culture does to 
women, and, more controversially perhaps, as figures for resistance, pointing 
to a possible way out.7
Of course the “frigid woman” can’t be that for us now. But the search for a 
usable feminist past has led me to notice how feminism as we know it was born 
from a discourse of women’s dissatisfaction with their situation that impor-
tantly included labelling and cataloguing, naming, sexual dissatisfaction.8 
6 Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, 66.
7 For reclamation of the figure of the hysterical woman, see for example Hélène Cixous and 
Catherine Clément, La jeune née. For an argument that parallels mine, see Suzanne Cataldi’s 
excellent “Sexuality Situated: Beauvoir on Frigidity.” Cataldi writes: “Rather than viewing [fri-
gidity] as an instance of female passivity or an organic incapacity, [Beauvoir] constructs it as 
a symbolic use that women may make of their bodies…. If … we view frigidity as a means or 
method of resistance, or a harm that women suffer in a culturally oppressive or sexist envi-
ronment, we will be more apt to notice the agency behind the passivity and the assumptions 
implicit in labeling a woman ‘frigid’” (70). See also Raquelle K. Bostow, “Frigidity According to 
Beauvoir: Le deuxième sexe as a Precursor to Second Wave French Feminism.”
8 See Altman, “Beyond Trashiness: The Sexual Language of 70s Feminist Fiction,” and Alix 
Kates Shulman, “Sex and Power: Sexual Bases of Radical Feminism.”
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 Often articulated in popular novels rather than as “feminist theory,” this dis-
course overlapped problematically with discourses that were not feminist, 
some that came to be seen as anti-feminist. This is hardly unusual. Feminism 
has always had, and has today, a complex and uneasy relationship with other 
culturally available discourses on gender and sexuality: biological discourses; 
religious ones (particularly in the nineteenth century, when some, though not 
all, activists for suffrage drew on arguments that women were morally superior 
to men); discourses about the “new woman” or “free woman” in the 1880s, the 
1920s, the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s; psychoanalytic approaches; love 
 stories… Today it seems particularly difficult to disentangle feminism from vari-
ous inspirational and therapeutic discourses we see in popular self-help texts 
and social formations. For instance, the “recovery movement” (of which Alco-
holics Anonymous is the best-known example) shares much of its “meth-
od” with early feminist consciousness-raising (truth-telling, safe space, going 
around the room), but moves participants toward a collective acknowledgment 
of their powerlessness rather than a resolve to take collective action for social 
change.9 We’re also seeing a revaluing of (retreat to) the domestic sphere (crafts, 
do-it-yourself, local food, attachment parenting, etc.) which seems to have a 
simultaneously symbiotic and antagonistic relationship to feminism, and the 
marshalling of a feminist (or “postfeminist”) rhetoric of “self- empowerment” 
(and “health”) around the never-ending pursuit of the impossibly perfect body. 
None of this can be dismissed as naïve: as Alison Winch observes about “body 
talk,” “critique and complicity are simultaneous.”10 Perhaps it will help to re-
member that earlier generations of feminists had discourse trouble also, and to 
look at how they worked within it, worked with it, and “worked” it.
1 A Passion for Frigidity?
In La force de l’âge (The Prime of Life), the second volume of Beauvoir’s autobi-
ography, one sentence jumps out from a long section where Beauvoir carefully 
9 See Elayne Rapping, The Culture of Recovery: Making Sense of the Self-Help Movement in 
Women’s Lives, and Wendy Kaminer, I’m Dysfunctional, You’re Dysfunctional: The Recovery 
Movement and Other Self-Help Fashions.
10 See Emily Matchar, Homeward Bound: Why Women Are Embracing the New Domesticity; 
Alison Winch, Girlfriends and Postfeminist Sisterhood. The phrase I quote comes from a 
talk Winch gave at Oxford in 2014. Her work is particularly concerned with the way wom-
en’s bodies, and women’s “correct” participation in neo-liberal (over)consumption, are 
policed by other women deploying the affects of “sisterhood,” a process she has named 
“the gynaeopticon.”
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records what she and Sartre were reading and studying, what films and music 
they enjoyed, etc., in the mid-1930s, before they wrote the books that would 
make them famous: “We became passionate about Stekel’s The Frigid Woman, 
because he was proposing a psychoanalysis which rejected the notion of the 
unconscious.”11
Four things (at least) seem odd about this sentence today. Just on the sur-
face, the conjunction of “frigid” and “passionate” feels paradoxical, even a bit 
louche: one could almost translate, “we fell in love with the frigid woman”… 
Second, we think of “the unconscious” as the foundational concept of psycho-
analysis, as Freud’s great contribution to modern thought, as what distinguish-
es psychoanalysis from other methods of therapeutic intervention and other 
forms of intellectual investigation (such as biology or analytic philosophy). So 
isn’t the idea of a psychoanalysis without the unconscious theoretically 
incoherent?
Third, “frigidity” is a word seldom heard nowadays, and certainly not from 
feminists. It sounds like an accusation, or a confession, of terrible, intimate 
failure, like a strange relic of a bygone era when bad shrinks made good women 
stay in terrible marriages, now happily banished along with iron maiden gir-
dles and “sure, she’s Phi Beta Kappa, but can she type?” It sounds like some-
thing you’d hear as you got out of the car at the end of a very bad date—but the 
car in question is an old gold Chevy with tailfins. Where men’s sexual problems 
are still very much with us (just try to watch a football game without hearing 
about them), women’s difficulties with pleasure seem to have gone under-
ground, and “frigidity” as such has disappeared. In more popular media, spe-
cifically sexual problems women have are talked about using other words: for 
instance, they may be framed as problems of “miscommunication.”12 Mean-
while, chemical and surgical “remedies” are marketed for something called 
11 “Nous nous passionnâmes pour La femme frigide de Stekel parce qu’il proposait une 
psychanalyse qui rejetait la notion d’inconscient” (La force de l’âge [hereinafter FA], 328). 
The year is 1936.
When quoting from Beauvoir, I have translated the title of Stekel’s book as The Frigid 
Woman, which reflects the title of the French translation she read (La femme frigide), (and 
incidentally gives a more accurate sense of the book’s contents than the original German 
title, Die Geschlechtskälte der Frau). French quotations from Stekel in Le deuxième sexe are 
given here exactly as Beauvoir gives them there, and translated by me from her quotation. 
My own readings of his work use the title of the English-language edition, Frigidity in 
Woman.
12 See Lisa Bland and Rusty Barrett, “‘Stick your (adj.) (noun) in my (adj. noun)!’: Teaching 
Women to Talk Dirty” for discussion of 1990s sexual self-help books. For general discus-
sion of “miscommunication” see Deborah Cameron, Verbal Hygiene.
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“ female sexual dysfunction.” So it’s not that everyone is happy in bed! But the 
frigid woman as a monstrous personality type seems to be gone.13
The banishing of “frigidity” as a weapon to be used against women was an 
explicitly-framed demand of 1970s feminism.14 In the United States, the locus 
13 When I first began working on what became this chapter, I wrote rather blithely that 
“while in the 1950s a woman diagnosed with this ‘disorder’ could be hospitalized and 
given shock treatments against her will, now you can’t even get insurance coverage for it, 
because the dsm (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) doesn’t list it.” Many years on from 
that “now,” the situation looks murkier: it would require a whole new paper to sort 
through the proliferation of diagnoses currently available, not to say marketed, to women 
who don’t find the kind of sex they are having to be one hundred percent satisfying. In-
creasingly this is conceived of as an organic, or semiorganic, “dysfunction” or “disorder” 
(the machine has broken down, but we can fix it). A partial survey: The dsm-iv (1994) 
included “hypoactive sexual disorder” and “sexual aversion disorder” (gender-neutral), 
and also “female orgasmic disorder (fod, formerly inhibited female orgasm),” about 
which it explained, “[w]omen exhibit wide variability in the type or intensity of stimula-
tion that triggers orgasm. The diagnosis of fod should be based on the clinician’s judg-
ment that the woman’s orgasmic capacity is less than would be reasonable for her age, 
sexual experience, and the amount of sexual stimulation she receives. The disturbance 
must cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty…. No association has been found 
between specific patterns of personality traits or psychopathology and orgasmic dysfunc-
tion in females” (505–6). They distinguished this from female sexual arousal disorder, dys-
pareunia, and vaginismus. The dsm-5 (2013) lists ten possibilities, of which three (female 
orgasmic disorder, female sexual interest/arousal disorder, and genito-pelvic pain/ 
penetration disorder) would seem to apply to women only.
The dsm itself, however, is currently in disrepute, not least because of its ties to Big 
Pharma. See Robin Rosenberg, “Abnormal is the New Normal: Why Will Half of the U.S. 
Population Have a Diagnosable Mental Disorder?” Activists who identify as asexuals have 
also called the dsm-5 into question, by analogy to successful challenges raised over time 
by those who wanted to remove “homosexuality” and “transsexuality” from the list of pa-
thologies and disorders. Meanwhile, scientists admit a lack of consensus about the tax-
onomies of female unpleasure. See R. Rosen et al., “The Female Sexual Function Index 
(fsfi): A Multidimensional Report Instrument for the Assessment of Female Sexual 
Function.” The authors note that their research was supported by Zonagen Inc. and Bayer 
AG. But lack of consensus has not prevented the explosive development of an industry 
dedicated to uncovering and expensively treating it, as Liz Canner’s film Orgasm Inc. 
documents in distressing detail. See also Carole Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman, and 
Leonore Tiefer, Sex is Not a Natural Act and Other Essays and “Female Sexual Dysfunction: 
A Case of Disease Mongering and Activist Resistance.” (It may be worth mentioning that 
the idea of surgical “remedies” to make possible vaginal orgasm dates back to Freud’s 
student and patron Marie Bonaparte, and is not new.)
“Erectile dysfunction” and “low T” are also a shift from the vocabulary of “impotence,” 
and perhaps it is a good sign if we no longer expect a man to be powerful and a woman to 
be simply warm. Concerns remain.
14 See Jane Gerhard, “Revisiting ‘The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm’: The Female Orgasm in 
American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism”; Beatrix Campbell, “A Feminist 
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classicus for this point is Anne Koedt’s “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm” 
(1968); older readers may also recall a poster from British Women’s Liberation 
(where did I put that?) which reads (emphasis added):
because women’s work is never done and is underpaid or unpaid or bor-
ing or repetitious and we’re the first to get the sack and what we look like 
is more important than what we do and if we get raped it’s our fault and 
if we get bashed we must have provoked it and if we raise our voices we’re 
nagging and if we enjoy sex we’re nymphos and if we don’t we’re frigid and if 
we love women it’s because we can’t get a man and if we ask our doctor 
too many questions we’re neurotic and/or pushy and if we expect com-
munity care for our children we’re selfish and if we stand up for our rights 
we’re aggressive and unfeminine and if we don’t we’re typical weak fe-
males and if we get married we’re out to trap a man and if we don’t we’re 
unnatural and because we still can’t get adequate safe contraceptives but 
men can walk on the moon and if we can’t cope or don’t want a preg-
nancy we’re made to feel guilty about abortion and for these and lots of 
other reasons we are part of the women’s liberation movement.15
A depressing amount of this is still relevant, but at least one feminist demand 
seems to have succeeded: when teaching The Second Sex or The Golden Note-
book, I often find myself having to explain what the unfamiliar word “frigidity” 
even meant. This is not at all to say that the current state of sexual discourse 
may not be equally bad for women; but at least the ground for debate has 
shifted.
Fourth and finally, the very presence of Stekel’s name in Beauvoir’s report 
becomes bizarre, once one knows who he was. Fortunately, few do, so I’ll need 
to introduce him at some length: but without at all meaning to suggest that his 
work is a rich, untapped vein for feminist theory. Au contraire.
2 Who Was Wilhelm Stekel?
Wilhelm Stekel (1868–1940) was a minor member of Freud’s circle in Vienna, 
an “early adopter” and avid propagandist. We think of psychoanalysis as Freud, 
Sexual Politics: Now You See It, Now You Don’t”; Carole Vance, “Introduction,” Pleasure 
and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality.
15 Joyce Stevens, “Because We’re Women.” First published as a broadsheet for International 
Women’s Day, Sydney, 1975.
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Jung, and Adler, but at the very beginning of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society 
it was actually Freud, Adler, and Stekel. In his rather florid Autobiography, 
Stekel says, “I was the apostle of Freud who was my Christ!” but Freud seems 
soon to have cast him instead as Judas: he was tossed out of the Vienna Psycho-
analytic Society for siding at crucial moments with Adler and against Victor 
Tausk, but also because, even when one corrects for the customary ad homi-
nem rancor of that group’s internal politics, he appears to have been a repulsive 
individual. Jung called him “a nuisance to psychoanalysis”: Freud himself re-
ferred to Stekel as “morally insane,” “an imbecile [schwachsinnig].”16 Even the 
colleague who edited and introduced his posthumously published autobiogra-
phy calls attention to “his unresolved narcissism, his overcompensated feelings 
of inadequacy.”17 Others accused him of distortions, plagiarism, fabricating his 
case records, and general “dirty-mindedness.” Stekel was a nuisance because 
the unfriendly caricature of Freudians drawn by narrow-minded social conser-
vatives was, in his case, uncomfortably close to the truth.
Beauvoir may or may not have known this, and it needn’t matter. But Stekel’s 
published work, including this hugely popular and influential book, displays 
the same instability and untrustworthiness that make him figure in the history 
of psychoanalysis as a butt and a buffoon. His statements about women veer 
wildly from the progressive to the hidebound and back again. Two apparent 
principles of selection emerge in his case histories: to include as much titillat-
ing material as he can, and second, to show the doctor (himself) in the most 
heroic manner possible, in contrast to his female patients who (to borrow 
Lacan’s phrase) “don’t know what they are saying.” His tone brings him closer 
to Dr. David Reuben’s cheerily heterosexist Any Woman Can than to a serious 
work of philosophy and politics.18 Both Paul Roazen and Toril Moi have called 
his books “pornographic,”19 and while this is a word I use only with trepidation, 
here it seems appropriate to name a literary genre which features repetition, 
redundancy, and excessive detail in sexual scenes, while the narrative or theo-
retical presentation which strings them together and “justifies” their inclusion 
16 Jaap Bos and Leendert Groenendijk, “The Art of Imitation: Wilhelm Stekel’s Lehrjahre”; 
Paul Roazen, Freud and His Followers; Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time; Vincent Brome, 
Freud and His Early Circle; Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud.
17 The Autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel: Or, the Life Story of a Pioneering Psychoanalyst, 13.
18 See Altman, “Everything They Always Wanted You to Know: The Ideology of Popular Sex 
Literature.”
19 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman. While I cannot agree with some of Moi’s more 
psychoanalytically-based readings, I’ve found her overall approach both provocative and 
sensible. Her (brief) discussion of Stekel occurs on pages 200 and 283–84.
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comes to seem a flimsy, perfunctory pretext.20 “Melodramatic” also seems apt. 
Even within the contested genre of sexology, vulnerable since its inception to 
charges of sensationalism, exploitation, and self-interest, this fellow stands out 
as a questionable figure, and not unfairly so.21
Frigidity in Woman is dominated by voluminous quotations from case mate-
rials, which in a certain way give voice to “women” speaking openly about their 
sexual experiences. But these stories are framed by a profound distrust of what 
Stekel calls the “prevaricating woman,” making his book a direct ancestor of 
The Sexually Adequate Female (1953) by Frank S. Caprio, M.D. Caprio’s unimag-
inably awful bestseller is really about the sexually inadequate, or as he puts it 
“sexually incompetent,” woman and what she must do to improve herself and 
save her marriage. He actually goes one step further than Stekel: since for him, 
the only orgasm that counts is vaginal orgasm, he feels able to speak for ex-
ample of “the frigid nymphomaniac.” Frigidity, says Caprio, causes infidelity, 
alcoholism, and worst of all, divorce. His is the book Anne Koedt will take as 
her target, the book Norman Mailer will turn to in The Prisoner of Sex (1971) to 
authorize his assertion that whatever feminists may say, he knows he has given 
“his” woman an earth-shattering orgasm. Caprio’s other claim to fame is Fe-
male Homosexuality (1954), authoritative for many years, and singled out by 
Jonathan Katz for its homophobic, destructive insistence on “heterosexual 
adjustment.”22 Both books are written firmly under the influence of Stekel.
And yet, when Beauvoir said she and Sartre had been “passionate” about 
Frigidity in Woman she was not exaggerating: both took it seriously in formulat-
ing (rather differently) the philosophical problem of the body, and so did Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty.23 My overarching question is why, or (to put it more plain-
ly) how could she? But first I must show how.
20 See Stephen Marcus, The Other Victorians, for the classic discussion.
21 I’m using “sexology” rather inclusively here (following Sylvie Chaperon’s example in Les 
origines de la sexologie, 1850–1900) to cover any form of writing about sexuality that makes 
a strong claim to scientific authority, whether medical, quasi-medical, or extra-medical. 
In Frigidity: An Intellectual History, Peter Cryle and Alison Moore trace the interpenetra-
tion of middlebrow novels and medical popularizations in France more broadly, and ear-
lier, back to the late nineteenth-century “roman de mœurs”: see 6, 108, and 120–21, and 
chapter 5, “The Wedding Night” (132–60).
22 See Jonathan Ned Katz, Gay/Lesbian Almanac and Gay American History for much inter-
esting material on both Stekel and Caprio. For instance, Katz found that a number of 
Caprio’s “cases” were lifted from True Confessions magazine, another plagiarized from 
Krafft-Ebing.
23 See Cataldi, “Sexuality Situated,” 75–79, and Le Dœuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 62–72 and 
113–16, for good discussions of how Beauvoir’s concept of frigidity differs from Sartre’s. 
Cataldi and Le Dœuff both mention Stekel as a source Beauvoir and Sartre use very 
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3 Stekel (and Freud) in The Second Sex
Stekel’s name appears in The Second Sex sixty-three times. Nine times, Beau-
voir quotes or paraphrases a view he holds in order to agree with it; once (the 
only instance from volume 1) she partly agrees and partly disagrees; two are 
passing references. The vast majority (fifty-one) are drawn from the descriptive 
case studies in Frigidity in Woman. Of these cases, eleven are quoted or cited 
briefly (a sentence or two), thirty-two take at least an indented paragraph, four 
take up at least half a page in the Gallimard Folio edition, and four are longer 
than a page. For purposes of comparison, Sartre’s name appears ten times, and 
her longest quotation from him is two sentences long. Obviously I’m not argu-
ing that Stekel is a greater influence on Beauvoir than Sartre, just that there’s 
enough here to make it surprising that Stekel isn’t more discussed in the sec-
ondary literature.
However, readers who’ve worked, or worked mainly, from H.M. Parshley’s 
English translation can be pardoned for wondering whether I’m over-reacting. 
Of Beauvoir’s case citations, Parshley entirely omits five; he makes minor cuts 
in seven of her quotations; but his most usual procedure is to substitute a tame 
paraphrase of his own, usually a sentence or two. He does this with two of the 
four huge quotations, and with all four of the quotations that are between half 
a page and a page in length. (He also does this for two of Stekel’s statements 
 differently, to the point where, as Le Dœuff notes, “one wonders if [Beauvoir] and Sartre 
had read the same book” (65); but neither Cataldi nor Le Dœuff historicizes “frigidity,” as 
I am attempting to do here.
The independence of Beauvoir’s thought from Sartre’s, on this and very many crucial 
points, has now been sufficiently demonstrated that I feel no need to dwell on it (or him) 
here: those interested should consult Le Dœuff ’s book, Simons, Beauvoir and The Second 
Sex, and Christine Daigle and Jacob Golumb, Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence, 
for a rich range of interpretations. Whether one wants to grant Beauvoir intellectual pri-
ority and ownership of ideas Sartre then “stole,” or see joint development of ideas, or 
continue to distinguish Beauvoir’s ideas as better than Sartre’s, it is clearly no longer pos-
sible to blame what’s “wrong” (or, for that matter, what’s right) with The Second Sex on 
Beauvoir’s submissiveness to her boyfriend’s view.
Merleau-Ponty’s use of Stekel is also beyond the scope of this inquiry, but a summary 
by Dorothea Olkowski is not reassuring: “Merleau-Ponty seems to have little or nothing to 
say about sexual difference. Sexuality, he asserts, must lie in relations and attitudes and 
not in biology, in anatomical or physiological conditions. Yet he speaks of frigidity in ex-
clusively feminine terms as always a refusal—of orgasm, of femininity, of sexuality—that, 
in turn, is a rejection of the sexual partner and ‘his’ destiny, as if femininity were in service 
to ‘his’ destiny. There is certainly no mention of ‘her’ destiny, nor of the interval in which 
she acts…. What is missing in Merleau-Ponty’s account is the woman’s own affective tem-
porality…” (Olkowski, “The End of Phenomenology: Bergson’s Interval in Irigaray,” 83).
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she cites in agreement.) If you look to Parshley’s version for direct quotation of 
Stekel’s own words, you’ll find only three brief ones, three somewhat longer 
ones, and one huge one. Stekel’s name, and his basic point, are still there, usu-
ally. What gets lost is his rather colorful voice, and the stylistic earmarks of the 
case history genre: “Miss M.G., 19 years old, was suddenly afflicted with a severe 
delirium…. Mrs. L.M., thirty-eight, tells me she is completely without feeling 
[insensible] with her husband…. Mrs. B.Z. was forty years old, had three chil-
dren and had been married when she began….”24 Margaret Simons’s classic 
1983 article, “The Silencing of Simone de Beauvoir: Guess What’s Missing from 
The Second Sex,” noted that Parshley cut down the chapter on “The Married 
Woman” by almost half, and slashing at Stekel, who figures prominently there, 
was part of how Parshley did it.25
However, philological beancounting may show not that Stekel was a great 
and overlooked theoretical influence, but just the opposite. Beauvoir’s most se-
rious influences and agreements tend to dissolve into her own argument and 
are marked infrequently, unobtrusively, or sometimes not explicitly signaled at 
all (Sonia Kruks has showed this for Merleau-Ponty, Eva Lundgren-Gothlin for 
Hegel and Marx).26 By contrast, the names of Stekel and other sexological “au-
thorities” seem to bead off like oil on water. Beauvoir’s use of all sorts of au-
thorities, sources, and influences should be understood as the opposite of slav-
ish, and as somewhat different from the sort of “scholarly” marking of debts 
and disagreements to which Anglo-American academics are accustomed; so 
her “use” of Stekel could be compared to the way she silently “unhooks herself” 
(as Michèle Le Dœuff puts it) from Sartre, or as Toril Moi says, “swerves.”27 And 
there are broad implications for what kind of an argument we take her to be 
making in The Second Sex. What kinds of truth claims is she making, and what 
24 “Mlle. M.G. …, âgée de dix-neuf ans fut subitement atteinte d’un délire aigu” (Le deuxième 
sexe [hereinafter DS] 2:169). “Mme. L.M…, trente-huit ans, mariée, me dit être complète-
ment insensible auprès de son mari” (DS 2:418). “Mme. B.Z… avait quarante ans, trois en-
fants et derrière elle vingt ans de vie conjugale quand elle commença à penser” (DS 2:461).
25 See also Toril Moi, “While We Wait: The English Translation of The Second Sex,” and Eliza-
beth Fallaize, “The Housewife’s Destiny: Translating Simone de Beauvoir’s ‘The Married 
Woman.’”
26 Sonia Kruks, Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity and Society; Eva 
 Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex & Existence: Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. Similar argu-
ments can be made for other philosophers: see e.g. Emily Ann Parker, “Strange Freedom 
in Beauvoir and Nietzsche.”
27 Michèle Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 107; Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of 
an Intellectual Woman, 143. See Nancy Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism for a differ-
ent, but quite compelling, formulation: Bauer describes Beauvoir as inventing an entirely 
new style of philosophical “appropriation.”
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sort of purchase are they meant to have on the real world? Genre is not a purely 
academic quibble, or a pragmatic question about which shelf a work belongs 
on in the library or bookstore; genre matters because it signals a relationship, 
an implicit contract, between writer and reader. So how The Second Sex uses 
the generic conventions of sexological case history signals how it was meant to 
be read, and can help us see how women (and men) did read it before it be-
came a work of Theory and a college text.
It is crucial to bear in mind the overall organization of The Second Sex, and 
especially its division into two volumes, which in France were first published 
separately, several months apart. Volume 1, “Les faits et les mythes” (Facts and 
Myths) begins with the theoretical introduction. The next section, labelled 
“Destin” (Destiny), disposes in three chapters of three types of arguments that 
have been used to “explain” women’s supposed destiny in a deterministic way 
(biological, psychoanalytic, and “the point of view of historical materialism,” 
which is to say, Marx and Engels). Then “Histoire” recounts the changing politi-
cal and economic positioning of women from prehistory to the (then) present 
day. Finally “Mythes” analyses both grand collective primitive myths and then 
some examples from modern literature, pulling together a complex, contradic-
tory, but ultimately unified story of how woman is situated as a dominated 
Other, by a combination of men’s self-interest, women’s complicity with it, and 
the social structures that come to solidify and embody male domination. Vol-
ume 2, titled “L’expérience vécue” (Lived Experience), begins again with its 
own brief introduction; it follows women through the life-cycle, then slides 
into individual chapters about specific types of women, but always under-
standing women’s character as a dynamic response to her situation, which in-
cludes what we would now call her social location, but also includes the body, 
understood not as a static thing but as “our grasp upon the world, and a sketch 
for our projects.”28
Parshley unhelpfully rendered “L’expérience vécue” as “Women’s Life Today,” 
which loses its resonance as technical vocabulary for phenomenologists (see 
Moi, “While We Wait”). Also obscured is Beauvoir’s focus, in this second vol-
ume, on life as women live it, live through it day after day, as changing subjects 
in a changing objective world; this is the dimension of “existence” and not of 
essentialized “Being,” it is “lived” rather than (some reified notion of) “Life,” as 
in The Meaning of Life. Like many of Parshley’s alterations, the shift from 
“Lived Experience” to “Life Today” flattens out Beauvoir’s account and brings it 
closer to a monolithic account of Woman than she intended.
28 “[N]otre prise sur le monde et l’esquisse de nos projets” (DS 1:73).
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The first volume’s unhooking of women from Woman, and the skepticism 
toward the Woman men invent and perpetuate, do, I’ll argue, carry through 
and govern the second volume’s somewhat looser discussion of “women and 
what they are like.” The introduction to volume 2 begins with the paragraph 
about “women today” I quoted in my introduction, including the reminder that
[w]hen I use the words “woman” or “feminine,” obviously I do not refer to 
any archetype, or any unchangeable essence; after most of my state-
ments, one must understand [sous-entendre] “under present conditions 
of education and society.” The point here is not to pronounce eternal 
truths, but to describe the common background from which every indi-
vidual woman’s existence arises.29
Beauvoir will make the same point in her conclusion (at the end of volume 2), 
and her philosophical language, in particular her account of “woman as Other” 
based on her rewriting of Hegel, is consistent throughout both volumes. But 
volume 2 includes much less explicit methodological self-reflection and al-
most no epistemological questioning or doubt, as if that had been established 
and cleared out of the way.
As I noted above, Beauvoir mentions Stekel only once in the first volume, 
and that mention is a cool one: it arises as part of her criticism of Freud and 
psychoanalysis more generally. Beauvoir’s critique of Freud includes most of 
the arguments made by later feminists. His idea of female sexual development 
is simply a “calque” or belated extrapolation from male development, so the 
Electra complex doesn’t make much sense, and his whole idea of sexuality is 
“flou,” vague, because he never makes clear when he’s talking about genitality 
and when he isn’t. His concept of “resistance” makes it impossible to argue 
with him. He doesn’t seem to know the difference between the penis, “this frag-
ile stem of flesh,”30 and the phallus: men’s access to power, freedom, activity in 
the wider world, which little girls might indeed envy, and why shouldn’t they? 
His account is problematically ahistorical.31 He has an “ersatz de morale” (an 
ersatz ethics):32 his system is normalizing, substituting some ideal of “health” 
29 DS 2:9.
30 “[C]ette fragile tige de chair” (DS 1:82).
31 “It is only within the situation grasped in its totality that the anatomical privilege forms a 
basis for a true human privilege. The truth of psychoanalysis could be found only in his-
torical context.” [Ce n’est qu’au sein de la situation saisie dans sa totalité que le privilège 
anatomique fonde un véritable privilège humain. La psychanalyse ne saurait trouver sa 
vérité que dans le contexte historique (DS 1:90–1).]
32 DS 1:93.
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where a philosopher would stipulate “the good,” but by pretending to be a sci-
entist and not a philosopher he fails to argue for it properly, and an ethics 
which denies it is an ethics is particularly dangerous.33 Perhaps the deepest 
problem Beauvoir had with Freud was that in his system no human behavior 
can be fully authentic: anything we think, feel, or do is symbolic of, reducible 
to, something else, something sexual, something about myself that I don’t have 
access to, although the analyst (supposedly) does. For her as for Sartre, Freud’s 
account of unconscious motivation is unacceptable because it reduces purpo-
sive human activity, understanding, and choice, to the status of an illusion.
Sartre pursues this argument rather differently, and at great length, in L’être 
et le néant: his concept of “bad faith,” and his insistence there on the individu-
al’s absolute freedom, required him to disavow the idea of an unconscious 
completely. I don’t see Beauvoir as rejecting the idea of “bad faith”; in The Sec-
ond Sex she tends to speak of a “fuite inauthentique” (inauthentic flight) rather 
than using the term “mauvaise foi,” but the latter term does occur. Still, her 
story-examples tend to be more concrete than Sartre’s, and more embedded in 
a social context. He sometimes sees “bad faith” when an individual attributes 
something to the social category he belongs to; Beauvoir sees refusing to admit 
that one belongs to a situated social category as a sign of bad faith. For in-
stance, she writes in the introduction, “[c]learly, no woman can without bad 
faith claim to situate herself beyond her sex”—a sentence Parshley omitted 
entirely, as Moi points out.34
Beauvoir’s skepticism can be illustrated quickly by an anecdote she takes 
from Denis de Rougemont: a woman goes into psychoanalysis because of a 
neurotic delusion that birds are attacking her; after a long, unsuccessful course 
of therapy the doctor happens to walk into the clinic garden with her and no-
tices that birds really are attacking her!35 Existentialism aside, the feminist rel-
evance is clear. The same phenomenon—for instance, a deep and abiding 
 anger—can look like a neurotic failure to “adjust to life,” or a well-founded 
33 She gives him failing marks in every philosophical field—epistemology, ethics,  ontology—
plus blames him, as others have blamed her, both for being a philosopher and for not be-
ing one.
34 “Il est clair qu’aucune femme ne peut prétendre sans mauvaise foi se situer par-delà son 
sexe” (DS 1:13). For Moi’s analysis, see “While We Wait,” 1012. Again it seems unnecessary to 
harp on this difference between Beauvoir and Sartre, especially since Sartre’s position 
evolved during the war toward the view that a refusal of solidarity was a moral weakness, 




 resistance to oppression, depending on whether one is inside, or outside, the 
clinical regime.36
Beauvoir suggests early in volume 1 that Stekel has somehow escaped the 
deep ontological error of reducing all human choice and all human behavior to 
unconscious sexual determinants. So one good explanation for Stekel’s strong 
presence in The Second Sex is indeed the reason Beauvoir gives in La force de 
l’âge: he enables her to provide copious descriptive psychoanalytic accounts, 
without being tied to a Freudian ontology or “ersatz ethics.” (A “nuisance to 
psychoanalysis” was precisely what she needed.) And he makes it possible to 
carry over the psychoanalytic claim that sexuality is fundamental to subjectiv-
ity, without making women the helpless victims of their drives. But then she 
dismisses him in a phrase, calling his analyses “superficial,” as indeed they are.
Without entirely throwing out the contributions of psychoanalysis, some 
of whose insights are fruitful, we will therefore reject its method. First, we 
will not limit ourselves by taking sexuality as a given. That attitude falls 
short, as is shown by its impoverished description of feminine libido, 
which, as I’ve already said, psychoanalysts have never studied directly [de 
front], but only by starting from male libido. They seem not to know that 
the attraction men hold for women is fundamentally ambivalent. Freud-
ians and Adlerians explain the anxiety the woman feels when confronted 
with the male sex organ as the inversion of a frustrated desire. Stekel saw 
better that it is a primary reaction [une réaction originale], but he ac-
counts for it superficially—on his account, the woman is afraid of losing 
her virginity, of being penetrated, of pregnancy, of pain, and that fear acts 
as a brake on her desire. This explanation is too rational.37
36 On this point, see also Simons: “In describing a subject’s failure to effect a transference or 
a sublimation (and surely the most obvious example here is in the ‘failure’ of a woman to 
become a heterosexual), a psychoanalyst, Beauvoir argues, ‘does not suppose that they 
perhaps refused it and that perhaps they had good reasons for doing so; [the analyst] does 
not want to consider that their conduct could have been motivated by ends freely posed’” 
(“The Second Sex and the Roots of Radical Feminism,” 156, quoting DS 1:92).
37 “Sans rejeter en bloc les apports de la psychanalyse dont certains aperçus sont féconds, 
nous refuserons donc sa méthode. D’abord nous ne nous bornerons pas à prendre la sexu-
alité comme une donnée: que cette attitude soit courte, c’est ce que manifeste la pauvreté 
des descriptions touchant la libido féminine; j’ai dit déjà que jamais les psychanalystes ne 
l’ont étudiée de front, mais seulement à partir de la libido mâle; ils semblent ignorer la 
fondamentale ambivalence de l’attraction qu’exerce sur la femme le mâle. Freudiens et 
adlériens expliquent l’angoisse éprouvée par la femme devant le sexe masculin comme 
l’inversion d’un désir frustré. Stekel a mieux vu qu’il y a là une réaction originale; mais il 
en rend compte d’une manière superficielle: la femme aurait peur de la défloration, de la 
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For Beauvoir, female sexuality is not a pale version of male libido—this is 
one of many moments in The Second Sex where Beauvoir indicates that wom-
en are different from men in ways that deeply matter—nor is woman’s desire a 
mask or a symbol for something else. It needs to be studied, not for what it re-
sembles, and not for what it conceals, but de front, head-on, as itself, for what 
it does. In other words, women’s desire needs to be seen as authentic, just as 
the desire of a young girl to climb a tree results, not from penis envy, but from 
a desire to climb a tree.38 (Later Beauvoir will say that when a woman takes a 
lover, it is a lover that she wants.)39
Whether she is right, in what follows, to describe that “primary” reaction as 
“this sort of appeal, at the same time insistent and terrified, which is female 
desire … characterized by an indissoluble synthesis of attraction and repul-
sion,” we may want to debate; and it is hard to know exactly what she means 
when she explains that
[t]he idea of “passive libido” is disconcerting because “libido” has been 
defined, based on the male, as pulsion, energy; but no one could conceive 
of light being at the same time yellow and blue; what is needed is the in-
tuition of green.40
But it is clear that no one (woman or man) can claim without bad faith that 
Beauvoir did not see, or did not value, woman’s “sexual difference.” What is 
unusual is that she located this difference in the experience of sexual desire, 
rather than where traditionalists, and some feminisms, would place it, in the 
experience of sexual reproduction, which is to say, maternity (or “the mater-
nal”). It is also worth noticing that, here as throughout, her discussion of wom-
en’s embodied experience is not limited to sexuality: she continues,
[w]e would get closer to reality if instead of defining libido in vague 
terms  like “energy,” we brought the meaning of sexuality together with 
pénétration, de la grossesse, de la douleur, et cette peur freinerait son désir; cette explica-
tion est trop rationnelle” (DS 1:92).
38 DS 1:94.
39 “[Q]uand elle prend un amant, c’est bien un amant qu’elle veut” (DS 2:422).
40 “Au lieu d’admettre que le désir se déguise en angoisse ou est combattu par la crainte, il 
faudrait considérer comme une donnée originale cette sorte d’appel à la fois urgent et 
effrayé qu’est le désir femelle; c’est la synthèse indissoluble de l’attraction et de la répul-
sion qui le caractérise…. L’idée d’une ‘libido passive’ déconcerte parce qu’on a défini la li-
bido à partir du mâle comme pulsion, énergie; mais on ne concevrait pas non plus qu’une 
lumière puisse être à la fois jaune et bleue; il faut avoir l’intuition du vert” (DS 1:92–3).
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the meaning of other human attitudes: taking, capturing, eating, doing, 
dominating, etc., for it is one of the singular modes of taking hold of an 
object; the qualities of the erotic object should also be studied as it pres-
ents itself not just in the sexual act but in perception generally. Such a 
study would look outside the frame of psychoanalysis, which posits eroti-
cism as irreducible.41
The contributions (apports) of psychoanalysis, in other words, are useful here 
only when subordinated to the contributions of phenomenology. Throughout 
her account of female development, Beauvoir will emphasize that there is 
more to the sexed (or gendered) body than the sexual body, for instance in the 
different ways girls learn to occupy physical space, the way aggressive or sim-
ply athletic activity is shamed out of us, and the psychological damage this 
does.42 But my point for now is simply that she has steered nimbly between 
two sorts of reductionism: Stekel seemingly can only see either attraction or 
repulsion, one at a time. Many if not most women will be able to falsify that 
claim by, um, consulting their own subjective experience. But the view attrib-
uted to Freud, which would reduce fear, repulsion, rejection of male advances 
to secret, repressed desire, is more obviously objectionable, since it smugly au-
thorizes taking a woman’s No as a sign that she really means Yes!—something 
Freud himself did, when he insisted to his patient Dora that Herr K., who was 
harassing her (with her father’s tacit complicity), was a perfectly attractive 
man and not all that old, really … and sent her home.43
It is in volume 2, though, that Stekel comes into his own and prances about 
displaying his “cases” like a circus ringmaster, or like Charcot presenting his 
collection of femmes hystériques in the theatre of St. Anne’s hospital.44 Here 
41 “On cernerait davantage la réalité si au lieu de définir la libido en termes vagues d’ ‘ énergie’ 
on confrontait la signification de la sexualité avec celle d’autres attitudes humaines: pren-
dre, capter, manger, faire, subir, etc.; car elle est un des modes singuliers d’appréhender un 
objet; il faudrait étudier aussi les qualités de l’objet érotique tel qu’il se donne non seule-
ment dans l’acte sexuel mais dans la perception en général. Cet examen sort du cadre de 
la psychanalyse qui pose l’érotisme comme irréductible” (DS 1:93).
42 This crucial insight would be carried forward by such feminist phenomenologists as San-
dra Bartky and Iris Marion Young.
43 See Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane, eds., In Dora’s Case: Freud-Hysteria- 
Feminism.
44 The engraving Freud, who had been Charcot’s student, kept in his Vienna consulting 
room shows a half-clothed, contorted woman fainting on the arm of the doctor’s white-
coated assistant, while the great man himself discourses to the audience. (US readers may 
recognize it from the cover of Bernheimer and Kahane’s casebook to Dora.) Apparently a 
version of this spectacle, specifically designed for the edification of philosophy students, 
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are a group of miserable maladjusted adolescent girls, many of them driven to 
suicide or psychosis by the onset of menstruation, by belief their breasts are 
too big, their blushes too red, their feet too ugly, their vaginas too small or in 
the wrong place or missing altogether. Here are some children fascinated by 
urination. Here are a horrifying series of wedding night vignettes, all piled up 
in a heap, repeating the same theme over and over, just as the woman (suppos-
edly) repeats it obsessively every time she tries to have sex. Here are some de-
luded women who make themselves and everyone around them miserable by 
insisting they do not want what according to him they do want; in fact here 
(step right up!) is the “prevaricating woman” who only thinks she is frigid, the 
source for Sartre’s claim in L’être et le néant that the woman he uses as an ex-
ample of “bad faith” showed “objective signs of pleasure” though she denied 
feeling any.45 As Le Dœuff shows, this assertion fails to conceive of female sub-
jectivity at all, as the only subjectivity in Sartre’s scene is male. (Having lost her 
unconscious, the “frigid woman” can now be blamed: Caprio’s oxymoron, “the 
frigid nymphomaniac,” and his rebranding of frigidity as “sexual inadequacy,”46 
also takes off from this very point.)
Moreover, Stekel is linked with some of the parts of The Second Sex later 
feminists have found troubling: places where the female body seems irretriev-
ably ugly; places where women seem not to know what they are feeling or 
where Beauvoir seems not to allow them the right to what they feel; places 
which seem to define women’s experience of sex according to a paradigm we 
might question: for example, Beauvoir’s statement that women’s subordina-
tion is expressed through her position in sexual intercourse, which has trou-
bled Toril Moi among others, can be linked to Stekel’s Frigidity in Woman.47 He 
appears very strangely in the rather odd chapter on “La lesbienne” (see chapter 
2 below). His name is often close to something uncomfortable, to a place where 
the reader starts to worry that Beauvoir has lost sight of her project to tear 
down and de-essentialize a patriarchal myth about women and is either letting 
the myth speak through her or, worse, building a new myth of her own.
Furthermore, she uses his name in the way one invokes an authority, as evi-
dence to support her own points; in some sections, the thickness and length of 
her quotations almost cede him the floor. The chapter on “Enfance” ( Childhood) 
was still going on in Foucault’s day as it was in Beauvoir’s (see Didier Eribon, Michel Fou-
cault, 41–3, 50). For all I know it goes on there still.
45 Stekel, Frigidity in Woman, 2:62–3; Sartre, L’être et le néant, 93–7, Being and Nothingness, 
95–9; Le Dœuff, Hipparchia’s Choice, 64–70. See also Moi, “Freedom and Flirtation,” where 
this “scene” from L’être et le néant is compared with similar episodes in L’invitée.
46 Caprio, The Sexually Adequate Female, 15.
47 Stekel, Frigidity in Woman, 2:3. See Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 167–68.
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closes with a quotation of almost two pages: Beauvoir calls this a “detailed con-
fession” which “constitutes a concrete synthesis of all the moments we have 
studied separately.”48 And finally, the concept of frigidity sometimes gets away 
from its owner and walks around on its own. Sometimes this leads to a sensible 
analysis, sometimes to a silly side-comment, as when she says that Scandina-
vian or Dutch women tend to be “clean and cold.”49 While Stekel’s name has 
dropped out by the final section, “Vers la libération” (Toward Liberation), fri-
gidity figures importantly in the account of sexuality given there.50
Politically speaking, Stekel is hard to pigeonhole. His homophobia is pro-
found; but he crusaded for a recognition of masturbation and childhood sexu-
ality as normal and healthy. His conclusion decries the sexual double standard 
and the reduction of women to only a “sexual creature,”51 but also rants against 
“defeminization”: “maternal love has always been regarded as something lofty, 
sacred, and unimpeachable” and “the woman who withholds from her calling 
as mother … denies her womanhood.”52 It is equally hard to say simply wheth-
er his influence on Beauvoir was progressive or the reverse. For instance, in her 
chapter on motherhood, she quotes his ringing denunciation of the hypocrisy 
of laws forbidding abortion: “the prohibition of abortion is an immoral law 
because it is bound to be violated every hour of every day.”53 But a moment 
later, his name authorizes the idea that morning sickness and even miscarriage 
can result from a woman’s internal refusal of motherhood and femininity and 
from her hostility toward the fetus—an idea that has rightly troubled feminists 
(and is, medically speaking, nonsense). In fact both his helpfulness and his 
faults have the same root: because he rightly refuses to naturalize (and normal-
ize) human behavior with some sort of Freudian determinism, he sometimes 
risks falling into a purely voluntaristic conception of human feeling, which 
means that people who are unhappy or oppressed can be blamed. (Both Sartre 
and Beauvoir have been charged with a similar voluntarism.)
But many other points in The Second Sex show that Beauvoir should have 
been able to see through him. Her denunciation of psychoanalysis as an “ersatz 
48 “[U]ne confession détaillée. Elle constitue une synthèse concrète de tous les moments 
que nous avons étudiés séparément” (DS 2:85).
49 DS 2:156, 271.
50 DS 2:611–13, 657–59.
51 Stekel, Frigidity in Woman, 2:274–75.
52 Ibid., 2:292 and 2:300. See Cryle and Moore, Frigidity, 216–21 for an excellent, and contex-
tual, discussion of Stekel’s conclusion.
53 “[L]a défense de l’avortement est une loi immorale puisqu’elle doit être obligatoirement 
violée, tous les jours, à toutes les heures” (DS 2:343).
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ethics” certainly applies to Stekel, who at best is a kind of ersatz Freud. That she 
did, in fact, see through him becomes clearer if we turn from her work to his.
4 Stekel par lui-même
Opening Frigidity in Woman, we find that Stekel has his own system, his own 
theory of human sexual life, about which Beauvoir never says a word. He be-
gins by deploring a sad fact about the modern world, an “unhealthy age”: be-
cause of evolution, and “the influences brought about by refinement in cul-
ture,” frigidity and impotence are on the rise; they are thus most prevalent in 
educated people of the upper classes. This is because, he says, human beings 
have a “double-chamber arrangement” of the nervous system, and “the specific 
character of every love is determined by the struggle between brain and spinal 
cord,” between the animal and the spiritual side of Man.54 “Primitive folk” 
mostly don’t have these problems because they are closer to unproblematic 
animality.55 (I’m not making this up.) Since love is immortal and divine, as the 
poets tell us, it is tragic that so many people (and so many of the best people!) 
are now incapable of it. “What they need is a new prophet who shall point 
their way to a new track and set them on the path which leads into the king-
dom of happiness and love.”56 This prophet, obviously, he plans to be.
But before he can get to sexual dysfunctionality, he wants us to know what 
love is. He begins to explain his theory that everyone has an “individual love 
requisite” by analyzing the phenomenon of love at first sight.57 All love is at 
root love of self, and the lover recognizes himself in the other person: we can 
see this, for example, in the fact that foot fetishists take exquisite care of their 
own feet, and that a man who likes to have his ear kissed will kiss his partner’s 
ear. Also (?) all love comes from infantile fixations. So, a certain man can only 
be aroused by a woman who is missing a tooth; this can be explained by the 
fact that his childhood nurse was missing the same tooth. Another man mar-
ries a woman because, he later realizes, she has the same “sideward glance” as 
his mother. Also (?) the “law of bipolarity” may bring about a reversal.58 Bald 
men desire women with lots of hair. Blondes are favored because mankind is in 
flight from sexuality. Women with dark hair are preferred because dark hair is 






“more sensuous.”59 Now, anyone accustomed to reading psychoanalytic mate-
rial will not be surprised that conflicting examples generate explanations that 
seem contradictory; indeed, unconscious motivation and overdetermination 
explain why this must be so. But while Stekel mentions both those ideas, he 
does not really take them on board, and every one of his conflicting explana-
tions is presented as if it were a universally applicable maxim.
As the discussion continues, curious anecdotes proliferate, innocent of the-
ory. Did you know that Descartes could only be attracted by cross-eyed wom-
en? Henry iii of France “is said to have had recourse to the odor of excreta as a 
means of refreshing himself from the fatigue of dancing” and once fell in love 
with a woman after wiping herself with her sweaty chemise.60 Smell is very 
important to some people; another man cares deeply about the shape of the 
ear (and wishes to have intercourse with it). We meet the man who could bring 
on orgasm by fondling a wart … the man who sucked the dental plates of pros-
titutes and could orgasm in no other way … and then (right there!) is an ex-
ample Beauvoir uses, of a woman who fell in love from a distance with a fa-
mous tenor, but did not wish to meet him in the flesh.61
What’s going on here?
It’s certainly more readable than Freud, because where Freud hedges every-
thing around with scientific apparatus and methodological reflection, Stekel 
simply asserts, as the expert, that he knows. Such theory as he has lies close to 
the surface. The “law of bipolarity” is explained as follows: “The self consists of 
opposite strivings which act as counterparts. One’s choice may follow the prin-
ciple of identification or the opposite principle of differentiation.”62 This “law” 
forms the basis of his claim to have invented the concept of “ambivalence,” 
which he accused Freud of stealing, but does it amount to anything more than 
two clichés, “birds of a feather” and “opposites attract,” laid end to end? The 
literalness of his analysis borders on parody.
Women who “have fallen” or who struggle against temptations, throw 
themselves out of the window and into the street;63 the man who enter-
tains secret thoughts of poisoning somebody, takes poison; one who 
59 Ibid., 1:14.
60 Ibid., 1:17.
61 Ibid., 1:52–3; DS 2:419.
62 Ibid., 1:11.
63 This example seems also to have been picked up by Sartre, but by way of Pierre Janet: see 
The Transcendence of the Ego, 100.
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yearns after the flames of love sets fire to himself; he who believes himself 
surrounded by poisonous thoughts, turns on the gas.64
He believes in the seven-year itch (illustrated with examples from the life of 
Goethe), and in Fliess’s notorious theory that the nose plays an important role 
in sexual life: for example, he knows a student who could have an orgasm sim-
ply by kissing a woman on the nose. “The size of the nasal openings also plays 
a larger role in sexual excitation than is usually recognized.”65
Children’s incestuous feelings for parents are on the rise because upper-
class parents, having fewer children, spoil them through “overtenderness” (“the 
only child is almost always fated to be a neurotic,” and favorite children are 
more likely to break down);66 this may be leading to class suicide, a disaster he 
parallels to the devastation of the First World War. He also says, though, that 
“love disorders” are “a kind of automatism which intervenes to prevent 
overpopulation.”67 On the other hand, the prevalence of erotic fixations upon 
servants and the lower classes is due to neglectful parents who abandon their 
small children to the care of wet-nurses.68 He finds all these situations prob-
lematic, seemingly without noticing when his claims logically cancel one an-
other out.
So did Stekel, as Beauvoir and Sartre believed, propose a psychoanalysis 
without the unconscious? Yes, if by “unconscious” one means, “deep.” In fact he 
uses the terms “unconscious” (and also “preconsciousness” and “coconscious-
ness”) from time to time, but unsystematically. Frigidity he seems to think is 
more or less conscious: you “can get the woman to admit” that she is angry, or 
thinking about her father or about God; one woman who had “presented” with 
a wish to be cured finally “admitted” that she had been telling herself funny 
stories as a distraction, to prevent herself from rewarding her husband with 
her orgasm. Has this woman gained some healing insight into her own uncon-
scious motivation, or has she merely been caught lying? (That Freud, too, uses 
phrases like “I brought her to admit,” in Dora for example, doesn’t make this 
any easier to pin down.)
Some of this is funny, but it can’t be dismissed as harmless. The smug, moral-
izing account of the upward aspiration and the downward longing, and his 
worries about the sexual degeneracy of modern Europe are disturbingly close 




68 Ibid., 1:37, 39.
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to such fascist and protofascist writers as Otto Weininger and Max Nordau, a 
discourse whose results we know (though he could not).69 He also leaves one 
with the feeling that women’s accounts of their own experience are not to be 
trusted—though men don’t come out looking very good, either. The solutions 
he proposes to the dilemmas arising from “individual sex requirements” can 
feel a little scary. One man is worried because he is sexually aroused only by 
very young girls—he has opened a candy store in order to be able to see them 
all the time, but he is afraid he will one day act on his desires and end up in jail. 
Stekel convinces him to marry a very small woman (located through a marriage 
broker), and to dress her up in pigtails and school uniform: they live happily 
ever after.70 In explaining how what looks like frigidity may actually be con-
cealed masochism (a theme Beauvoir will take up), he tells us about a woman 
who drove her husband so crazy with her complaining that finally he beat her, 
which turned out to be what she really wanted—and they too lived happily 
ever after!71 At this point Stekel quotes Nietzsche, seemingly with approval: 
“when you go to a woman, forget not your whip!” Not nice, no.
And yet, irritatingly, every once in a while he gets things totally right. There’s 
nothing wrong with masturbation, he says: this was one of his explicit dis-
agreements with Freud. “Perhaps there is no such thing as a normal person.”72 
Men have problems too. “Disorders of our love life are truly social diseases.”73 
“The well-known saying, the criminal is the crime of the state can be paralleled 
by ‘the neurotic is the crime of the family.’”74 Total frigidity does not exist, all 
women are able to have orgasms; adult traumas matter, and one should not 
waste time looking for childhood “keys” when an actual cause, like a rape, or a 
husband who does not know what he is doing, is staring one in the face. Plus, 
he seems to see libido as gender-neutral: there seems to be (for him) both a will 
to dominate, and a will to be dominated, in sex, but neither gender has a mo-
nopoly on either position; and he takes it for granted that women have (all 
69 See Erin Carlston, Thinking Fascism: Sapphic Modernism and Fascist Modernity, for a good 
summary of this discourse and its widespread influence on otherwise sensible people of 
good will. Some of the incoherence of Stekel’s conclusion may be attributed to his belated 
understanding of the consequences of Hitler’s pro-natalism, and to the war that would 
make him, like Freud, a refugee. But on page 291 of the English translation he is still saying 
that “the future of Europe looms austere and dark…. It is becoming already obvious that 
the fertility of the Slavic race will destroy Germanic organization and culture after it shall 
appropriate it to its own uses.”




74 Stekel, Autobiography, 44.
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sorts of) sexual desires which they, like men, will attempt to satisfy in some 
way.
But as I said above, the progressive and the retrograde have the same roots. 
His refusal to categorize sexual behavior as deviant (“there is no such thing as 
a normal person”) leaves him no room to condemn rape or pedophilia: he 
notes several times an assault by a brother, a grandfather, with no particular 
affect, although (unlike Freud) he is not provoked to doubt the woman’s state-
ment that the abuse really happened. The shallow roots of sexual proclivities 
mean frigidity is not essentialized, can be caused by a bad husband, helped by 
better “technique”; it also means that lesbianism is “curable,” and enables him 
to terminate many of his triumphant cases, not with clarifying insight (in 
which he seems largely uninterested) but with a simple “heterosexual adjust-
ment,” and wedding bells. The doctor-hero brings closure and respectability to 
the flood of narrative, supposedly neutralizing (and thereby authorizing) its 
pornographic potential. “Amor Vincit Omnia” is his conclusion: one patient 
(identified as a “backfisch,” a young girl) says to him, “you may well be proud of 
what you have done for me.”75 How this can be reconciled with the seemingly 
fixed nature of the “individual love requisites” is unclear.
But perhaps it’s a mistake to take the theory seriously. Stekel’s strong point 
(and his legacy to the drugstore paperback) is as a raconteur of spicy stories. It 
doesn’t advance his analysis, or the cause of science more broadly, for us to 
learn that case 34 (a lesbian) “can whistle remarkably well and she drinks on 
average daily about ten glasses of beer,”76 but it certainly brings her to life for 
us. His second volume largely abandons (pretention to) theory in favor of serial 
narrative: “Confessions,” “Psychoanalysis of a Case of Dyspareunia,” “The Anal-
ysis of a Messalina,” “Fragmentary Analysis of a Transvestite.” It does seem pos-
sible he made some of these up, if I judge by an admittedly novel-ridden con-
ception of verisimilitude. (Some of them I hope he made up.) And maybe 
Beauvoir didn’t actually care whether he made them up? At one point she re-
fers to a case study subject as a “heroine.”77
So, if everything is shallower and less tragic than Freud thought, and most of 
it can be changed, is this good? On the one hand, the truly frigid woman has 
been de-biologized and de-pathologized; on the other hand, a new monster 
has been created, the “prevaricating woman,” who pretends, or claims, to be 
frigid, as part of a battle of the sexes she is carrying out in her own family. In 
The Second Sex, too, we hear about women who are crispées (clenched), about 




women’s sexual expression of their rancune (resentment, rancor, desire to take 
revenge). Now, Beauvoir was very lucid in the first volume about how self- 
serving men’s accounts of women’s sexual experience could be. In her intro-
duction she describes Marynia Farnham’s Modern Woman: A Lost Sex, whose 
jeremiad about modernity is much the same as Stekel’s, as “fort agaçant” (very 
annoying);78 in later chapters she saw through D.H. Lawrence, Montherlant, 
Claudel … Couldn’t she see through this risible charlatan?
5 What She Made of What He Made of Us
I think she did see through him. Putting the texts side by side, it’s striking that 
she almost always (though not quite always) quotes only his example, omitting 
his reductive analysis of it. Racquelle Bostow has noticed that “Beauvoir uses 
only the adjective ‘frigid’ (frigide) and never the substantive ‘frigidity’ (frigidi-
té), which suggests a fixed sickness” or a personality “type.”79 The breezy arro-
gance of the healer-interpreter that resounds through Stekel’s own writings is 
never heard in The Second Sex, either as his triumph or as hers. It is as if she 
values Stekel’s documentary evidence of women’s problems, but find his solu-
tions too derisory even to combat; she removes them as neatly as if she’d been 
reading with a pair of scissors in her hand. It’s true that Stekel’s name appears 
uncritically, as though he were a simple professional authority cited to back up 
her view. But considering how much The Second Sex relies on psychoanalytic 
and sexological descriptive accounts, it is striking that a truly therapeutic dis-
course is remarkably absent: no one is cured.
Something similar happens with Helene Deutsch. As Éliane Lecarme- 
Tabone has noted in a detailed and convincing inquiry, Beauvoir cites Deutsch’s 
work very frequently in The Second Sex, while continuing to directly oppose 
Deutsch’s naturalistic and normative assumptions about a specifically “differ-
ent” feminine sexuality.80 Beauvoir demolishes Deutsch’s theory of female 
masochism in a few well-chosen words, but continues to use her examples co-
piously, and feminists ever since have wondered why Beauvoir spends so much 
78 DS 1:12. For discussion of Farnham, see Jane Gerhard’s excellent article “Revisiting ‘The 
Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,’” 458–59.
79 Bostow, “Frigidity According to Beauvoir,” 4.
80 Éliane Lecarme-Tabone, “Beauvoir et Hélène Deutsch,” 47–61. Stekel and Deutsch are the 
two most salient authorities dealt with in this way, but there are others: the overlapping 
fields of psychoanalysis and sexology are very well represented. Beauvoir’s use of discred-
ited, or at least unfashionable, sources, and the issue of “guilt by association,” will be con-
sidered more broadly in later chapters.
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time discussing women’s masochism, if she did not after all see female sexual-
ity as intrinsically masochistic and, well, bad.
But perhaps we can see why Stekel and some of the other authorities that 
now seem problematic represented such an important resource for Beauvoir 
that she used them, in spite of flaws she saw, if we reflect on what her alterna-
tives were, since most of what we’d now turn to (“standard works” or more 
popular materials) had yet to be written. Even Kinsey’s volume on women did 
not appear until 1953.81 Beauvoir’s own sexual education had been so rudimen-
tary, she tells us in her memoirs, that as a child she got a meaningful piece of 
information from a scrap of newspaper hanging in the bathroom (to be used as 
toilet paper).82 As a phenomenologist, if not quite yet as a feminist, she was 
not satisfied to make up her examples: she needed real subjective accounts, 
and these were few and far between. So perhaps she read Stekel as lesbians in 
the 1950s would read pulp fiction (and indeed pulp psychoanalysis!): simply 
searching for representation, which was very hard to find. In an economy of 
representative scarcity, biases can be ignored or silently corrected, even when 
they do not pass unnoticed. One takes what one needs and leaves the rest.
Beauvoir tells us that The Second Sex grew out of an autobiographical im-
pulse. But—and this seems important—it did not stop there. Indeed, when 
(according to this account) Sartre convinced her that an important part of be-
ing Simone was being female, and she realized that she had not realized this, 
she went in search of information, information which would precisely not be 
drawn from her own subjective experience, which supposedly had failed to 
teach her anything useful about it. (Perhaps this is why her method, especially 
in the second volume, is to pile example on example, to the point where one 
can almost forgive Parshley for saying, OK, we get it, enough already.) She tells 
us she went to the Bibliothèque nationale,83 where she read everything on the 
81 See Coffin, “Beauvoir, Kinsey, and Mid-Century Sex”: “[Beauvoir] was reading Kinsey’s re-
port on men in December 1948, as she composed the introduction to The Second Sex and 
began to write volume 2. ‘There are some very interesting things in it,’ she wrote to Nelson 
Algren, ‘and other rather funny ones! I should be pleased if the same work was already 
done for women; it would help me for my book.’ That reading may have helped her open 
The Second Sex with the dismissal of the ‘voluminous nonsense uttered about women in 
the last century’—a gesture of grand revisionism that parallels Kinsey’s” (27).
82 Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée [hereinafter mjfr], 139–40. See also 28, 56, 77–8, 80–2, 
113–21, 138–41, 151–55, 224–28. One of Beauvoir’s targets in that book, as in Quand prime le 
spirituel and The Second Sex, is the inadequacy of sexual education. Whether this situa-
tion has really improved, either for scholars or for curious little girls, is not a question I 
can take up here.
83 La force des choses (hereinafter FCh) 1:136, 235, 258–59; Force of Circumstance, trans. Rich-
ard Howard (hereinafter FCirc), 103, 177–78, 195–96. See also “The Art of Fiction No. 35,” 
interview with Madeleine Gobeil.
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subject of women that had appeared in English or French and used the meth-
ods she had learned in her “formation universitaire” to distinguish the material 
that “really counted” from myths and prejudiced accounts.84 How close we are 
here to Virginia Woolf who, given the assignment to lecture on women and 
literature that would become A Room of One’s Own, duly trotted off to the Brit-
ish Library with her notebook and looked under W. On the other hand, how far 
we are, really, from Woolf ’s surprise and horror at what she found, and her de-
cision to seek the truth about women elsewhere, around the streets of London 
and in her own common sense. Uncovering her own anger, unmasking the an-
ger of the patriarchs, Woolf “unhooked” herself from Professor X with his mea-
suring rod and from the scruffy, grunting student sitting next to her, and also 
from the whole prestige of scholarly inquiry, precisely the prestige Beauvoir 
invokes in reminding us (perhaps defensively) of her own scholarly accom-
plishments. Where Woolf in the library threw up her hands, went for a walk, 
and started from scratch, Beauvoir simply got out another pack of blank note-
cards (as it were).
So it is clear that scholarly inquiry, particularly empirical inquiry, and even 
more particularly inquiry with some basis in the physical sciences, maintain a 
prestige and a value for her. Despite her critique of knowledge-formation, her 
unmasking of myths and the self-interested motivations behind them, she re-
mains at Sandra Harding’s first stage, where the methods and the ethical stan-
dards of science are invoked to judge those who fail to meet their own stan-
dards and procedures (“sexist science is bad science”).85 But this does not 
preclude placing an equally high epistemological value upon accounts drawn 
from everyday experience, introduced by a phrase such as “I knew a young 
woman who” (j’ai connu une jeune femme qui), “a woman told me” (une 
femme m’a dit), or or “I remember a friend of my youth, who” (je me rappelle 
une amie de jeunesse à qui). There is also a proliferation of accounts drawn 
84 We may well feel that her university education had taught her nothing of the kind, 
marked as it must have been by biases and lacunae. But she may mean simply that she 
had learned to work quickly through a great deal of material, and not to believe every-
thing she read. It’s worth remembering that at that time “psychology” was studied as a 
branch of philosophy, and would have included much that we would now have trouble 
recognizing as “science.”
85 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism. Only in a later stage does “standpoint 
theory” come to see the procedures as problematic in themselves (exclusionary, and so 
forth). One may regret this commitment of Beauvoir’s, especially when trying to teach the 
biology chapter! But she herself never regretted it, and employed much the same tech-
nique, and the same intellectual structure, in writing La vieillesse two decades later. In-
deed any expectation of such regret would be anachronistic.
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from women’s memoirs and letters, and from fictional texts, some written by 
women and some by men. I was surprised to realize, in the course of my bean-
counting, that the most frequently cited name in The Second Sex is Colette’s. 
Sophie Tolstoy also scores high. Beauvoir is even willing to use a passage from 
a novel by Mauriac, a writer she particularly disliked (and who returned the 
favor), because the heroine seemed to be describing women’s sexual misery in 
a particularly cogent way. She calls upon women’s accounts of their own expe-
rience even when these accounts are tremendously mediated. And while dif-
ferent kinds of sources might, one would think, imply different kinds of “truth 
claims” or levels of authority, Beauvoir does not subordinate one level of ex-
ample to another: they are simply linked paratactically, side by side. So the 
sexology does not govern or explain the fiction or the personal anecdote; the 
heroine of the Mauriac novel, or the Dorothy Parker story, is no more and no 
less “made up” than the “heroine” of Stekel’s case history.86
I suspect Karen Vintges is right to label this method phenomenological;87 if, 
as Sartre was excited to discover, Husserl’s method makes it legitimate to “do 
philosophy” about a glass of beer, or an apricot cocktail,88 surely one can also 
then do philosophy about a menstrual pad. And I think she’s also right to see 
“j’en connais des femmes qui” as one of Beauvoir’s most profound legacies to 
the women’s movement. To give one example: leafing through the old version 
of Our Bodies, Ourselves, I was struck by the stories, women giving accounts of 
their sexual histories. This written-down version of consciousness-raising tri-
angulates on the “truth about women,” sketches a community of seekers after 
truth by means of what Woolf scholars used to call “unity in multiplicity.” The 
individual and the collective are not opposed but allied, at least on the page.
But there is one sort of example Simone de Beauvoir never uses in The Sec-
ond Sex. She never uses a hypothetical. This is interesting well beyond the fact 
that it is another “swerve” from the Sartre of L’être et le néant (“Suppose I go into 
a café looking for my friend Pierre…,” “Suppose a waiter asks me…,” etc.) and a 
radical departure from a venerable, perfectly well-respected, philosophical 
manner of “writing the personal”—still going on wherever philosophers gath-
er (“we tend to say…,” “I can imagine …”)—a way of thinking and writing in 
which Beauvoir became completely uninterested. She was looking for data.
Still, to say she got something she needed from Stekel is not to excuse her, 
exactly. As she herself said (writing about the Marquis de Sade), “one is always 
86 For discussion of what Beauvoir believed about the truth value of fiction, see Toril Moi, 
“What Can Literature Do? Simone de Beauvoir as Literary Theorist.”
87 Karen Vintges, Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir.
88 FA, 157.
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more influenced than one believes by the ideas against which one is fighting.”89 
I take it as axiomatic that feminism at any period will be inextricably entwined 
in other discourses of that time about women and sexuality. Cora Kaplan, writ-
ing about Mary Wollstonecraft, has made the observation that “all feminisms 
give some ideological hostage to femininities and are constructed through the 
gender sexuality of their day as well as standing in opposition to them,”90 and 
Foucault says similarly that at any given point in history, the discourses of re-
pression and liberation will be the same discourses.91 We may find this discon-
certing, or we may find it empowering; the point for my purposes is to look not 
at what the discourse of frigidity was (tainted, “problematic”), but at what in 
this text it did, and does.
I’m now going to suggest some ways in which against all odds, and counter-
intuitively, examples from Stekel helped Beauvoir make arguments that are 
key to the usable feminism of The Second Sex. To summarize, I believe he 
helped her establish that women do have, and are entitled as human beings to 
have, a sexual subjectivity of their own; he furthered her account of women’s 
character as constructed by their situation, thus potentially changeable; and he 
enabled her to provide a rich, detailed, concrete, complex picture of women’s 
misery under patriarchy, fueling the argument for change.
First: His detailed examples of childhood sexual play help do away with the 
myth of childhood innocence. Kids are fascinated by urination, kids try to find 
out about sex and get some strange ideas, kids play doctor, kids masturbate, 
girls do this just as much as boys: get used to it. In fact, Beauvoir says, it’s a 
“persecution” to try to stop them.92 She returns to this topic prominently in her 
book’s conclusion, giving psychoanalysis credit where she feels it is deserved:
It is already progress that “depraved” little girls are no longer cauterized 
with a red-hot iron; psychoanalysis has made parents a bit better in-
formed; but women’s puberty and sexual initiation still come to pass un-
der such deplorable conditions that none of the objections people make 
to the idea of a radical change are valid.93
89 “[O]n est toujours plus influencé qu’on ne croit par les idées qu’on combat” (Faut-il brûler 
Sade?, 60).
90 Cora Kaplan, Sea Changes: Essays on Culture and Feminism, 49.
91 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, an Introduction, 95–101.
92 DS 2:79.
93 “Qu’on ne cautérise plus au fer rouge les fillettes ‘vicieuses,’ c’est déjà un progrès; la psy-
chanalyse a un peu instruit les parents; cependant les conditions actuelles dans lesquelles 
s’accomplissent la formation et l’initiation sexuelle de la femme sont si déplorables 
qu’aucune des objections que l’on oppose à l’idée d’un radical changement ne saurait être 
45Unhappy Bodies: The Frigid Woman in The Second Sex
(Freud himself was much more conservative than Stekel about masturba-
tion, including with his own children.)94 A key section here is the long quota-
tion, two and a half pages, from Stekel’s case study of a “Viennese süße Mädel” 
with which Beauvoir concludes her chapter on “Enfance.” This is the story 
which Beauvoir says “constitutes a concrete synthesis of all the moments we 
have studied separately”; it shows children indulging their curiosity about the 
body through inquiry and sex play of various kinds. Beauvoir comments:
Even though this is an ordinary [normal] and not a pathological case, 
people might call this child exceptionally “perverse.” She was only less 
closely supervised than others.95
That it was “normale” for children to be interested in sex did not go without 
saying.
Second: Indeed, this did not go without saying even for adult women. On 
page 237, I began to overcome my distaste for the word “frigidity,” because I 
began to historicize it. Beauvoir has been discussing the reluctance of medical 
and social authorities to give women access to drugs which will alleviate the 
pain of childbirth. Something analogous happens, she thinks, with sex itself:
[M]ales haven’t scrupled to refuse their partner sexual happiness; it has 
even struck them as advantageous to deny her the temptations of desire 
by denying her the autonomy of pleasure.96
This is followed by a footnote.
valable” (DS 2:657). (“Formation” is hard to translate, since it can also mean “develop-
ment” more generally. Parshley has “training,” which is certainly right in a phrase like “for-
mation universitaire,” and here does preserve the sense that the girl is being formed, 
rather than forming herself: someone writing now might simply say, “socialization.” But 
“formation” can also be applied to, for instance, a fruit, as it develops from a blossom, so 
both biology and culture are kept in play.)
94 Anna Freud’s biographer and Paul Roazen have separately indicated the ill effects on 
Freud’s own children of their father’s Victorian intransigence on this point. See Roazen, 
Freud and His Followers, 15; Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Anna Freud: A Biography.
95 “On dira peut-être—bien qu’il s’agisse d’un cas normal et non pathologique—que cette 
enfant était d’une exceptionnelle ‘perversité’; elle était seulement moins surveillée que 
d’autres” (DS 2:88).
96 “On comprend donc que les mâles n’aient eu aucunement scrupule à dénier à leur com-
pagne le bonheur sexuel: il leur a même paru avantageux de lui refuser avec l’autonomie 
du plaisir les tentations du désir” (DS 2:237).
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Even today, woman’s claim to pleasure makes men angry: an astonishing 
document bearing on this point is Dr. Grémillon’s little booklet, The Truth 
About Woman’s Venereal Orgasm. We learn from the preface that the au-
thor, a hero of the Great War who saved the lives of fifty-four German 
prisoners, is a man of the highest morality. Taking violent exception to 
Stekel’s work on The Frigid Woman, he declares (among other things): 
“The normal woman, the good producer of children [pondeuse, a word 
usually applied to hens, refers literally to a good layer of eggs], has no 
venereal orgasm. Numerous are the mothers (and the best ones) who 
have never felt the fantasmatic spasm … The erogenous zones, usually 
latent, are not natural but artificial. People boast of acquiring them, but 
they are the stigmata of abject failure…. You can tell this to the profes-
sional lady’s man [homme de joie—this is an insulting neologism: a fille de 
joie is a prostitute] and he won’t care in the least, he wants his partner in 
crime to have a venereal orgasm and she will have one. If it doesn’t exist 
it will be brought to exist. The modern woman wants to be made to vi-
brate. We reply: Madam, we haven’t got the time, and hygiene forbids 
it! … The man who creates erogenous zones is working against his own 
interest: he creates insatiable creatures. The whore can drain innumera-
ble husbands dry without tiring herself …. the woman with a ‘zone’ be-
comes a new woman with a new state of mind, sometimes a monstrous 
woman who can go as far as crime … There would be no neurosis and no 
psychosis if people could be persuaded that ‘making the beast with two 
backs’ was as indifferent a matter as eating, urinating, defecating, sleep-
ing ….”97
97 Parshley gives only: “Even in our time, women’s claim to sexual pleasure still arouses male 
anger. In a small work on the female orgasm, a Dr. Grémillon, taking issue with Stekel, 
declares that the normal, fertile woman has no orgasm. He goes on to say that erotogenic 
zones are artificial, not natural, they are signs of degeneration; to create them is unhy-
gienic and foolish, for women then become insatiable, new and terrible creatures, capa-
ble of crime, and so on” (436). What gets lost here is both what is most outrageous in the 
original statement and what is most outraged about Beauvoir’s counterattack: the tex-
ture, the grain of the voice.
“De nos jours encore, la prétention de la femme au plaisir suscite de mâles colères: sur 
ce point un document étonnant, c’est l’opuscule du docteur Grémillon: La vérité sur 
l’orgasme vénérien de la femme. La préface nous apprend que l’auteur, héros de la guerre 
de 14–18, qui sauva la vie de cinquante-quatre prisonniers allemands, est un homme de 
la plus haute moralité. Prenant violemment à partie l’ouvrage de Stekel sur La femme 
frigide, il déclare entre autres: ‘La femme normale, la bonne pondeuse n’a pas d’orgasme 
vénérien. Nombreuses sont les mères (et les meilleures) qui n’ont jamais éprouvé le 
spasme mirifique…. Les zones érogènes le plus souvent latentes ne sont pas naturelles 
mais artificielles. On s’enorgueillit de leur acquisition, mais ce sont des stigmates de dé-
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Repulsive as we find the concept of frigidity, what it replaced was in some 
ways worse: the good woman and mother as passionless, the woman who feels 
(or thinks she feels) sexual pleasure as a shameless prostitute, a devourer of 
men. Where Stekel blamed modernity for impairing sexual fulfillment, Grémil-
lon blames modernity for creating it in the first place: the only excuse for sex in 
his view would appear to be reproduction. As social historians have shown, the 
“new woman” of the early twentieth century created a moral panic, implicitly 
linked to a nationalist moral ideology, and here we have a prime example.98
Perhaps it was progress, then, to regard “frigidity” as a problem rather than 
an accomplishment? Stekel’s talk of “cures” is repellent, but if it’s a problem 
that sexual feeling in women can be missing, it must be definition normally or 
naturally be there. Logically, one must first argue that women legitimately have 
sexual feeling before one can criticize the way men have attempted to channel 
and misdescribe it, whether along the lines Anne Koedt will develop, or in the 
ways Beauvoir will go on (at length) to do.
So, going back to the quotation from La force de l’âge, perhaps frigidity and 
passion are not opposites after all. There’s a nascent politicization of female 
sexuality: it is part of being human, and thus each woman has a right to it, a 
right she’ll need to fight for, because there are still those who would deny it 
to her.
Third: In the chapter on “La jeune fille” (The Young Girl), Beauvoir mobilizes 
many examples from Stekel to make her point that female adolescence is a 
“travail,” a “work” in the sense that psychoanalysts speak of “the work of 
mourning.”99 Sexuality must be learned, and the way most girls learn it is aw-
ful. He is one of many authorities here who provide precise, detailed informa-
tion, which Beauvoir folds together into a collective phenomenological ac-
count. For instance:
chéance…. Dites tout cela à l’Homme de joie, il n’en tiendra pas compte. Il veut que sa 
camarade de turpitude ait un orgasme vénérien et elle l’aura. S’il n’existe pas, on le fera 
naître. La femme moderne veut qu’on la fasse vibrer. Nous lui répondons: Madame, nous 
n’avons pas le temps et cela nous est interdit par l’hygiène!… Le créateur des zones 
érogènes travaille contre lui-même: il crée des insatiables. La gouge peut sans fatigue 
épuiser d’innombrables maris … la ‘zonée’ devient une femme nouvelle avec un état 
d’esprit nouveau, quelquefois une femme terrible et pouvant aller jusqu’au crime…. Il n’y 
aurait pas de névrose, pas de psychose si on était persuadé que ‘faire la bête à deux dos’ 
est un acte aussi indifférent que manger, uriner, déféquer, dormir…’” (DS 2:237, ellipses 
and emphasis in original).
98 See Cryle and Moore, Frigidity, 243–47; Mary Louise Roberts, Civilization Without Sexes: 
Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927; Christine Bard, Les garçonnes: modes 
et fantasmes des années folles.
99 DS 2:140.
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According to a survey reported by Havelock Ellis in 1896, out of one hun-
dred and twenty-five students in an American high school, thirty-six at 
the moment of their first period knew absolutely nothing about the mat-
ter. Thirty-nine had some vague acquaintance with the idea. That is to 
say, more than half of them were in ignorance. According to Hélène 
Deutsch, things had hardly changed in 1946. Ellis cites the case of a young 
girl who threw herself in the Seine at Saint-Ouen because she believed 
she had contracted an “unknown disease.” In “Letters to a Mother,” Stekel 
also tells the story of a child who attempted suicide, seeing her menstrual 
flow as a sign and a punishment for the impurities that soiled her soul. It 
is natural that the girl would be frightened: it seemed to her that her life 
was slipping away...100
Whatever one may think of any of these authorities as theorists, what Beauvoir 
is doing is mining them for examples, for data if you will, to support her own 
claim that girlhood is hell. This is entirely a cultural and social account, and the 
quotations, often long, are in the first person, as in the following example 
(Beauvoir footnotes Frigidity in Woman), which begins “une femme confie” (a 
woman confides):
I suffered from a feeling of physical inferiority, maintained by constant 
criticisms at home. My mother in her exaggerated vanity always wanted 
to show me off to advantage, and she always had a long list of pointers 
for the dressmaker, to conceal my defects: the sloping shoulders, the too-
prominent hips, the too-flat backside, the overfull breasts, etc…. I tor-
tured myself particularly about my feet which during puberty were very 
ugly and people gave me a hard time about the way I walked …. There 
was certainly some truth in all this, but they made me so unhappy …. I 
was sometimes so intimidated that I no longer knew at all how to stand. 
100 “D’après une enquête rapportée en 1896 par Havelock Ellis, sur 125 élèves d’une ‘high 
school’ américaine, 36 au moment de leurs premières règles ne savent absolument rien 
sur la question, 39 avaient de vagues connaissances; c’est-à-dire que plus que la moitié 
d’entre elles était dans l’ignorance. Selon Helen [sic] Deutsch, les choses en 1946 n’auraient 
guère changé. H. Ellis cite le cas d’une jeune fille qui s’est jetée dans la Seine à Saint-Ouen 
parce qu’elle se croyait atteinte d’une ‘maladie inconnue.’ Stekel, dans les ‘lettres à une 
mère,’ raconte aussi l’histoire d’une enfant qui tenta de se suicider, voyant dans le flux 
menstruel le signe et la punition des impuretés qui souillaient son âme. Il est naturel que 
la jeune fille ait peur: il lui semble que c’est sa vie qui lui échappe” (DS 2:68–9).
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If I met someone my first thought was always, “if only I could hide my 
feet.”101
Is there anything outdated about this, apart from the dressmaker with her 
pins?
At another point Beauvoir observes:
Many young girls suffer because their calves are too sturdy, because their 
breasts are either too slight or too heavy, because their hips are skinny, or 
on account of a wart; or else, they fear some secret deformity:
Every young girl carries within herself all sorts of absurd fears which 
she hardly dares admit to herself, says Stekel. No one would believe how 
many young girls suffer from the obsession of being physically abnormal 
and secretly torment themselves because they can’t be sure of being built 
in the usual way. One young girl for example believed her “lower open-
ing” was in the wrong place. She thought sexual intercourse took place 
through the navel, and was unhappy because her navel was closed and 
she couldn’t get her finger into it. Another believed she was a hermaphro-
dite. Yet another thought she was crippled and would never be able to 
have sexual relations.102
101 “Je souffrais d’un sentiment d’infériorité physique entretenu par des critiques incessantes 
à la maison…. Ma mère dans sa vanité exagérée voulait toujours me voir particulièrement 
à mon avantage et elle avait toujours un tas de détails à faire remarquer à la couturière 
pour dissimuler mes défauts: les épaules tombantes, les hanches trop fortes, le derrière 
trop plat, les seins trop pleins, etc. Ayant eu le cou gonflé pendant des années, il ne m’était 
pas permis d’avoir le cou nu…. Je me vexai surtout à cause de mes pieds qui pendant ma 
puberté était très laids et on m’agaçait à cause de ma façon de marcher…. Il y avait cer-
tainement quelque chose de vrai dans tout cela, mais on m’avait rendue tellement mal-
heureuse, et surtout comme ‘backfisch’ et j’étais parfois tellement intimidée que je ne 
savais plus du tout comment me tenir; si je rencontrais quelqu’un, ma première idée était 
toujours ‘si seulement je pouvais cacher mes pieds’” (DS 2:67). Ellipses in original.
102 “[B]eaucoup de jeunes filles souffrent de ces mollets trop robustes, de ces seins trop dis-
crets ou trop lourds, de ces hanches maigres, de cette verrue: ou bien, elles craignent 
quelque malformation secrète
Toute jeune fille porte en elle toutes sortes de craintes ridicules qu’elle ose à peine 
s’avouer, dit Stekel. On ne saurait croire combien de jeunes filles souffrent de 
l’obsession d’être physiquement anormales et se tourmentent en secret parce qu’elles 
ne peuvent pas avoir la certitude d’être normalement bâties. Une jeune fille par 
 exemple croyait que son ‘ouverture inférieure’ n’était pas à sa place. Elle avait cru que 
le commerce sexuel se faisait à travers le nombril. Elle était malheureuse que son 
nombril soit fermé et qu’elle ne puisse y enfoncer son doigt. Une autre se croyait her-
maphrodite. Une autre se croyait estropiée et incapable d’avoir jamais de rapports 
sexuels” (DS 160–61).
Chapter 150
Nothing natural here, and no indication that these obsessions are especially 
delusional: they result from an absence of accurate information, and from a 
lack of openness.
How do these examples bear on the claim, which is still being made, that 
Simone de Beauvoir did not like the female body?103 They show something 
rather different: her understanding that most women did not like their own 
bodies, and her grasp of the reasons why.
Fourth: Beauvoir also includes two of Stekel’s many accounts of the sexual 
molestation of children. Here again Stekel was in advance of Freud: it would be 
too simple to say Freud thought sexual abuse never occurred, but he treated 
such memories with skepticism, as screens for repressed desire for the father. 
Stekel was more straightforward. “Grandfathers among others are often very 
dangerous …”:
I was fifteen. The day before the funeral, my grandfather came to sleep at 
our house. The next day, my mother had already gotten out of bed, he 
asked me if he couldn’t come into my bed to play with me; I got up im-
mediately without answering him …. I began to be afraid of men, re-
counts a woman.
Another young girl remembers suffering a severe shock at the age of 
eight or ten years old when her grandfather, an old man of seventy, groped 
her genitals. He took her on his lap and slid his finger into her vagina. The 
child felt a boundless distress [une immense angoisse] but never dared to 
speak of it. Since that time she has been very afraid of all that is 
sexual.104
103 Patricia Moynagh usefully summarized this controversy in 2006 as follows: “For the opin-
ion that Beauvoir adopted a negative view of women’s bodies, see, for example, O’Brien, 
The Politics of Reproduction, which claims that The Second Sex undermines women’s ca-
pacity to reproduce. Similarly, Moira Gatens has taken Beauvoir to task for presupposing 
that women ‘simply are absolutely Other’ due to female biology. (See Gatens, Feminism 
and Philosophy, 27.) Elizabeth Grosz claims that Beauvoir treats the body as a thing, un-
like other feminists such as Irigaray, Cixous, Spivak, Wittig, Butler, and many others who 
are concerned with the lived body. That Beauvoir treats the body as a thing is simply not 
true, though she says we may experience it as such and indeed this may be inevitable” 
(Moynagh, “Beauvoir on Lived Reality, Exemplary Validity, and a Method for Political 
Thought,” 28). See below for further discussion.
104 Parshley includes most of this one, but reads, “tampered with her genitals, inserting his 
finger. The child felt severe pain but was afraid to speak of the incident.” “Pain” is one solu-
tion to the hard-to-translate “angoisse,” which can mean both anguish and anxiety; it sug-
gests physical pain, which seems likely enough, though it’s not what the text says. “On 
trouvera des récits de telles expériences dans L’asphyxie de Violette Leduc, dans La haine 
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The doctor went outside the clinic and saw that men really were attacking 
her.105
However, it’s in the chapter on sexual initiation that Stekel really comes into 
his own. If you add that chapter together with the one on “La femme mariée” 
(The Married Woman), where the issue of sexual initiation is reprised, you find 
a total of twenty-one examples of horrible first experiences of sex, of which 
nine end in hospitalization or suicide, and all result in ruining the woman’s 
enjoyment of sex thereafter. And these are just Stekel’s examples: Beauvoir has 
many more. Frigidity can result from an awful experience of the marriage bed:
Stekel mentions some gripping examples on this point….
A woman of thirty-six has suffered for fourteen years from lower back 
pains so unbearable that she has to take to her bed for many weeks…. She 
felt these violent pains for the first time on her wedding night. During the 
defloration, which was exceedingly painful, her husband cried out: “You 
deceived me, you’re no longer a virgin….” The pain is the fixation of this 
unpleasant scene. This illness is the husband’s punishment, as he has had 
to spend huge sums for her numerous cures…. This woman remained 
numb [insensible] during her wedding night and she has remained so 
maternelle de S. de Tervagnes et L’orange bleue de Yassu Gauclère. Stekel estime que les 
grands-pères entre autres sont souvent très dangereux.
J’avais quinze ans. La veille de l’enterrement, mon grand-père était venu coucher à la 
maison. Le lendemain, ma mère s’était déjà levée, il me demanda s’il ne pourrait pas 
venir dans mon lit pour jouer avec moi; je me levai immédiatement sans lui répon-
dre…. Je commençai à avoir peur des hommes, raconte une femme.
Une autre jeune fille se rappelle avoir subi un choc sérieux à l’âge de huit ou dix ans 
quand son grand-père, un vieillard de soixante-dix ans, avait tripoté ses organes géni-
taux. Il l’avait prise sur ses genoux en glissant son doigt dans son vagin. L’enfant avait 
senti une immense angoisse mais n’osa pourtant jamais en parler. Depuis ce temps elle 
a eu très peur de tout ce qui est sexuel” (DS 2:79–80).
105 Beauvoir’s use of Stekel thus brings her closer to the position on childhood trauma now 
associated with Alice Miller and Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson: stories of childhood abuse, 
from those Freud discounted in his own practice to those we hear today, were real, they 
really happened, and when psychoanalytic theory becomes a means to deny this or ex-
plain it away, psychoanalysis itself becomes a form of abuse. See Miller, Thou Shalt Not Be 
Aware: Society’s Betrayal of the Child, and Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppres-
sion of the Seduction Hypothesis; see also Janet Malcolm, In the Freud Archives. That Beau-
voir was concerned, in a way we would consider political, with the abuse of women and 
girls, is suggested by the account she gives in La force de l’âge of her sympathy toward a 
young girl, Violette Nozières, who was accused of poisoning her abusive father, and her 
outrage at the hypocrisy of the judges and press who in her view “s’employèrent à étouffer 
la vérité” (busied themselves hushing up the truth) (FA 153–54). This would have hap-
pened in 1933.
Chapter 152
throughout the time of her marriage…. Her wedding night was a terrible 
trauma determining her whole future life.
A young woman consults me for various nervous troubles and espe-
cially an absolute frigidity…. On the wedding night, her husband uncov-
ered her and cried out, “Oh! What short, thick legs you have!” Then he 
attempted coitus, which left her perfectly numb [insensible] and caused 
her only pain…. She knew quite well that the insult on her wedding night 
was the cause of her frigidity.
Another frigid woman recounts that “during her wedding night, her 
husband profoundly insulted her: while watching her undress, he said, 
“My God but you’re skinny!” Then he made up his mind to caress her. For 
her, the moment was unforgettable and horrible. What brutality!
Mrs. Z.W. is also completely frigid. The great trauma of her wedding 
night was that her husband said to her, after the first intercourse, “You 
have a great big hole, you deceived me.”106
Mrs. H.N. …., raised very puritanically, trembled at the thought of her 
wedding night. Her husband undressed her almost with violence without 
permitting her to go to bed. He took off his own clothes, demanding that 
she look at him nude and admire his penis. She hid her face in her hands. 
Then he exclaimed, “Why didn’t you stay home, you stupid idiot [espèce 
106 “Stekel rapporte à ce propos des exemples saisissants: 
Une dame de trente-six ans souffre depuis quatorze ans de douleurs lombaires si 
insupportables qu’elle doit garder le lit pendant plusieurs semaines…. Elle a ressenti 
cette violente douleur pour la première fois au cours de sa nuit de noces. Au cours de 
la défloration qui avait été excessivement douloureuse, son mari s’était écrié: ‘Tu m’as 
trompé, tu n’es plus vierge….’ La douleur est la fixation de cette scène pénible. Cette 
maladie est le châtiment du mari qui a dû dépenser de grosses sommes pour ses in-
nombrables cures…. Cette femme est restée insensible pendant la nuit de noces et elle 
l’est restée pendant tout le temps de son mariage…. La nuit de noces fut pour elle un 
affreux traumatisme déterminant toute sa vie future.
Une jeune femme me consulte pour plusieurs troubles nerveux et surtout une fri-
gidité absolue…. Dans la nuit de noces, son mari après l’avoir découverte se serait 
écrié: ‘Oh! comme tu as les jambes courtes et épaisses!’ Ensuite, il tenta le coït qui la 
laissa parfaitement insensible et ne lui causa que des douleurs…. Elle savait très bien 
que c’était l’offense de sa nuit de noces qui était la cause de sa frigidité.
Une autre femme frigide raconte que ‘pendant sa nuit de noces, son mari l’aurait 
profondément offensée: en la voyant se déshabiller, il aurait dit: ‘Mon Dieu que tu es 
maigre!’ Ensuite, il se serait décidé à la caresser. Pour elle, ce moment aurait été inou-
bliable et horrible. Quelle brutalité!
Mme. Z.W. est également complètement frigide. Le grand traumatisme de la nuit 
de noces fut que son mari lui aurait dit après le premier coït: ‘Tu as un grand trou, tu 
m’as trompé’” (DS 2:161–62).
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de gourde]! Finally, he threw her on the bed and brutally deflowered her. 
Naturally she remained frigid forever.107
Trauma can also result from the husband’s impotence: she cites an example 
from Freud—as summarized by Stekel.
A patient [une malade] had the habit of running from one room to an-
other room in the middle of which stood a table. Then she would arrange 
the tablecloth in a certain way, call the maid to approach the table, and 
then dismiss her…. When she tried to explain this obsession, she remem-
bered that the cloth had a nasty stain and that she would arrange it each 
time so that the stain would become obvious to the maid…. It was all a 
reproduction of the wedding night, when the husband had showed him-
self less than virile. He ran from his room to hers a thousand times to try 
again. Embarrassed about the maid who would have to make the beds, he 
poured out some red ink on the sheet to make her believe there was 
blood.108
Or, personal situation, conditioned by social milieu, can engender frigidity:
Miss G. S. … had given herself to a man, expecting that he would marry 
her, but insisting on the fact “that she didn’t care for marriage, she didn’t 
want to tie herself down.” She played at being the free woman. In truth, 
she was a slave to morality, like her whole family. But her lover believed 
her and never mentioned marriage. Her stubbornness became more and 
more intense until she became numb. When he finally asked her to marry 
107 “Mme. H.N.… élevée très pudiquement tremblait à l’idée de sa nuit de noces. Son mari la 
déshabilla presque avec violence sans lui permettre de se coucher. Il se débarrassa de ses 
vêtements en lui demandant de le regarder nu et d’admirer son pénis. Elle dissimula sa 
figure dans ses mains. Alors il s’exclama: ‘Pourquoi n’est-tu pas restée chez toi, espèce de 
gourde!’ Ensuite, il la jeta sur le lit et la déflora brutalement. Naturellement, elle demeura 
à jamais frigide” (DS 2:248).
108 “Une malade avait l’habitude de courir d’une chambre vers une autre au milieu de laquelle 
se trouvait une table. Elle arrangeait alors la nappe d’une certaine façon, sonnait la bonne 
qui devait s’approcher de la table et la congédiait…. Quand elle essaya d’expliquer cette 
obsession, elle se rappela que cette couverture avait une vilaine tache et qu’elle l’arrangeait 
chaque fois de façon que la tache devait sauter aux yeux de la bonne…. Le tout était une 
reproduction de la nuit de noces où le mari ne s’était pas montré viril. Il accourut mille 
fois de sa chambre dans la sienne pour essayer de nouveau. Ayant honte de la bonne qui 
devait faire les lits, il versa de l’encre rouge sur le drap pour lui faire croire qu’il y avait du 
sang” (DS 2:250).
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him, she revenged herself by declaring her lack of feeling, no longer wish-
ing to hear of a union….
A young girl of seventeen had a love-affair with a man in which she 
took intense pleasure. Pregnant at nineteen, she asked her lover to marry 
her; he was indecisive and advised her to have an abortion, which she 
refused to do. After three weeks, he declared that he was ready to marry 
her and she became his wife. But she never forgave him those three weeks 
of torture and became frigid…
Mrs. N.M. … learns that two days after her wedding her husband went 
to see an old mistress. The orgasm she had had before that disappeared 
forever.109
What emerges from this sorry litany? For one thing, Beauvoir adds to her in-
dictment of how women are brought up, an indictment of how men behave 
toward them through physical and verbal brutality or simply by not being up to 
the task (perhaps because men’s education, too, is faulty). To show how badly 
men treat women under patriarchy was not really Stekel’s overall point; but at 
the end of the day, what we have is a catalogue of male sexual insensitivity to 
rival The Golden Notebook.
109 “Mlle. G.S…. s’était donnée à un homme en attendant qu’il l’épouse, mais en insistant sur 
le fait ‘qu’elle ne tenait pas à un mariage, qu’elle ne voulait pas se lier.’ Elle jouait à la 
femme libre. En vérité, elle était esclave de la morale comme toute sa famille. Mais son 
amant la croyait et ne parlait jamais de mariage. Son opiniâtreté s’intensifiait de plus en 
plus jusqu’à ce qu’elle devînt insensible. Quand il la demanda enfin en mariage, elle se 
vengea en lui avouant son anesthésie et en ne voulant plus entendre parler d’une union. 
Elle ne voulait plus être heureuse. Elle avait trop attendu…. Elle se dévorait de jalousie et 
attendait anxieusement le jour de sa demande pour la refuser orgueilleusement. Ensuite, 
elle voulut se suicider uniquement pour punir son amant avec raffinement.
Une femme qui jusque-là avait eu du plaisir avec son mari, mais très jalouse, s’imagine 
pendant une maladie que son mari la trompe. En rentrant chez elle, elle décide de rester 
froide avec son mari. Jamais plus elle ne devrait être excitée par lui puisqu’il ne l’estimait 
pas et n’usait d’elle qu’en cas de besoin. Depuis son retour elle était frigide. Au début elle 
se servait de petits trucs pour ne pas être excitée. Elle se représentait son mari faisant la 
cour à son amie. Mais bientôt l’orgasme fut remplacé par des douleurs….
Une jeune fille de dix-sept ans avait une liaison avec un homme et y prenait un intense 
plaisir. Enceinte à dix-neuf ans, elle demanda à son amant de l’épouser: il fut indécis et lui 
conseilla de se faire avorter, ce qu’elle refusa. Après trois semaines, il se déclara prêt à 
l’épouser et elle devint sa femme. Mais elle ne lui pardonna jamais ces trois semaines de 
tourment et devint frigide. […]
Mrs. N.M.… apprend que son mari, deux jours après son mariage, est allé voir une an-
cienne maîtresse. L’orgasme qu’elle avait auparavant disparut à jamais” (DS 1:179).
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Does it “date” The Second Sex that it has no chapter on violence against 
women? Not so much, in my opinion. It is true that “rape” does not figure in the 
table of contents, so if you’re looking quickly for an excerpt on the topic to in-
clude on your Intro syllabus you won’t find one. What you will find, though, in 
the chapter on “sexual initiation,” is the statement that women’s first experi-
ence of sex is always more or less of “un viol,” a rape,110 and a quotation from 
Havelock Ellis to the effect that there is more rape inside of marriage than out 
of it.111 Perhaps she would not have been uncomfortable with the idea of a 
“rape continuum.” There are moments where she almost sounds like Andrea 
Dworkin.112
But insofar as she subsumes rape, including violent rape, under a broader 
category I’ve been calling “bad sex,” she is departing from a feminist view that 
was orthodox for many years: that rape should be understood not as sex but as 
violence.113 This may raise red flags for those who remember a shallow, anti-
feminist backlash book by Katie Roiphe, The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and Fem-
inism on Campus (1993), which argued that there was no such thing as date 
rape, just “bad sex.”114 It was Roiphe, I think, who started the backlash against 
what she called “victim feminism” (such as Take Back the Night marches). That 
approach was, to put it mildly, unhelpful to grass-roots activists on campuses 
(where rape remains epidemic); the uptake of the critique of “victim femi-
nism” from within feminism, by Naomi Wolf and others, seems to me a further 
step backward.115 This really is not what Beauvoir is doing, though: far from 
dismissing other problems as “just bad sex,” her claim is that what I’m calling 
110 DS 2:163.
111 DS 2:248.
112 For a fascinating application of Beauvoir’s phenomenology to the problem of violence 
against women, see now Fiona Vera-Gray, Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment: A Criti-
cal Analysis of Street Harassment.
113 I have vivid memories of a woman named Linda Morrison, at a training for campus advo-
cates in the 1990s, raising a rolling pin high over her head and saying, “if I hit you over the 
head with this, nobody in their right mind would say, wow, Linda Morrison’s baking. So 
just because a penis and a vagina are involved….”
114 Depressingly similar arguments appear periodically in the backlash against student cam-
pus activism, for instance, the 2014 Twitter war between #notallmen and #yesallwomen.
115 Naomi Wolf, Fire With Fire: The New Female Power and How to Use It (1994). For a strong 
analysis, see Alison Phipps, Politics of the Body. It’s hard not to notice that criticisms of 
women’s studies programs for “living in the past,” and denunciations of “left melancholy” 
as if that were a character flaw—which is not at all what Walter Benjamin meant, by the 
way—followed soon after Roiphe’s fifteen minutes of fame, and tended in the same 
 direction. See for instance Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late 
Modernity.
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bad sex is in itself a manifestation of male power, and a very bad problem 
indeed.
But is she then saying—and many have claimed this—that something is 
wrong with women? Did Beauvoir hate the female body, and idealize the male 
body and men more generally? Quite close to passages I’ve been discussing is a 
section that has been key in those arguments and that I admit I myself have 
never loved. It connects back to the idea of women’s sexual arousal as simulta-
neous attraction and repulsion—the idea Beauvoir advanced as something all 
the psychoanalysts, including Stekel, had failed to understand or seemed not 
to know.
Feminine sex desire [rut] is the soft throbbing of a mollusk. Whereas man 
is impetuous, woman is only impatient; her expectation can become ar-
dent without ceasing to be passive; man dives upon his prey like the eagle 
and the hawk; woman lies in wait like a carnivorous plant, a swamp which 
insects and children sink into. She is suction, leech-like suction, inhala-
tion, she is pitch and glue, a passive appeal [appel], insinuating and vis-
cous: thus, at least, she vaguely feels herself to be. This is why there is in 
her not only resistance against the male who claims to make her submit, 
but also interior conflict….116
Commentators, most especially Michèle Le Dœuff, have noted that the lan-
guage of “holes and slime” is Sartrean language, and have found it problematic 
here. I certainly agree that as a description of what women’s body is, in the in-
itself, essence, Being sense of “is,” this would clearly be unacceptable. (I am not 
a mollusk. Do not call me a mollusk.)117 But is this such a description? Suppose 
116 Toril Moi’s translation of this passage (Making of an Intellectual Woman, 168) helped me 
here, but I have modified it slightly. “Le rut féminin, c’est la molle palpitation d’un coquil-
lage; tandis que l’homme a de l’impétuosité, la femme n’a que de l’impatience: son attente 
peut devenir ardente sans cesser d’être passive; l’homme fond sur sa proie comme l’aigle et 
le milan; elle guette comme la plante carnivore, le marécage où insectes et enfants 
s’enlisent; elle est succion, ventouse, humeuse, elle est poix et glu, un appel immobile, in-
sinuant et visqueux: du moins est-ce ainsi que sourdement elle se sent. C’est pourquoi, il 
n’y a pas seulement en elle résistance contre le mâle qui prétend la soumettre, mais aussi 
conflit intérieur. Aux tabous, aux inhibitions provenant de son éducation et de la société 
se superposent des dégoûts, des refus qui ont leur source dans l’expérience érotique elle-
même: les uns et les autres se renforcent mutuellement si bien qu’après le premier coït la 
femme est très souvent plus révoltée qu’auparavant contre son destin sexuel” (DS 2:167).
117 I started to write, I am not viscous, but then again … OK, I took a shower, so I’m not vis-
cous right now. But surely if one is not at least somewhat viscous during intercourse, it’s 
going to hurt like hell?
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we read this paragraph in the light of her statement (early in Volume 1) that 
“the body is not a thing, it is a situation,”118 and note the end of its penultimate 
sentence: “du moins est-ce ainsi que sourdement elle se sent” (thus, at least, 
she vaguely feels herself to be), “sourdement” meaning, literally, “deaf-ly.” Is it 
not, rather, a description of how it might feel like for a young girl who has been 
taught to hate and fear her body to be waiting in bed for a man she only sort of 
knows, to come and do, she’s not exactly sure what, to her—although she 
knows she wants him to do something … As a phenomenological account of 
that lived experience (which is not everybody’s, not always, need not be, should 
not be) it may actually be sort of … recognizable?119
Now, the challenge of reading volume 2 is keeping one’s mind fixed on the 
governing theoretical language that opens it: “I do not refer to any archetype, 
or any unchangeable essence; after most of my statements, one must under-
stand [sous-entendre] ‘under present conditions of education and society.’”120 
Bearing that in mind, and in the proximate context of rapes, near rapes, insults, 
misinformation, and general misery with which Beauvoir has just loaded us, it 
seems to me better to see the “mollusk” section as a description of a woman’s 
experience of her body as conditioned by patriarchy, and not in a shallow way.
If so, this section can be read to show that women’s sexual misery is a non-
trivial aspect of their oppression, a crime, something worth discussing in order 
to change it. Part of being a woman is experiencing your own body as loath-
some to yourself. In a culture where women still starve themselves, cut them-
selves, rot out their insides with induced vomiting—all phenomena Beauvoir 
explicitly discusses, by the way—can we really claim that this is dated?
118 DS 1:73. “[D]ans la perspective que j’adopte—celle de Heidegger, de Sartre, de Merleau-
Ponty—si le corps n’est pas une chose, il est une situation: c’est notre prise sur le monde 
et l’esquisse de nos projets.”
119 Marso and Moynagh make the point that Beauvoir generally “makes a vital distinction 
between ontological claims … and phenomenological claims” (Simone de Beauvoir’s Politi-
cal Thinking, 4). For a fuller explanation of the phenomenological background see Sara 
Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beau-
voir. See also now Jennifer McWeeny, “The Second Sex of Consciousness.”
120 “When I use the words ‘woman’ or ‘feminine’ obviously I am not referring to any arche-
type or any unchangeable essence; after most of my claims the reader should infer ‘in the 
current state of education and social custom.’ The point is not to set forth some eternal 
Truths, but to describe the common background from which every singular woman’s ex-
istence takes off.” [Quand j’emploie les mots ‘femme’ ou ‘féminin’ je ne me réfère évidem-
ment à aucun archétype, à aucune immuable essence; après la plupart de mes affirma-
tions il faut sous-entendre ‘dans l’état actuel de l’éducation et des mœurs.’ Il ne s’agit pas 
ici d’énoncer des vérités éternelles mais de décrire le fond commun sur lequel s’enlève 
toute existence féminine singulière (DS 2:9).]
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Fifth: Stekel’s examples as Beauvoir deploys them provide a powerful cri-
tique of bourgeois marriage. He did not mean to do this. She meant to do this. 
The critique is undertaken directly in the name of sexual pleasure. She meant 
this, too. The young girl, she says, is sold a bill of goods in the name of bour-
geois “bonheur”; sex can, indeed, be an excellent thing; but “the principle of 
marriage is obscene.” Following closely on a page-long account of a woman’s 
disappointment on her wedding night, owing to the husband’s timidity and 
inexperience, Beauvoir writes:
The difficulties of the early experiences are easily overcome, when love or 
desire draws a complete consent from both partners. Physical love draws 
its power and dignity from the joy the lovers give and receive in the mu-
tual consciousness of their freedom. Nothing they do can then be shame-
ful, since neither of them is submitting to it: it is generously desired by 
both of them. But the principle of marriage is obscene because it trans-
forms an exchange which should be founded on a spontaneous impulse 
into rights and duties; it gives the bodies an instrumental, thus degrading 
character in dooming them to take hold of their generality.121
The abstraction “generality” is part of an argument she is carrying on with 
Hegel, but that need not detain us here, since what is at stake is not at all ab-
stract. The passage continues: “The husband is often chilled by the thought 
that he is carrying out a duty, and the wife feels shame, finding herself at the 
mercy of someone exercising his rights.”122 Sex is good but only when it is free. 
As she has said much earlier, “[s]exual instinct cannot be regulated … it will 
not let itself be integrated into the social,123 because there is in eroticism a re-
volt of the instant against time, of the individual against the universal.”124 But 
121 “Les difficultés des premières expériences sont aisément surmontées si l’amour ou le désir 
arrachent aux deux partenaires un total consentement; de la joie que se donnent et pren-
nent les amants dans la conscience réciproque de leur liberté, l’amour physique tire sa 
puissance et sa dignité; alors aucune de leurs pratiques n’est infâme puisque, pour aucun, 
elle n’est subie mais généreusement voulue. Mais le principe du mariage est obscène 
parce qu’il transforme en droits et devoirs un échange qui doit être fondé sur un élan 
spontané; il donne aux corps en les vouant à se saisir dans leur généralité un caractère 
instrumental, donc dégradant” (DS 2:254–55).
122 “[L]e mari est souvent glacé par l’idée qu’il accomplit un devoir, et la femme a honte de se 
sentir livrée à quelqu’un qui exerce sur elle un droit” (DS 2:255).
123 “Le social.” We might say “social system,” or just “it will not let itself be socialized.”
124 “[O]n ne peut réglementer l’instinct sexuel … il ne se laisse pas intégrer au social parce 
qu’il y a dans l’érotisme une révolte de l’instant contre le temps, de l’individuel contre 
l’universel” (DS 1:103–4). She says something quite similar in her essay on Sade; and she 
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when eroticism is pressed into service to mean, or to support, something other 
than itself—the state, bourgeois values, an economic bargain, or even an en-
during relationship—the revolutionary character of free eroticism cannot sur-
vive. And, as she continues to describe at some length, it is not just that such 
relations should (theoretically) not be satisfying, they actually and concretely 
are not satisfying, at least after a time.
6 The Trouble with Happy
I agree with commentators who have read these passages, and a few others, as 
signs of a utopian strain in Beauvoir’s writing about the possibilities of sex and 
love; both Debra Bergoffen and Karen Vintges have emphasized Beauvoir’s de-
velopment of a sexual ethics of mutual recognition and reciprocity between 
equals, which is particularly salient when contrasted with Sartre’s much grim-
mer vision of human relationship and his devaluation of emotion.125 For in-
stance, at the end of her chapter on “sexual initiation”: “the normal and happy 
flowering of female eroticism” requires that “woman succeed in surmounting 
her passivity and in establishing with her partner a relationship of reciprocity.”126 
But Vintges and Bergoffen are concerned with love and not with sex as such—
Vintges calls her chapter “A Place for Love”—and both tend to elide the part of 
Beauvoir’s discussion that is specifically sexual, sexual in a concrete and em-
bodied way. Vintges discusses the frigid woman only as she appears in L’être et 
le néant, and Bergoffen never mentions frigidity at all.
Beauvoir certainly did take the view that if and when sexuality was not root-
ed in a traditional economy with the man as taking and the woman as giving 
drew the ethical reflection in an early diary, as Margaret Simons underlines: “The diary 
passage (for May 6, 1927) reads in part ‘I had just seen Barbier again …. [O]ne instant I 
held in my hands an entirely new life …. The horror of the definitive choice, is that it en-
gages not only the self of today, but that of tomorrow, which is why basically marriage is 
immoral” (Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism, 
195). See also Altman, “Beauvoir and the Sexual Revolution.”
125 A similar argument was advanced by Barbara Andrew in her paper “How Love Allows One 
To Be Free and Vice Versa.” See Bergoffen, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered 
Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities, and Vintges, Philosophy as Passion, although Vintges 
notes that Beauvoir “retains the barb of Sartre’s thinking”: in general, her discussion is 
more nuanced and textually grounded than Bergoffen’s. See also Bauer, Beauvoir, Philoso-
phy, & Feminism, 224–37.
126 “Cet épanouissement suppose que–dans l’amour, la tendresse, la sensualité–la femme 
réussisse à surmonter sa passivité et à établir avec son partenaire un rapport de réciproc-
ité” (DS 2:189).
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(or providing a service), and provided the sexual act itself could be spontane-
ous and autonomous, it was of enormous value, and that the changes to the 
world that would be necessary for this to come about were changes worth 
working for. The passages where Beauvoir discusses this are lovely. But they are 
tantalizingly brief, and they are rare; whereas the discussions of bad sex are 
all-too-frequent, all-too-long, all-too-ugly, and very concrete. Bergoffen herself 
does not claim otherwise; she says Beauvoir “speaks in more than one voice—a 
voice of the project that appeals to traditional Marxist-existentialist analyses, 
and a voice that challenges the ethic of the project by calling on the categories 
of generosity, the gift, and the erotic to liberate us from the perversions of pa-
triarchal gender.”127 Within philosophy today this may count as a brave claim. 
But we should think about what we do when we use euphemisms like “erotic” 
and “embodiment” and the “bond”—a word I do not think ever appears in The 
Second Sex—to talk about, well, fucking, and orgasm, and being made to feel 
like a thing rather than a person. Bergoffen’s epilogue notes that
a book dedicated to the un-thought of Beauvoir’s work is a paradoxical 
enterprise. On the one hand, the point of the book is to assert the pres-
ence of a thinking that is integral to the body of Beauvoir’s philosophy. 
On the other hand, it recognizes that the thinking it points to is barely 
acknowledged by Beauvoir herself.
I do not pretend to understand why the category of the erotic, the re-
vised description of intentionality, the paradigm of generosity, and the 
ethic of the gift remains on the margins of Beauvoir’s work.128
Well. There is a broader point to be made here about the tension between two 
sorts of approaches philosophers take to the work of earlier philosophers. One 
kind, often disparaged as merely “history of philosophy,” “not really philoso-
phy,” undertakes to provide an accurate, historicized account of what the ear-
lier writer was doing, to represent their views fully and fairly even when dis-
agreeing with them. In the other kind, a small amount (sometimes a very small 
amount) of source material serves as stimulus or jumping-off point for the 
later writer’s own creative and speculative thought. Both can be productive for 
feminism, but the latter can sometimes leave one feeling faintly crazy. (“Did 
she read the same book I read? Is there something wrong with my head?”) Hav-
ing read a number of books with titles like Hegel’s Philosophy of X which might 
more accurately have been titled Rhapsody on a Theme by Hegel, I appreciate 
127 Bergoffen, Philosophy of Beauvoir, 110.
128 Ibid., 221.
61Unhappy Bodies: The Frigid Woman in The Second Sex
Bergoffen’s honest epilogue, but I admit to finding this approach to scholarship 
methodologically foreign—and somewhat perverse.
And I especially have trouble following Bergoffen’s slippage from “an ethic 
that figures our desire for recognition according to the paradigms of generosity 
and the gift” to the idea that Beauvoir somehow might see (certain kinds of) 
marriages as worth celebrating after all.129 This is informed by what I can only 
call wishful thinking. One may disagree with Beauvoir, but what she said was 
“the principle of marriage is obscene,” and that is, I believe, what she meant.130
(Is the feminist critique of marriage itself dated? It is true that one rarely 
hears it in public any more, even from queers. One has to be so careful not to 
question any woman’s choice. “There’s nothing to be gained by offending peo-
ple.” Is there then nothing to be lost by being afraid of offending people?)
Perhaps here is the place to say that Beauvoir’s focus on sexuality, which I’ve 
been emphasizing here, is not in contradiction to the fundamentally material-
ist analysis that undergirds The Second Sex. Sexuality and economics are tight-
ly intertwined for her, or rather, bad sex and economics are intertwined.131 
What ruins sex for women, even after the difficulties of initiation have been 
overcome (and incidentally also ruins sex for men) is that it is embedded in a 
system of economic relationships—chiefly marriage, but her discussion is 
more wide-ranging (see for example her chapters on the prostitute, and on the 
woman in love, who is often a kept mistress rather than a wife). As long as 
some or most women derive their income from marriage, the economic lot of 
even those women who do not marry is worsened: wages for “women’s work” 
are depressed; the temptation to add to one’s low income by taking money 
from men for sex, directly or indirectly (“se faire aider”) understandably be-
comes greater; this in turn influences the already unpleasant and sexualized 
conditions of the workplace; all of which makes marriage, even where not 
women’s only choice, more attractive than it would otherwise be, thus per-
petuating the whole system, da capo al fine. (If at this point you’re saying, wait, 
129 Ibid., 7.
130 To be fair, Parshley’s version—“marriage is obscene in principle”—somewhat weakens 
the axiomatic force of Beauvoir’s claim in English, as a thing could be bad “in principle” 
(“in theory”) but OK “in practice.” Parshley’s sentence can be read along those lines, but if 
Beauvoir had meant this, she would have said something like “en principe, le mariage est 
obscène.”
131 One might contrast this to “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,” where Koedt describes the 
reasons women sleep with men, fake orgasm, etc., as psychological; she doesn’t discuss 
the economic or other pragmatic factors that frame women’s sexual choices. Adrienne 
Rich would later restore the economic analysis to the discussion of sex in “Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.”
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they told me Beauvoir was a bourgeois liberal feminist with no class analysis … 
yes, they probably did tell you that. You have to read the book.)132
The link forged between sex and money by the marriage system is harmful 
to women in at least two ways. First, because it disadvantages them with re-
spect to men (men have power over women in bed because of all the ways men 
have power over women outside the bed); but second, because sex is not the 
sort of thing about which one should engage in economic relationships, buy-
ing, exchange. It amounts to buying and selling the body, buying and selling 
what is precious about individual subjectivity. That’s why the utopian sentence 
about the instant and the individual occurs in the chapter on Marx and Engels, 
rather than in the chapter on Freud. Even if the bargain of marriage could 
somehow be made fairer (for instance, suppose the state paid women wages 
for housework including sexual services), that would not satisfy Beauvoir’s ob-
jection. She remains outraged by the idea of sexuality as a “service,” the idea 
that it should enter into a nexus of economic exchange at all.
Outrage is not too strong a word. We learn from Mémoires d’une jeune fille 
rangée that it was Beauvoir’s best friend, Zaza, who first made the connection 
for her, pointing out that there was no difference between bourgeois marriage 
and prostitution, except for the amounts of money involved. Zaza figured this 
out on her own, without having taken Feminist Theory, as her mother was trot-
ting her around in hopes of arranging a money marriage, while forbidding her 
to have any contact (even through letters) with the man she actually loved. 
Beauvoir attributed her friend’s tragic death to the frustration of both spirit 
and body, the contradictions between Zaza’s lucidity about her individual 
needs and her loyalty to her mother’s bourgeois world; I think she kept faith 
with that moment of disgust and insight her whole life. The last line of Mé-
moires d’une jeune fille rangée reads: “Together we had fought against the dank 
quicksands of the destiny which lay in wait for her, and for a long time I felt 
that I had bought my freedom with her death.”133 This sounds both melodra-
matic and romantic, I know, but Toril Moi has observed that existentialism is a 
melodramatic philosophy, and second wave feminism, at least in the United 
States, was (despite its attack on the selling of romance) in some ways a roman-
tic movement, hoping to recover the real body underneath the makeup and 
the trappings, to find the real love (heterosexual or otherwise) that at least 
potentially lay on the other side of revolution, once the “power trips” had been 
132 I’ll have more to say about Beauvoir’s materialism in chapter 3.
133 “Ensemble nous avions lutté contre le destin fangeux qui nous guettait et j’ai pensé long-
temps que j’avais payé ma liberté de sa mort” (mjfr, 503).
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gotten out of the way: the hope that (as Foucault would rather snidely parody 
such discourses of liberation) “tomorrow sex will be good again.”134
Or perhaps the critique of marriage would have struck Beauvoir even with-
out Zaza’s mediation. In Une mort très douce, she writes about her own mother: 
“Her case would have been enough to convince me that bourgeois marriage 
was an unnatural institution.”135
So in Beauvoir’s chapter about marriage, the discourse of frigidity was being 
deployed against the selling of bourgeois married happiness (“bonheur” was 
the code word, in her early diaries, for the possibility of marriage to her cousin, 
which while attractive in some ways would have put an end to her indepen-
dence and her intellectual life). This connects to the crucial distinction in her 
introduction between “happiness” and “freedom,” which is worth reading in its 
full context:
When we look through books about woman, we note that among the 
viewpoints most usually adopted is the perspective of the public good or 
the general interest. In truth, what each writer means by this is the inter-
est of society as he wishes to maintain or establish it. As for us, we hold 
that there is no public good other than that which ensures the private 
good of citizens; we judge institutions by the concrete opportunities they 
provide for individuals. But we do not confuse the idea of private interest 
with the notion of happiness, another frequently-encountered point of 
view: aren’t women in a harem happier than a woman voter? Isn’t the 
housewife happier than the woman worker [l’ouvrière]? It’s hard to really 
know what the word “happiness” means, much less what authentic val-
ues it may mask [recouvre]; there is no way to measure someone else’s 
happiness [le bonheur d’autrui] and it is always easy to declare that the 
situation one wants to impose on them is a happy one: in particular, 
those whom one condemns to stagnation, one declares happy under the 
pretext that happiness is immobility…. [Happiness] is therefore a notion 
to which we will not refer. The perspective we adopt is that of existential-
ist ethics. Every subject poses himself concretely, by means of projects, as 
a transcendence; he accomplishes his freedom only by perpetually mov-
ing through and beyond it [dépassement] toward other freedoms; there 
is  no justification for present existence save its expansion toward an 
134 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 7, in the discussion of “the speaker’s benefit.” For historical 
context, see Didier Eribon, “Michel Foucault’s Histories of Sexuality.”
135 “[Q]ue le mariage bourgeois soit une institution contre nature, son cas suffirait à m’en 
convaincre” (Une mort très douce, 51).
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 infinitely open future. Each time transcendence falls back into imma-
nence there is degradation from existence to “in itself,” from freedom to 
facticity. This fall is a moral failing [faute] if the subject consents to it; if it 
is inflicted on the subject, it takes the shape of a frustration and an op-
pression; either way, it is an absolute evil.136
Here Beauvoir anticipates, and argues against, not just the functionalist objec-
tion that marriage (and the subjection of women more broadly) is a necessary 
pillar of civil society required to support the State, but also the criticism that 
many if not most women prefer to be married and actively seek happiness 
through marriage rather than through work and economic independence. 
They may well do so, but their complicity is only one more sign of their subor-
dination. This point was well summarized by Shulamith Firestone from the 
perspective of 1970: “Why should a woman give up her precious seat in the 
cattle car for a bloody struggle she could not hope to win?”137 Slaves, and wom-
en under patriarchy, may be told by their masters that they are happy; they 
may put on a good show of being happy, and may even sincerely believe it. But 
that is no excuse for not freeing them. Consent is no defense.
To be sure, bringing Stekel to bear on a critique of bourgeois institutions 
involves reading him very much against the grain. His cases tend to have rather 
136 “Si nous passons en revue quelques-uns des ouvrages consacrés à la femme, nous voyons 
qu’un des points de vue le plus souvent adopté, c’est celui du bien public, de l’intérêt gé-
néral; en vérité chacun entend par là l’intérêt de la société telle qu’il souhaite la maintenir 
ou l’établir. Nous estimons quant à nous qu’il n’y a d’autre bien public que celui qui assure 
le bien privé des citoyens; c’est du point de vue des chances concrètes données aux indi-
vidus que nous jugeons les institutions. Mais nous ne confondons pas non plus l’idée 
d’intérêt privé avec celle de bonheur; c’est là un autre point de vue qu’on rencontre 
fréquemment; les femmes de harem ne sont-elles pas plus heureuses qu’une électrice? La 
ménagère n’est-elle pas plus heureuse que l’ouvrière? On ne sait trop que le mot bonheur 
signifie et encore moins quelles valeurs authentiques il recouvre; il n’y a aucune possibi-
lité de mesurer le bonheur d’autrui et il est toujours facile de déclarer heureuse la situa-
tion qu’on veut lui imposer: ceux qu’on condamne à la stagnation en particulier, on les 
déclare heureux sous prétexte que le bonheur est immobilité. C’est donc une notion à 
laquelle nous ne nous référons pas. La perspective que nous adoptons, c’est celle de la 
morale existentialiste. Tout sujet se pose concrètement à travers des projets comme une 
transcendance; il n’accomplit sa liberté que par son perpétuel dépassement vers d’autres 
libertés; il n’y a d’autre justification de l’existence présente que son expansion vers un 
avenir indéfiniment ouvert. Chaque fois que la transcendance retombe en immanence il 
y a dégradation de l’existence en ‘en soi,’ de la liberté en facticité; cette chute est une faute 
morale si elle est consentie par le sujet; si elle lui est infligée, elle prend la figure d’une 
frustration et d’une oppression; elle est dans les deux cas un mal absolu …” (DS 1:30–31).
137 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, 1.
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pat happy endings, like Dr. David Reuben’s. Usually she omits these; at least 
once she includes it (in explaining why a woman frigid in her first marriage 
may be sexually happier with a lover or a second husband), but then notes, 
“[n]ot all affairs have fairy-tale endings.”138
As I noted earlier, Stekel’s name gradually drops out of the last third of vol-
ume 2, but “the frigid woman” does not. In the last sections, Beauvoir suggests 
that, in her misery and “rancune,” the frigid woman, like the masochist, at least 
has a self, a “moi,” and that rather than dissolving herself in eroticism, she af-
firms this “moi” through her resistance and may even achieve some lucidity in 
doing so. Apropos of the question of how “the independent woman” can satisfy 
her sexual desires, she considers the idea that women could simply purchase 
sexual services, as men have done for so long, but rejects this option as simply 
unsatisfying.
Masculine pride conceals the ambiguity of the erotic drama from the 
male: he lies to himself easily and spontaneously. Women are more easily 
humiliated, more sensitive, and also more lucid: she will only succeed in 
blinding herself at the cost of a more calculated bad faith. To buy herself 
a man, even if she could afford it, usually wouldn’t seem satisfying 
to her.139
Perhaps the fact that women demand more from sexual encounters than men 
do is not actually a character flaw. Perhaps it is a sign of her greater potential 
for authenticity. In her essay on Sade, she says that “infliger une jouissance” 
(inflicting a pleasure, or inflicting an orgasm) can be a terrible thing, a terrible 
defeat for the object.140 Perhaps not to give in is better. The worst thing a wom-
an can do is identify herself wholly with her status as object, as the narcissist 
and the woman in love do. It is better to be an unhappy person than a happy 
thing.
This all sounds very odd, doesn’t it? So I was reassured to have my reading 
confirmed in the clearer context of an interview Beauvoir gave in 1976, that is, 
after she had identified herself with, and put her energies fully at the disposal 
of, the resurgent and vigorous Women’s Liberation Movement.
138 “Toutes les liaisons ne s’achèvent pas ainsi en conte de fées” (DS 2:424).
139 “L’orgueil viril masque au mâle les équivoques du drame érotique: il se ment spontané-
ment; plus facilement humiliée, plus susceptible, la femme est aussi plus lucide; elle ne 
réussira à s’aveugler qu’au prix d’une mauvaise foi plus rusée. S’acheter un mâle, à sup-
poser qu’elle en ait les moyens, ne lui semblera généralement pas satisfaisant” (DS 2:608).
140 Faut-il brûler Sade?, 20.
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Alice Schwarzer: What role do you think sexuality, as it is understood to-
day, plays in the oppression of women?
Simone de Beauvoir: I think that sexuality can be a dreadful trap. Some 
women become frigid—but that is not perhaps the worst thing that can 
happen to them. The worst is for women to find sexuality so enjoyable 
that they become more or less slaves to men—which can be another link 
in the chain shackling women to men.
Alice Schwarzer: If I understand you correctly, you see frigidity, given 
the current state of malaise created by the power relationships between 
men and women, as a more cautious and appropriate reaction, because it 
reflects this unease, and makes women less dependent on men?
Simone de Beauvoir: Exactly.141
Notice how neatly this reverses Sartre’s use of the frigid woman to define bad 
faith. For Beauvoir, the narcissist is in bad faith, and the woman in love is in 
bad faith, and the lesbian may or may not be in bad faith depending on how 
she “assumes her situation” (see chapter 2 below); and we can extrapolate that 
a woman who fakes orgasm to hang on to her meal ticket might be in bad faith. 
But by the end of the book, the frigid woman is simply being honest, not just 
with her speech, but with her whole body, refusing to understand herself as 
only an object.142 This is the opposite of bad faith, this is authenticity. And this 
is politics.
7 Misery, Agency, Ethics
However, in summarizing Beauvoir’s use of Stekel, some troubling points re-
main so far unaccounted for by my analysis. In the chapter on “La mère,” as I 
141 Alice Schwarzer, Simone de Beauvoir Today: Conversations 1972–1982, 76–7.
142 Odd as this may sound, Beauvoir has some company here. Alison Moore mentions that 
Andrea Dworkin “ironically … considered the invention of frigidity to be a lesser form of 
misogyny than the pornographic stereotypes of women as voracious nymphomaniacs, 
remarking, ‘Perhaps this is a recognition, however perverse, that no one could possibly 
like or want what men do to women’” (“Invention of the UnSexual: Situating Frigidity in 
the History of Sexuality and in Feminist Thought,” 182–83, quoting Dworkin, Pornography: 
Men Possessing Women, 179). Moore also mentions Elizabeth Grosz “paraphrasing Luce 
Irigaray: ‘The so-called “frigid woman” is precisely the woman whose pleasures do not fit 
neatly into the male-defined norms of sexual pleasure’” and then quoting Irigaray: “Many 
women believe they are ‘frigid’ and they are often told this is so. When a woman tells me 
she is ‘frigid,’ I laugh and tell her I don’t know what this means” (182, quoting Grosz, Sexual 
Subversions: Three French Feminists, 133).
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mentioned earlier, she invokes his authority for the claim that morning sick-
ness “always expresses a refusal of the child”;143 she also takes up three bits 
from one of his case subjects who describes childbirth itself, and then breast-
feeding, as sexually exciting, and describes this in a disturbingly erotic way.144 
Perhaps she deploys these examples to undermine and interrupt a bourgeois 
construction of maternal “instinct” as the automatic, innocent, redemptive at-
tribute of “la bonne pondeuse”? The “prevaricating woman” and her friend the 
“malade imaginaire” (his unsympathetic version of the “hysteric”) are a much 
stronger presence in Stekel than in Beauvoir, but they are here, too.
Perhaps this is in line with Alice Schwarzer’s observation that Beauvoir of-
fered women an explanation, but never an excuse.145 On an abstract level, 
holding women responsible for their sexual feelings gives women back what 
later feminists would call agency. It’s hard to feel easy in one’s mind about this, 
remembering how mainstream American psychoanalysts blamed and abused 
women in the 1950s,146 and how closer to our own time Katie Roiphe used a 
similar line of reasoning to undermine women’s right to say they have been 
sexually assaulted. But Beauvoir’s version is considerably more complex. She 
recognizes a terrain of human lived experience that is neither wholly given nor 
wholly voluntary.
I am not sure subsequent work on this problem has brought us closer to 
solving it, theoretically or practically. In the early 1980s, Carole Vance explained 
that it was a mistake to confuse the view of sexuality as socially and culturally 
constructed with the view that sexuality is voluntary or easy to change. “The 
cultural analogue is useful here, for although human cultures are arbitrary in 
that behavior is learned and not intrinsic, anthropologists do not believe that 
entire cultures can transform themselves overnight, or that individuals social-
ized in one cultural tradition can acculturate at will.”147 What feminists then 
(in the early days of what came to be called the “sex wars”) were arguing about 
was not so much whether sexual patterning could be changed, but rather 
whether, and when, it made feminist sense to try to do so. There is a clear break 
between the way feminists talked about this in the early 1970s, when the point 
143 DS 2:353.
144 DS 2:363, 371.
145 Schwarzer, “Introduction,” Simone de Beauvoir Today, 25, but the knife of the thought is 
clearer in the French: “Pour moi, la vie et l’œuvre de Simone de Beauvoir sont un défi 
lancé aux hommes et aux femmes. Car si les femmes peuvent trouver dans sa théorie 
l’explication de leur situation, elle ne pourra jamais leur servir d’excuse” (Simone de Beau-
voir aujourd’hui: six entretiens, 26).
146 See e.g. Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 66–72.
147 Carole Vance, “Introduction,” Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, 9.
Chapter 168
of consciousness raising was described as “starting to stop,” collectively uncov-
ering the patriarchal roots of one’s inmost feelings in order to work at changing 
them,148 and the way most of us (I think) now approach, for instance, the task 
of increasing the feminist awareness of our students in introductory women’s 
studies classes. One does not want to be prescriptive (indeed, that would 
be  contradictory to the idea of consciousness-raising as authentic self- 
transformation) but I do think most of us, including most of the students, are 
at least vaguely hoping that something will change, internally as well as exter-
nally. (Isn’t this what “awareness” means?) It is not always easy to find the mid-
dle ground between silencing or “shutting other people down,” and the posi-
tion caricatured in The Onion as: “Women Now Empowered By Everything A 
Woman Does.”149 (Note the “now,” which implies a “then.”)
Plenty of examples support the view that Beauvoir’s support and sympathy 
for whatever a woman did was not automatic. “There is some truth” in men’s 
indictment of women’s conduct, though “it is not dictated by her hormones” 
but molded by her situation.150 In the interests of balance, I’ll include my least 
favorite example of Beauvoir’s use of Stekel, from her chapter on “La vie de 
société” (Social Life): three really excessive stories of women who can only ex-
perience orgasm on the gynecologist’s table. I hope Stekel made these up, and 
I’m not entirely sorry Parshley omitted most of this.
[T]hree-quarters of the men who are persecuted by erotomaniacs are 
doctors: it gives many women great exhibitionist pleasure to strip for a 
man.
I know some women, says Stekel, who find their only satisfaction in 
the examination by a doctor they fancy. Among old maids especially, a 
large number of patients come to see the doctor to be examined “very 
carefully” for a minor vaginal discharge or some little problem. Others 
148 See Robin Morgan, “Introduction,” Sisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings from 
the Women’s Liberation Movement (1970), especially xxvi-xxvii. See also Campbell, “A Fem-
inist Sexual Politics: Now You See It, Now You Don’t”; Rachel DuPlessis and Ann Snitow, 
eds., The Feminist Memoir Project;  Sandra Bartky, “Feminine Masochism and the Politics of 
Personal Transformation.” In this last piece, which originally appeared in 1984, Bartky both 
uses, and examines, the language of ethical self-scrutiny, of “criticism and self-criticism.”
149 The Onion, February 19, 2003. Actually, this is not entirely a caricature: see Nina Power’s 
analysis of Jessica Valenti’s Full Frontal Feminism: A Young Woman’s Guide to Why Femi-
nism Matters, in One Dimensional Woman, 35.
150 “Il y a dans toutes ces affirmations une vérité. Seulement les conduites que l’on dénonce 
ne sont pas dictées à la femme par ses hormones ni préfigurées dans les cases de son 
cerveau: elles sont indiquées en creux par sa situation” (DS 2:483).
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suffer from a cancer phobia, or fears of infection (from a toilet) and these 
phobias give them a pretext for being examined.
He cites among others the two following cases:
B.V., a rich old maid of forty-three, goes to see a doctor once a month, af-
ter her period, demanding a very careful exam because she thought 
something was wrong. Each month she picks a new doctor and each time 
plays out the same scene. The doctor asks her to undress and lie down on 
the table or the couch. She refuses, saying she is too modest, that it is 
against nature! The doctor forces her or gently persuades her, she un-
dresses, finally, explaining that she is a virgin and that he must be careful 
not to hurt her. He promises to give her a rectal exam. Often the orgasm 
appears as soon as the examination begins; it is repeated, and intensifies, 
during the rectal exam. She always goes under a false name and pays im-
mediately…. She admits that she has played with the idea of being raped 
by a doctor….
Mrs. L.M., thirty-eight, married, tells me she is completely sexually 
numb with her husband. She comes to be analyzed. Only after two ses-
sions does she admit to having a lover. But he does not succeed in bring-
ing her to orgasm. She only has them when being examined by a gyne-
cologist. (Her father was a gynecologist!) Nearly every second or third 
session, she is driven to go to a doctor and ask for an examination. Some-
times she asks for a treatment, and those are her happiest times. The last 
time, a gynecologist gave her a long massage because of a supposedly 
prolapsed uterus. Every massage led to many orgasms. She explains her 
passion for these examinations by the first one she ever had, which 
brought on the first orgasm of her life….
A woman can easily imagine that the man to whom she has bared her-
self has been impressed by her physical charms or her beautiful soul, and 
so in pathological cases she persuades herself that the priest or the doc-
tor is in love with her. Even if she is normal, she gets the impression that 
a subtle connection has been forged between him and her; she revels in 
respectful obedience; sometimes, however, she draws from this a confi-
dence that helps her to accept her life.151
151 “[L]es trois quarts des hommes que persécutent les érotomanes sont des médecins; dé-
nuder son corps devant un homme représente pour maintes femmes un grand plaisir 
exhibitionniste. 
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What are we to make of this? Is it simply a feature of the encyclopedic nature 
of The Second Sex, its “nothing human is alien to me” quality, which, I am argu-
ing, interrupts and problematizes any idea that a unitary, naturalized account 
of “woman” can be given? It may be more significant that the women who love 
doctors too much are highly respectable bourgeoises, and that these examples 
come in the chapter on “La vie de société” (Parshley translates this as “social 
life,” but “société” here refers more specifically an uppercrust form of life, as in 
our phrase “high society”). It is as if to say: see, your nice normal banal “bon-
heur” has this kind of rot at its root, drives women to this kind of insanity. 
Beauvoir didn’t hate women, but she sure didn’t like ladies very much. Those 
Je connais quelques femmes, dit Stekel, qui trouvent leur seule satisfaction dans 
l’examen par un médecin qui leur est sympathique. C’est particulièrement parmi les 
vieilles filles qu’on trouve un grand nombre de malades qui viennent voir le médecin 
pour se faire examiner ‘très soigneusement’ pour des pertes sans importance ou pour 
un trouble quelconque. D’autres souffrent de la phobie du cancer ou des infections 
(par les W.-C.) et ces phobies leur donnent un prétexte à se faire examiner.
Il cite entre autres les deux cas suivants: 
Une vielle fille, B.V. …., quarante-trois ans, riche, va voir un médecin une fois par mois, 
après ses règles, en exigeant un examen très soigneux parce qu’elle croyait que quelque 
chose n’allait pas. Elle change chaque fois de médecin et joue chaque fois la même 
comédie. Le médecin lui demande de se déshabiller et de se coucher sur la table ou le 
divan. Elle s’y refuse en disant qu’elle est trop pudique, qu’elle ne peut pas faire une 
chose pareille, que c’est contre la nature! Le médecin la force ou la persuade douce-
ment, elle se déshabille enfin, lui expliquant qu’elle est vierge et qu’il ne devrait pas la 
blesser. Il lui promet de faire un toucher rectal. Souvent l’orgasme se produit dès 
l’examen du médecin; il se répète, intensifié, pendant le toucher rectal. Elle se présen-
te toujours sous un faux nom et paye de suite…. Elle avoue qu’elle a joué avec l’espoir 
d’être violée par un médecin….
Mme. L.M…., trente-huit ans, mariée, me dit être complètement insensible auprès 
de son mari. Elle vient se faire analyser. Après deux séances seulement, elle m’avoue 
avoir un amant. Mais il n’arrivait pas à lui faire atteindre l’orgasme. Elle n’en avait qu’en 
se faisant examiner par un gynécologue. (Son père était gynécologue!) Toutes les deux 
ou trois séances à peu près, elle était poussée par le besoin d’aller chez un médecin 
pour demander un examen. De temps en temps, elle demandait un traitement et 
c’était les époques les plus heureuses. La dernière fois, un gynécologue l’avait massée 
longtemps à cause d’une prétendue descente de la matrice. Chaque massage avait en-
traîné plusieurs orgasmes. Elle explique sa passion pour ces examens par le premier 
toucher qui avait provoqué le premier orgasme de sa vie….
La femme s’imagine facilement que l’homme à qui elle s’est exhibée a été impressionné 
par son charme physique ou la beauté de son âme et ainsi se persuade-t-elle, dans les cas 
pathologiques, être aimée du prêtre ou du médecin. Même si elle est normale, elle a 
l’impression qu’entre lui et elle existe un lien subtil; elle se complaît dans une respectueuse 
obéissance; parfois, d’ailleurs, elle y puise une sécurité qui l’aide à accepter sa vie” (DS 
2:417–18).
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who complain that she spends too much of the book talking about her class of 
origin overlook the special hostility she shows toward that milieu.
Parshley does something interesting here. He cuts the passage way down 
and eliminates the quotations, substituting this comparatively dignified para-
phrase: “Stekel reports many cases of this kind: especially old maids who come 
to the doctor for trifling reasons and ask for ‘a very thorough examination,’ or 
go from one gynecologist to another in search of ‘massage’ or ‘treatment’; some 
frigid wives experience orgasm during medical examination only.” But then off 
his own bat he adds a footnote:
Dr. R.L. Dickinson, famous American gynecologist, reports a number of 
cases of the same kind in his works (with Lura Beam) A Thousand Mar-
riages (1931) and The Single Woman (1934). Many patients simply dis-
played more or less eroticism, but others made such pests of themselves 
that the doctor would refuse further treatment, or he would cool their 
ardor by hurting them intentionally. TR.152
Words fail me, or rather, the sort of words that come to me are not very schol-
arly (we won’t go back we’ll never go back … and for these and lots of other 
reasons …). Presumably it was not part of Parshley’s project (nor Stekel’s) to 
underscore the sadism of the medical profession. I would like to think Parsh-
ley’s footnote is at cross-purposes with Beauvoir’s intention, but I also wish I 
could be clearer about what her intention was.153
The strange examples are not entirely gratuitous, however, because they 
connect to Beauvoir’s important idea that the effects of sexual dysphoria are 
problematic, not just psychologically, but ethically.
The great danger our social customs create for the child, is that the moth-
er to whom he is entrusted (bound hand and foot) is almost always an 
unsatisfied woman. Some would claim that women have less need of 
sexual satisfaction than men do; nothing is more dubious. Repressed 
women make bitter wives, sadistic mothers, fanatical housekeepers, un-
happy, dangerous creatures. In any case, even if her desires happened to 
152 The Second Sex, trans. Parshley, 547.
153 It’s also hard not to wonder how Stekel, Dickinson, etc., can be so sure that the woman on 
their examining table is in love with them. Does she display “objective signs of pleasure,” 
such as “viscosity”? Faugh. Think I’ll postpone that Pap smear a couple more decades 
after all.
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be less frequent than a man’s, that’s no reason to find it superfluous for 
her to satisfy them.154
In other words, sexual frustration is a harm, and the harmed woman cannot be 
good.
Now that a new, complete, and accurate translation is available, it may seem 
otiose to keep going after Parshley, who may well have been trying to help: he 
may have been more aware than Beauvoir that Stekel was a sketchy authority 
and that some of these cases could be spurious. He also might have seen it as a 
writing problem that Stekel’s voice comes to dominate and Beauvoir’s gets lost. 
Around these same issues, he takes out many other quotations: a long passage 
about bad sex in marriage quoted from Thérèse Desqueyroux, a novel by Beau-
voir’s enemy Mauriac; oodles of Sophie Tolstoy; long strands of Hegel…. Insofar 
as I argue that the right to sexual subjectivity was part of what American femi-
nists latched on to in The Second Sex, enough of Beauvoir’s point must have 
been left for this message to carry. What has vanished, however, is the con-
creteness and plausibility of the women’s misery. Oddly, it is the voices of 
women who are taken away (Stekel’s patient, Mauriac’s heroine, as well as Tol-
stoy’s wife). The texture is changed. Yes, these chapters were redundant, but 
redundancy is the point. These are not isolated, odd, or pathological cases. 
Rather, they feed into Beauvoir’s composite account of the “lived experience” 
of being a woman.155 In a way, this is the women’s liberation poster (“for these 
and other reasons”) writ large: it’s not that every injury on the list happened to 
every woman, or that there is even one woman to whom all the injuries on the 
poster occurred, as is underscored by the fact that some of the items contradict 
others. Rather, the family resemblance among all these grievances becomes an 
154 “Le grand danger que nos mœurs font courir à l’enfant, c’est que la mère à qui on le confie 
pieds et poings liés est presque toujours une femme insatisfaite” (DS 2:372).
“On prétend que la femme a moins besoin que l’homme de l’activité sexuelle: rien n’est 
moins sûr. Les femmes refoulées font des épouses acariâtres, des mères sadiques, des mé-
nagères maniaques, des créatures malheureuses et dangereuses; en tout cas, ses désirs 
fussent-ils plus rares, ce n’est pas une raison pour trouver superflu qu’elle les satisfasse” 
(DS 2:426).
155 Patricia Moynaugh has repurposed Kant’s idea of “exemplary validity” to explain this very 
well: “Beauvoir’s examples interest us because they transcend themselves yet remain situ-
ated…. [She] describes experiences that have been lived by actual women, and she situ-
ates them in the moment, both in The Second Sex and in her fiction…. [E]xamples pay 
tribute to the utter and complete singularity of any one event or life … yet her examples 
go beyond themselves. For all their specificity, which Beauvoir is intent on preserving, her 
examples are not contained to themselves because they expose the oppression of women 
in its ‘endless variety and monotonous similarity’” (“Beauvoir on Lived Reality,” 24).
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urgent call to collective action: not an assertion that all women are something, 
but a resolution to do something.
To say this another way: redundancy demonstrates mimetically that wom-
en’s oppression is overdetermined. One girl gets oppressed one way; another 
girl escapes that but gets oppressed in a different way; one way or another, it’s 
coming at/for you. Also: if one kind of argument doesn’t convince you, another 
may: there’s a dissertation-y amount of evidence provided here, perhaps re-
flecting Beauvoir’s awareness that she would not be taken at her bare word. 
She knew this would be controversial, and it was.
Despite the new translation, it is still important to attend to the criticisms of 
the old one made by Moi and Fallaize because, as Moi shows, subsequent work 
in feminist theory (Penelope Deutscher, Tina Chanter, Judith Butler) seem to 
have used it, and thus misread Beauvoir.156 By changing the texture of Beau-
voir’s writing, Parshley’s revisions make Beauvoir’s discussion more homoge-
nous than it originally was. This is not “merely” a question of style. Some 
 commentators have worried that despite Beauvoir’s announced intention of 
de-naturalizing and de-essentializing women’s experience, the account of 
what “elle” (she) goes through in the course of volume 2 slips back from the 
experiences of women to the Experience of Woman, as a reified thing. I too 
would find this troubling were it so; I don’t think it is; but it is truer of Parshley’s 
Beauvoir than of Beauvoir herself.
As I see it, another kind of unhelpful flattening results from analyses that 
emphasize Beauvoir’s utopian account of erotic possibilities, rather than her 
depressing catalogue of the difficulties and impasses of women’s sexual situa-
tion. Disciplinary differences may account for some of this: Bergoffen, Vintges, 
Andrew, and Bauer approach The Second Sex by way of Beauvoir’s earlier philo-
sophical essays, whereas my first point of entry to her work is more literary. But 
their emphasis is also more in keeping with the trend of feminist theory to lo-
cate and foreground women’s agency wherever possible, in the face of accusa-
tions about “victim feminism” or “left melancholy.” Like finding “continuities” 
with the later work of Irigaray and Kristeva, or with the “ethic of care,” this 
looks like an attempt to update her and underscore her continuing relevance, 
not just to make ourselves feel better.
But since my project is historical, it seems important to also underscore that 
the impetus to second-wave feminism involved pointing out over and over that 
the situation of woman was miserable, whatever Redbook and Mademoiselle 
might say, and (by multiplying examples from different genres and different 
walks of life) to convince women that their misery was a collective feature of 
156 “While We Wait,” 1022–25. See also Winter, “L’essentialisation de l’altérité,” 77–9, 81.
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their unjust situation, not a symptom of some shameful individual neurosis.157 
The claim of 1970s feminists, at least in the United States, was partly an asser-
tion of a woman’s right to be unhappy, to understand her unhappiness as un-
happiness, rather than depression, maladjustment, or some other character 
flaw. One could take this back even farther: Lucy Stone said in 1855 that “disap-
pointment is the lot of women,” adding that “it shall be the business of my life 
to deepen this disappointment in every woman’s heart until she bows down to 
it no longer.”158 And one could note that the “right to be unhappy” has been 
withheld particularly, though differently, from American women of color, as 
Tamara Beauboeuf-Lafontant shows in Behind the Mask of the Strong Black 
Woman.
Besides, The Second Sex does, in fact, include a strong account of women’s 
agency—possibly too strong for some people’s tastes. Beauvoir’s analysis of 
women’s “complicity” with their status as Other holds women responsible, as 
full human beings and ethical agents, for their own success or failure, within 
the horizons of possibility offered to them. This insistence motivates passages 
that have looked to some like they are “against women” or “blaming women.” 
The question is, which women? A properly intersectional analysis, of the sort 
feminists of color and transnational feminists have been demanding, requires 
us to admit that women’s “agency” is not always well-deployed, and that the 
agency of some women involves the subordination of other women.159 Such an 
account will include the “adaptive preferences” of women who make hard 
choices from among an unenviably impoverished menu of options—as Offred 
in The Handmaid’s Tale puts it, explaining why she doesn’t use the word “rape” 
to describe what’s happening to her, “[t]here wasn’t a lot of choice, but there 
was some, and this is what I chose.”160 It must also cover the actions some 
women take that do direct and serious harm to other women, whether or not 
it is their fully conscious intention to do so. I think Beauvoir already saw this in 
the 1940s.
Later parts of this book will speak more fully to claims that Beauvoir failed 
to understand the constraints less privileged women were under, claims I agree 
with Sonia Kruks and others are unfair. My observation now is simply this: one 
157 See Altman, “Beyond Trashiness.”
158 Remark made at a National Woman’s Rights Convention in Cincinnati, Ohio, as quoted in 
Miriam Schneir, ed., Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings, 106.
159 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color,” and Chandra Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Femi-
nist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse.” I’ll discuss this more fully in later chapters.
160 Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale, 94. See also Serene Khader, Adaptive Preferences 
and Women’s Empowerment.
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especially productive feature of Beauvoir’s approach is her recognition that 
the question of “agency” is not the only question, and does not exhaust femi-
nist ethical and political analysis: remember that she says, “[t]his fall [from 
freedom to facticity] is a moral failing if the subject consents to it; if it is in-
flicted on the subject, it takes the shape of a frustration and an oppression; ei-
ther way, it is an absolute evil.”161 There is something refreshing about the re-
minder that identifying an evil thing, and working to get rid of it, is actually 
more important than figuring out whose fault it was and how it came about.162 
It’s not that agency doesn’t matter, it’s that the concept of harm is broader than 
the question of agency, and we should not be sidetracked into taking the part 
for the whole.
Truth to tell, I find it hard to see how one could speak of a feminist ethics, let 
alone a feminist politics, without some conception of women as agents mak-
ing choices, however constrained those choices may sometimes be; and it must 
be possible for women to make bad ethical choices if it possible for women to 
make good ones. The distinction between ethics and politics was one Beauvoir 
did not make, either before or after she began to call herself a feminist. I see no 
good reason to make that distinction, either. As Chris Cuomo has remarked, 
“feminism is an ethical system.”163
If we accept all this, we will next have to accept the need to specify a content 
to our ethical judgment, and take responsibility for that, rather than quasi-
democratically falling back on “agency” as if that were the ultimate feminist 
good. For instance, we might say that, on a collective level, women’s subordina-
tion was connected to the commodification of sexuality whether through mar-
riage or through sex slavery/trafficking or through anything in between. Wom-
en may feel powerful through sexual performance and exchange and yet not 
actually be powerful (they could be wrong about it). Or, some individual wom-
en might genuinely be “empowered” through complicity, but the individual 
agency of some women is detrimental to other women and to the interests of 
161 Emphasis added. “Chaque fois que la transcendance retombe en immanence il y a dégra-
dation de l’existence en ‘en soi,’ de la liberté en facticité; cette chute est une faute morale 
si elle est consentie par le sujet; si elle lui est infligée, elle prend la figure d’une frustration 
et d’une oppression; elle est dans les deux cas un mal absolu” (DS 1:31).
162 As she said in another context, “[t]o look for the reasons why one should not stamp on a 
man’s face is to accept stamping on his face.” [Chercher les raisons pour lesquelles il ne 
faut pas marcher sur la figure d’un homme, c’est accepter qu’on lui marche sur la figure 
(FCh 101, FCirc 77, translation modified).]
163 nwsa Conference, Program Administration and Development Workshop, November 12, 
2009, Atlanta, Georgia.
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women as a class.164 What ethical content we specify is left open, but, once we 
specify it, we will have to admit that we disagree, say what our values are, and 
acknowledge that, as Beauvoir says in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (The 
 Ethics of Ambiguity) and elsewhere, to work toward one good may damage 
another.165
Like it or not, the root of Beauvoir’s claim for women’s agency was in the 
existentialist account of freedom. This account has usually been labelled “Sar-
trean,” and Sartre has become so unpopular now within both feminism and 
philosophy that it may be hard to remember his value for an earlier genera-
tion of feminist ethicists (like Sandra Bartky and Iris Marion Young), not to 
mention the successful political mobilizations that have been taken up in his 
name.166 But Foucault scholar and queer theorist Didier Eribon takes his cue 
from Sartre;167 and the young British activist (and philosopher) Nina Pow-
er, who came to public attention around 2011 as a blogger for student street 
protests, startled me in a talk at Oxford by saying nonchalantly, as if it were 
a matter of course, “well, I’m an existentialist…” It’s almost enough to make 
one stop believing in the idea of intellectual history, or at least the idea of 
“generations.”
Sartre’s own writing certainly deserves the feminist critiques it has attract-
ed. But the fact that in academic circles it has become slightly embarrassing to 
use words like “freedom” and “liberation” at all strikes me as seriously problem-
atic. Do we say “agency” now simply to avoid saying “freedom,” as we say “the 
body” or “the erotic” to avoid saying “fucking,” let alone “frigidity”? (To avoid 
being associated with braless bead-wearing hairy-legged viragos who actually 
meant it when they said they didn’t want to get married, that marriage was a 
trap, that the only way to win the “Beauty Myth” game was to refuse to play?) 
Well, yes, it’s a fairly terrifying idea, freedom. As the existentialists said.
164 See Altman and Kerry Pannell, “Policy Gaps and Theory Gaps: Women and Migrant Do-
mestic Labor.”
165 See Kruks, “Introduction to ‘Moral Idealism and Political Realism,’” and Simone de Beau-
voir and The Politics of Ambiguity. I’ll discuss Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté in more detail 
in chapter 3.
166 Bartky, for instance, in explaining that “feminist consciousness, in large measure, is an 
anguished consciousness,” quotes L’être et le néant: “It is on a day that we can conceive of 
a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and we decide they are 
unbearable” (“Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness,” 14).
167 Eribon’s collection Papiers d’identité takes its epigraph from Sartre: “L’important n’est pas 
ce qu’on fait de nous, mais ce que nous faisons nous-même de ce qu’on a fait de nous” 
(What matters isn’t what they make of us, but what we make of what they make of us).
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8 Therapy and Self-Improvement
Once we overcome our anxiety about genre—there’s no reason good philoso-
phy cannot be written about bad sex—we might note without concern that 
popular sexologists and even marriage manuals from the 1950s and 1960s refer 
back to Beauvoir. (I find this less surprising now that I’ve seen Judith Coffin’s 
excellent article documenting how the reception of Beauvoir’s work was inter-
twined with the reception of Kinsey’s.)
Anne Koedt does not mention The Second Sex. But in 1964, a little book 
called The Sexually Responsive Woman, by Phyllis and Eberhard Kronhausen, 
was published by the slightly disreputable Grove Press, with an approving 
(though brief) preface by Beauvoir.168 Perhaps it is fanciful to see this title as a 
deliberate refutation of Caprio’s Sexually [In]Adequate Female: the word “re-
sponsive” clearly places it as one of a spate of books popularizing and domes-
ticating the research of Masters and Johnson, which was published as Human 
Sexual Response (Grove had quite a line-up of these).169 The authors, a married 
couple and both therapists, do set out in some detail the Masters and Johnson 
findings, which (by the way) corroborated through measurement what Beau-
voir had said in The Second Sex about the timing of woman’s arousal. They are 
very critical of Freud and psychoanalysis, very much pro-orgasm, and very 
clear about the sorts of stimulation that are effective in bringing it about. Most 
of the book, however, is given over to the life histories of five women chosen 
as  representative: they are called “The More-Than-Average-Housewife,” “The 
Married Lesbian,” “The Doctor’s Wife,” “The Sexual Sophisticate,” and “The Fe-
male Psychoanalyst.” Certainly, as with Stekel, someone could read and buy it 
for the spicy stories (this was what kept Grove in business), and the chapter 
titled “The Struggle for Orgasm” is not at all political, but otherwise there is 
little for a feminist of any era to object to. I find it interesting that Beauvoir 
continued to support this kind of work. I don’t know what position she would 
have taken in the “sex wars” of the 1980s and 1990s, but we can be pretty sure 
she wouldn’t have taken the position that they were irrelevant.
So is The Second Sex a self-help book? Hardly. For one thing, it doesn’t offer 
any help. As I said earlier, there’s no use of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic dis-
course (it is mainly descriptive, occasionally explanatory), nor does she make 
168 Phyllis Kronhausen and Eberhard Kronhausen, The Sexually Responsive Woman. Flap 
copy tells us they are also “authors of the widely read and much-discussed Pornography 
and the Law.”
169 See Paul Robinson, The Modernization of Sex: Havelock Ellis, Alfred Kinsey, William Mas-
ters and Virginia Johnson.
Chapter 178
any allusion to possible therapeutic uses of existentialist philosophy. And she 
appears to have had some suspicion of the self-help genre herself.
Americans today, who are quite respectful of the institution of marriage 
and also individualists, are redoubling their efforts to integrate sexuality 
with wedded life. Each year a great many works are published about 
starting married life, designed to teach spouses to adapt to one other, and 
especially to teach the man how to create a happy harmony with his wife. 
Psychoanalysts and doctors take the role of “marriage counselors,” and it 
is acknowledged that, yes, the wife too has a right to pleasure, and the 
man should be acquainted with the best techniques to arrange it for her. 
But we have seen that sexual success is not just a matter of technique. 
Even if the young man knows by heart a hundred manuals like What Ev-
ery Husband Should Know, The Secret of Conjugal Bliss, and Love Without 
Fear, he still cannot be sure of getting his new wife to love him. For she 
reacts to the situation as a whole. And traditional marriage hardly cre-
ates  the most conducive conditions for female eroticism to awake and 
bloom.170
To get from bad sex to good sex will require more than an earnest “good faith” 
effort: institutions will have to change.
And in fact Beauvoir’s view of good sex is very demanding. Good sex must 
be autonomous, spontaneous, free—Bergoffen is right to quote the bit about 
the “instant.” But the further implication is that good sex will also be episodic, 
that there is no way to stabilize it as part of a permanent arrangement. Couples 
who’ve been together for a long time, she says, tend to fall into something re-
sembling incest or mutual masturbation; fantasizing about one person while 
you’re in bed with another, she calls a “comédie” (playacting); “infliger une 
170 “[L]es Américains d’aujourd’hui, qui sont à la fois respectueux de l’institution conjugale et 
individualistes, multiplient les efforts d’intégration de la sexualité au mariage. Chaque 
année paraissent quantité d’ouvrages d’initiation à la vie conjugale destinés à enseigner 
aux époux à s’adapter l’un à l’autre, et singulièrement à enseigner à l’homme comment 
créer avec la femme une heureuse harmonie. Des psychanalystes, des médecins jouent le 
rôle de ‘conseillers conjugaux’; il est admis que la femme a, elle aussi, droit au plaisir et 
que l’homme doit connaître les techniques susceptibles de le lui procurer. Mais on a vu 
que la réussite sexuelle n’est pas seulement une affaire de technique. Le jeune homme 
eût-il appris par cœur vingt manuels tels que Ce que tout mari doit savoir, Le secret du 
bonheur conjugal, L’amour sans peur, il n’est pas certain qu’il saura pour autant se faire 
aimer de sa nouvelle épouse. C’est à l’ensemble de la situation psychologique que celle-ci 
réagit. Et le mariage traditionnel est loin de créer les conditions les plus favorables à l’éveil 
et à l’épanouissement de l’érotisme féminin” (DS 2:244).
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 jouissance” can be a power play; being deliberately, almost professionally, 
“good at” giving another person pleasure, as Elisabeth’s boy-toy Guimiot does 
in L’invitée, is faintly disgusting; another form of ersatz sexuality is the pursuit 
of sexual experience in the absence of genuine and deep desire (she says 
American girls are particularly prone to this, but in Les mandarins something 
very similar is attributed to Nadine).171 So it seems unlikely that she would have 
thought very highly of the “sensate focus” exercises recommended by Masters 
and Johnson, or of the books on “improving sexual communication” that filled 
the shelves and tables of the Barnes and Noble in its heyday. Perversely, all 
these approaches are too conscious, too deliberate and intentional, not truly 
intersubjective. Good sex cannot be a project. So where Beauvoir’s statement of 
the problems draws on and in some ways resembles the sexological sources 
foregrounded by self-help (she even uses some Kinsey statistics about the tim-
ing of orgasm), she wouldn’t have liked any of their answers. As Vintges notes, 
“when a young woman came to see her and asked advice, Beauvoir told her to 
think about things other than herself, and to read rather than to talk.”172
Like much else, this goes back to the distinction between “happy” and “free.” 
It seems to me that Beauvoir’s view of “happiness” owes a lot to the trip to the 
United States she recorded in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 (America Day by 
Day 1947), which overlapped with the writing of The Second Sex. I agree with 
Edward Fullbrook that people should pay more attention to that book, which 
he says “stands in relation to The Second Sex, rather like Darwin’s The Voyage of 
the Beagle does to The Origin of Species.”173 A lucid, but not unloving, critique 
of American popular culture, at the height of McCarthyism and the Jim Crow 
South, it could be compared to William Whyte’s The Organization Man in some 
ways, to Adorno’s Minima Moralia in others. Beauvoir talks there about “book-
stores where men and women buy books with promising titles: The Secret of 
Happiness, Happiness in Five Lessons,” and also about the “mystification” prac-
ticed by radio therapists, and the general tendency of Americans to see non- 
conforming individuals as “cases.”174 With particular reference to returning GIs 
and the treatment of what’s now called “post-traumatic stress syndrome,” she 
observes:
Psychoanalysis is a vast enterprise of social recuperation; its sole aim is 
to  enable each citizen to take up a useful place in society…. To be 
171 DS 2:256–58, 177; L’invitée, 107–10; Les mandarins 2:174–75.
172 Vintges, Philosophy as Passion, 90.
173 Fullbrook, “Patriarchy’s History of Ideas,” 125.
174 L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 (hereinafter AJ), 90–1.
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 well-adapted, here, means in truth to hand in one’s resignation from one-
self; to be happy is to persist stubbornly in blinding oneself. Many things 
would change for Americans if they could only admit that there is unhap-
piness on earth, and that unhappiness is not a priori a crime.175
What’s interesting is that while Beauvoir dismisses “the pursuit of happiness,” 
which can result from and/or lead to false consciousness, bad faith, complicity, 
etc., she does not dismiss the question of unhappiness, which results from ob-
jective conditions of unfreedom, and is destructive of both the self and others. 
Unhappiness presumes the possibility of happiness, which lies somewhere 
over the horizon: one cannot and should not will it into existence, any more 
than one should “infliger une jouissance.” Nonetheless, as an American prod-
uct of that same vintage insisted, attention must be paid.
These ideas seem unlikely to sell any mugs or t-shirts for the Feminist Major-
ity. But they resonate with Arlie Hochshild’s The Managed Heart, Barbara 
 Ehrenreich’s Bright-Sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking 
Has Undermined America and, in a different way, Sara Ahmed’s Promise of Hap-
piness, which warns particularly of the ways “happiness is used to justify 
oppression.”176
Where does this leave psychoanalysis? One irony of teaching Beauvoir now 
is that it may be the first exposure to Freud students have ever had—whether 
because feminist critiques have been successful, or for more depressing rea-
sons. It feels slightly insane to have to introduce students to the idea of “penis 
envy” in order to show them what nonsense it is: their faces show pretty clearly 
that they can figure that out for themselves. The smug determinists feminism 
must now confront are not psychoanalysts but neuroscientists and their pill-
pushing accomplices.
175 “La psychanalyse est une vaste entreprise de récupération sociale; son seul but c’est de 
permettre à chaque citoyen de reprendre une place utile dans la société…. On comprend 
bien qu’après avoir respiré pendant toute leur jeunesse l’optimisme américain, après avoir 
vécu dans un pays qui nie l’existence du mal, ces jeunes gens ont étés bouleversés par une 
brusque confrontation avec le monde en guerre, et leur expérience ne s’intègre plus au 
système dans lequel il leur faut à nouveau se situer. Ceux qui ont le courage de continuer 
à croire en cette expérience représentent une force neuve; mais beaucoup se sentent 
simplement perdus. On les regardera comme guéris quand ils auront perdu la conscience 
d’être perdus. S’adapter, ici, c’est en vérité se démettre de soi-même; être heureux, c’est 
savoir s’aveugler avec entêtement. Beaucoup de choses seraient changées chez les Améri-
cains s’ils voulaient bien admettre qu’il y a du malheur sur terre et que le malheur n’est 
pas a priori un crime” (AJ 93).
176 Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 2. Ahmed starts from Beauvoir, but also takes aim 
at what she sees as a recent “happiness turn.”
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But I still think it’s worth engaging with the part of Beauvoir’s uptake of 
Freud that was not just critique. An examination of the issues of Les Temps 
Modernes around the time she was working on, and serially publishing, The 
Second Sex, shows a more profound and more eclectic engagement with his 
work than has previously been assumed.177 And I find it a promising develop-
ment that European psychoanalysts seem to have become interested in Beau-
voir, and especially that a number of them seem to be recognizing the value of 
a feminist psychoanalysis that would not be Lacanian.178 Élisabeth Roudinesco 
notes that, toward the end of her life, Beauvoir expressed a wish that she had 
written a study of psychoanalysis from woman’s perspective; Roudinesco 
points out that actually, she had already done so. Those who want “les apports 
de la psychanalyse” without the gender normativity may find some cues in 
Beauvoir’s work, even now.
It’s not usually noted that Anne, the heroine of Les mandarins, is working on 
a book—when another character asks her if she too is a writer, she answers, 
“Thank God, no!”179 And commentators have sometimes criticized Beauvoir 
for not creating a model Woman Writer in this character with whom she shares 
so much else of her life. Nonetheless there are a few points where we see Anne 
177 For instance, in issue 32 (May 1948), the first extract from what would become Le deuxième 
sexe appears under the title “La femme et les mythes,” described in a footnote as “extrait 
d’un ouvrage à paraître sur la situation de la femme.” The same issue also includes a long 
extract by Freud himself, “Moïse et son peuple,” translated by Annie Merma—it seems to 
be from the third part of Moses and Monotheism. What interests me is the unsigned intro-
ductory note, which contextualizes it and ends with the following paragraph: 
As always, one might find some of the interpretations Freud gives to be narrow. Rather 
than explaining human conflict by sexual conflict, one might reintegrate the hatred of 
the father to human aggression. The study by Simone de Beauvoir, published in this 
issue, shows precisely, on certain points, how sexuality is taken up in human conflicts 
which do not go beyond it [“dépassent” translates the Hegelian term “Aufhebung”] but 
rather, so to speak, set it in motion. However, these very conceptions were not foreign 
to Freud and in any case are only made possible by his work, to which, in publishing 
these texts, we wish to pay homage.” [Comme toujours, on peut trouver ici que cer-
taines interprétations données par Freud sont étroites. Au lieu d’expliquer le conflit 
humain par le conflit sexuel, on pourrait réintégrer la haine du père à l’agressivité hu-
maine. L’étude de Simone de Beauvoir publiée dans ce même numéro montre juste-
ment, sur certains points, comment la sexualité est reprise dans des conflits humains 
qui ne la dépassent pas, mais qui, pour ainsi dire, l’animent. Cependant, ces concep-
tions mêmes ne sont pas étrangères à Freud et, en tout cas, elles n’ont été rendues 
possibles que par son œuvre, à laquelle, en publiant ces textes, nous voudrions rendre 
hommage.]
178 See Élisabeth Roudinesco, Juliet Mitchell, Jacqueline Rose, and other contributors to the 
excellent Simone de Beauvoir et la psychanalyse, edited by Pierre Bras and Michel Kail.
179 Les mandarins, 52.
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working on “mon livre,” which is an attempt to bring together the insights of 
Marxism and psychoanalysis. Perhaps the book she was working on was The 
Second Sex. Or perhaps (in spite of the energy expended on the question in the 
1970s and 1980s) that book remains to be written.
9 Last Thoughts
So what have we learned from the frigid woman, that can still matter to us 
today?
First, that women’s sexual and bodily unhappiness should not be disregard-
ed. (Date rape, anorexia.)
Second: that we should be suspicious of the promises of therapy and self-
help, even as we recognize that we cannot hope to extricate feminism from 
them. (Oprah, Glamour magazine.)180 We should work with this rather than 
isolating ourselves. Because as long as women are perceived as having to 
choose between their emancipation as human subjects on the one hand, and 
the possibility of sexual and personal happiness on the other, feminism cannot 
occur, as we who try to teach it to the young are well aware.
In her youth, Simone de Beauvoir saw herself as facing this choice, between 
her independent, intellectual self and the possibility of “bonheur,” because 
marriage to her bourgeois cousin Jacques and a future life as a “femme 
d’intérieur” would have meant sacrificing literally everything else she cared 
about. Later she met Sartre and discovered (she says) that she could have both. 
Vintges suggests that Beauvoir’s contribution to ethics is partly her creation of 
her own life as “exemplary,” her description of an “art of living,” and I think this 
is right; but some who have taken this too literally (“Simone de Beauvoir, Live 
like Her”)—have taken it as if it were self-help, in fact—have ended up disap-
pointed in her, or in Sartre (and his New Left avatars), or in themselves.181 It 
might make more sense to look at what she says about this “choice” on the level 
of theory, which I think is roughly the following: the opposition is false from 
the start, bourgeois happiness is a sell, because oppressed sex is bad sex.
Third: you can use a bad tool to do a good task.
Michèle Le Dœuff suggested that Simone de Beauvoir had a “genius for the 
inappropriate,” meaning that she started from a philosophical viewpoint (Sar-
tre’s solipsistic version of existentialism) that was poorly suited to what she 
180 See Rapping, The Culture of Recovery.
181 See for instance Nancy Miller, Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent’s Death.
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wanted to make of it (feminism).182 At the very least, she had an unusual will-
ingness to make use of whatever came to hand. I do think it’s reasonable to 
hold people accountable when they use problematic discourses uncritically, 
e.g. “Lacan dit,” as though the mere citation of an authoritative name put an 
end to thought. But I hope feminism has set aside the task of purifying our 
own discourse (or policing the language of other feminists) for residues. In-
deed, for a text to be political in any meaningful sense it must engage with, 
be embedded in, concrete and substantial circumstance. We all have to stand 
somewhere.
182 Hipparchia’s Choice, 55.
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Simone de Beauvoir and Lesbian Lived Experience
There is a large family of things we know and need to know about our-
selves and each other with which we have, as far as I can see, so far cre-
ated for ourselves almost no theoretical room to deal.
eve kosofsky sedgwick1
I’d be careful about saying any woman had no consciousness.
joan nestle2
Every act of becoming conscious
(it says here in this book)
is an unnatural act
adrienne rich3
On the first International Women’s Day of the new millennium, I walked across 
the small midwestern campus where I work to sit sipping punch with a miscel-
laneous group of people. The sweet-tempered woman leading our discussion 
asked each of us to name one woman who had inspired us, whose life we want-
ed to celebrate on this special occasion. Most of those present, ranging from an 
earnest sophomore girl to the campus rabbi, a man in his seventies, said, “my 
mother.” I named Rosa Luxemburg—a lie, but I wanted Socialism to be at least 
mentioned … Only one person named Simone de Beauvoir: H., the music librar-
ian, whose self-description when we’d first met had been as a lesbian, but who 
by the time of this discussion was transitioning from female to male.
The Second Sex was a strange, unwieldy book to begin with, and it seems to 
get stranger all the time; Beauvoir still means a lot to people, but just what she 
means keeps changing. When I asked H. “why Beauvoir?” he referred to Judith 
Butler, then got a little nervous: “I need to sit down and really read The Second 
Sex,” he said; “I’ve never actually done that.” That reaction has become very fa-
miliar to me over the several decades I’ve been working on Beauvoir.
1 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet, 24.
2 Joan Nestle, remark made during discussion of The Feminist Memoir Project: Voices from 
Women’s Liberation, Columbia University Seminar on Woman and Society, New York City, 
May 17, 1999.
3 Rich, “The Phenomenology of Anger,” 169.
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People seem to attribute a profound, even a life-changing, significance to 
Simone de Beauvoir even when they have not read a word she wrote. Her 
name stands for some kind of deep unsettling (in the good sense), unhooking, 
undermining, kicking loose: things, as it turns out, are not, or at least do not 
have to be, as Mother said they were; what you’ve always suspected was going 
on underneath the everyday human comedies of gender, is in fact there, and 
everywhere.
At the same time Beauvoir has been a target for disappointment and anger.
The first time I read The Second Sex was around 1981, in a graduate literature 
seminar at Columbia co-taught by Carolyn Heilbrun and Nancy Miller. I didn’t 
understand the book, I didn’t understand why it was important to them that 
we read it, and I totally hated it. Partly I think I was blaming the messenger: 
that my oppression was that deep, that total, was not something I wanted to 
know. The parts I hated most, though, were the parts about sex, especially the 
chapter titled “La lesbienne.” Oddly, some of the same parts that then furnished 
me with reasons for utterly dismissing her now seem to me the backbone of 
Beauvoir’s project, and a good second starting-point for my argument: that it is 
worth reading Beauvoir, that she is less wrong about many things than has gen-
erally been supposed, and that reading The Second Sex with attention to time, 
both the time of its writing and the different times of its readings, helps us 
better understand what she meant, and discover what we can still use.
But then, coming out in my early twenties, with the theory wars dividing 
Columbia’s English department and the sex war starting across the street, I had 
a checklist of myths to distrust: arrested development, mother-daughter pat-
terns, inversion, butch-femme roles, masculine protest, anything to do with 
Sigmund Freud. All these myths seemed to be repeated in Beauvoir. None of 
them had anything to do with me: I was me, and I was in love, for my own rea-
sons, many of which had to do with feminism. I also had a deep, deep suspicion 
of seeing lesbians marshalled as symbols or allegories in the texts of straight 
women.4
I was not alone. Many American lesbian feminists have found Beauvoir’s 
chapter “La lesbienne” (“The Lesbian”) problematic, from the 1970s on: it pro-
vides no “positive role models,” appears to include biologistic explanations, 
and cites such discredited authorities as the rather bizarre Wilhelm Stekel (see 
chapter 1 above). And who is “la lesbienne,” the lesbian, anyhow? The definite 
article certainly dates the chapter theoretically, in the same way Beauvoir’s use 
of “la femme” (Woman) and “elle” (she) throughout the book does. This, plus 
4 See Altman, “How Not To Do Things with Metaphors We Live By.” This was before the 1990 
publication of Beauvoir’s Lettres à Sartre complicated what we knew about her love life.
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her seeming failure to take the position about “inversion” we thought was the 
correct one—that there was no such thing, that same-sex love had nothing at 
all to do with a desire to be the opposite gender—made us think she couldn’t 
possibly be a social constructionist after all. Then there was the way she drew 
on literary texts we did not think much of, such as the poems of Renée Vivien, 
as though they had a nonfiction, documentary authority. And finally there was 
her overt disdain for the idea of lesbians and/or homosexuals organizing them-
selves as a political movement.
But this may be a good time to look again. Beauvoir’s view that lesbian lives 
may be lived in many different ways, that gender “inversion” and object choice 
are not necessarily related but sometimes may be, does not look so retrograde 
in this age of “queer,” of the revaluation of bisexuality, of new transgender pos-
sibilities and subjectivities. Her contentions that lesbianism, like heterosexual-
ity, like anything else, may be lived either in bad faith or in authenticity, de-
pending on the way it is chosen, and that the body matters, but doesn’t 
determine us, may, as Toril Moi has argued, be helpful in formulating a concep-
tion of agency feminism can use.5
But why were we originally angry and embarrassed, rather than simply dis-
missive? We found in that text neither a mirror nor a model, and yet some 
ideas there seemed familiar enough that we resented an intrusion: how dare 
she talk about my private things in this way I don’t quite recognize? It was a bit 
like Freud’s uncanny, or the existentialist Look of the Other which steals from 
me my position as center of the world, as subject. Now I wonder whether I was 
at that time so concerned to stress the ordinary normality of my life that I was 
unnerved by the very ideas, terms, and images that might now be praised as 
resistance to normalization of the female body. Rereading with the under-
standing that, as I discussed above, feminism at any period will be inextricably 
entwined with other contemporary ways of seeing women and sex, that, as 
Foucault tells us, the discourses of repression and liberation can’t be pried 
apart,6 I see something rather different. In the early 1980s, my classmates and I 
found Beauvoir’s discussion of lesbian sexuality both heterodox and incoher-
ent, which it was, and is … but this no longer strikes me as such a bad thing.
Much of the work done on Beauvoir and lesbianism has been biographical. 
Here, as in the first chapter, I will continue to sideline that approach, by which 
I don’t mean to suggest it isn’t important; but I think the way many generations 
of women have read her life looking for either reassuring mirrors or hopeful 
models, and then often reacted to what they found out with disappointment or 
5 See Toril Moi, What is a Woman? 3–120.
6 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 95–101.
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even rage, doesn’t help us remember to read her work and listen to what she 
actually says. This is just as true for “the lesbian question” as it has been for the 
question of the success or failure of her lifelong relationship with Sartre.7
But those less familiar with Beauvoir may still want at least a seat-of-the-
pants answer to the question, “Was she a lesbian?” One can’t answer this ques-
tion, and one can’t not answer it, either. Let me just say that the world is di-
vided into people for whom the question has a simple one-word answer, and 
those for whom it does not; Beauvoir is in the latter category.
She was certainly accused of being a lesbian at least three times. First, dur-
ing the phony war of 1939–40, when her journal records that her friend Stepha 
“interrogated” her one day (in the Café Dôme) “to find out whether I was really 
a piège.”8 Second, during the German occupation of France, she was fired from 
her teaching job on the basis of an accusation of “détournement de mineur” 
(corruption of a minor) brought (with some accuracy, if little justice) by the 
mother of one of her students, Nathalie Sorokine, an incident she masks in her 
autobiography.9 And third, charges that Beauvoir was a lesbian figured in the 
stream of logically inconsistent vilification with which such established French 
literary figures as François Mauriac greeted the publication of The Second 
Sex:  “Frustrated, frozen, priapic, nymphomaniac, a lesbian, a hundred times 
7 Both issues have been entangled with posthumous revelations and with questions about 
public versus private presentations of self. Responses have ranged from the hagiographic to 
the wounded to the passive-aggressive. Useful discussions include Margaret Simons, “Lesbi-
an Connections”; Jeffner Allen, “A Response to a Letter from Peg Simons, December 1993”; 
Hazel Barnes, “La lesbienne.”
8 “Je me suis assise à côté d’elle et elle m’a interrogée pour savoir si j’étais vraiment piège; on a 
lu le journal, regardé Marie-Claire qui donne des modèles de lettres aux soldats à se fendre la 
pipe…. ” Beauvoir, Journal de guerre, 88. Piège is short for “piège-à-loups,” literally “wolf trap” 
or “man trap.” Apparently this phrase was used to describe a homosexual person of either sex 
by Beauvoir’s friend Mme. Morel, who seems to have invented it. I have not seen it used by 
anyone outside the Sartre circle, nor have I yet succeeded in getting any French person to 
recognize it. As Margaret Simons notes (“Lesbian Connections,” 122–26), Beauvoir did not 
record her reply to Stepha, nor did she mention this conversation in her letter to Sartre detail-
ing her day; but both journals and letters for the period suggest it was a question she was 
asking herself.
9 Although Beauvoir covers up the content of the charge, her comment there is interesting: 
“Before the war, the matter would have ended there; with the clique of Abel Bonnard [a reac-
tionary Minister of Education installed by the German occupiers] it happened otherwise; at 
the end of the school year, the headmistress with the blue chin informed me that I was ex-
cluded from the University” (which is to say, banned from teaching in the public sector). 
[Avant-guerre, l’affaire n’eût pas eu de suite; avec la clique d’Abel Bonnard, il en alla autre-
ment; à la fin de l’année scolaire, la directrice au menton bleu me signifia que j’étais exclue de 
l’Université (La force de l’âge [hereinafter FA], 617).]
Chapter 288
 aborted: I was accused of everything, even of having an illegitimate child”10—
the French version of the nympho-lesbo-killer-whore, with additional charges 
of frigidity, abortion, and out-of-wedlock motherhood.11 And since her death 
she has been accused both of being a lesbian and of not being one, sometimes 
in the same breath.
What else can I say?—that she had a number of very important loving rela-
tionships with women early and late in life, which may or may not have been 
sexual; that she had sexual contact with women, at least through the early 
1940s, in ways that may or may not have been loving;12 that she never said she 
was a lesbian; and that she had her homophobic moments—like most people.
1 Where the Lesbians Are
It’s helpful, as always, to keep the basic structure of Beauvoir’s argument in 
mind. The first volume, “Les faits et les mythes,” performs a series of moves that 
unsettle any naturalized notion of femininity as essence and expose men’s 
view of women as “Other” as a disabling mystification. The second volume, ti-
tled “L’expérience vécue,” takes us through women’s life cycle under present 
conditions of education and society.13 Beauvoir describes “la femme” as she is, 
but “what we must understand is the range of the verb ‘to be’”—as Bill Clinton 
once put it, it all depends on what the meaning of the word “is” is.
We find this vicious circle in all such circumstances. When an individual 
or a group of individuals is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact is that 
10 “Insatisfaite, glacée, priapique, nymphomane, lesbienne, cent fois avortée, je fus tout, et 
même mère clandestine.” She continues: “People [wrote and] offered to cure me of my 
frigidity, or to satisfy my monstrous appetites; they promised the filthiest revelations, but 
in the name of the True, the Beautiful, the Good, and even of Poetry, all of which I had 
outraged.” [On m’offrait de me guérir de ma frigidité, d’assouvir mes appétits de goule, on 
me promettait des révélations, en termes orduriers, mais au nom du vrai, du beau, du 
bien, de la santé et même de la poésie, indignement saccagés par moi (FCh 1:260–61).] See 
also Ingrid Galster, Le deuxième sexe de Simone de Beauvoir: Mémoire de la Critique, and 
Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman.
11 So, if as Didier Eribon says in Réflexions sur la question gay, “l’injure” (the insult, the curse) 
is the beginning of gay identity….
12 Perhaps the best description of this period was her own, much later, in a letter to Nelson 
Algren: “I happened to behave very badly,” she wrote (A Transatlantic Love Affair: Letters 
to Nelson Algren, 135).
13 “Après la plupart de mes affirmations il faut sous-entendre ‘dans l’état actuel de l’éducation 
et des mœurs.’ Il ne s’agit pas ici d’énoncer des vérités éternelles mais de décrire le fond 
commun sur lequel s’enlève toute existence féminine singulière” (DS 2:9).
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he, or it, is inferior; but what we must understand is the range of the verb 
“to be”: bad faith consists in giving it the value of a static substance, when 
it has the dynamic Hegelian meaning: to be is to have become, to have 
been made what one now shows oneself to be.14
Nothing about what women are like now has any necessary implications for, or 
deep claim upon, what the women of tomorrow could be, and if you refuse to 
recognize this, if instead you pile up reasons why nothing can change and why 
you can’t change, you’re guilty of bad faith. As Adrienne Rich put it, “Only she 
who says / she did not choose, is the loser in the end.”15
But I tell my students to write this point on an index card and keep it in front 
of them while they read the rest of the book, because it is very easy to lose track 
of, in the welter of detail about how women under present conditions of cul-
ture and society do, in Beauvoir’s view, happen alas to be. Many chapters and 
sub-arguments in The Second Sex take the form of a sandwich, with problem-
atically essentialist or essentializing filling between slices of social construc-
tionist bread. In her chapter on biology, for example, after reminding us that a 
woman is not the same thing as an ovary and that it is a long way from the egg 
to the woman, she leads us through a tortured discussion of the sperm, the egg, 
and animal behavior from anaerobes to us, before telling us that none of it 
much matters because “man” is not a natural species but a cultural idea—the 
body is the instrument of our grasp on the world; the body is a situation, which 
we may choose to live freely or otherwise.16
“So why didn’t she just say so, and spare us what all those stupid scientists 
said?” the annoyed student wants to know. Apparently the project to “under-
stand everything” and “say everything” that Beauvoir conceived in adolescence 
did not issue in systems-building (as it did for Sartre) but in a dislike of leaving 
anything out.17 I’ve been arguing, though, that this is actually a strength: the 
encyclopedic piling up of seemingly everything available on a topic corrects 
for the philosopher’s habit of categorical statement, opens up spaces to think 
14 “On retrouve ce cercle vicieux en toutes circonstances analogues: quand un individu ou 
un groupe d’individus est maintenu en situation d’infériorité, le fait est qu’il est inférieur; 
mais c’est sur la portée du mot être qu’il faudrait s’entendre; la mauvaise foi consiste à lui 
donner une valeur substantielle alors qu’il a le sens dynamique hégélien: être c’est être 
devenu, c’est avoir été fait tel qu’on se manifeste” (DS 1:25). This passage develops from an 
analogy between the situation of women and the situation of Blacks, which I’ll explore in 
my later chapters.
15 Rich, “Twenty-One Love Poems,” 244.
16 See Fallaize, “A Saraband of Imagery.”
17 mjfr 335.
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in that a tighter argument might have foreclosed, makes it possible to engage 
with the thickness, the depth, the ambiguity of the lived world.
But as with The Golden Notebook, the structure of The Second Sex is integral 
to the argument. The chapter titled “La lesbienne” occurs in the middle of the 
section on women’s life cycle, but lesbian experience and feeling in The Second 
Sex are not confined to that chapter. Rather, lesbian existence is diffused 
throughout, as perfectly ordinary, only to be expected, even something any ra-
tional woman, if not deformed by her culture, might well prefer. The opening 
pages of the first chapter, “Enfance,” tell us that both boys and girls begin by 
desiring their mothers;18 a bit later we hear that the garçon manqué (tomboy) 
is only rebelling against the social constraints that deny her the human right to 
actively possess the world.19 According to the next chapter, “La jeune fille” (the 
young girl), another form of adolescent reluctance to go along with the con-
ventional vocation féminine can be found in schoolgirl romances, which are 
described at length with reference to Mädchen in Uniform, Emily Dickinson’s 
letters, and the novels of Colette and Rosamund Lehmann, alongside psycho-
analytic and sexological narratives.20 Then, when it comes time for “L’initiation 
sexuelle” (Sexual Initiation, by which Beauvoir means heterosexual initiation), 
women have a lot to overcome: for one thing, male flesh is resistant and repul-
sive compared to the more familiar sensation of touching a woman’s smooth 
body;21 there is often not much distinction between a woman’s first hetero-
sexual penetration and rape;22 and finally, it is difficult for a woman, who is a 
free desiring subject and a human being grasping the world, to resign herself to 
the sexual passivity and dependence involved in “becoming a woman.”23 Read-
ers might be forgiven for concluding that lesbian feeling is more basic, or at 
least more obvious, that it is heterosexuality that must be learned, very often in 
fear and trembling. “If we must speak of nature, one might say that naturally 
every woman is lesbian.”24
That heterosexuality has to be learned is a big part of Beauvoir’s central con-
tention throughout her second volume. I’ve argued in chapter 1 that her long 
catalog of things that can go wrong for the young girl, the adolescent, the mar-




21 DS 2:154–55, 191.
22 DS 2:148, 162–63.
23 DS 2:165, 195–98.
24 “[S]i l’on invoque la nature, on peut dire que naturellement toute femme est homo-
sexuelle” (DS 2:195).
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some readers to say Beauvoir “didn’t like women,” is in fact making this point: 
the development of “patriarchal femininity,” as Moi helpfully calls it, is a 
wrenching experience;25 the process of becoming a “woman” deforms you. The 
crisis of adolescence, Beauvoir says, is a travail, a “work,” comparable to the 
work of mourning described by psychoanalysis.26 Showing this is part of show-
ing that it is a process: it’s not natural or inborn, and thus, it could be other-
wise. At one time, I was bothered by her description of same-sex affection as a 
phase or stage because I took this to mean she was minimizing its authenticity, 
by reinscribing it within normative heterosexuality. But now it strikes me as a 
key move in her unsettling of heterosexual “development,” which is so far from 
obvious, so bizarre, in fact, that the explanation for it must involve social 
power.
Is the chapter on “La lesbienne,” as Ursula Tidd has said, marginalized by its 
placement within the life cycle of “the woman”?27 There are two ways to see 
this. Volume 2 has four parts, “Formation,” “Situation,” “Justifications,” and 
“Vers la libération.” “La lesbienne” is at the end of the “Formation” section, 
poised on the cusp of adulthood, between “L’initiation sexuelle” and “La femme 
mariée” (The Married Woman)—two chapters that contain the densest and 
most awful descriptions of rotten heterosexual sex in the book. The lesbian 
chapter is not in section 4, “Towards Liberation,” which has only one chapter, 
“La femme indépendante,” but things could be worse. At least it’s not in the 
third section, “Justifications,” with its protracted jeremiads against three life 
paths women can take in complicitous bad faith: “La narcissiste,” “L’amoureuse” 
(The Woman in Love), and “La mystique.” “La lesbienne” is taken as part of the 
life cycle, part of ordinary development, and yet, there she also is, as herself.
2 Reading in Time
It is curious to me now that around the same time I was learning to detest 
Beauvoir’s view of lesbians, I was very much liking Adrienne Rich’s “Compul-
sory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” which first appeared in Signs in 
1980, and which makes what now seems a very similar point: why would wom-
en ever turn from loving women to loving men unless they were forced to? 
Rich never mentions Beauvoir by name in that essay, but the word “existence” 
in her title now jumps out at me, as does the word “phenomenology” in her 
25 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 190–94.
26 DS 2:140.
27 Ursula Tidd, “Le deuxième sexe, la conscience noire et la conscience lesbienne,” 75.
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poem, “The Phenomenology of Anger,” from which one of the epigraphs to 
this chapter is taken.28 For those of us trying to do work on lesbians within 
women’s studies, itself a fledging field, Rich’s essay was tremendously helpful, 
not least because her “lesbian continuum” seemed to offer a way out of the 
mulberry bush game of “X was a lesbian? You can’t prove that, so we won’t ap-
prove your dissertation topic.”29 But I also remember vigorously defending 
“Compulsory Heterosexuality” against the anxiety and anger of heterosexual 
feminists who resented being told that their own sexual choices were not au-
thentic or feminist enough and that they were not entitled to want what they 
felt they wanted.
I have now taught the essay to mainly heterosexual undergraduates of both 
sexes approximately fifty times, and have learned to deal with this issue a bit 
more tactfully. Rich doesn’t actually say that heterosexuality can’t be a genuine 
choice, but she never suggests that it can. It’s still a real issue and a hard one to 
discuss without resurrecting that old existentialist term, “authenticity.”30 The 
28 For a reading of Beauvoir through the lens of Rich’s argument, see Simons, “Lesbian Con-
nections.” Rich herself explains her terms as follows: “Lesbian existence suggests both the 
fact of the historical presence of women and our continuing creation of the meaning of 
that existence”—italics mine, to indicate a very Beauvoirian turn of thought. It is interest-
ing as well that in the exchange of letters about this essay Rich reprinted alongside it in 
Blood Bread and Poetry (1986), the editors of Powers of Desire question, among other con-
cepts, the term “false consciousness”—in some ways, another version of “bad faith.” Per-
haps this marks the historical moment when both terms left the lexicon of feminist theo-
ry, probably for perfectly good reasons, but not without loss (see Moi, What is a Woman). 
Also, like Beauvoir, Rich begins her argument by turning psychoanalysis against itself, by 
using the evidence it uncovers to expose its tacit normativity. (Rich’s particular target is 
Nancy Chodorow.)
Beauvoir’s legacy to Rich and other early lesbian-feminists is complex. For instance, 
Lillian Faderman uses the term “existentialist lesbians” to refer to what were more often 
called “political lesbians” or “women-identified-women,” when they weren’t being called 
by worse names (Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers, 207, 269). Why existentialist? Rich signals 
her indebtedness to Beauvoir most clearly in Of Woman Born; when she said, in the fa-
mous talk reprinted in On Lies Secrets and Silence, “[i]t is the lesbian in us who is creative, 
for the dutiful daughter of the fathers in us is only a hack”—she must have been thinking 
of Beauvoir’s Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, which was translated as Memoirs of a Duti-
ful Daughter. But what was she thinking—that Beauvoir had stopped short of this insight 
about lesbians? That she had had it in spite of herself?
29 This seems quaint now even to me, although it wasn’t much fun at the time. De mortuis nil 
nisi bonum.
30 Interestingly, glbtq politics seems to be one place where the fundamentally existential-
ist questions about “choice” have retained cultural salience, with implications for political 
activism.
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problem is, while you’re busily unsettling normativity, how not to erect an-
other competing norm that oppresses and marginalizes other people.
Beauvoir had a lot of problems, but this one she avoided: either choice can 
be lived authentically, she says: it depends. Her ethics are extremely demand-
ing, as I discussed in chapter 1, but they are equal opportunity ethics. The les-
bian chapter concludes:
In truth, homosexuality is not a deliberate perversion, any more than it is 
a fatal curse. It is an attitude chosen in situation, that is to say at the same 
time motivated, and freely adopted. None of the factors the subject takes 
on board by this choice—physiological givens, psychological history, so-
cial circumstance—is determinative, even though all contribute to ex-
plain it. This is for woman one way among others of resolving the prob-
lems posed by her condition in general, by her erotic situation in 
particular. Like all human behaviors, it will lead to masquerades, disequi-
librium, failure, lying, or, on the contrary, it will be the source of fruitful 
experiences, depending on whether it is lived in bad faith, laziness, and 
inauthenticity, or in lucidity, generosity, and freedom.31
31 “En vérité l’homosexualité n’est pas plus une perversion délibérée qu’une malédiction fa-
tale. C’est une attitude choisie en situation, c’est-à-dire à la fois motivée et librement adop-
tée. Aucun des facteurs que le sujet assume par ce choix—données physiologiques, histoire 
psychologique, circonstances sociales—n’est déterminant encore que tous contribuent à 
l’expliquer. C’est pour la femme une manière parmi d’autres de résoudre les problèmes po-
sés par sa condition en général, par sa situation érotique en particulier. Comme toutes les 
conduites humaines, elle entraînera comédies, déséquilibre, échec, mensonge ou, au con-
traire, elle sera source d’expériences fécondes, selon qu’elle sera vécue dans la mauvaise foi, 
la paresse et l’inauthenticité ou dans la lucidité, la générosité et la liberté” (DS 2:217–18), 
emphasis in original.
It is hard to know how to translate “assumer”; if one uses “assumes,” readers who don’t 
know this is a key existentialist term may assume [sic] it has its ordinary English meaning. 
“Takes on board” is at least better than Parshley’s “accepts.” No wonder I didn’t understand 
this when I read it in English! I have translated “comédies” as “masquerades,” which 
doesn’t quite satisfy me, either, since “comédies” for the existentialists includes any occa-
sion on which one “plays a role,” even when one is (culpably) unaware of doing so. It’s not 
all that far from Judith Butler’s “repeated stylizations of the self,” except that Butler thinks 
this is a good thing (or at least, that it is inevitable), whereas Beauvoir thinks it is a bad 
thing that free people should (and can) avoid.
Much more might be said about Butler’s relationship to Beauvoir: as Lisa Knisely (“Op-
pression, Narrative Violence, and Vulnerability: The Ambiguous Beauvoirian Legacy of 
Butler’s Ethics”) and Diana Coole (“Butler’s Phenomenological Existentialism”) have 
shown in convincing detail, Butler’s earliest publications praise Beauvoir for views of sex 
and gender she would set out in Gender Trouble as her own argument against Beauvoir. 
H.’s comment seems to have been more acute than I realized at the time.
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That’s the last paragraph. But the road by which Beauvoir reaches it is rough.
The chapter opens with the question of “inversion,” and here is where the 
“sandwich” I referred to earlier begins. Her very first statement takes apart the 
received representation of “the lesbian” as a short-haired woman in a bowler 
hat and tie whose “virility” results from a hormonal anomaly. Nothing could be 
further from the truth, she says, than this confusion between the invertie and 
the virago: lots of lesbians are feminine, and many of the most masculine 
women are heterosexual. “There is no ‘anatomical destiny’ which determines 
their sexuality.”32
But why then does she choose the word invertie to name the lesbian? And why 
does she then launch into a discussion of this very connection between sexual-
ity and soma, drawing on such problematic authorities as Helene Deutsch, 
Stekel, Ernest Jones, Havelock Ellis, Krafft-Ebing? Why is she even willing to 
give the time of day to so tainted a concept as “masculine protest,” especially 
since she has handily refuted it in her chapter on childhood?33 Has she changed 
her mind about whether there is, in the static bad sense of “is,” such a thing as 
“feminine” or “masculine,” after all?
As I argued in the previous chapter, though, we need to remember to read 
her use of the psychoanalysts and the other sexologists in volume 2 through the 
statements about method in volume 1: again, she’s making use of their descrip-
tive accounts, particularly on subjects where reliable data are scant, without 
privileging scientific claims over other sorts of truth claims (made for example 
by memoir or imaginative literature) and without accepting the underlying de-
terminisms that the scientific or pseudoscientific accounts imply. Psychoana-
lysts, she says in volume 1, always make the mistake of seeing a “signification” or 
meaning and taking it for a “reason,” and this results in an “ersatz ethics,” an 
ideal of normality.34 Here again she is using their case stories, their readings, 
and even their ways of reading, without accepting the normativity or the mor-
alizing. “The history of the individual is not a fatal procession … Homosexuality 
can be, for the woman, a way of fleeing her condition or of taking it on board. 
The capital error of the psychoanalysts is, through moralizing conformism, 
never to envision it as anything but an inauthentic attitude.”35 My favorite ex-
ample of this argument also comes from this chapter:
32 “Aucun ‘destin anatomique’ ne détermine leur sexualité” (DS 2:192).
33 “[P]rotestation virile” (DS 2:197).
34 DS 1:93.
35 “[L]’histoire de l’individu n’est pas un progrès fatal…. L’homosexualité peut être pour la 
femme une manière de fuir sa condition ou une manière de l’assumer. Le grand tort des 
psychanalystes c’est, par conformisme moralisateur, de ne l’envisager jamais que comme 
une attitude inauthentique” (DS 2:195).
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The notions of “inferiority complex” and “masculinity complex” remind 
me of an anecdote Denis de Rougemont tells…. A lady imagined that, 
when she took a walk in the country, the birds were attacking her. After 
many months of psychiatric treatment failed to cure her of her obsession, 
the doctor accompanying her in the clinic garden noticed that the birds 
were attacking her.36
A joke, but one that restores a woman’s right to name her own experience, her 
right to common sense, perhaps even her agency—at least her epistemological 
agency. Elsewhere Beauvoir says yes, tomboys like to climb trees, but who 
wouldn’t want to climb trees? What requires explanation is not the desire, but 
its cultural prohibition to half the species.
And in a way, what choice did Beauvoir have? It almost sounds like a party 
game: try to handle this issue in the twentieth century without using Freud. Try 
to pick up this plate of Jello without using your hands.
I also see her as using sexological discourse, and the discourse of “inversion,” 
against normativity, against itself. For example, she opposes the idea that every 
invertie is really a “hidden man” by introducing the stories of a “hermaphro-
dite” who desired only men and of a “passing woman” who was taken for a ho-
mosexual because she followed her male lover into the army.37 If our first con-
cern is to prove that gay people are no different from anyone else, we might see 
the proliferation of strange stories as ultimately pathologizing and sensation-
alizing the whole topic; but if that’s not our first concern, we can see them as 
cumulatively destabilizing, unhooking gender identity from sexual “prefer-
ence” and sexual behavior: if so many different things are possible, how could 
we say that any single simple connection was necessary? “Rien ne suffit à expli-
quer” why some women are lesbians: nothing suffices to explain it, nothing fi-
nally explains it, no one factor can explain it; but some are. Recognizing this is 
one more way Beauvoir breaks the link between sexuality and procreation.
However, if this was hard for me to see in the 1980s, it must have been even 
less clear when the book first appeared in the United States. This came home 
to me when I found the lesbian chapter from The Second Sex included in an 
36 “Les notions ‘complexe d’infériorité,’ ‘complexe de masculinité’ me font songer à cette 
anecdote que Denis de Rougemont raconte…. [U]ne dame s’imaginait que, lorsqu’elle se 
promenait dans la campagne, les oiseaux l’attaquaient; après plusieurs mois d’un traite-
ment psychanalytique qui échoua à la guérir de son obsession, le médecin l’accompagnant 
dans le jardin de la clinique s’aperçut que les oiseaux l’attaquaient” (DS 2:197).
37 DS 2:193. The first example seems to be based on someone Beauvoir actually knew, who 
had lived in the same building during the war. She tells the story in La force de l’âge (472) 
and, somewhat differently, in L’invitée (171–72).
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anthology edited by Hendrik Ruitenbeek, The Problem of Homosexuality in 
Modern Society, which appeared as a Dutton paperback original in 1963.38 
Dominated by American psychoanalysts of the type Carol Groneman has bril-
liantly named “cookbook Freudians” (a pinch of this, a dollop of that, season 
with prejudice and stir) the book includes essays with titles like “The Flight 
From Masculinity” and “The Effectiveness of Psychotherapy with Individuals 
Who Have Severe Homosexual Problems,” and it smells strongly of moral pan-
ic. Like many popularizations of sexual theory, it also delivers titillation under 
the legitimating cover of science.39 Seeing Beauvoir in this company reminds 
me how impossible (and wrong) it is to try to extricate the meaning of any 
work from its discursive surround; while most of the other articles are much 
worse, it is discouraging to think of readers of the anthology taking at face 
value Beauvoir’s descriptions of “the lesbian” who seeks a narcissistic mirror 
relationship, “the lesbian” who turns to women because there are no men 
where she is or because men don’t desire her, “the lesbian” who is haunted by a 
frustrated longing for her mother40—even though, in the context of The Sec-
ond Sex as a whole, these examples pile up, contradict each other, are declared 
to be descriptive rather than explanatory, and in the end suggest that the ways 
of being a lesbian are many, rather than one.
The title of The Problem of Homosexuality in Modern Society is particularly 
interesting. For whom is homosexuality a problem? For homosexuals, or for 
the “modern society” that would prefer to exclude them but must learn to 
manage them? I am reminded of Sartre’s statement that the Jewish problem is 
not a problem for Jews but “our” problem, of Gunnar Myrdal’s statement that 
38 I am not sure how this happened; probably Beauvoir did not have control over the uses to 
which her English-language text was put by Knopf.
39 Carole Groneman, Nymphomania: A History. See also Altman, “Everything They Always 
Wanted You to Know,” and Jay Gertzman, Bookleggers and Smuthounds: The Trade in Erot-
ica, 1920–1940.
40 It’s especially depressing to remember that pulp paperbacks, of which this is one, were 
among the few sources lesbians in the 1950s could turn to for information about how to 
interpret their own feelings. However, gay people have often been very creative at elabo-
rating positive and even political identities from images and ideas acquired in the oddest 
places.
Not all the essays in Ruitenbeek’s book are equally awful; for instance there’s a solid 
social approach by Evelyn Hooker. Ruitenbeek’s obituary describes him as “among the 
first psychoanalysts to advocate equal rights for homosexuals” (New York Times, May 26, 
1983), and John D’Emilio discusses his contribution to the movement in Sexual Politics, 
Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940–
1970 (141, 166). According to the Times, he died at fifty-five “as a result of complications 
from a rare infection, said his sole survivor and adopted son, Richard McConchie.” Nine-
teen eighty-three. Moment of silence. (We won’t go back.)
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racism is a white problem. And yet, both alternatives seem troubling: either 
homosexuality is a pathology (a problems homosexuals have), or there is an 
“us” whose problem it is and homosexuals who are not “us” become, in Beau-
voir’s language, the Other. Is she doing the latter thing in her text when she 
speaks of “the lesbian” as “she”?
In the early 1980s, some American feminist philosophers, among them Ann 
Ferguson, Claudia Card, and Marilyn Frye, faulted Beauvoir for refusing to 
take on the possibility of lesbian identity, and for seeming to split off “the les-
bian” from “the woman,” presumably to the benefit of the latter (conceived as 
heterosexual).41 Ferguson in particular found that Beauvoir’s existentialist fo-
cus on individual choice had blinded her to the possibility of lesbianism as a 
political and social collective identity. Frye’s argument is characteristically lu-
cid, but all three essays are marred by numerous misreadings, especially of 
Beauvoir’s conception of the body, unfortunate effects of engaging in intense 
exegesis of brief utterances, as philosophers in the analytic tradition tend to 
do, rather than locating meaning in the work as a whole. Curiously, all three 
employ Beauvoir’s basic concept, authenticity, in judging her own statements 
as lacking it. But there is an important kernel of truth here: at the one point in 
Beauvoir’s lesbian chapter where she mentions that certain lesbians like to get 
together in clubs and groups because they are lesbians—that is, come together 
around and on behalf of a political identity—they are dismissed as inauthen-
tic, “pointless[ly] grandstanding.”42 And this occurs just before the concluding 
paragraph I quoted above.
Does it make sense to object both to what seems to be Beauvoir’s refusal 
(here) of the idea of lesbianism as a group identity, and to what seems to be her 
assertion of lesbianism as a group identity for “elles,” that is, for someone else? 
The logical contradiction is more apparent than real, though. In the first in-
stance, Ferguson and the others were looking for affirmation of a collective 
lesbian subjectivity, in the second instance, they were troubled by what struck 
them as lesbian objectification.43 The relation between oppression and iden-
tity was, of course, the sixty-four thousand dollar question for gay and lesbian 
thinkers in the 1980s, but it was our question, not Beauvoir’s, and there may 
still be something to be said for refusing to answer it.
41 Ann Ferguson, “Lesbian Identity: Beauvoir and History”; Marilyn Frye, “History and Re-
sponsibility”; Claudia Card, “Lesbian Attitudes and The Second Sex.”
42 “Inutiles fanfaronnades” (DS 2:217).
43 Similar concerns were raised later by Ursula Tidd, Simone de Beauvoir: Gender and Testi-
mony, 55–7, and Toril Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 199–203.
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It is also misleading to see Beauvoir as focused on individual choice in the 
way that Sartre (at least the Sartre of L’être et le néant, the only Sartre then 
available to her) indeed unfortunately was. In fact what she talks about when 
she talks about freedom in that chapter and elsewhere is the freedom to as-
sume one’s situation in one or another way. The situation, remember, is the 
body, plus the social situation, which for her involves givens, données: this was 
her objection to Sartre’s early theory, an objection he’d later take on board.44 
You have to see that socially speaking some free subjects are freer than others 
to undertake any kind of analysis of oppression, really—and certainly to be-
come any kind of a materialist, which by 1949 they both were. So to say as 
Beauvoir does that one can “assume” or take up homosexuality (or heterosexu-
ality) in a number of different ways is not to say that this is a mere matter of 
individual “preference” like vanilla vs. strawberry. It is in fact not to take a posi-
tion on that question at all, in the final analysis, which—given what Eve Sedg-
wick and Didier Eribon say about the potential political dangers of either posi-
tion in that debate—actually looks somewhat prescient.45 It is good also to 
bear in mind Sedgwick’s demonstration in Epistemology of the Closet that one 
should not expect a person to be consistently essentialist (or social construc-
tionist) about both gender identity and sexual identity: the mixed configura-
tion often appears.
In a way, Beauvoir started the whole problematics of identity with her 
 question—are there women, really?—although I agree with Moi that in the 
end her answer to that question was, yes. As Beauvoir says about Woman in the 
discussion of myth: “If she did not exist, men would have invented her. They 
did invent her. But she also exists.”46 So, if no single factor suffices to explain 
lesbianism, and if lesbian existence may be assumed by individuals in various 
ways, are there lesbians, really? Her answer by the end seems to be, yes and no; 
no, but yes. Moi’s insight that Beauvoir expected identity to be “a consequence 
and not a cause of freedom” seems apposite.47
But certainly there was nothing here you could build a movement on or 
around. Or was there? If the objections of Ferguson and Card amount to blam-
ing Beauvoir for not inventing or predicting the identity politics of the 1980s, 
this no longer looks as bad as it once did. But I also want to question their read-
ing that because she didn’t affirm a distinct identity category for lesbians to 
44 See Sonia Kruks, “Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching Sartre About Freedom.”
45 See also Vera Whisman, Queer by Choice.
46 “[S]i elle n’existait pas, les hommes l’auraient inventée.
Ils l’ont inventée. Mais elle existe aussi sans leur invention” (DS 1:303).
47 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 144.
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mobilize around, heterosexual normativity forms the basis of The Second Sex.48 
Again, it all depends on the meaning of the word “is.” Perhaps the way same-
sex desire runs all through the book like a thread, plus the insistence on how 
difficult and unpleasant the establishment of heterosexual pleasure is, accom-
plished an anti-homophobic work, or at least made that possible later—in the 
way that her discussion of frigidity as a perfectly reasonable reaction to mar-
ried life, and a mode of female resistance, made possible Anne Koedt’s “Myth 
of the Vaginal Orgasm,” of which, in fact, the superior rationality of lesbianism 
is the final argument?49 How should we judge a theory: by where it came from? 
By where it went?
3 The Time of Writing
When I first began writing about Beauvoir and lesbians, I thought of defending 
her on the grounds that 1970s and 1980s critiques were anachronistic, because 
the idea of lesbianism or homosexuality as a political identity, a grounding for 
collective liberation, simply was not available before the Stonewall protest in 
1969. But this would be wrong. Christine Bard’s wonderful book Les garçonnes: 
modes et fantasmes des années folles mentions, for example, that in 1924, a pro-
homosexuality review called Inversions, with both men and women as con-
tributors, appeared in Paris (and was immediately suppressed by the censors).50 
48 Hazel Barnes, in what is probably the best close analysis of the chapter as a whole, makes 
a similar argument. Barnes cites Beauvoir—“What requires explanation is not the posi-
tive aspect of the invert’s choice, but the negative side of the coin: she is not defined by 
her taste for women, but by the exclusivity of that taste” [Ce qu’il faut expliquer chez 
l’invertie ce n’est donc pas l’aspect positif de son choix, c’en est la face négative; elle ne se 
caractérise pas par son goût pour les femmes mais par l’exclusivité de son goût (DS 
2:196)]—and notes: “It is entirely evident that she starts from a position of bisexuality…. 
The truth is that it is these critics who have fallen into the trap of the binary reasoning 
they deplore so much, and it is Beauvoir who corresponds to the post-modern position.” 
[De façon tout à fait évidente, elle part de la bisexualité…. La vérité est que ce sont ces 
critiques qui sont tombés dans le piège du raisonnement binaire qu’ils déplorent tant, et 
c’est Beauvoir qui correspond aux positionnements post-modernes (Barnes, “La lesbi-
enne,” 323–24).] Barnes does not name all the “critics” she means; one she does name is 
Marie-Jo Bonnet.
49 “Lesbian sexuality could make an excellent case, based upon anatomical data, for the ir-
relevancy of the male organ…. The recognition of clitoral orgasm as fact would threaten 
the heterosexual institution” (Koedt, “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,” 116).
50 Bard, Les garçonnes, 78. I am deeply indebted to Didier Eribon for pointing me toward this 
and other crucial resources, as well as for the example of his own inspiring intellectual 
and political work.
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Beauvoir and Sartre were well aware of the pioneering work of Magnus 
Hirschfeld’s Institute for the Study of Sexuality in Berlin51—“scientific” work 
(and itself not unproblematic) but clearly directed toward bringing about posi-
tive social change in legal and cultural attitudes towards both homosexuals 
and women, which was why the Nazis burned it. Bard’s book documents the 
storm over Victor Margueritte’s controversial best-selling 1920s novel, La gar-
çonne, which caused a moral panic over “the liberated woman” but also be-
came a lifestyle, a fashion sensation, and especially a haircut eagerly adopted 
by women of all sorts. Semi-pornographic and wildly popular, probably for 
both good and bad reasons, that novel begins with an attack on the sexual 
double standard and ends as an argument for companionate marriage, but in-
cludes a long excursion into the lesbian “underworld.” Bard’s discussion shows 
that there was a significant prewar history to the mutual implication of lesbi-
anism, transvestism as a cultural style, and feminism in France, and that the 
alliances were not always what one might have expected them to be.
There’s a parallel temptation to explain Beauvoir’s statement in her intro-
duction, “women … do not say ‘we,’” by saying that she wrote The Second Sex 
“before feminism,” in a kind of political void. But that, too, would be wrong. 
There was a feminism in her day, she knew it well—one of its leaders, Cécile 
Brunschvicg, was married to her graduate school advisor—and she conscious-
ly rejected it. (Her full sentence reads, “women—except in certain conferences 
which remain abstract demonstrations—do not say ‘we.’”)52 The French suf-
frage movement was bourgeois, nationalist, strongly Catholic, and in France as 
elsewhere many of its early arguments were based in a traditional view of 
women as moral guardians of the family.53 As Bard shows, most feminists 
joined the culturally conservative attack on Margueritte’s novel, and were op-
posed to the cultural style of the sexually emancipated woman that it both 
depicted and helped produce. These feminists were not obvious allies for 
Beauvoir, since the future freedom she projects in The Second Sex is centrally a 
freedom of sexual self-expression and pleasure for women.
So perhaps it’s better to examine Beauvoir’s conscious rejection of lesbian 
collective identity by specifying historically which forms of this were available 
and visible to her. What was she responding to? Should we see her analysis 
(some have) as cowardly, as yet one more example of Marcel Proust’s famous 
51 FA 153.
52 “Les femmes—sauf en certains congrès qui restent des manifestations abstraites—ne 
disent pas ‘nous’” (DS 1:19). She’s drawing a contrast to Blacks, especially “the Blacks of 
Haiti,” and proletarians.
53 See Sylvie Chaperon, Les années Beauvoir, 1945–1970.
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insight that it would be no good rebuilding Sodom, because all the actual sod-
omites would immediately flee, crying, “I’m not one of those”?54 The effects of 
oppression should never be discounted.55 But there may be more to see.
Didier Eribon has drawn my attention to some of the ways homophobic re-
marks were used after the war, by Sartre and others, as part of the épuration 
(purge) whereby the literary establishment, with Sartre the young Turk now 
firmly at its center, cleansed itself of those writers who had collaborated with 
the Nazis. For example, in “Qu’est-ce qu’un collaborateur?” (What is A Collabo-
rator?), Sartre wrote that because collaboration was feminine, it was not sur-
prising that so many of the collaborators were homosexual.56 Eribon com-
mented, “the assertion is unbearable, but it is also true.”57 Many of the writers 
and artists who collaborated were, in fact, homosexuals, members of what Eri-
bon called “our tradition”—Marcel Jouhandeau, Jean Cocteau, Colette (who 
seems to have contributed to a fulsome festschrift for the traitorous Vichy 
leader, Maréchal Pétain)—and there was a strong, and repulsive, homoerotic 
element to the embrace of the fascist “blood consciousness,” under the sign of 
“revolutionary” (woman-hating) masculinity, by such targets of the épuration 
as Robert Brasillach and Maurice Bardèche. Of course, as Eribon went on to 
say, many members of the Résistance were also homosexual, and it is impor-
tant not to oversimplify what led various people to do, or not do, various things 
during the war:58 his underlying argument is that being homosexual, even be-
ing a pro-homosexual homosexual, was (and is) no guarantee that a given writ-
er (or human being) would take progressive positions on other issues; it did 
not (and does not) insulate anyone from the worst political mistakes and 
crimes. (Eribon’s political conclusion is that solidarity must be demonstrated 
54 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Proust and the Spectacle of the Closet,” and Eribon, Ré-
flexions sur la question gay.
55 “September 9 [1939]…. I go to the Dôme with Olga. There are two little lesbians next to us, 
and one gets into a thing with the waiter: ‘I don’t talk to waiters,’ she says; and the mous-
tached waiter, easy-going yet threatening: ‘But waiters have ears to hear, and what they 
hear they can repeat, and the dungeon of Vincennes is nearby.’” [9 septembre (1939)…. Je 
vais au Dôme avec Olga. Il y a deux petites lesbiennes à côté de nous, et l’une s’engueule 
avec le garçon: “Je ne parle pas avec les garçons,” dit-elle; et le garçon, moustachu, bonasse 
et menaçant: “Mais les garçons ont des oreilles pour entendre, et ils peuvent le répéter et 
le donjon de Vincennes n’est pas loin” (FA 443).] “Garçon” is also the word for “boy,” so 
there’s a double entendre: “I don’t talk to boys.”
56 Sartre, “Qu’est-ce qu’un collaborateur?”
57 Eribon, “Fascists, Anti-Semitism, and Homosexuality in France since the 1930s.”
58 See Alice Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and French Intellectual 
Life and The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brassilach; Erin Carlston, 
Thinking Fascism; Gisèle Sapiro, La guerre des écrivains; Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies.
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and can never be presumed.)59 My own point here is simply that if Beauvoir 
looked around her for examples of homosexual clubs or “interest groups,” some 
of what she saw wasn’t very pretty.
Indeed, going back to prewar Germany, the socialist pro-inversion model of 
Hirschfeld’s Institute could be contrasted with the repressive, anti-Semitic, and 
militantly anti-effeminate homosexuality of the Ernst Röhm circle and the 
Wandervogel groups. At the same panel where Eribon spoke (at a Chicago con-
ference on “The Future of the Queer Past”), Todd Shepard showed that, a bit 
later, French critics of torture in Algeria would be attacked by French national-
ists as pederasts; meanwhile those leftist activists themselves described the tor-
turers as homosexual.60 In short, we need to recognize both homosexual iden-
tity and homophobia as generally available languages that were not marked as 
either Left or Right, as either pro- or anti-woman. Again, the Foucault touch-
stone seems apt: “There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and op-
posite it another discourse that runs counter to it.”61
I do not mean to excuse Sartre’s remark, merely to contextualize it. Note that 
(unlike Beauvoir) he seems committed here to a rather simplistic version of 
the “inversion” model, and willing to use the term “feminine” as though it had 
a stable and permanent meaning. In fact the picture of homosexuality in his 
work overall is murky. Sometimes he presents a homosexual as a striking ex-
ample of a person caught in an attitude of “bad faith”: Daniel in Les chemins de 
la liberté (The Roads to Freedom) is a clear example of someone who is unable 
or unwilling to assume his freedom in any authentic way, and he serves as a foil 
to the heterosexual male protagonist, who can’t quite handle his freedom, 
59 This seems truer, and even more unbearable, than when he said it in 2000. Xenophobic 
mobilization against Islamic immigrants in the Netherlands, the most sexually “progres-
sive” country in the European Union, partly on that basis; charges of racism against the 
Human Rights Campaign … Milo Yiannopolous…
60 Questions of homosexuality in France were deeply involved with national identity and 
pride, with military and reproductive vigor. One may compare the McCarthyite charge 
that homosexuality, like Communism, was “un-American,” and note the deep connec-
tions between anti-Semitism and homophobia in both cases. This helps contextualize, for 
example, why there is so much about the Dreyfus affair in Proust’s Sodome et Gomorrhe, 
and why Gide’s L’immoraliste opens with a fictional letter from a not unfriendly govern-
ment official, who asks, “how can a man like Michel serve the state?” (L’immoraliste, 3; 
emphasis added).
61 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 101. He continues: “Discourses are tactical elements or 
blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and contradictory 
discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing 
their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy. We must not expect the dis-
courses on sex to tell us, above all, what strategy they derive from, or what moral divisions 
they accompany, or what ideology they represent; rather, we must question them….”
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 either, but is at least making a lucid effort. The lesbian in Huis clos (No Exit), 
who may be partly based on Beauvoir, is morally sophisticated without being 
sympathetic. In “L’enfance d’un chef” (The Childhood of a Leader) there’s more 
than enough homosexual bad faith to go around, but it’s hard to tell against 
whom the satire is directed, exactly. But Sartre’s fullest treatment of the issue, 
in his book about Genet, may show (one form of) male homosexuality as a fully 
authentic choice. It interests me that Sartre wrote about Genet after reading 
The Second Sex, and in fact he even cites some of Beauvoir’s descriptions of “la 
femme”—a thing people often suppose he never did.62 On the other hand, he is 
working quite firmly within an “inversion” model (as if Genet and his male ho-
mosexual characters were “really” women, and thus Beauvoir’s thoughts about 
femininity would be helpful in understanding them). Might he, too, perhaps 
with her assistance, have come to see homosexuality (like heterosexuality) as 
something people might “assume” either authentically, or otherwise? He does 
not seem to have thought so in 1945, when his introductory manifesto for Les 
Temps Modernes stated (as part of an attack on Proust), “we refuse to believe 
that a homosexual’s love has the same character as a heterosexual’s.”63 Presum-
ably he saw this differently by the 1960s, when he would take a public stand in 
favor of Gay Liberation, and against state censorship of their publications. 
Whether one chooses to see his view as self-contradictory, or as evolving in 
a progressive direction, one thing seems clear for Sartre and also, I think, for 
Beauvoir: the major sources for their views of homosexuality were not psycho-
analytic or sexological, but literary.
4 Between Gide and Proust
The unsettling, destabilizing move that Beauvoir accomplished for so many 
readers was mainly accomplished for her, I think, by her early reading of André 
Gide. In Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée she records her encounter at the age 
of fifteen with the literature of inquiétude (restlessness), to which she was in-
troduced by her cousin Jacques, and her eager embrace of Gide’s values, “sin-
cerity” and “immoralism.” She quotes particularly the famous sentence from 
his 1897 Les nourritures terrestres (The Fruits of the Earth): “Family, I hate you! 
62 Sartre, Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr, 37, 57, 291. For fuller discussion of how Beauvoir’s 
conception of the Other influenced Sartre’s book on Genet, see Simons, Beauvoir and The 
Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism, 46.
63 “Nous refusons de croire que l’amour d’un inverti présente les mêmes caractères que celui 
d’un hétérosexuel” (Sartre, “Présentation,” 12).
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Shut-in homes, bolted doors.”64 “We were on the same side,” she notes—not 
least, as she saw in humorous hindsight, because Gide and other violently anti-
bourgeois writers were themselves disoriented children of the bourgeoisie, 
and because their revolt, interior and poetic rather than social or political, 
could enable one to take deep intellectual pride in an adolescent spat with 
one’s mother. Still, his influence endured. As a young teacher, she tried to pass 
on Jacques’s awakening gift to her by teaching and discussing Gide’s views with 
her students, with mixed success: parental complaints resulted in a series of 
unpleasant incidents with the authorities, which perhaps prepared the way for 
her dismissal from the teaching corps for “détournement de mineur.” By this 
time, she could have shared with them the overt, if somewhat bizarre, sexual 
theory Gide offered in Corydon (1924) and the franker insights about his own 
homosexual experiences, which he’d sketched as fiction in L’immoraliste (1901), 
then openly presented in the autobiographical Si le grain ne meurt (1926). One 
wonders what she told them. At the most intense period of triangular sexual 
activity with Sartre and various of her students and younger friends, she was 
avidly reading Gide’s journals … and sending them on to Sartre and to their 
young friend Jacques Bost in the army, as soon as she finished them.65
It’s hard now to see Gide’s work as in any way sexually progressive: the early 
work is timid, diffuse, coy, shot through with religious agony and moralizing; 
Corydon’s insistence on a Greek pedagogical model of masculine, even military 
(and non-sexual) pédérastie rests on a deep and absolutely explicit misogyny; 
L’immoraliste and the most autobiographical narratives eroticize colonial “na-
tives” and lower-class boys generally in a thoroughly racist and insufferably 
aristocratic way, and … well, frankly, one can’t help feeling sorry for his wife, 
imprisoned all the while in celibate respectability. To understand why Beau-
voir found Gide’s writings revolutionary and even empowering, one needs to 
realize how profoundly Catholic and bourgeois and nationalist and generally 
stifling the “foyers clos” of her milieu were; that in her mother’s house one 
could transgress sexually just by being alone in a room with a man, the best 
kind of marriage was an arranged marriage, etc. Must one see in Beauvoir’s ap-
propriation of Gide another example of what Le Dœuff has called Beauvoir’s 
“genius for the inappropriate”?66 Perhaps it is simply the operation of a com-
mon mechanism of readerly identification: identification with/in narrative, 
64 “Famille, je vous hais! foyers clos, portes refermées” (mjfr 268). Ménalque, the character 
who says this, is often seen as a version of Oscar Wilde.
65 FA 111–12. Si le grain ne meurt may have been one model (among others) for Mémoires 
d’une jeune fille rangée, where Beauvoir seems similarly concerned to trace the steps of 
her sexual coming-of-age in a matter-of-fact, straightforward tone.
66 Hipparchia’s Choice, 55.
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unlike adherence to a philosophical or political position, is rarely single or to-
tal, sole or whole, and is not meant to be.
In any case, Gide’s explicit taking up of the cudgels “pour l’homosexualité”—
for which despite his unparalleled cultural capital he was duly vilified—did 
not provide any space for lesbian identity. His was hardly a call to arms any 
woman could reasonably heed. But the insistence that homosexual men were 
not effeminate or “inverted”—au contraire! en garde!—made a point that may 
have been theoretically useful to Beauvoir in a different way. In the lesbian 
chapter, she remarks in passing that
[e]ven man does not desire woman exclusively; the fact that the organism 
of the male homosexual may be perfectly manly implies that the manli-
ness of a woman does not necessarily commit her to homosexuality.67
And the observation, or the unsettling move, may touch the book’s argument 
as a whole as well: because once the question of femininity has been raised 
with respect to men, that is, to those who are biologically male, the question of 
what femininity can mean for anyone, including women, has been raised. The 
word “femininity” has acquired its implicit inverted commas, and a return to 
naïve essentialism about gender is (or should be) impossible.68
The history of homosexuality in French literature has often been written in 
the light of Proust’s advice to Gide—“you can tell everything, as long as you 
never say ‘I’” (advice Gide ignored).69 As a result of this comment, of the pre-
sumed (though somewhat unusual) heterosexuality of the narrator in À la re-
cherche du temps perdu, and of the fact that some of his portraits of what he 
calls invertis are less than flattering, Proust is often seen as the loser in this ex-
change, as an apologist for the closet or even a self-hating homosexual. Like 
Beauvoir, he oscillates between diverse and complicated and self-contradictory 
67 “L’homme même ne désire pas exclusivement la femme; le fait que l’organisme de 
l’homosexuel mâle peut être parfaitement viril implique que la virilité d’une femme ne la 
voue pas nécessairement à l’homosexualité” (DS 2:193).
68 The issue of whether a homosexual man really “is” a woman might look different, too, af-
ter Beauvoir’s critique (what is a woman, are there women, really) places those inverted 
commas around “is,” and de-biologizes the question of “femininity.” I would like to think 
this was a legacy from second-wave feminism to the gay (and gay and lesbian) movements 
of the 1970s and 1980s.
69 “[V]ous pouvez tout raconter, mais à condition de ne jamais dire, Je” (Gide, journal entry 
for May 14, 1921, quoted in Michael Lucey, Never Say I: Sexuality and the First Person in 
Colette, Gide, and Proust, 1). A younger Gide had already received (and ignored) the same 
advice from Oscar Wilde himself: “promise me, never write ‘I’ anymore…. In art, you see, 
there is no first person” (Alan Sheridan, André Gide: A Life in the Present, 148).
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portraits of individuals, their behavior, its meaning, etc., and blanket theoreti-
cal statements about l’inverti, the homosexual. And like her he has been blamed 
for conforming to his own joke about the sodomites who flee Sodom pour ne 
pas avoir l’air d’en être, so as not to be taken for “one of those.”70
I think this is unfair. It’s possible to argue that in À la recherche as a whole, 
the question of inversion, after a million tortured explanations, twists and 
turns and exceptions, falls apart of its own weight or, if you like, deconstructs 
itself. By the very end of the work it has been said of nearly every character that 
he or she “en est une” (is one of those), at least sometimes; as Eve Sedgwick 
points out, the question of sexual identification becomes progressively less co-
herent and more interesting.71 Finally the question about “en être”—who is 
one of those?—may be answered as Beauvoir answered the determinists: it all 
depends what you mean by “être.” The key element for Proust is, of course, 
time, which produces “les intermittences du cœur” and allows for change and 
contingency. Perhaps what we’re seeing here is a love that would prefer not to 
speak its name, because all the available names feel wrong. In any case, Proust 
was another writer Beauvoir read and reread throughout her life; his thought 
was formative to how both she and Sartre, and indeed the French generally, 
thought through the question of homosexuality (and the related question of 
Jewishness).72
Beauvoir’s debt to Proust was profound and productive. But the helpfulness 
of male models to lesbian writers tends to be ambiguous. In Proust, men who 
desire men and women who desire women occupy very different epistemo-
logical positions. The questions he poses about homosexual men are questions 
about the formation of subjectivity: who or what is this guy, what does he want 
and why does he want what he wants, how did he get that way, etc., with the 
old “who or what am I?” lurking in the street outside or peeping over the tran-
som. But the lesbian question is always “does she or doesn’t she?” and it is 
posed by an amorous or voyeuristic male subject to whom the woman’s desire 
70 Marcel Proust, Sodome et Gomorrhe, 615–32.
71 Sedgwick, “Proust and the Spectacle of the Closet.” À la recherche du temps perdu is an-
other very long book which will look quite different depending on whether one reads and 
absorbs the whole thing, or takes the part for the whole. I’d argue, for example, that Char-
lus is not “the homosexual” in any reified way; but one must live with him well into the 
final volume, and his old age, to grasp that he is, in fact, Charlus, and not “the” anything. 
(He is not even “a” Charlus; he is himself.)
72 Discourses about homosexuality and about Jews are inextricably related throughout Eu-
rope at this period, in ways I haven’t space to discuss. See Carlston, Thinking Fascism. See 
also Altman, “A Book of Repulsive Jews? Rereading Nightwood.”
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remains opaque, and for whom its ambiguity is a source of anxiety.73 This anx-
ious gaze is objectifying or, more accurately, is about objectification, because 
Proust’s point is precisely that objectification doesn’t work. No one but Odette 
will ever know what Odette is thinking or feeling, or what she wants, even at 
the moment of the act of physical “possession”—“in which, in any case, one 
possesses nothing,” as Proust says—a very Beauvoirian point.74 We’re surpris-
ingly close, here, to Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s account of “the Look,” the moment 
where one suddenly remembers that one is not the only subject in the world, 
and that the other person may have a different idea about what is going on.75 
And despite the ineffable silence of women in Proust’s text, I would not be 
quick to say whether Swann or Odette, “Marcel” or Albertine, finally has the 
upper hand.
But if Beauvoir sought literary models for full-fledged lesbian subjectivity, 
Proust could be little more help than Gide. She turned instead to the tradition 
of the girl’s school crush romance story (or, to put it more elegantly, the lesbian 
Bildungsroman): Mädchen in Uniform, Dusty Answer … turned to it in The Sec-
ond Sex, in her novels, and perhaps even in her own life.76
5 Lesbian Reading
She would not say of any one in the world now that they were this or were 
that …
virginia woolf, Mrs. Dalloway77
73 Sedgwick also observes that the language of “inversion” is never applied to the lesbians in 
the text (234); it is not Albertine’s gender identity that is in question, but the things she 
(maybe) does, the features of her life that escape the narrator’s gaze.
74 “[O]ù d’ailleurs l’on ne possède rien” (Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, 275). Compare Beau-
voir’s description (discussed in chapter 1 above) of eroticism as a revolt of the instant 
against the flow of time, and thus unsocializable in any systematic way.
75 Sartre sees this mainly as the opening of hostilities between competing subjectivities, at 
best a source of nausea, where for Proust it is the beginning of all desire…. In L’invitée, 
Beauvoir seems to do both: Xavière is an opaque and therefore fascinating object of desire 
for both Françoise and Pierre, but as the source of a competing view of Françoise to Fran-
çoise’s own view of herself she is so threatening that she must be killed at the end of the 
novel.
76 The schoolgirl romance was largely an English vein, but it would be mined by Beauvoir’s 
protégée and disappointed admirer, Violette Leduc, in such works as La bâtarde and 
Thérèse et Isabelle and, very differently, by Monique Wittig in her marvelous first novel, 
L’Opoponax.
77 Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, 8.
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But lesbian erotics are only partially about conscious victories and ro-
mantic sunsets. They are also about conscious and unconscious struggle, 
circulations of power, failure of nerve, and fear of loss, always in the con-
text of a hostile public.
carolyn allen, Following Djuna78
The “lesbian question” has been, and is, a literary question, as Julie Abraham 
shows at the beginning of Are Girls Necessary?.
In Anglo-American culture, fiction has been a primary arena for the rep-
resentation of sexuality and gender and the construction of identities. 
First cousin to the case history, and more accessible than scientific texts, 
novels remained over the first half of the twentieth century easier to pro-
duce and harder to censor than theater or film. So, for a combination of 
formal, cultural, and material reasons, the novel has been the genre in 
which representations of lesbianism have been recognized.
As Abraham argues, quite a bit of twentieth-century writing by and about les-
bians goes on outside “lesbian novels” about happy or unhappy couples, “com-
ing out,” and so on, and it takes longer to recognize or even notice what is les-
bian about the work of, say, Willa Cather or Gertrude Stein. “Nonetheless it is 
surprising … how much lesbian writing contains aspects of the subjects and 
formula of the lesbian novel.”79
Abraham’s work mainly references British and American fiction, and so, to a 
surprising extent, does Beauvoir’s. Or perhaps what is surprising is to what ex-
tent the lesbian literary tradition was an Anglo-American phenomenon.80 In-
deed, the women’s literary tradition was.81 Beauvoir’s autobiographies record a 
fiction-dependent process of self-formation and Bildung strikingly similar to 
the stories Rachel Brownstein and Nancy Miller have told about middle-class 
girls reading under the bedcovers, learning to write and live their own stories.82 
After all my careful attempts at historicity and distance, it is startling to realize 
that Beauvoir read what I read: that she wept over Little Women, then threw it 
across the room when she learned that Laurie married the insipid, pretty Amy, 
78 Carolyn Allen, Following Djuna: Women Lovers and the Erotics of Loss, 23.
79 Julie L. Abraham, Are Girls Necessary?: Lesbian Writing and Modern Histories, xiii.
80 Even Renée Vivien and Natalie Barney, who lived in Paris and wrote in French, were 
Americans. The only exception, if she even counts, is Colette.
81 See Susan Suleiman, Subversive Intent: Gender, Politics, and the Avant-garde, 30.
82 See Nancy K. Miller, “Emphasis Added: Plots and Plausibilities in Women’s Fiction,” and 
Rachel Brownstein, Becoming a Heroine.
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and not the clever and bookish “Joe [sic]”;83 that she took to heart the sorrow-
ful story of Maggie Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss, and vowed to do better by 
becoming, not Maggie, not Lucy, but George Eliot;84 that she read all of Woolf ’s 
novels and essays as they appeared, even made her way through Dorothy Rich-
ardson’s Pilgrimage.85 As a girl who sought models and possibilities in her 
reading, rather than her milieu, which was limiting and distressing, she had 
taught herself (by the time she met Sartre) the first half of the “women in lit-
erature” survey as it would appear in the United States around 1975.
Many of the texts named in her autobiography find their way into The Sec-
ond Sex, too, supplemented by examples and arguments drawn from Woolf ’s A 
Room of One’s Own. But how can fiction be source material for philosophy? 
What kind of book is this, anyway? Genre matters because it determines what 
kinds of truth claims are being made, and what will constitute acceptable evi-
dence for those claims. But genre also matters because it determines how read-
ers are being invited to participate in the work of constructing a text. Who is, 
and who isn’t invited? What implicit contracts between writer and reader are 
in play? What relationship, what community, is being constructed? (Or imag-
ined, through an intuition of future community among a set of solitary readers, 
each isolated, and yet all passionately engaged.)
I am sympathetic to the insistence of Christine Delphy, and numerous femi-
nist writers internationally, that “Simone de Beauvoir, c’était un philosophe,” 
which I take to mean, pay attention to what she actually said, take its proposi-
tional content, so to speak, seriously, and argue for or against it in a grown-up 
way; master your transferences, be a reader and not just a fan. Beauvoir’s exclu-
sion from the philosophical canon as it is read and taught resulted from pure 
misogyny; disagreeing with that exclusion is a key move in recognizing her 
importance as a thinker, period. Agreed. Yet philosophical accounts can tend to 
smooth out the lumpy, digressive, baggy texture of Beauvoir’s writing, and 
leave out the parts of The Second Sex that, whether I love them or hate them, 
seem most meaningful to me: the stories about women, told in their own 
words.86
83 mjfr 122–24 and 145–46.
84 mjfr 194–95.
85 “Dorothy Richardson’s interminable novel, which over the course of ten or twelve volumes 
succeeds at telling absolutely nothing.” [[L]’interminable roman de Dorothy Ri chardson 
qui réussit pendant dix ou douze volumes à ne raconter strictement rien (FA 63).]
86 As I hope I showed in chapter 1, what we hear in the extended sexological and psychoana-
lytic examples is often not the voice of the “expert” but the suffering woman; in the same 
way, we often seem to be hearing from the heroine of a novel, rather than the novel’s male 
author.
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The Second Sex is not a lesbian novel. But if it were a lesbian novel, what 
lesbian novel would it be?
Not Radclyffe Hall’s The Well of Loneliness, which Abraham and most other 
commentators see as the formative template for twentieth-century lesbian lit-
erature. In a footnote to the last paragraph of the lesbian chapter, Beauvoir 
says, “The Well of Loneliness presents a heroine marked by a psychopathologi-
cal fate. But the documentary value of this novel is very thin, despite the repu-
tation it has found.”87 What did she dislike, one wonders: Hall’s ersatz ethics? 
the God-talk? The tortured final plea for tolerance toward homosexuals as a 
group? The stereotypical division Hall draws between “real” (mannish) lesbi-
ans and the other, temporary, feminine kind, a distinction that other sorts of 
“documentary” evidence, cited in Beauvoir’s chapter, falsifies? Hall’s excruciat-
ingly bad writing? Or … maybe it was the maudlin unhappy ending, the self-
sacrifice of the guilt-tripped heroine, and her seemingly inevitable defeat and 
misery?
A closer model may have been Rosamond Lehmann’s Dusty Answer, which 
Beauvoir and Zaza read together, and which Beauvoir tells us she tried to imi-
tate in her own first unsatisfactory attempts to write.88 She draws on it, and on 
another Lehmann novel, Invitation to the Waltz, repeatedly in the parts of The 
Second Sex that deal with the young woman’s development, the Bildungsro-
man parts if you will. Only Alain-Fournier’s Le Grand Meaulnes seems to have 
made a comparable impression on her young projections of how her life, and 
her writing, might turn out.
Lehmann herself was a 1920s English writer to the bone, linked with other 
post-World War I feminists (Vera Brittain, Winifred Holtby, Storm Jameson, Re-
becca West) who have been relegated, with some justice and some injustice, to 
the B-list as more of sociological than literary interest. Her books, to borrow a 
phrase from A Room of One’s Own, lay about in second hand shops like fallen 
pockmarked apples, until the day they were found and resurrected as Virago 
Modern Classics.89 There is no such thing as “women’s writing,” but if there 
were, these would be it. They sit on the border between being “good bad nov-
els” and “bad good novels,” by which I mean that they make tremendous use of 
sentimental longings, on the part of characters and readers—both are tremen-
dous tearjerkers—even as they sketch an ironic awareness of the limitations 
87 “Le puits de solitude présente une héroïne marquée par une fatalité psychophysiologique. 
Mais la valeur documentaire de ce roman est fort mince en dépit de la réputation qu’il a 
connue” (DS 2:217N).
88 Most of these early attempts remained unfinished. See Altman, “Necessity but 
[unintelligible].”
89 Lehmann is to Woolf as Howells is to James.
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posed for a young woman by her inscription and self-inscription in romance 
plots. Imagine D. H. Lawrence’s Ursula, or Miriam, transplanted into a Jane 
Austen novel, and you will have a fair sense of Invitation to the Waltz’s Olivia, 
Dusty Answer’s Judith. (Naked swimming and rapture over gardens feature 
heavily.) Lehmann appeals to the instincts of romance-reading even while she 
seems to sow the seeds for seeing beyond them.90 What she captures best is 
the intensity of sexual feeling and power of sexual fantasy in the life of a cre-
ative young girl; and also the profound humiliations into which such feelings 
can lead her, given that other people (especially young men) may have differ-
ent ideas, or just limited imaginations. The attraction of Dusty Answer may 
partly have been that it shows sexuality as confused, diffused, and multiple. 
Judith’s love for Jennifer is central, sensual, lyrical, and her grief and confusion 
when Jennifer leaves her (for an older woman more clearly marked in the text 
as lesbian) cut very deep. But Judith is simultaneously in love with, and at-
tracted to, a variety of other people, including a man who keeps trying to warn 
her that he is homosexual.
Dusty Answer has usually been discussed in terms of its contribution to the 
canon of “lesbian images,” and as such it has been judged wanting, in terms 
that strikingly recall the criticisms of Beauvoir I described earlier. English critic 
Gabrielle Griffin compares it to Clemence Dane’s (monstrous) Regiment of 
Women, complaining that Jennifer and Judy’s relationship is “pre-sexual” and 
familial, while Jennifer’s relationship to the more masculine Geraldine Man-
ners is “purposeless,” “deracinated,” “promiscuous” and provides no viable al-
ternative.91 One thing that might be said of these criticisms is that they keep us 
from reading and enjoying the book on its own terms; another is that they de-
velop an ersatz ethics no less chilling than the heterosexual plotting Griffin 
presumably means to oppose. (What conceivable lesbian image, or reality, 
would be acceptable?)
What did Beauvoir look for, and find, in Dusty Answer? Arguments of the 
“Emily must have felt” sort often feel tricksy. But having compared Lehmann’s 
novel with Beauvoir’s autobiographical writing about her youth, and with her 
youthful diaries, I want to speculate that she didn’t pore over it in a hungry 
search for lesbian representation, for information about her own same-sex de-
sires, for cultural legitimation that would bless her union with her friend Zaza 
90 See Suzanne Clark, Sentimental Modernism, and Janice Radway, Reading the Romance, for 
a less unsympathetic view than mine of the romance genre.
91 Griffin, Heavenly Love? Lesbian Images in Twentieth-Century Women’s Writing. Despite its 
date, 1993, Griffin’s book sits firmly within a strong lesbian-feminist paradigm, and opens 
with a polemic against queer theory.
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and empower her to give up on Jacques. Rather, she sought and found a young 
woman full of life, full of passionate feeling for people of both sexes, and also 
of a longing to be herself for herself first … and capable too of study and intel-
lectual detachment, but unwilling to give up on love.
Does this have to be inauthentic? Isn’t it how it just, uh, is, sometimes? Or, in 
the dignified phrase Beauvoir chose sometimes when she wished to introduce 
her own life into that dignified philosophical tome, The Second Sex, “I myself 
know some women who…”
6 Lesbians and L’invitée
But of course The Second Sex is not a lesbian novel, or any other kind of novel. 
The closest thing to a lesbian novel Beauvoir actually wrote was L’invitée.92
L’invitée is a lesbian novel only in the way that To the Lighthouse and Mrs. 
Dalloway are, in the same way (but much more strongly) that according to 
Barbara Smith Sula is one.93 They don’t signal themselves as such, aren’t The 
Well of Loneliness or Riverfinger Woman; they do not say “we.” But there are a 
few passages that, once you’ve understood them, radiate meaning subtly 
throughout the whole text.94 And you say to yourself, or your students, well 
what did you think it was about, silly? Once pointed out, the emotional current 
is irreversibly evident. But such works are totally unconcerned about “lesbian 
identity,” about drawing a line of demarcation between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.
L’invitée includes a number of scenes between Françoise and Xavière that 
are both emotional and erotic, including a number of scenes where the two of 
them together appreciatively watch other women.95 This may help us make 
sense of the intensity of Françoise’s desire to bring Xavière to Paris, and of her 
sadness when Pierre decides to make seducing Xavière one of his projects, in a 
sense cutting Françoise out of her share of Xavière’s affection: she is jealous of 
both of them. Eroticism between women, while never named, is diffused and 
92 Julie Abraham makes a distinction between “lesbian novels” and “lesbian writing” which 
I am not following here; my usage of the term “novel” is looser.
93 Barbara Smith, “Toward a Black Feminist Criticism.”
94 Rich’s idea of “lesbian continuum,” Audre Lorde’s similarly diffuse and inclusive notion of 
“the erotic,” might be relevant here.
95 Xavière, who is described as both opaque (in the manner of Proust’s êtres de fuite) and 
perverse, has a fine selection of pinups on the wall of her room. Some, though not all, of 
the women they watch together are women of color. I’ll return to this issue in chapter four 
below.
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unsettling throughout … in the same way that the deep bonds between men 
are diffused, unsettling, troublants throughout Le Grand Meaulnes and the ear-
ly work of Gide. The “pedagogical model” of the relationship also seems influ-
enced by Gide’s life and work, as well as by some of the schoolgirl lesbian ro-
mances I discussed earlier.
As much as I have learned from Toril Moi’s work on Beauvoir, I find myself 
dissenting from her Freudian and somewhat Kristevan reading of L’invitée. To 
me, L’invitée is not about separating from the symbiotic mother.96 It is, among 
many other things, about not quite having the courage to bring another wom-
an out, to be a younger woman’s first and real lover; and envying the men for 
whom heterosexual seduction is an obvious, and culturally syntonic, move. 
Perhaps an insight into the ethical limitations of the pedagogical model it-
self—an awareness she began developing in the manuscript that became 
Quand prime le spirituel, and that took its baldest form in her much later state-
ment to Nelson Algren, “I happened to behave very badly”—is at least on the 
horizon as well. What’s interesting is that because lesbian desire is never 
named, it need never be named as a problem, a crime, a disease, or any of a 
number of other distressing options that were certainly culturally available to 
Beauvoir. The question of how the characters’ behavior might relate to conven-
tional morality (whether bourgeois or Kantian) is simply irrelevant. Possibly 
an advantage.
This does not really make L’invitée a lesbian novel. But it is not exactly a 
heterosexual novel either, because the heterosexuality it foregrounds is an at-
tempt to, in Woolf ’s phrase, “live differently.”97 However problematic this turns 
out to be (it does lead to murder) the attempt is never abandoned. For this 
reason Toril Moi’s question, why Françoise doesn’t just do the obvious thing 
and ask Pierre not to sleep with Xavière, seems misguided. To do that, to enact 
the same sort of possessive jealousy as an ordinary bourgeois wife, would be to 
vitiate not just the basis for that couple’s original “pact,” but the whole idea or 
original choice around which Françoise is constructing her own new form of 
subjectivity in relationship. The final line, “[e]lle s’était choisie” (she had cho-
sen herself) doesn’t mean, or doesn’t only mean, that she killed Xavière so she 
could keep Pierre for herself—that would reaffirm the heterosexual plot; rath-
er I think it means, she chose to keep her different story going, even though 
there was no existing paradigm within which her story could be said to “make 
sense.” Perhaps precisely for that reason. Just as in the lesbian chapter of The 
Second Sex, ethical questions about the authenticity or inauthenticity of desire 
96 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 118–23.
97 Woolf, The Years, 286, 309.
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are foregrounded; but here, ideas about homosexual versus heterosexual de-
sire, about lesbian “identity,” do not speak to these questions: so they are 
silent.98
7 Last Thoughts
La théorie, c’est bon, mais ça n’empêche pas d’exister.
Charcot quoted by Freud99
Sexual theory has been traditionally used to say, “People have been forced 
to be this thing; people could be that thing.” And you’re left in the middle 
going, “Well, I am here, and I don’t know how to get there.” It hasn’t been 
able to talk realistically about where people are sexually.
amber hollibaugh100
As I said above, The Second Sex is of course not a lesbian novel, or any other 
kind of novel. But I do hope that this juxtaposition at least helps us wonder 
whether it can finally be judged to be monologic. So many competing voices, 
saying so many different things, at such length, so many instances of “on the 
other hand,” are not digressions from her point, they are the point. This has 
profound implications for how we read it, both for the experience of (sitting 
there and) reading it, and for the final act of deciding “what she means” and 
passing political judgment. A certain statement, presented as a generalized ac-
count of how things always are for everyone, may offend me terribly; if it is of-
fered, instead, as a story among others, I may swallow it, may even remember a 
similar story that once happened to me, may now read my own story differ-
ently. If identification with the text, like identification in reading a novel, need 
not be sole or whole or involve identity, perhaps the resulting text will speak to 
many different readers and seem to be saying many different things? (As this 
one, remember, did.)
Perhaps one might call the lesbian chapter a piece of literary criticism 
(among other things). An attempt to put together, to cut together (in the sense 
of montage) a picture of “lesbian existence” from the documents that were to 
hand, judging some more effective than others but leaving in a lot of rough 
98 A very compelling 2010 article by Michael Lucey, “Simone de Beauvoir and Sexuality in 
the Third Person,” reaches a similar conclusion by a different route.
99 Roazen, Freud and His Followers, 72.
100 Amber Hollibaugh and Cherrie Moraga, “What We’re Rolling Around in Bed With,” 72.
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edges. Because she did not trust her own fragmentary experience, or her un-
derstanding of it? Or, because she wanted it to be better than it had been for 
her?
Or because she did not in the final analysis wish to speak for others?
Who knows? I am not however interested in fleeing Griffin’s ersatz ethics in 
the other direction, and suggesting that every indication of lesbian existence, 
however slight or problematic, constitutes a “queer touch” that renders the text 
and the author deliciously subversive. Foucault’s insight cuts both ways, cuts 
many more ways than two.
What then is the theoretical payoff, for example for some future conversa-
tion I might have with H., or with my feminist students who wonder quite rea-
sonably what any of this has to offer them? If what is useful and exciting is al-
ways the first awareness, the first unsettling move, the first undermining of 
heterosexist “common sense,” the first uncoupling of sex from gender and of 
sex-as-it-has-been from sex as it might be … well, this can be accomplished by 
a number of “theorists” in a number of ways. What Gide did for Beauvoir, Beau-
voir did for Judith Butler, and Butler did for H.; it was probably Foucault who 
did it for me. A true and important thing will be thought more than once and 
by more than one very smart person. This does not particularly help us assess 
the adequacy or inadequacy of the various theories we have in front of us. But 
maybe that’s the wrong game.
My original claim was a modest one: simply that it is interesting and worth-
while to read Beauvoir, and to read her in this way, in time. This is the sort of 
claim literary critics like myself do tend to make, though we sometimes dress 
them up in fancier language. It might be tempting to make a stronger claim: 
that the readings of Ann Ferguson et al. were “gay” or “lesbian” readings, which 
accounted for their flaws, and that my own reading was “queer” and therefore 
better. (As some are now saying that The Well of Loneliness is not, as was 
thought, a bad and somewhat cowardly novel about lesbians, but a good and 
brave novel about a transgendered person: Jay Prosser advances this sort of 
view in Second Skins, and I think H. for example holds it.)101 I don’t think these 
readings are wrong by any means … but …
What do we want from a theory, anyhow? Perhaps the richest and most en-
during theories are those that, far from legislating a single outcome for a single 
moment in time and space make it possible to think … more than one thing, in 
more than one way?
101  Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality.
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Nothing to Say About Race and Class?
We should be judged, not by the errors we make but by what we make of 
our errors.
annie sugier1
Critics should not construct for our subjects a historically impossible 
purity.
jonathan arac2
[B]eaucoup de problèmes nous paraissent plus essentiels que ceux qui 
nous concernent singulièrement….
The Second Sex, 1:29
Summer 2006. I am traveling to Berlin to speak at a conference, “Black Euro-
pean Studies in Transnational Perspective,” stopping for a month in Oxford on 
the way. Dragging three overweight suitcases stuffed with books and notes 
about Simone de Beauvoir, I land at Heathrow and find myself in a longer im-
migration queue than usual (because England is playing in the World Cup), 
and I fall into conversation with two very young American women, recent col-
lege graduates. One, who asserts gamely that she “works in improv in New 
York,” is coming “to study Shakespeare at the Globe”; the other, nervous and 
asthmatic, is emigrating, moving to (I think) Hertfordshire to get married and 
live happily ever after. She is carrying her wedding dress with eight-foot train in 
a monster-sized garment bag over her shoulder, and oozing anxiety about her 
prospective in-laws, who appear to have a great deal of money. “I’m from a 
humble background,” she explains to me, a total stranger. She’s from New Ha-
ven, but she didn’t go to Yale … This isn’t going to work, I think, but of course 
1 Colloque internationale, Université Paris Diderot Paris 7, January 2008. Annie Sugier was in-
troduced as “physiciste et militante, ancien combattante du mlf et de la Ligue des Droits de 
la Femme.” She delivered a powerful testimony about Beauvoir’s direct impact on feminist 
activism in the 1970s and into the twenty-first century. Some of what she said has been pub-
lished as Annie Sugier and Kahina Benziane, “Nos chemins se sont croisés,” in the conference 
proceedings.
2 Jonathan Arac, “Imperial Eclecticism in Moby Dick and Invisible Man: Literature in a Postco-
lonial Empire,” 152.
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I don’t say so. As an older woman, a “frequent flyer,” I make reassuring noises to 
both. “We’re almost there,” I say.
As we finally approach the immigration desk, the budding actress asks me 
to look over her landing card, because she isn’t sure she filled it out right (I have 
admitted to being a teacher). I see that in the box for “nationality,” she has writ-
ten, “Hispanic, Jewish.” So I say gently, no, that’s where you put “usa.”
And the other young woman says “Oh. I just put ‘White.’”
...
A funny story (sort of); when I told it in Oxford, D. started teasing me: “when 
are you going back to White?” But how does it happen that perfectly likeable, 
well-meaning, well-educated young people seem oblivious to their own na-
tionality as a salient fact about themselves even when traveling? Is it that Amer-
icans “generously” assume all human beings to be American till proven other-
wise? Or, that within the United States questions of race and ethnic identity 
are so heated and vexed that they block out all information about the rest of 
the world?
Issues of nation and race were urgent for Simone de Beauvoir and her intel-
lectual and political traveling companions in the years following the Second 
World War, as the Cold War consolidated American hegemony, while old-style 
European colonialism exploded, decayed, shifted shape. Such issues are equal-
ly urgent for feminists today: in France, where questions about hijab and secu-
larism have divided feminists, with Beauvoir’s legacy claimed by both sides; in 
the United States, where the lip service given to multiculturalist ideals in main-
stream civic life seems to have left kneejerk nationalism largely undisturbed; 
and in feminist theory, where we are still looking for a way to think about more 
than one kind of oppression at the same time, without subordinating one to 
another or excusing any, trying to find our way toward a fully anti-racist and 
transnational feminism that does not dissolve into paradoxes. It would, I will 
argue, be a mistake to assume that Beauvoir has nothing to contribute to those 
discussions.
The task of the next four chapters is partly to answer what I view as misun-
derstandings and misappropriations of Beauvoir’s views on race and class, a 
task already well begun by Margaret Simons, Sonia Kruks, Doris Ruhe, others. 
But I hope to go beyond the rather strange professional activity of “defending 
my author” to convey a richer understanding of what Beauvoir actually said, 
and why, and how that can help us. I place particular emphasis on what liter-
ary scholars call “reception contexts.” It is important to situate Beauvoir with 
respect to the discourses of the time and place from which she wrote: many 
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misunderstandings have arisen from not doing so, from imposing anachronis-
tic expectations and/or recruiting her to later intra-feminist debates. But also, 
placing Beauvoir’s readers in historical context can usefully complicate the 
usual map we draw of feminist history since the middle of the last century.
I’ll be reading Beauvoir in dialogue with other discourses around race and 
class, both upstream and downstream from her arguments, including her en-
gagement with the anti-colonial and anti-racist work being done by Richard 
Wright, Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, and also with a more problematic dis-
course of “appreciation” of non-European cultural forms by the French intel-
lectual left and the avant-garde. International travel, both real and imaginary, 
played a crucial role in all those discourses, and in how her relationships to 
them developed. And, as one might expect, it is not always easy, perhaps not 
always possible, to pry the progressive and regressive discourses apart.
1 Beauvoir’s Trip to America, and What She Found There
What I had been doing on that airplane was re-reading Beauvoir’s L’Amérique 
au jour le jour 1947 (America Day by Day 1947), a book-length essay-travelogue-
diary about her first visit to the United States.3 In that book Beauvoir suggests 
that Americans, including American college students, really don’t know much 
about the wider world they live in, a situation she found strange and somewhat 
terrifying, given the enormous power the United States was wielding as the 
Cold War got under way. She was especially concerned to ask how a sense of 
political impotence and fatalism, including among intellectuals and on the so-
called Left, could co-exist with an American optimism and idealism she re-
garded as sincere. L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 is an interesting book in its 
own right, but also because while she was writing it, she was working out the 
ideas that would emerge as The Second Sex.4 Beauvoir spent time in New York 
3 Translations from this text are my own. Of the two available English versions, both titled 
America Day by Day (without the year), the better one is Carol Cosman’s (1999). The earlier 
one (1953), by Patrick Dudley, includes some good photographs, but made very significant 
cuts from the French, eliminating most of the Beauvoir’s political and economic critique and 
her discussion of current events, including many of the passages I discuss below. See William 
McBride, “The Postwar World According to Beauvoir,” for a comprehensive account of what 
is missing. Beyond a simple “dumbing down” for American audience, McBride sees “obvious 
malice aforethought”: “In fact, there is something quite sinister about this first English trans-
lation, which in certain respects is more like a Hollywood film version of L’Amérique au jour 
le jour” (“The Postwar World According to Beauvoir,” 432).
4 Excerpts from L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 appeared in four issues of Les Temps Modernes, 
from December 1947 through April 1948; in the very next issue, the lead article is “La femme 
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and Chicago, where she met with leading American intellectuals and French 
expatriates; she also took a far-flung lecture tour of college campuses, visited 
California and New Mexico, and traveled through Texas and the Deep South on 
a Greyhound bus with her friend Nathalie Sorokine Moffat. And while she saw 
a lot about the United States that she liked, she was also quite critical, particu-
larly of an American tendency to think in abstractions, because abstractions 
tend to be mystifications, or myths. Abstraction, she says, is a way of making 
things bearable that ought to be, and remain, unbearable.5 She also notes that 
the idea of “Europe,” of herself as “European,” first became salient to her in the 
course of that trip.6
Travel’s power to reverse the optic of identity is a familiar enough idea. 
She’d reach for it in the introduction to The Second Sex as a way to clarify her 
basic concept of the Other: while traveling, the “native” is scandalized to see 
that other countries have their own natives, who look at him and see a for-
eigner.7 That underlying problem of intersubjectivity, which Sartre so memo-
rably phrased as “the Look of the Other that steals my world from me,” had 
preoccupied Beauvoir from her earliest writings, and had taken center stage in 
her first published novel, L’invitée, with its epigraph from Hegel: “every con-
sciousness desires the death of the other.” But the problem of the Other had 
turned out not to be as simple as it had seemed when Françoise in that novel, 
looking through a keyhole, saw herself as the villainess in someone else’s story 
rather than the heroine of her own life. In the post-war writing of what Beau-
voir called her “moral period” (Le sang des autres [1945], Pyrrhus et Cinéas 
[1944], Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté [1947]), the struggle for subjectivity be-
came less claustrophobic, more oriented toward responsibility for a collective 
future. L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 takes a further step. The identity thrown 
in her face here is both collectivized and politicized in a concretely historical 
way: postwar international rearrangements and regroupings have decisively 
marginalized Western Europe, which now appears as a mere battleground or 
et les mythes,” described in a footnote as “an extract of a forthcoming work on the situation 
of women” (extrait d’un ouvrage à paraître sur la situation de la femme). Writing The Second 
Sex seems to have taken about three years, with L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 in the middle. 
For details, see Doris Ruhe, “Femmes, Juifs, Noirs: Le deuxième sexe en situation,” Penelope 
Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance, and Mar-
garet Simons, “Richard Wright, Simone de Beauvoir, and The Second Sex,” a pioneering article 
to which all subsequent work on this topic, including mine, is deeply indebted.
5 L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 (hereinafter AJ), 527–34.
6 AJ 108.
7 “En voyage le natif s’aperçoit avec scandale qu’il y a dans les pays voisins des natifs qui le re-
gardent à son tour comme étranger” (DS 1:17).
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terrain of ideological encounter for the two “real” powers. Perhaps one could 
phrase this as “the Look of the Others, which steals our world from us”— 
except that it is not just their Look; it is their army.8
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 is a key transitional text in Beauvoir’s thinking 
and also in her intellectual “style” (for want of a better term). It takes up again 
the central philosophical insight of Pyrrhus et Cinéas and Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté: dépassement, the freedom to move beyond the “givens,” is basic to 
human life, but a million traps entice people to betray that freedom. However, 
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 leaves behind the arid abstract tone that later 
made her dissatisfied with her moral period works; perhaps this smoothed her 
return to philosophical thinking with The Second Sex.9 Her book on America 
was also a cautious transition into Beauvoir’s vast autobiographical project, 
which in itself has been enormously important for feminism: most people 
have tended to see that project as starting with Mémoires d’une jeune fille ran-
gée, but in fact L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 is the first place where the incho-
ate personal writing of diaries and letters begins tentatively to coalesce into a 
coherent yet embodied, public yet personal, “voice.”
The book loosely follows a journal format, and she records impressions 
rather than aiming to give a definitive single view: she explains, “I must under-
line that no single passage, taken on its own, amounts to a definitive judge-
ment; often, moreover, I did not arrive at a firm and final point of view, and it 
is the whole collection of my indecisions, additions, and rectifications that 
8 In La force des choses she tells the story of an encounter Sartre had on his earlier visit to the 
United States, as part of an official French delegation; he’s been warned about rising repres-
sion of left-wing intellectuals, and “in effect, what was said was hardly reassuring. Over lunch, 
the public relations director of Ford referred lightly to the coming war against the Soviet 
Union. ‘But you have no common frontier, where will you fight?’ asked a journalist from the 
Communist Party. ‘Oh, in Europe,’ was the carefree response.” [En effet, on lui avait tenu des 
propos peu rassurants. Au cours d’un déjeuner, le directeur des Public relations de Ford avait 
évoqué avec bonne humeur la prochaine guerre contre l’URSS. “Mais vous n’avez pas de fron-
tière commune, où se battra-t-on?” avait demandé une journaliste du PC. “En Europe,” répon-
dit-il avec naturel (FCh 1:54–5).]
9 See Ruhe, “Femmes, Juifs, Noirs”: “Some fundamental ideas relevant to her research on wom-
en are, so to speak, tested out [in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947]. Certain stances which, in 
The Second Sex, derive somewhat dogmatically from existentialist doctrine, appear in a dif-
ferent and gentler light…. Her book about America lets her try out the interpretive method 
she will bring to bear in The Second Sex.” [Des idées fondamentales touchant ses recherches 
sur les femmes y sont en quelque sorte mises à l’essai. Des positions qui, dans Le deuxième 
sexe, suivent de manière quelque peu dogmatique la doctrine existentialiste, apparaissent 
sous un autre jour, un jour plus “doux”…. Son livre sur l’Amérique lui permet de mettre à 
l’essai la grille théorique dont elle va se servir dans Le deuxième sexe (85–7).]
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constitutes my opinion.”10 Nonetheless her impressions are strongly and deci-
sively expressed, and it is most definitely a political essay.11 For one thing, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 begins Beauvoir’s cri-
tique of consumer culture and of what Adorno about the same time was call-
ing “the administered life,”12 a critique that would culminate in her late novel 
Les belles images. She finds American advertising especially fascinating: “The 
constipated young woman smiles a loving smile at the glass of orange juice 
that loosens her bowels.”13 Dazzled at first by the variety of choices available 
in American drugstores, she is disillusioned to find that all the brands of 
toothpaste, all the kinds of chocolate, taste exactly the same. “This pointless 
profusion has an aftertaste of mystification. A thousand possibilities open be-
fore us; but they are all the same. Thus the American citizen can consume his 
freedom within the life that is imposed on him, without even noticing that 
this life is not a free one.”14 American intellectuals, like novelist and critic 
Mary McCarthy, responded as though “our American way of life” had been at-
tacked, and they were not entirely wrong; but those who mocked the book as 
simply incoherent or filled with trivialities didn’t grasp that Beauvoir was try-
ing also to communicate the texture of what she called a “world,” in the way a 
novel might do, while working through crucial social postwar problems by 
means of concrete and situated examples.15
Part of why L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 was not well-understood or liked 
by American readers was Beauvoir’s stubborn refusal to see herself as visiting 
the land of White. Quite early in the book she goes to an embassy cocktail 
10 “Je tiens à signaler qu’aucun morceau isolé ne constitue un jugement définitif; souvent, 
d’ailleurs, je n’aboutis à aucun point de vue arrêté, et c’est l’ensemble de mes indécisions, 
des additions et rectifications qui constitue mon opinion” (AJ 10).
11 The directness and specificity of these interventions into Cold War national and interna-
tional discourses, underscored by the placement of serialized sections in Les Temps Mod-
ernes, gives the lie to an old idea that she left such matters to Sartre. See also Sonia Kruks, 
“Ambiguity and Certitude in Simone de Beauvoir’s Politics,” on the forthright polemical 
style of some, though not all, of Beauvoir’s political writing.
12 That Adorno was a German Jew enduring exile rather than a French tourist only makes 
the parallels between their accounts more striking.
13 “La jeune fille constipée sourit d’un sourire d’amoureuse au jus de citron qui relâche ses 
intestins” (AJ 39).
14 “Il y a dans cette profusion inutile un arrière-goût de mystification. Voici mille possibilités 
ouvertes: mais c’est la même. Mille choix permis: mais tous équivalents. Ainsi le citoyen 
américain pourra consommer sa liberté à l’intérieur de la vie qui lui est imposée sans 
s’apercevoir que cette vie même n’est pas libre” (AJ 34).
15 See Mary McCarthy, “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique,” and discussion in Chapter 4 below. See 
also Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, 
Resistance, 65–7.
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party of French expatriates, and one of them (whom she doesn’t identify) 
takes her by the hand and says, you must promise me you won’t write anything 
about America, and especially about the problem of the Blacks, which is diffi-
cult and painful and hard to understand.16 Beauvoir bristles at the idea of be-
ing told what she should and shouldn’t write, and interprets what she calls his 
“servility” as just what one would expect from a former supporter of Pétain. He 
and others seem to be reading the race question as a stand-in for Cold War 
politics.17 Others warn her not to go to Harlem—she’ll be found in a gutter 
with her throat cut, she’ll be raped … she identifies this as a strange fantasy on 
the part of the whites, and goes there anyhow, first on foot by herself, later ac-
companied by her friend Richard Wright.18 She writes about how “the irratio-
nal fear [Harlem] inspires can only be the other side of hate and a sort of re-
morse…. Harlem weighs on the conscience of whites like original sin on the 
conscience of a Christian.”19 She accompanies Richard Wright to a variety of 
Black churches, and sees at first hand the difficulties he and his wife Ellen are 
having living as an interracial couple in Greenwich Village. Visiting New Mex-
ico, she is charmed by Taos Pueblo but unnerved by its resemblance to a “Jar-
din d’Acclimation” or zoo; she has much to say about the way Native Ameri-
cans are encouraged to stage their own ethnicity for an audience of arty, liberal 
whites who collect their art.20 Some months later, when she and her friend 
Nathalie Sorokine Moffat see how Blacks waiting for the bus are treated by the 
whites, she will write,
In the middle of the desert, the State Line was invisible. But when we got 
off the bus, we understood we had crossed a border. On the doors of the 
“rest rooms,” we read on one side “white ladies, white gentlemen,” on the 
16 AJ 30–2.
17 It’s interesting to find echoes of the same attitude, as late as 1992, in the dismissive re-
marks of historian Tony Judt in Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944–1956. Judt was in 
many ways the heir of the so-called “New York Intellectuals,” some of whom Beauvoir met 
on this visit; their instant mutual dislike is recorded in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 and 
elsewhere, as I’ll discuss in Chapter 4 below. The failure of that group, including Hannah 
Arendt, to understand and support the emerging Civil Rights movement has been well 
documented. See Michael Barber, “Phenomenology and the Ethical Basis of Pluralism: 
Arendt and Beauvoir on Race in the US,” and Kathryn T. Gines, Arendt and the Negro 
Question.
18 AJ 49–54, 54–8, 83–4.
19 “Ces noirs ne vont pas déferler soudain vers Wall Street, ils ne constituent aucune menace 
immédiate. La peur déraisonnable qu’ils inspirent ne peut être que l’envers d’une haine et 
d’une espèce de remords. Fiché au cœur de New York, Harlem pèse sur la bonne con-
science des blancs comme le péché originel sur celle d’un chrétien” (AJ 53).
20 AJ 262–83. The term “radical chic” would be anachronistic here, but only slightly.
123Nothing to Say About Race and Class?
other “colored women,” “colored men.” Only whites were in the grand hall 
that served as a waiting-room; the Blacks were penned in a little adjoin-
ing cubbyhole; next to the spacious restaurant reserved for whites the 
tiny “lunch-room” for “colored people” could only hold four customers at 
a time. For the first time we see with our own eyes this segregation about 
which we have heard so much; being forewarned makes no difference; 
something falls on our shoulders which will stay there all across the 
South; it is our own skin, heavy and stifling, whose color burns us.21
In New Orleans, she and Sorokine go to the Black quarter to hear some jazz and 
then can’t find a cab. “So we go on foot through this enemy city, this city where 
we are enemies in spite of ourselves, justly responsible for the color of our 
skins and for everything which, in spite of ourselves, it implies.”22
But no European ever saw America for the first time.23 McCarthy would 
complain that Beauvoir’s expectations of America were shaped by what she’d 
seen in the movies, and McCarthy is right: Beauvoir says so herself. The ver-
tigo of encountering in real life scenes and places she already “knew” from 
films brings a particular self-reflexivity to her project, especially when what 
she sees coincides with Hollywood images (and she feels, wait, this is “real 
life,” so it shouldn’t). The impressions which had formed her (and Sartre’s) 
ideas of America were also highly literary: Hemingway, Steinbeck, Faulkner, 
John Dos Passos, and Richard Wright, whose works she had read before she 
met him.24 When she came to sit down and write, she also drew heavily on 
non-fictional sources, especially Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, the 
21 “Au milieu du désert, la State Line était invisible. Mais quand nous descendons de 
l’autobus, nous comprenons que nous avons franchi une frontière. Sur les portes des rest-
rooms, on lit d’un côté ‘White ladies,’ ‘White gentlemen,’ et de l’autre ‘Coloured women,’ 
‘Coloured men.’ Il n’y a que des blancs dans le grand hall qui sert de salle d’attente: les 
noirs sont parqués dans un petit réduit attenant; à côté du restaurant spacieux réservé 
aux blancs le minuscule lunch-room pour coloured people ne peut accueillir que quatre 
clients à la fois. C’est la première fois que nous voyons de nos yeux cette ségrégation dont 
nous avons tant entendu parler; et nous avons beau être prévenues: quelque chose tombe 
sur nos épaules qui ne nous quittera plus à travers tout le Sud; c’est notre propre peau qui 
est devenue lourde et étouffante et dont la couleur nous brûle” (AJ 284).
22 “Nous traversons donc à pied cette ville ennemie, cette ville où malgré nous nous sommes 
des ennemis, justement responsables de la couleur de notre peau et de tout ce que, en 
dépit de nous-mêmes, elle implique” (AJ 318).
23 Ann Douglas made this remark many years ago in reference to early American literature.
24 The influence of Dos Passos in particular on Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s fictional epistemolo-
gies would be difficult to overstate, though it has not received much attention. See Alt-
man, “Beauvoir as Literary Writer,” and Michael Lucey, “Simone de Beauvoir and Sexuality 
in the Third Person.”
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comprehensive and interdisciplinary investigation of race in America that fa-
mously concludes (among many other things) that the problem of race is re-
ally a white problem. As Margaret Simons notes in her indispensable article, 
“Richard Wright, Simone de Beauvoir and The Second Sex,” Beauvoir refers 
frequently to Myrdal’s formulation of the contradiction between America’s 
universalist claims about human rights and freedoms, and the manifest de-
nial of those freedoms to those Americans who happened to be Black.25 But 
Simons also sees Myrdal’s influence on The Second Sex as limited by his “pa-
ternalistic liberalism…. Writing as an anti-Communist and a social engineer, 
Myrdal largely ignores the Black community and its leaders” and “finds noth-
ing of value in African American culture and community, which he describes 
as ‘pathological.’”26
These problems with Myrdal are certainly glaring today. However, I also see 
a more positive influence on Beauvoir from Myrdal. His work builds a powerful 
case, not just that values must and ought to inform social investigations, but 
that social investigations should inform moral values. Myrdal’s methods of in-
quiry are eclectic and comprehensive, in ways that might have, if not inspired, 
at least justified the encyclopedic way Beauvoir would go about writing The 
Second Sex.27 Also, like Myrdal, Beauvoir went to see America for herself, and 
she wrote what she saw: the bad, the good (including martinis), the randomly 
weird, like a bowling alley in Queens where the pinboy is part of the machine, 
or an earnest, detailed explanation of how doughnuts are made.28 Some of 
these seemingly gratuitous episodes, which McCarthy found naïve and gull-
ible, don’t point in any particular political direction; they simply contribute to 
the narrative texture, the creation of a plausibly “thick” narrated world, in the 
way Barthes describes as “l’effet de réel.”29
25 Simons, “Richard Wright.” In Psychology Comes to Harlem: Rethinking the Race Question in 
Twentieth-Century America, Jay Garcia explains why Richard Wright nonetheless staunch-
ly supported Myrdal; for a balanced summary of Myrdal’s view and contribution, see 
Richard H. King, Race, Culture, and the Intellectuals, 1940–1970.
26 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 171.
27 See Deutscher, Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, 80–1, for confirming details drawn from 
letters: apparently it was after being impressed by the size and scope of Myrdal’s book 
that Beauvoir headed to the Bibliothèque nationale. Deutscher’s view of the value of 
Myrdal’s influence, and of Beauvoir’s interdisciplinary approach more generally, is quite 
different from mine. See also Simons, “Richard Wright,” 170–72.
28 AJ 100, 128.
29 Roland Barthes, “L’effet de réel” (1968). The term is sometimes translated as “reality effect” 
or “realist operator.” Beauvoir herself articulates a similar idea in the introduction to La 
force des choses: “I don’t dwell on the color of a sky, on the taste of a piece of fruit, for my 
own enjoyment; if I was telling the story of someone else’s life, I would include these 
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Other incidents have greater significance. The segregated bus trip continues 
relentlessly, for pages and pages; trapped for a claustrophobic sixteen hours 
through Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, we can taste the sand-
wiches and the Coca-Cola, hear the conductor’s genial comments on the scen-
ery, see the romantic Spanish moss on the trees, the tropical azaleas and cacti, 
sun sparkling on water “like a honeymoon dream,” vast lawns and solitary 
shacks.30 And we can feel the sweat on faces as tension mounts with the heat.
And all through the long day the great Southern tragedy pursues us like 
an obsession…. Everywhere we go, a smell of hate is in the air, the arro-
gant hate of whites, the silent hate of Blacks. There’s no room for Ameri-
can politeness here. The Blacks are pushed around as the line presses to-
ward the exit. “You’re not going to let that négresse pass in front of you,” 
says a woman to a man, her voice shaking with fury.31
Eventually the pot boils over.
The Blacks squeeze themselves humbly onto the back bench, trying to 
disappear. In mid-afternoon, with the heat and the bumps that are espe-
cially rough at the rear, a pregnant woman faints. With each jolt of the 
 so-called trivial details just as copiously, if I happened to know them. It’s not just that they 
convey the feeling of a time in history and a person of flesh and blood; but by their very 
lack of significance they are, in a true story, the mark of truth itself: they point to nothing 
but themselves and the only reason to include them is that they were there. That’s 
enough.” [La couleur d’un ciel, le goût d’un fruit, je ne les souligne pas par complaisance 
à moi-même: racontant la vie de quelqu’un d’autre, je noterais avec la même abondance, 
si je les connaissais, ces détails qu’on dit triviaux. Non seulement c’est par eux qu’on sent 
une époque et une personne en chair et en os: mais, par leur non-signifiance, ils sont dans 
une histoire vraie la touche même de la vérité; ils n’indiquent rien d’autre qu’eux-mêmes 
et la seule raison de les relever, c’est qu’ils se trouvaient là: elle suffit (FCh 1:8–9).]
Michael D. Barber’s article convincingly describes the method of Beauvoir’s text as 
phenomenological, and reminds me to mention that the “diary” format was a subsequent 
reconstruction (two visits to the US were collapsed into one, and the chronology was 
rearranged).
30 “[C]omme un rêve pour lunes de miel” (AJ 322).
31 The word Beauvoir uses in this sentence and the next, “négresse,” is difficult to translate. 
It seems likely that the white passengers on the bus used a less polite term. “Et tout au 
long du jour la grande tragédie du Sud nous poursuit comme une obsession…. [P]artout 
où nous passons, il y a une odeur de haine dans l’air: haine arrogante des blancs, haine 
silencieuse des noirs…. La gentillesse américaine n’a plus de place ici; dans la queue qui 
se presse aux portes du bus, on bouscule les noirs: ‘Vous n’allez pas laisser cette négresse 
passer devant vous,’ dit une femme à un homme, avec une voix tremblante de fureur” 
(AJ 322).
Chapter 3126
bus, her lifeless head bangs against the bus window. We hear the snig-
gering and scandalized voice of a college-girl shouting, the négresse has 
gone crazy! The driver stops the bus and goes to investigate, oh it’s only 
a négresse who passed out, everybody jeers, these women always make 
such a fuss…. Someone shakes the sick woman a little to rouse her and 
the bus drives on; we don’t dare to offer her our place at the front: the 
whole bus would be in an uproar and she would be the first victim of 
their indignation.32
The exaggerated courtesy of southern whites toward women is trumped by 
racism. White women are among the worst offenders. Individual gestures of 
ordinary humanity feel impossible.
The bus continue to roll, the young woman continues to suffer, and, by 
the time we reach a town, she is unconscious again. The travellers head 
out regardless, in search of Coca-Cola; only one elderly American woman 
comes with N. and me to try and help her. She thanks us nervously and 
leaves as fast as she can, refusing any further assistance; she knows that 
white eyes are judging her harshly, and she is afraid.
It’s a minor incident. But it helps me understand why, when we stop in 
the crowded parts of town where the Blacks are allowed to live, the placid 
Greyhound draws such bitter looks.33
As Margaret Simons comments,
32 “Les noirs s’entassent humblement sur la banquette du fond, ils essaient de se faire ou-
blier. Au milieu de l’après-midi, dans la chaleur et les cahots qui sont particulièrement 
rudes à l’arrière, une femme enceinte s’évanouit; sa tête abandonnée cogne contre la vitre 
à chaque sursaut; nous entendons la voix ricanante et scandalisée d’une college-girl qui 
crie: ‘La négresse est folle!’ Le conducteur arrête l’autobus et il va voir ce qui se passe; ce 
n’est qu’une négresse évanouie, et tout le monde ricane; il faut toujours que ces femmes 
fassent des embarras…. On secoue un peu la malade, on la réveille et l’autobus repart; 
nous n’osons pas lui offrir notre place à l’avant, tout le car s’y opposerait et elle serait la 
première victime de l’indignation provoquée” (AJ 322–23, ellipsis in original).
33 “L’autobus continue à rouler, la jeune femme à souffrir et, quand on s’arrête en ville, elle 
est évanouie de nouveau; les gens vont boire des coca-cola sans s’occuper d’elle; il y a 
seulement une vieille Américaine qui vient avec N. et moi essayer de lui porter secours. 
Elle nous remercie, mais elle a l’air inquiet et elle s’en va au plus vite sans accepter que 
nous l’aidions davantage; elle se sent coupable aux yeux des blancs et elle a peur. Ce n’est 
qu’un petit incident. Mais il m’aide à comprendre pourquoi, quand nous traversons les 
faubourgs où s’entasse une population noire, ce sont des regards si farouches qui se po-
sent sur le placide Greyhound” (AJ 323).
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Beauvoir’s graphic descriptions in America Day by Day of the racism of 
white women show how she learns firsthand that white racist allegiances 
and privilege can motivate white women to deny the humanity of Black 
women…. Beauvoir leaves the South with few illusions about the possi-
bilities of feminist sisterhood easily cutting across a racist divide.34
The trip also leaves her well aware that being a well-meaning white person is 
no defense when a problem is structural: what solidarity the white women do 
feel able to offer is rejected, and rightly. I am reminded of Robert’s remark in 
Les mandarins: “one can’t draw a straight line in a curved space.” (Or as Ador-
no, writing around the same time, would put it, “wrong life cannot be lived 
rightly.”)35
Another especially interesting episode, described in vivid detail, is a guided 
tour of a Chicago meat-packing factory, an “enormous concentration camp” 
reeking with “the wild and rancid smell of blood.”36 Just as in Upton Sinclair’s 
The Jungle, the plant is set up for tourists, like a museum: “This country loses no 
opportunity to educate…. A sign warns, ‘those with sensitive nerves should 
keep out.’ Everyone goes in.”37 I will spare my reader the stomach-churning 
details, and simply note that—again as in Sinclair—the incident is framed by 
an analysis of inequality:
Here raw meat and blood are converted into abstract numbers, written 
on perfectly clean paper, in a carefully filtered atmosphere; the offices on 
LaSalle Street and Wall Street don’t smell of gasoline or sweat, either, but 
the gap that separates the world of profit from the world of labor is felt 
more keenly here than elsewhere, because of the smell, so close by, that 
besieges this dungeon.38
34 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 179–80.
35 “Dans un espace courbe, on ne peut pas tirer de ligne droite, dit Dubreuilh. On ne peut 
pas mener une vie correcte dans une société qui ne l’est pas” (Les mandarins, 2:343). Ador-
no, Minima Moralia, 39.
36 “[É]norme camp de concentration. Il y flotte une odeur de sang, fauve et rance, qui pé-
nètre jusque dans les wagons du métro” (AJ 517).
37 “[C]e pays est volontiers pédagogique…. [U]ne pancarte nous prévient: ‘Que les per-
sonnes sensibles restent à la porte.’ Tout le monde entre” (AJ 518).
38 “[L]a viande et le sang sont convertis ici en chiffres abstraits qui s’inscrivent sur du papier 
bien propre, dans une atmosphère soigneusement conditionnée; les offices de Lassalle 
Street et de Wall Street ne sentent pas non plus le pétrole ni le sueur; mais le hiatus qui 
sépare le monde du profit de celui de travail est plus sensible ici qu’ailleurs, à cause de 
l’odeur si proche qui investit ce donjon” (AJ 517).
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There amid the hot smell of the blood, in the dimly-lit hall where steel 
knives flash, two dramas are superimposed: man against beast and man 
against man. It’s no accident that the bloody arms dismembering the ani-
mal cadavers are almost all Black arms in red gloves.39
Beauvoir follows this with an analysis of labor history, of the way Blacks 
were used to break strikes, while white labor unions wouldn’t accept them as 
members.
A similar analysis of the economics of sharecropping appears on pages 293–
97: she begins by describing what she sees out the window of the bus as similar 
to what is described in James Agee’s 1941 exposé, Let Us Now Praise Famous 
Men, then notes that Agee’s book “is dedicated to whites. But the vast majority 
of cotton workers are Black, and the system by which all of them are oppressed 
is a legacy of slavery.”40 Unlike Agee, she compares the sharecropping system 
explicitly to an internal colony, in an analysis documented with facts and fig-
ures that lasts for many pages.
So, to sum up Beauvoir’s discussion of race in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947: 
first, she picks up on a mystification, a particular sickness, that entwines sex 
and race and rape and fear, and refuses to believe in it; second, she is encour-
aged to subordinate racial questions to national ones, and to issues of “national 
interest,” and she refuses to put one before the other, while seeing how inextri-
cable they are; third, she narrates racialized experience in an understated but 
dramatic way, as though we were reading a novel; and fourth, her attention to 
the question of race is an attention to the material conditions in which Ameri-
cans of color were then living, and the systematic material reasons why.41
How likely does it seem that the person who saw these sights, recorded 
these feelings, produced these analyses, would have had “nothing to say about 
race and class” in the other book she was writing at exactly the same time? It is 
not likely, and it is not true.
39 “Dans l’odeur chaude du sang, dans la sourde lumière du hall où brille l’acier des cou-
teaux, il y a deux drames qui se superposent: l’homme contre les bêtes, et les hommes 
entre eux. Ce n’est pas un hasard si les bras sanglants qui dépècent les cadavres sont 
 presque tous sous leurs gants rouges des bras noirs” (AJ 519).
40 “Ce livre est consacré aux blancs. Mais l’immense majorité des travailleurs du coton sont 
des noirs et le régime auquel tous sont soumis est un héritage du régime de l’esclavage” 
(AJ  294).
41 We’d refer to this now as “institutional racism.”
129Nothing to Say About Race and Class?
2 Materialist Analysis and Working Women’s Lives in The Second Sex
Beauvoir’s visit to the slaughterhouse would bear direct fruit in The Second Sex, 
in an analysis of the failure of solidarity between working class men and work-
ing class women, who are used by factory owners to undercut men’s wages.
While employers were eager to hire women because they accept lower 
wages, that same reason led to resistance from working-class men. Soli-
darity between the cause of women and the cause of the proletariat was 
not as quick and direct as Bebel and Engels would claim. The problem 
was similar to what happened with the Black labor force in the United 
States. The most oppressed minorities in a society are easily deployed by 
the ruling classes as a weapon against the class they belong to; thus they 
appear at first to be enemies, and a deeper consciousness of the situation 
is needed before Blacks and whites, women workers and working men, 
can work in coalition rather than fighting one another.42
She continues:
That male workers at first viewed this cheap competition as a formidable 
threat, and met it with hostility, is understandable. It is only since women 
have joined the labor movement that they have been able to defend their 
own interests, without jeopardizing the cause of the working class as a 
whole.43
42 “Si les employeurs ont accueilli avec empressement les femmes à cause des bas salaires 
qu’elles acceptent, ce même fait a provoqué des résistances du côté des travailleurs mas-
culins. Entre la cause du prolétariat et celle des femmes il n’y a pas eu une solidarité aussi 
immédiate que Bebel et Engels ne le prétendaient. Le problème s’est présenté un peu de 
la même manière qu’aux usa à propos de la main-d’œuvre noire. Les minorités les plus 
opprimées d’une société sont volontiers utilisées par les oppresseurs comme une arme 
contre l’ensemble de la classe à laquelle elles se rattachent; du même coup, elles apparais-
sent d’abord comme ennemies et il faut une conscience plus profonde de la situation 
pour que les intérêts des noirs et des blancs, des ouvrières et des ouvriers réussissent à se 
coaliser au lieu de s’opposer les uns aux autres” (DS 1:200).
43 “On comprend que les travailleurs mâles aient d’abord vu dans cette concurrence à bon 
marché une menace redoutable et qu’ils se soient montrés hostiles. C’est seulement 
quand les femmes ont été intégrées à la vie syndicale qu’elles ont pu défendre leurs pro-
pres intérêts et cesser de mettre en danger ceux de la classe ouvrière dans son ensemble” 
(DS 1:200–1).
Chapter 3130
I checked to see whether Parshley might have cut this, but no, it’s there.
Economic analysis of this sort is far from unusual in The Second Sex. How-
ever, that fact often escapes attention. Most commentators who discuss the 
topic have focused on Beauvoir’s criticisms of Marx and Engels, in Chapter 3, 
“Le point de vue du matérialisme historique” (The Viewpoint of Historical Ma-
terialism). Simons says that “Wright’s phenomenological descriptions of the 
Black experience of oppression provide a methodological alternative to both 
Myrdal’s objectifying social science methodology and the economic reduction-
ism of Marxist orthodoxy,” associating the latter with Sartre’s influence and 
setting it aside.44 But I think a closer look is worthwhile. Beauvoir’s own mate-
rialist analysis in the “Histoire” sections of The Second Sex includes a numbing 
proliferation of figures and facts drawn from historical sources, analyzing 
changes in women’s labor force participation, the mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship between low salaries and labor market entry, the development of pro-
tective legislation, and so on. She may not have written from the teleological 
“point of view of historical materialism,” but her book is nonetheless both ma-
terialist and historical.45
Most accounts do suggest that Beauvoir stood on the sidelines during her 
companion’s complicated dance with the Communist Party, during this period 
and afterwards.46 And yet I would not hesitate to call Beauvoir a Marxist in the 
sense in which I would not hesitate to call myself one. Here’s what she had to 
say about it in La force de l’âge, looking back on the year after she passed the 
exams for the agrégation in philosophy, a year she largely spent reading a very 
long list of books (mostly British and American literature) the Sorbonne had 
not seen fit to assign:
In winter by my fire, in summer on the balcony, awkwardly smoking Eng-
lish cigarettes, I filled in the gaps in my education…. Wanting to know 
something of Marx and Engels, I tackled Capital in the Bibliothèque Na-
tionale. I approached it from the wrong angle, not seeing the difference 
between Marxism and the kind of philosophies I was used to, so that 
while it seemed very simple to understand in fact I grasped hardly any-
thing. Even so, the labor theory of surplus value was a revelation to me, 
44 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 176.
45 I hope it is clear from context that the “materialism” of which I speak is not the so-called 
“new materialism” proposed by Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Elizabeth Grosz, et al; Beau-
voir would not have found the idea of “object-oriented ontology” at all compelling. See 
Sonia Kruks, “Beauvoir and the Marxism Question” and “Materiality and ‘The Marxism 
Question’ in the Work of Simone de Beauvoir.”
46 See Kruks, “Beauvoir and the Marxism Question.”
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just as dazzling as the Cartesian cogito or the Kantian critique of time 
and space. I condemned exploitation with all my heart, and I felt an im-
mense satisfaction at taking the mechanism apart and seeing how it 
worked. The world appeared in a new light from the moment I saw labor 
as the source and substance of all value. Nothing has ever made me re-
nounce this truth, neither the criticisms that the end of Capital aroused 
in me, nor those I found in books, nor in the subtle doctrines of more re-
cent economists.47
Anthony Dawahare makes a parallel point about Richard Wright: “To say 
Wright’s disagreements and eventual break with the cpusa were a rejection of 
Marxism would be as fallacious as saying that Martin Luther’s break with the 
Catholic Church was a rejection of Christianity.”48
In 1963, and again in the 1970s, she’d comment that “if I were writing [The 
Second Sex] today I would give the opposition of the One and the Other a more 
materialist grounding” based “not on the antagonism of consciousnesses, but 
on the economic base of scarcity.”49 But that, she says, wouldn’t change the 
47 “L’hiver au coin de mon feu, l’été sur mon balcon, fumant avec maladresse des cigarettes 
anglaises, je complétais ma culture…. Je voulus connaître Marx et Engels et, à la Nationale, 
je m’attaquai au Capital. Je m’y pris très mal; je ne faisais pas de différence entre le 
 marxisme et les philosophies auxquelles j’étais habituée, si bien qu’il me parut très facile à 
comprendre et je n’en saisis, en fait, presque rien. Tout de même, la théorie de la plus-value 
fut pour moi une révélation, aussi éblouissante que le cogito cartésien, que la critique 
kantienne de l’espace et du temps. De tout mon cœur, je condamnais l’exploitation et 
j’éprouvai une immense satisfaction à en démonter le mécanisme. Le monde s’éclaira d’un 
jour neuf au moment où je vis dans le travail la source et comme la substance des valeurs. 
Rien ne me fit jamais renier cette vérité, ni les critiques que suscita en moi la fin du Capital, 
ni celles que je trouvai dans des livres, ni dans les doctrines subtiles d’économistes plus 
récents” (FA 62–3).
That was written at the end of the 1950s, but my analysis below of essays written be-
fore the trip to the United States confirms her early absorption of Marx’s key insights.
48 Anthony Dawahare, “Richard Wright’s Native Son and the Dialectics of Black Experience,” 
65. In Sonia Kruks’s formulation, “Beauvoir always affirmed socialism (albeit not in its 
Soviet version) as a regulative ideal: socialism remained for her, if not fully realizable, the 
guiding ideal for a human life together that would enable the realization of full freedom 
for all…. However, she took her Marxism so much for granted that it often remained unar-
ticulated. This is evidenced in the surprise she expressed at the hostility of the Commu-
nists towards The Second Sex when it was published: ‘my thesis owed so much to Marxism 
and showed it in such a favorable light that I did at least expect some impartiality from 
them!’ she later wrote” (“Beauvoir and the Marxism Question,” 190).
49 She continues: “I’ve said also that this wouldn’t change the development of the book: all 
masculine ideologies aim to justify the oppression of woman, and she is conditioned by 
society to consent.” [Théoriquement, j’ai dit déjà que si j’écrivais aujourd’hui Le deuxième 
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book’s underlying “développement” or modify its conclusion. The retrospec-
tive comment does not really mark a shift in her actual analysis; she is placing 
her views, for a new audience, in dialogue with the French, British, and Ameri-
can feminist writers of that time, recording in particular her agreement with 
socialist-feminist Juliet Mitchell.50 The Second Sex had already made quite 
clear that women’s economic independence from men is a necessary, though 
not a sufficient, condition for her liberation.
Once one starts looking, economically grounded analysis is everywhere in 
The Second Sex. The intimate connection between the history of women and 
the history of private property is not simply asserted as per Engels, but demon-
strated through specific historical situations. The picture she paints is not one 
of unbroken progress (either for women or for “l’homme”); rather she shows 
ups and downs, for which she gives specific social and economic explanations, 
and explores the always different, often contradictory, lived realities of bour-
geois women and women from the working class. These analyses ground her 
book’s underlying thesis: it is only through work that women can escape the 
sexe je donnerais des bases matérialistes et non idéalistes à l’opposition du Même et de 
l’Autre. Je fonderais le rejet et l’oppression de l’autre non sur l’antagonisme des consciences, 
mais sur la base économique de la rareté. J’ai dit aussi que le développement du livre n’en 
serais pas modifié: toutes les idéologies masculines visent à justifier l’oppression de la 
femme; elle est conditionnée par la société de manière à y consentir (Tout compte fait, 614).]
50 “In short, I used to think that the class struggle should take precedence over the women’s 
movement. Now I think we must carry on both together.” [Bref, je pensais autrefois que 
la  lutte des classes devait passer avant la lutte des sexes. J’estime maintenant qu’il faut 
 mener les deux ensemble (Tout compte fait, 624).] She refers to Juliet Mitchell’s Women’s 
Estate, which listed differences between “féminisme radical” and “socialisme abstrait”: 
“Some years ago I would have defended exactly the arguments she calls abstract social-
ism; now I think, as Mitchell does, that neither set of claims can stand alone, and they 
must be brought together.” [Il y a quelques années j’aurais défendu exactement les thèses 
du socialisme abstrait; maintenant je pense comme Juliet Mitchell qu’aucune des deux 
séries d’affirmations ne se suffit: il faut les compléter les unes par les autres (Tout compte 
fait, 624–25).]
See also Sandrine Dauphin, “Du socialisme au féminisme radical: les fondements du 
militantisme chez Simone de Beauvoir,” although Dauphin like most commentators con-
centrates on developments after The Second Sex, in particular, the strong anti-colonialist 
stand Beauvoir took during the French war against Algeria. Dauphin quotes from a talk 
Beauvoir gave in Japan in 1966: “Though socialism is not a sufficient condition, it is cer-
tainly a necessary one.” [Si le socialisme n’est pas une condition suffisante, c’est certaine-
ment une condition nécessaire (Dauphin, 326, quoting Beauvoir, “Mon expérience 
d’écrivain,” 438).] Dauphin notes that when Beauvoir says she hopes for the emergence of 
“une conscience de sexe,” “[t]he choice of the term ‘consciousness,’ which comes from 
Marxist language, is not innocent. It refers to revolutionary action” [Le choix du terme 
“conscience,” issu du langage marxiste, n’est pas innocent. Il renvoie à l’action révolution-
naire (327).]
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curse of dependency to become full free adult human beings. This is simulta-
neously an ethical and a practical/political goal.
Moreover, sustained attention is paid to the lived experience of working 
women, both urban and rural. For instance, at the end of the history section, 
when she is drawing up a balance sheet of the position of women “today,” the 
general statement that “la femme” still has difficulty reconciling work and fam-
ily is followed immediately by a section beginning: “Let us consider, for exam-
ple, the lot of peasant women. In France they constitute the majority of wom-
en who participate in production.”51 Two full pages then graphically describe 
how farm work turns women into beasts of burden.52 A short paragraph notes 
that women who keep shops or run small businesses are better off, as they had 
been in the middle ages (when they were the only women whose “capacité ci-
vile” was recognized by the legal code), but that
[i]t is quite different for the women workers, employees, secretaries, and 
salesgirls who work outside the home. They find it much more difficult to 
51 “Considérons par exemple le sort des paysannes. En France elles constituent la majorité 
des femmes qui participent au travail producteur” (DS 1:228).
52 “The care of the garden, barnyard, sheepfold, and pigpen falls on her alone; she takes part 
in the heavy work: cleaning the cowshed, spreading the manure, sowing, plowing, hoeing, 
and haymaking; she digs, pulls weeds, reaps, picks grapes, and sometimes helps load and 
unload wagons of straw, hay, wood and kindling, animal bedding, and so on. In addition, 
she prepares the meals and manages the household: washing, mending, and such. She 
undertakes the heavy burdens of motherhood and caring for children. She rises at dawn, 
feeds the chicken and the small animals, serves the men their first meal, attends to the 
children and goes out to work in the fields or the woods or the kitchen garden; she pumps 
water from the well, serves the second meal, does the washing up, works again in the 
fields until dinner; after the last meal she spends the evening mending, cleaning, shelling 
corn, etc. Since she has no time to take care of her health even during pregnancy, she is 
prematurely bent and withered, sapped by illness…. [M]ost of the time, rural work re-
duces women to the state of beasts of burden.” [Les soins du jardinage, de la basse-cour, 
de la bergerie, de la porcherie lui incombent exclusivement; elle prend part aux gros 
travaux: soin des étables, épandage du fumier, semailles, labourage, sarclage, fenaison; 
elle bêche, arrache les mauvaises herbes, moissonne, vendange, et parfois aide à charger 
et décharger les chariots de paille, foin, bois et fagots, litières, etc. En outre, elle prépare 
les repas, tient le ménage; lessive, raccommodage, etc. Elle assure les dures charges de la 
maternité et du soin des enfants. Elle se lève à l’aube, nourrit la basse-cour et le petit bé-
tail, sert le premier repas aux hommes, donne des soins aux enfants et s’en va travailler 
aux champs ou dans les bois ou au jardin potager; elle puise l’eau à la fontaine, sert le 
second repas, lave la vaisselle, travaille de nouveau aux champs jusqu’au dîner; après le 
dernier repas elle occupe la veillée à raccommoder, nettoyer, égrener le maïs, etc. Comme 
elle n’a pas loisir de s’occuper de sa santé même pendant les grossesses, elle se déforme 
vite, elle est prématurément flétrie et usée, rongée de maladies…. [L]a plupart du temps 
le travail rural réduit la femme à la condition de bête de somme (DS 1:229–30).]
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reconcile their job with household work: errands, cooking, cleaning, and 
looking after clothing require at least three and a half hours of work every 
day and six on Sunday, a considerable sum when added on to their fac-
tory or office hours.53
This material is reprised in the concluding fourth section, “Toward Liberation,” 
in the chapter on “The Independent Woman.”54
Another example: the chapter on “The Mother” famously begins with a long 
excoriation of the horrors of illegal abortion; from the start, Beauvoir makes 
clear that women workers and poor women feel the greatest impact of cruel 
and hypocritical laws, with detailed information explicitly drawn from a first-
person account that had been published in the “Documents” section of Les 
Temps Modernes.55
Abortion has sometimes been called a “class crime,” and this is largely 
true. Contraceptive practices are more widespread in the bourgeoisie; 
the existence of bathrooms makes their use easier than for workers or 
farmers deprived of running water; … poverty, insufficient housing, and 
the need for the wife to work outside the home are the most common 
reasons for abortions….
The seriousness of this ordeal varies a great deal depending on the 
circumstances. The conventionally married woman or one comfortably 
provided for, supported by a man, having money and relations, is better 
off; first, she finds ways to have a “therapeutic” abortion much more eas-
53 “La commerçante, la patronne qui dirige une petite entreprise ont été de tout temps des 
privilégiées…. Elles ont la chance que leur travail s’exerce au lieu même où se trouve leur 
foyer et qu’il ne soit généralement pas trop absorbant.
Il en va tout autrement pour l’ouvrière, l’employée, la secrétaire, la vendeuse, qui tra-
vaillent au-dehors. Il leur est beaucoup plus difficile de concilier leur métier avec le soin 
du ménage (courses, préparation des repas, nettoyage, entretien des vêtements deman-
dent au moins trois heures et demie de travail quotidien et six heures le dimanche; c’est 
un chiffre considérable quand il s’additionne à celui des heures d’usine ou de bureau)” 
(DS 1:230). She continues: “As for the professions, even when women lawyers, doctors, 
professors have some household help, home and children bring burdens and worries 
which are a heavy handicap for them too.” [Quant aux professions libérales, même si avo-
cates, médecins, professeurs se font un peu aider dans leur ménage, le foyer et les enfants 
représentent aussi pour elles des charges et des soucis qui sont un lourd handicap (DS 
1:230).]
54 DS 2:598–99, and see below.
55 Geneviève Sarrau, “Salle commune.” Beauvoir had already written a visceral account of 
the horrors of illegal abortion in Le sang des autres. See Altman, “Beauvoir as Literary 
Writer.”
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ily; if necessary, she has the means to pay for a trip to Switzerland, where 
abortion is liberally tolerated; … she can find unofficial help that is just as 
safe; she has the right addresses, she has enough money to pay for consci-
entious care, without waiting until her pregnancy is advanced; she will be 
treated respectfully…. On the other hand, there is little distress more de-
serving of compassion than that of an isolated and penniless girl who sees 
herself ensnared in a “crime” to erase a “sin” that those around her con-
sider unpardonable: in France this is the case of approximately 300,000 
female employees, secretaries, students, workers, and peasants.... I was 
told about a typist who stayed in her room for four days, lying in her own 
blood, with no food or water, because she did not dare to call for help.56
The generalized psychological account of resistances to motherhood, and the 
lived experience of pregnancy and maternity under the (then) present state of 
education and morality (mœurs), follows this.
A third place where Beauvoir explores and analyzes “l’expérience vécue” 
of poor and working-class women is in the chapter on prostitution. After 
explaining the similarities between prostitution and marriage,57 and how, 
56 “On a dit parfois que l’avortement était un ‘crime de classe’ et c’est en grande partie vrai. 
Les pratiques anti-conceptionnelles sont beaucoup plus répandues dans la bourgeoisie; 
l’existence du cabinet de toilette en rend l’application plus facile que chez les ouvriers ou 
les paysans privés d’eau courante; … la pauvreté, la crise du logement, la nécessité pour la 
femme de travailler hors de la maison sont parmi les causes les plus fréquentes de 
l’avortement…. La gravité de cette épreuve varie beaucoup selon les circonstances. La 
femme bourgeoisement mariée ou confortablement entretenue, appuyée par un homme, 
ayant argent et relations, est très avantagée: d’abord, elle obtient beaucoup plus facile-
ment qu’une autre la licence d’un avortement ‘thérapeutique’; au besoin, elle a les moyens 
de se payer un voyage en Suisse où l’avortement est libéralement toléré; … à défaut de 
complicité officielle, elle trouve des secours officieux qui sont aussi sûrs: elle connaît de 
bonnes adresses, elle a assez d’argent pour payer les soins consciencieux et sans attendre 
que sa grossesse soit avancée; on la traitera avec égard…. En revanche, il y a peu de dé-
tresses plus pitoyables que celle d’une jeune fille isolée, sans argent, qui se voit acculée à 
un ‘crime’ pour effacer une ‘faute’ que son entourage ne lui pardonnerait pas; c’est chaque 
année en France le cas d’environ trois cent mille employées, secrétaires, étudiantes, ou-
vrières, paysannes; la maternité illégitime est encore une tare si affreuse que beaucoup 
préfèrent le suicide ou l’infanticide à l’état de fille-mère” (DS 2:334–36). “On m’a parlé 
d’une dactylo qui est demeurée quatre jours dans sa chambre, baignant dans son sang, 
sans manger ni boire, parce qu’elle n’avait pas osé appeler” (DS 2:338–39).
57 “The prostitute is a scapegoat; man unloads his turpitude onto her, and then he repudi-
ates her…. From the economic point of view, her situation is similar to the married wom-
an’s…. For both, the sexual act is a service…. The main difference between them is that the 
legitimate wife, oppressed as a married woman, is regarded as a human person; this re-
spect is beginning to work seriously toward defeating oppression. However, the prostitute 
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hypocritically enough, bourgeois “morality” makes brothels necessary, she 
presents a complex discussion, again drawing on a first-person account that 
was published in Les Temps Modernes, as well as on other factual information.
It is naïve to wonder what motives drive a woman to prostitution…. No 
hereditary fate, no physiological defect, weighs on them. In reality, as 
soon as a profession opens in a world where misery and unemployment 
are rife, there are people to enter it; there will always be policemen and 
there will always be prostitutes, as long as these institutions exist…. “Of 
all the causes of prostitution,” wrote Parent-Duchâtelet in his study in 
1857, “none is more active than the lack of work and the misery that is the 
inevitable consequence of inadequate salaries.” … It has been noted that, 
among other things, many “girls” [filles] were once servants; this is what 
Parent-Duchâtelet established for all countries, what Lily Braun noted in 
Germany and Ryckère in Belgium. About fifty percent of prostitutes were 
domestic servants first. One look at “maid’s rooms” is enough to explain 
this fact. Exploited, enslaved, treated as an object rather than as a person, 
the maid or chambermaid cannot look forward to any improvement of 
her lot; sometimes she has to submit to the whims of the master of the 
house; from domestic slavery and sexual subordination to the master, she 
slides into a slavery that could not be more degrading and that she dreams 
will be better. In addition, women in domestic service are very often up-
rooted; it is estimated that eighty percent of Parisian prostitutes come 
from the provinces or the countryside.58
does not have the rights of a person: she is the sum of all types of feminine slavery.” [La 
prostituée est un bouc émissaire; l’homme se délivre sur elle de sa turpitude et il la re-
nie…. Du point du vue économique, sa situation est symétrique de celle de la femme 
mariée…. Pour toutes deux l’acte sexuel est un service…. La grande différence entre elles, 
c’est que la femme légitime, opprimée en tant que femme mariée, est respectée en tant 
que personne humaine; ce respect commence à faire sérieusement échec à l’oppression. 
Tandis que la prostituée n’a pas les droits d’une personne, en elle se résument toutes les 
figures à la fois de l’esclavage féminin (DS 2:430).]
58 “Il est naïf de se demander quels motifs poussent la femme à la prostitution…. Aucune 
fatalité héréditaire, aucune tare physiologique ne pèse sur elles. En vérité, dans un monde 
où sévissent misère et chômage, dès qu’une profession est ouverte, il y a des gens pour 
l’embrasser; aussi longtemps qu’existeront la police, la prostitution, il y aura des policiers, 
des prostituées…. ‘De toutes les causes de la prostitution, écrivait en 1857 Parent-Duchâte-
let au cours de son enquête, aucune n’est plus active que le manque de travail et la misère 
qui est la conséquence inévitable des salaires insuffisants.’ … On a remarqué entre autres 
qu’une grande partie des ‘filles’ se rencontraient parmi les servantes; c’est ce qu’a établi 
pour tous les pays Parent-Duchâtelet, ce que Lily Braun notait en Allemagne et Ryckère 
pour la Belgique. Environ 50% des prostituées ont été d’abord domestiques. Un coup d’œil 
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Notice that the discussion broadens out from “prostitution” to other forms 
of highly exploitive (and class-specific) “women’s work.”
As she does generally in her phenomenological accounts of sexual experi-
ence (see Chapter 1 above), Beauvoir here draws on all sorts of fact-based 
sources, including the memoirs of a Dr. Bizard who reports stories of individu-
al patients, sometimes in their own words.59 The stories pile up in long lists 
and the stories vary, but even though individual stories point in different direc-
tions, Beauvoir’s overall account has a cumulative collective force.
[S]ometimes it is the lover—the first, the second—who suggests this way 
of earning money. There are also many girls who are prostituted by their 
families…. Among young female vagabonds, there are also many girls 
abandoned by their families who begin by begging and slip from there to 
the streets. In 1857, out of 5,000 prostitutes, Parent-Duchâtelet found that 
1,441 were influenced by poverty, 1,425 seduced and abandoned, 1,255 
abandoned and left penniless by their parents. Contemporary studies 
suggest approximately the same conclusions. Illness often leads to prosti-
tution as the woman becomes unable to hold down a real job or loses her 
place; it destroys her precarious budget, and forces her to come up with 
new resources quickly. So it is with the birth of a child.60
sur les ‘chambres de bonnes’ suffit à expliquer le fait. Exploitée, asservie, traitée en objet 
plutôt qu’en personne, la bonne à tout faire, la femme de chambre n’attend de l’avenir 
aucune amélioration de son sort; parfois, il lui faut subir les caprices du maître de la mai-
son: de l’esclavage domestique, des amours ancillaires, elle glisse vers un esclavage qui ne 
saurait être plus dégradant et qu’elle rêve plus heureux. En outre, les femmes en service 
sont très souvent des déracinées; on estime que 80% des prostituées parisiennes viennent 
de la province ou de la campagne” (DS 2:430–32).
59 Bizard, Souvenirs d’un médecin. One example should illustrate the style of these accounts: 
“S., deflowered at 15½ by a young man who enticed her to his home with the pretext of 
introducing her to his sister. He didn’t have a sister, but he did have syphilis.” [S … déflorée 
à quinze ans et demi par un jeune homme qui l’attira chez lui sous prétexte de lui faire 
connaître sa sœur. Le jeune homme en réalité n’avait pas de sœur mais il avait la syphilis 
(DS 2:433).] Many of their stories deal with seduction, rape, or something in between; 
they parallel the accounts of “sexual initiation” I discussed in my first chapter, but Beau-
voir additionally notes: “We can be sure that these girls who gave in passively nevertheless 
suffered the trauma of defloration; one would like to know what psychological influence 
this brutal influence had on their future; but ‘whores’ are not psychoanalyzed.” [Ces 
jeunes filles qui ont cédé passivement n’en ont pas moins subi, on peut en être certain, le 
traumatisme de la défloration: on voudrait savoir quelle influence psychologique cette 
brutale expérience a eue sur leur avenir; mais on ne psychanalyse pas les “filles” (DS 
2:434).]
60 “Parfois c’est l’amant—le premier, le second—qui suggère ce moyen de gagner de l’argent. 
Il y a aussi beaucoup de jeunes filles qui sont prostituées par leur parents…. Parmi les 
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Like the analysis of abortion, Beauvoir’s discussion of prostitution uses 
what we would now call a “mixed methodology,” both quantitative and qualita-
tive: statistics provide evidence for the scope of what she’s describing, while 
first-person accounts help her attend to women’s oppression (individual and/
or systemic) without discounting their agency.61 She gives the microphone 
over for long stretches to “the author of ‘The Life of a Prostitute,’” published in 
part in Les Temps Modernes under the pseudonym “Marie-Thérèse.”62 (That the 
first-person accounts of abortion and prostitution were published there, and 
so early, is interesting in itself; what Sartre called “existentialist anthropology,” 
especially manifest in the section called “Documents,” clearly showed an atten-
tion to intersections of gender and class, even before Beauvoir’s trip to Ameri-
ca.) Marie-Thérèse’s story is complex, and Beauvoir barely shapes it but rather 
responds to it; I’m not quoting from it here, because quoting selectively risks 
privileging one or two moments in a complex narrative, imposing a teleology 
that the account itself deliberately refuses. But Beauvoir’s quotations add up to 
many pages; it’s comparable to her two-page quotation from one of Stekel’s 
“confessions” at the end of her chapter on Childhood.
Marie-Thérèse and the others are not sentimentalized pitiful victims, nor 
are they entirely free agents. All attention is paid to the situations in which 
the choice to become a prostitute is made and remade, and to the contingent 
relations, with other women and with men, that develop. It is made clear 
that whatever a woman’s initial reasons for entering prostitution, economic 
pressure (money owed to a pimp or brothel keeper) is often what keeps wom-
en in that life. And if the causes are economic, so are the consequences.
jeunes vagabondes, on compte aussi un grand nombre de fillettes abandonnées par leurs 
proches, qui commencent par la mendicité et glissent de là au trottoir. En 1857, Parent-
Duchâtelet, sur 5,000 prostituées, avait trouvé que 1,441 avaient été influencées par la pau-
vreté, 1,425 séduites et abandonnées, 1,255 abandonnées et laissées sans ressources par 
leurs parents. Les enquêtes modernes suggèrent à peu près les mêmes conclusions. La 
maladie pousse souvent à la prostitution la femme devenue incapable d’un vrai travail, ou 
qui a perdu sa place; elle détruit l’équilibre précaire du budget, elle oblige la femme à 
s’inventer hâtivement des ressources neuves. De même, la naissance d’un enfant” (DS 
2:434–35).
61 It’s difficult for a summary to convey Beauvoir’s avidity for statistical fact, even where we’d 
least expect to see quantitative analysis: for instance, in the chapter on “La mystique”: 
“Out of the 321 people with stigmata recognized by the Catholic Church, only 47 are men” 
[Sur les trois cent vingt et un stigmatisés que compte l’Église catholique, il y a quarante-
sept hommes seulement (DS 2:591).]
62 DS 2:435–43.
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It is not their moral or psychological situation that makes prostitutes’ ex-
istence miserable. It is their material condition, which for the most part 
is deplorable. Exploited by pimps and hotel-keepers, they have no secu-
rity, and three-quarters of them are penniless. After five years in the trade, 
around 75 percent have syphilis…. One in ten has tuberculosis, 60 percent 
become alcoholics or drug addicts; 40 percent die before forty…. Com-
mon prostitution is a hard job where the sexually and economically op-
pressed woman—subjected to the arbitrariness of the police, humiliat-
ing medical checkups, the whims of her clients, and the prospect of 
germs, sickness, and misery—is really reduced to the status of a thing.63
And she adds in a footnote:
Obviously, it is not through negative and hypocritical measures that this 
situation can be changed. For prostitution to disappear, two conditions 
are necessary: a decent job must be guaranteed to all women; custom 
must not place any obstacles to free love. Prostitution will be suppressed 
only by suppressing the needs to which it responds.64
Notice that there is both an economic and a cultural/ideological piece of this 
solution—a recapitulation of her overall two-part argument about women’s 
liberation.
It is only at this point, fifteen pages into the chapter, that Beauvoir turns to 
a group of higher-class women she calls “hétaïres”: “I will use the word hetaira 
to designate women who use not just their body but also their whole person as 
63 “Ce n’est pas leur situation morale ou psychologique qui rend pénible l’existence des pros-
tituées. C’est leur condition matérielle qui est dans la plupart des cas déplorable. Ex-
ploitées par le souteneur, la taulière, elles vivent dans l’insécurité et les trois quarts d’entre 
elles sont sans argent. Au bout de cinq ans de métier, il y a environ 75% qui ont la syphi-
lis…. Une sur vingt a la tuberculose, 60% deviennent alcooliques ou intoxiquées; 40% 
meurent avant quarante ans…. La basse prostitution est un pénible métier où la femme 
opprimée sexuellement et économiquement, soumise à l’arbitraire de la police, à une 
humiliante surveillance médicale, aux caprices des clients, promise aux microbes et à la 
maladie, à la misère, est vraiment ravalée au niveau d’une chose” (DS 2:443–44).
64 “Ce n’est évidemment pas par des mesures négatives et hypocrites qu’on peut modifier la 
situation. Pour que la prostitution disparaisse il faudrait deux conditions: qu’un métier 
décent fût assuré à toutes les femmes; que les mœurs n’opposent aucun obstacle à la li-
berté de l’amour. C’est seulement en supprimant les besoins auxquels elle répond qu’on 
supprimera la prostitution” (DS 2:444N).
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a capital to be exploited.”65 This includes a discussion of Hollywood stars and 
the “kept woman” who “is a parasite of the rich bourgeoisie,” and who comes in 
for the same vivid scorn as respectable married women of that class did in the 
previous chapter, “La vie de société.”66 The distinction, drawn from classical 
Athens, between the hetaira and her more down-to earth counterpart (whom 
the Greeks called the pornē) may seem rather strange, but it does permit Beau-
voir to attend first to the gritty details of “survival sex” and then to also discuss 
women for whom selling themselves does appear to be a free choice (though 
she says it is a bad one), without conflating the two groups.
While to discuss this issue fully would require more space than I can give it 
here, it’s interesting that some current feminist impasses are avoided. To put it 
anachronistically (since Beauvoir does not use our terminology), sometimes 
women are “trafficked,” sometimes they see “sex work” as the best of a set of 
bad alternatives, often some combination of the two operates; yet others find 
(or think they find) self-expression in making such a choice. But drawing these 
distinctions does not preoccupy Beauvoir in the way it obsessed moralists of 
her day and perplexes many feminists now: she’s against the exchange of sex 
for money either way, but her sympathies are clearly with the pornai.67
Now, in none of these examples are working women and poor women an 
add-on or an excursive afterthought to a main story about “Women.” If any-
thing, it is bourgeois women who appear second, as a kind of special case, 
partly exempt from the practical burdens of other women, but (for that very 
reason) peculiarly vulnerable to morally suspect temptations. Beauvoir uses 
the noun “parasite” and the adjective “parasitaires” no fewer than twenty-three 
times to describe such women.
Moreover, attention to the contradictions of class drives Beauvoir’s analysis 
of the oppression of women. After summarizing the arguments of Saint- Simon, 
Fourier, Victor Hugo, and Jeanne Deroin, she notes that “[t]hese theoretical 
debates are not what influences the course of events, which they tend rather 
to mirror with some delay.”68 Economic factors such as the weakening of the 
aristocracy (which “caused the ruin of landed property” [ruine la propriété 
65 “[J]e me servirai du mot d’hétaïre pour désigner toutes les femmes qui traitent, non leur 
corps seulement, mais leur personne entière comme un capital à exploiter” (DS 2:226).
66 See below and also Chapter 1 above.
67 For a different, but comparably provocative, philosophical synthesis, see Shay Welch, Exis-
tential Eroticism: A Feminist Approach to Understanding Women’s Oppression- Perpetuating 
Choices.
68 “Ce ne sont pas ces débats théoriques qui influent sur le cours des événements: plutôt ils 
les reflètent avec hésitation” (DS 1:195).
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foncière]), and then the industrial revolution, advanced the cause of women’s 
liberation.69 Economic factors also explain men’s resistance to women’s cause. 
Attacks on women in the ideological and cultural sphere are heightened at 
historical moments when women’s economic autonomy poses a threat to 
men’s control. This happens, apparently independently, at different times and 
in different places: while Beauvoir sometimes speaks of “the march of history,” 
and looks forward to a socialist future as a kind of culmination of the process 
begun by the entrance of women into factory work, the story she tells along the 
way is considerably lumpier and messier. One example from the ancient world 
is mentioned in the introduction:
It is striking, for example, that the Roman code limiting a wife’s rights 
invokes “the imbecility and fragility of the sex” just when a weakening 
family structure makes her a threat to male heirs….70
This receives a longer discussion in the history chapter, where various ancient 
legal codes and sets of customs relating to dowry and inheritance are com-
pared and contrasted. A parallel analysis is given of the relationship between 
feminist and anti-feminist ideas and the material changes brought by the in-
dustrial revolution:
69 “Woman regains her economic importance, lost since the prehistoric era, because she es-
capes from the home and takes up a new role in factory production. Machinery made this 
upheaval possible by canceling out the difference in physical force between male and fe-
male workers in many cases. Since the sudden boom in industry demands more labor than 
male workers can supply, women’s contribution becomes necessary. This is the great revo-
lution of the nineteenth century which transforms the lot of women and opens before her 
a new era. Marx and Engels take its full measure, and promise women a liberation bound 
up with that of the proletariat.” [La femme reconquiert une importance économique 
qu’elle avait perdue depuis les époques préhistoriques parce qu’elle s’échappe du foyer et 
prend à l’usine une nouvelle part à la production. C’est la machine qui permet ce boule-
versement car la différence de force physique entre travailleurs mâles et femelles se trouve 
en un grand nombre de cas annulée. Comme le brusque essor de l’industrie réclame une 
main-d’œuvre plus considérable que celle qui est fournie par les travailleurs mâles, la col-
laboration des femmes est nécessaire. C’est la grande révolution qui transforme au xixe le 
sort de la femme et qui ouvre pour elle une ère neuve. Marx et Engels en mesurent toute la 
portée et ils promettent aux femmes une libération impliquée par celle du prolétariat 
(DS  1:195–96).]
70 “Il est frappant par exemple que le code romain pour limiter les droits de la femme in-
voque ‘l’imbécillité, la fragilité du sexe’ au moment où par l’affaiblissement de la famille 
elle devient un danger pour les héritiers mâles” (DS 1:23).
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In the nineteenth century the feminist question again becomes a parti-
san dispute. One consequence of the industrial revolution is women’s 
participation in productive labor. At this point, feminist claims leave the 
domain of theory and find economic bases; their adversaries become 
that much more aggressive; landed property may have been partly de-
throned, but the bourgeoisie clings to the old morality which sees in the 
solidity of the family the guarantee of private property, calling all the 
more bitterly for women to return to the home now that her emancipa-
tion has become a genuine threat; even within the working class, men 
tried to put a brake on this liberation because women appeared to them 
as dangerous competitors, all the more so since they were accustomed to 
work for low wages. To prove the inferiority of women, the antifeminists 
now drew, not just on the resources of religion, philosophy, and theology, 
but also science: biology, experimental psychology, and the like.71
You’ll recall that in the introduction to her book Beauvoir refers programmati-
cally to class (and race) divides, in explaining why “women do not say we”: 
“Bourgeois women show solidarity with bourgeois men, not with women of 
the proletariat; white women ally themselves not with Black women but with 
white men….”72 I’ll discuss below how this fits in the logical structure of the 
introduction; what I want to note for now is that this point is made again and 
again, and more concretely, throughout the rest of the book. It is not simply 
that bourgeois women contribute to their own oppression because they are 
unwilling to give up their class privilege; the progress of feminism overall (as 
measured by legal reform and through struggles for suffrage) has been retarded 
by class divisions—and these are not superficial matters of ideology, but result 
71 “Au xixe siècle la querelle du féminisme devient à nouveau une querelle de partisans; une 
des conséquences de la révolution industrielle, c’est la participation de la femme au tra-
vail producteur: à ce moment les revendications féministes sortent du domaine théorique, 
elles trouvent des bases économiques; leurs adversaires deviennent d’autant plus agres-
sifs; quoique la propriété foncière soit en partie détrônée, la bourgeoisie s’accroche à la 
vieille morale qui voit dans la solidité de la famille le garant de la propriété privée: elle 
réclame la femme au foyer d’autant plus âprement que son émancipation devient une 
véritable menace; à l’intérieur même de la classe ouvrière, les hommes ont essayé de 
freiner cette libération parce que les femmes leur apparaissaient comme de dangereuses 
concurrentes et d’autant plus qu’elles étaient habituées à travailler à de bas salaires. Pour 
prouver l’infériorité de la femme, les antiféministes ont alors mis à contribution non 
seulement comme naguère la religion, la philosophie, la théologie mais aussi la science: 
biologie, psychologie expérimentale, etc.” (DS 1:24).
72 “Bourgeoises elles sont solidaires des bourgeois et non des femmes prolétaires; blanches 
des hommes blancs et non des femmes noires” (DS 1:19).
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from genuinely opposed material interests. For instance, in explaining a retreat 
from progressive thought with the victory of Napoleon and then the Restora-
tion, she says:
The fact is, most bourgeois women capitulate…. “It is easier to put people 
in chains than to remove them if chains bring prestige,” George Bernard 
Shaw has said. The bourgeois woman clings to her chains because she 
clings to her class privilege. People have never tired of telling her, and she 
knows, that the emancipation of women will weaken bourgeois society; 
freed from male domination, she would be condemned to work. She 
might regret that her rights to private property are subordinated to those 
of her husband, she would regret the abolition of private property even 
more; she feels no solidarity with working-class women; she is much clos-
er to her husband than to the women in the garment trades. She makes 
his interests hers.73
Throughout the history sections, Beauvoir carefully marks how the position of 
women differed greatly depending on whether the women were of the labor-
ing classes or from elites, and highlights a paradoxical insight, that due to the 
link between women and private property, upper-class women are more re-
stricted by their gender than peasant and working women are, which of course 
doesn’t mean that the latter are freer or better off over all. For instance, in feu-
dal times, she sees greater “reciprocity” between the serf and his wife, who 
gains “concrete autonomy because she finds a social and economic role,”74 
than between the lord of the manor and his lady.
So many factors collude against woman’s independence that they are 
never all abolished at the same time. Physical weakness no longer mat-
ters, but the subordination of women remains useful to society in the 
73 “[L]e fait est que la plupart des femmes de la bourgeoisie capitulent…. ‘Il est plus facile de 
charger les gens de chaînes que de les leur enlever si les chaînes donnent de la considéra-
tion’ a dit Bernard Shaw. La femme bourgeoise tient à ses chaînes parce qu’elle tient à ses 
privilèges de classe. On lui explique inlassablement, et elle sait que l’émancipation des 
femmes serait un affaiblissement de la société bourgeoise; libérée du mâle, elle serait 
condamnée au travail; elle peut regretter de n’avoir sur la propriété privée que des droits 
subordonnés à ceux de son mari, elle déplorerait encore davantage que cette propriété fût 
abolie; elle n’éprouve aucune solidarité avec les femmes des classes ouvrières: elle est 
beaucoup plus proche de son mari que des travailleuses du textile. Elle fait siens ses inté-
rêts” (DS 1:192).
74 “[D]ans le travail libre, la femme conquiert une autonomie concrète parce qu’elle re-
trouve un rôle économique et social” (DS 1:166).
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case of married women. Marital rights also survive the disappearance of 
feudalism. A paradox, one which still endures today, grows stronger: the 
more fully a woman is integrated into society, the fewer privileges she 
has…. It is not because she is judged constitutionally incompetent that 
the wife is subordinated to her husband; when no interests are opposed 
to it, the full range of women’s capabilities is recognized. From feudalism 
to our own day the married woman is deliberately sacrificed to private 
property. It is important to note that the more substantial her husband’s 
wealth is, the more severe this servitude will be.75
This does not mean that lower-class women are better off, however:
[I]n the working classes, economic oppression cancels out the inequality 
of the sexes, but leaves the individual without opportunities….76
Later historical events will give rise to the same sorts of comments and 
conclusions:
We might expect the French Revolution would have changed women’s 
lot, but nothing of the sort occurred. This bourgeois revolution was re-
spectful of bourgeois institutions and values, and it was made almost en-
tirely by men. It is important to underline that during the Ancien Régime 
it was working-class women who knew the greatest independence with 
respect to their sex…. [They] suffered oppression on the economic level, 
not on the level of sex…. [Meanwhile, t]he women of the bourgeoisie 
were too fully integrated into the family to find any concrete solidarity 
among themselves; they did not constitute a separate caste that could 
present demands; economically, their existence was parasitical. Thus the 
75 “[T]ant de facteurs se conjuguent contre l’indépendance de la femme que jamais ils ne se 
trouvent tous abolis ensemble: la faiblesse physique ne joue plus; mais la subordination 
féminine demeure utile à la société au cas où la femme est mariée. Aussi la puissance 
maritale survit à la disparition du régime féodal. On voit s’affirmer le paradoxe qui se 
perpétue encore aujourd’hui: la femme la plus pleinement intégrée à la société est celle 
qui possède le moins de privilèges…. Ce n’est pas parce qu’elle est jugée foncièrement in-
capable qu’on subordonne l’épouse à son époux: quand rien n’y contredit on reconnaît à 
la femme la plénitude de ses capacités. De la féodalité à nos jours la femme mariée est 
délibérément sacrifiée à la propriété privée. Il est important de noter que cette servitude 
est d’autant plus rigoureuse que les biens détenus par le mari sont plus considérables” (DS 
1:165–66).
76 “[D]ans les classes travailleuses, l’oppression économique annule l’inégalité des sexes; 
mais elle enlève toutes chances à l’individu” (DS 1:172).
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women who, despite their sex, might have participated in events were 
prevented by their class, while those of the class that could have taken 
action were condemned to stand aside because they were women. Only 
when economic power falls into the hands of the workers will it become 
possible for the woman worker to win the rights that the parasitical wom-
an, noble or bourgeoise, has never obtained.77
Beauvoir repeatedly uses “parasitaire” in this economic sense. Compare Vir-
ginia Woolf ’s insight in Three Guineas: if women factory workers went on strike, 
production for war would grind to a halt; if the women of Woolf ’s own class 
went on strike no one would notice.78 Different vectors of oppression cross in 
paradoxical ways; generalizations about “women” as a class are shown to be 
false; and it is clearly impossible to understand how any of it works without 
looking at all of it simultaneously. If this is not an intersectional analysis, I have 
never seen one.
Moreover, while entrance into paid work with the industrial revolution 
would be an essential step toward women’s liberation, the lot of the woman 
worker is hardly described as a picnic, then or “aujourd’hui”:
At the start of the nineteenth century, women were more shamefully ex-
ploited than workers of the other sex. Home-based work consisted of 
what the English call the “sweating system”; seamstresses worked con-
tinuously without earning enough to meet their needs. Jules Simon in 
The Woman Worker and even the conservative Leroy-Beaulieu in Women’s 
Work in the Nineteenth Century published in 1873 denounced detestable 
77 “On pourrait s’attendre que la Révolution eût changé le sort de la femme. Il n’en fut rien. 
Cette révolution bourgeoise fut respectueuse des institutions et des valeurs bourgeoises; 
et elle fut faite à peu près exclusivement par les hommes. Il est important de souligner 
que pendant tout l’Ancien Régime ce furent les femmes des classes travailleuses qui con-
nurent en tant que sexe le plus d’indépendance…. C’est sur le plan économique et non sur 
le plan sexuel qu’elle subit l’oppression…. Les femmes de la bourgeoisie étaient trop inté-
grées à la famille pour connaître entre elles une solidarité concrète; elles ne constituaient 
pas une caste séparée susceptible d’imposer des revendications; économiquement, leur 
existence était parasitaire. Ainsi tandis que les femmes qui, malgré leur sexe, auraient pu 
participer aux événements en étaient empêchées en tant que classe, celles de la classe 
agissante étaient condamnées à demeurer à l’écart en tant que femmes. C’est quand le 
pouvoir économique tombera aux mains des travailleurs qu’il deviendra possible à la tra-
vailleuse de conquérir les capacités que la femme parasitaire, noble ou bourgeoise, n’a 
jamais obtenues” (DS 1:186–88). She reprises these arguments in her conclusion to the 
history section. See DS 1:222–25.
78 Woolf, Three Guineas, 12–13.
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abuses; the latter avers that more than two hundred thousand working 
women in France earned less than fifty centimes per day. It’s easy to un-
derstand how eagerly they rushed toward the factories; besides, there was 
soon little remaining outside the workshops except for sewing, laundry, 
and domestic work, all slave jobs for starvation wages…. Often the factory 
owners preferred women workers to men. “They do better work for less 
money.” This cynical maxim clarifies the drama of women’s work. For it is 
through work that woman has won her dignity as a human being, but it 
was a singularly hard and slow battle. Spinning and weaving took place in 
conditions of lamentable hygiene….79
This section lasts for five and a half more pages, including graphic descriptions 
of horrendous conditions. (That Beauvoir talks about the deadening imma-
nence of housework is well-known; do we remember that she knew, and said, 
that factory work was no less deadening, and far more dangerous?)80 Numer-
ous statistics document women’s entry into the labor force, and provide evi-
dence about what is now called the “wage gap” between men and women; a 
carefully dated sequence of protective legislation, up until 1913, is also includ-
ed. When she gets to the question of why women’s wages remain low, she pro-
vides an analysis which is still relevant and valuable: the reasons, she explains, 
include the lack of support from male trade unions (it is in this context that 
the comparison drawn from the visit to the Chicago slaughterhouse occurs), 
cynical exploitation of married women’s need to work, the assumption of all 
concerned that women should be content with a “salaire d’appoint” (second-
ary income, or “pin money”) since they were not supposed to be supporting 
79 “Au début du xixe la femme était plus honteusement exploitée que les travailleurs de 
l’autre sexe. Le travail à domicile constituait ce que les Anglais appelent le ‘sweating sys-
tem’; malgré un travail continu, l’ouvrière ne gagnait pas assez pour subvenir à ses be-
soins. Jules Simon dans L’ouvrière et même le conservateur Leroy-Beaulieu dans Le travail 
des femmes au xixe publié en 1873 dénoncent des abus odieux; ce dernier déclare que plus 
de deux cent mille ouvrières françaises ne gagnaient pas cinquante centimes par jour. On 
comprend qu’elles se soient hâtées d’émigrer vers les manufactures; d’ailleurs il ne resta 
bientôt hors des ateliers que les métiers d’aiguille, le blanchissage et la domesticité, tous 
métiers d’esclaves payés à des salaires de famine…. Les patrons souvent les préfèrent aux 
hommes. ‘Elles font du meilleur travail et moins payé.’ Cette formule cynique éclaire le 
drame du travail féminin. Car c’est par le travail que la femme a conquis sa dignité d’être 
humain, mais ce fut une conquête singulièrement dure et lente. Filature et tissage 
s’accomplissent dans des conditions hygiéniques lamentables” (DS 1:196–97).
80 She’d prepared this ground in Le sang des autres, and would return to it in Les belles ima-
ges. See also the visit to her cousin’s lampshade factory described in La force de l’âge 
(69–70).
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families, and the “inertie resignée” (resigned inertia) of women workers, re-
sulting from a “tradition de résignation et de soumission” (tradition of resigna-
tion and submission) which is “now” coming to an end through their union 
activism. Women workers are described as facing concrete difficulties, but 
they are not “othered” as passive victims of some abstract capitalist force, 
“helpless before the iron,” in Tillie Olsen’s resonant phrase.81
Beauvoir would return to this theme in the concluding section, “Vers la 
libération,” in the chapter on “La femme indépendante”:
It is through work that woman has been able, to a great extent, to bridge 
the gap separating her from the male; work alone can guarantee her con-
crete freedom…. Many women are conscious of these advantages, even 
those with the lowest-level jobs. I heard a cleaning woman say as she was 
scrubbing a hotel lobby floor, “I never asked anyone for anything. I made 
it on my own.” She was as proud of being self-sufficient as a Rockefeller. 
However, one must not think that the simple combination of suffrage 
and a job means perfect liberation; work today is not freedom. Only in a 
socialist world would woman’s access to work assure her of freedom. To-
day the majority of workers are exploited.82
She deepens the point by returning to a question similar to the one she refused 
to answer in the introduction—“isn’t a housewife happier than a voter?”—and 
takes it up not just on the idealist terrain of existentialist ethics, but in practi-
cal material terms.
An influential bien pensante recently carried out a survey of women 
workers at a Renault factory: she asserts that they would rather stay 
home than work in a factory. Without a doubt, they are economically 
independent only within an economically oppressed class; and besides, 
81 Olsen, “I Stand Here Ironing,” 12.
82 “C’est par le travail que la femme a en grande partie franchi la distance qui la séparait du 
mâle; c’est le travail qui peut seul lui garantir une liberté concrète…. Beaucoup des 
femmes ont conscience de ces avantages, même parmi celles qui exercent les métiers les 
plus modestes. J’ai entendu une femme de journée, en train de laver le carreau d’un hall 
d’hôtel, qui déclarait: ‘Je n’ai jamais rien demandé à personne. Je suis arrivée toute seule.’ 
Elle était aussi fière de se suffire qu’un Rockefeller. Cependant il ne faudrait pas croire que 
la simple juxtaposition du droit de vote et d’un métier soit une parfaite libération: le tra-
vail aujourd’hui n’est pas la liberté. C’est seulement dans un monde socialiste que la 
femme en accédant à l’un s’assurerait l’autre. La majorité des travailleurs sont aujourd’hui 
des exploités” (DS 2:597–8).
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tasks carried out in a factory do not free them from household chores. 
If they had been able to choose between forty hours of weekly work 
in a factory or at home, they would undoubtedly have responded quite 
differently.83
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the “point of view of existentialist ethics” required 
Beauvoir to see women’s struggle as not about happiness or “fulfillment,” but 
about freedom; freedom however is not an abstraction, because freedom is al-
ways freedom in situation, and a primary feature of situation is economic. Dif-
ferences between groups of women are not essentialized, but situated, rooted 
in different relations to the institutions of private property and to the means of 
production; but differences between women profoundly matter, to lived expe-
rience, to historical causation, and to the possibility of a better future, which 
will be the result of collective struggle.
3 Questions of Exclusion, Questions of Method
However, there are some very smart and knowledgeable feminists for whom 
the name “Beauvoir” is shorthand for exactly the opposite of this sort of analy-
sis. A friend of my youth, who works on the history of Black women in the 
US, admitted she had never bothered to read The Second Sex “because Vicky 
Spelman’s book says it doesn’t take race and class into account.” Elizabeth 
Spelman’s book Inessential Woman actually doesn’t say exactly that; but it 
is certainly scathing about Beauvoir’s contribution to “the ways in which the 
attempt to treat gender in isolation from factors such as race and class has 
both reflected and perpetuated a choice to focus on the lives of some women 
rather than others” and has tended “to conflate ‘woman’ with a small group 
of women—namely, white middle-class heterosexual Christian women in 
Western countries.”84 A landmark book in feminist theory, Inessential Wom-
an turned many away from Beauvoir’s work; ritual denunciations of “white 
83 “Une dame importante et bien pensante a fait récemment une enquête auprès des ou-
vrières des usines Renault; elle affirme que celles-ci préféraient rester au foyer plutôt que 
de travailler à l’usine. Sans doute, elles n’accèdent à l’indépendance économique qu’au 
sein d’une classe économiquement opprimée; et d’autre part les tâches accomplies à 
l’usine ne les dispensent pas des corvées du foyer. Si on leur avait proposé de choisir entre 
quarante heures de travail hebdomadaire à l’usine ou dans la maison, elles auraient sans 
doute fourni de tout autres réponses” (DS 2:598).
84 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, 58.
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woman feminism” since that time routinely include her. Most recently, cri-
tiques have come from Black women philosophers, who have been investi-
gating the convergences and the contestations between Beauvoir’s work and 
other postcolonial and liberatory writing (Patricia Hill Collins, Audre Lorde, 
bell hooks, as well as Wright and Fanon). Many of their discussions point, as 
Spelman did, to the absence of a Black woman’s standpoint from Beauvoir’s 
work, and to the problem with thinking analogically about different oppres-
sions as though they were discrete, the problem classically captured by the ti-
tle of the groundbreaking anthology, All the Women Were White, All The Blacks 
Were Men, But Some of Us Were Brave.85
That is a serious conversation I hope to join. The continued relevance of 
Beauvoir’s account of the lived experience of women, and her theorizing of 
that account, must surely stand or fall on the question of whether people who 
do not share her social location can relate to what she has written in helpful 
ways. The thing is, we have a fair amount of concrete evidence that some did, 
and still do. Whether that evidence should weigh more or less heavily than a 
theoretical explanation of why they really should not have is, I suppose, a ques-
tion of method.86
Here’s the kind of thing I mean. Several African feminists have written 
that Beauvoir’s focus on the dynamics of “the family,” without acknowledging 
that the sort of nuclear family she (and I) grew up in is only one of many pos-
sible forms, makes her work unsuitable to an analysis of Africa. This makes 
sense.87 Oyeronke Oyewumi’s criticism that Beauvoir consistently assumes a 
western kinship paradigm in which women appear as wives seems to me unan-
swerable: she’s right that Beauvoir does this. She’s also right that it’s not quite 
 satisfactory—even though the family Beauvoir describes, and the status of 
“wife” within it, is precisely what The Second Sex is attacking: as she would say in 
the 1970s, “[l]ike many feminists, I am opposed to the family, without knowing 
quite what to put in its place.”88 Maria Lugones, applying the principle that if a 
85 The work of Kathryn T. Gines has been particularly helpful to me, as I encountered it first 
at the Diverse Lineages of Existentialism conference (St. Louis, June 19–21, 2014), and then 
in her article, “Sartre, Beauvoir, and The Race/Gender Analogy.”
86 The question of whether, and how, a text’s reception constitutes its meaning, in whole or 
in part, has obviously been a huge topic within both philosophy and literary studies 
(though usually separately), too huge for me to tackle here.
87 Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Family Bonds/Conceptual Binds: African Notes on Feminist Episte-
mologies.” See also Signe Arnfred, “Simone de Beauvoir in Africa,” and Nkiru Uwechia 
Nzegwu, Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture.
88 “Comme beaucoup de féministes, je désire l’abolition de la famille, mais sans trop savoir 
par quoi la remplacer” (Tout compte fait, 626).
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theory is unsuitable to an analysis of Africa, it is unsuitable, period, has used 
Oyewumi’s account of the pre-colonial Yoruba to argue that “gender” is itself 
produced by colonization and modernity. This is a logic I can follow on the 
page; it would invalidate Beauvoir’s work, along with a great deal else.89
An abstract discussion of standpoint theory would be unhelpful here. What’s 
really at issue, I think, might be called the shock of non-recognition, the way you 
can be reading along in a book, absorbed in a story or convinced by an analysis, 
making yourself at home, until it kicks you in the stomach with a distorted pic-
ture of yourself, and you feel like you’re looking into a funhouse  mirror. The 
more fully you’d trusted the text (and the teller), the stronger the vertigo and the 
feeling of betrayal. Fanon describes this experience of reading Sartre;90 I think 
Beauvoir had the same experience with Hegel, although that’s something of a 
conjecture.91 Maria Lugones’s essays describe something similar, leading her to 
conclude: “When I do not see plurality stressed in the very structure of a theory, 
I know that I will have to do lots of acrobatics—like a contortionist or a tight-
rope walker—to have this theory speak to me without allowing the theory to 
distort me in my complexity.”92 The shock of non- recognition is the founding 
moment of feminist critique, perhaps of all cultural criticism. It should never be 
dismissed.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence for recognition, as well as non-
recognition, when women of color have read Beauvoir. At the Cinquantenaire 
89 María Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System.” There is 
much more to Lugones’s very rich argument, and also to Oyewumi’s, than I can take up 
here.
90 “Quand je lus cette page, je sentis qu’on me volait ma dernière chance…. Jean-Paul Sartre 
… a détruit l’enthousiasme noir” (Peau noire masques blancs, hereinafter pnmb, 108–109). 
This is rendered as “Sartre has destroyed Black zeal” in Charles Lam Markmann’s transla-
tion, Black Skin, White Masks, hereinafter bswm (103).
91 Many Hegel scholars find it useful to conceive of The Phenomenology of Spirit as a novel, 
a Bildungsroman with Geist as the hero. My analysis of where Beauvoir follows Hegel and 
where she argues with him makes it plausible that she (and indeed other feminist read-
ers) could read quite far into the book identifying with that hero, taking “Geist” as ungen-
dered and universal, until we are unpleasantly thrown by the first mention of women, 
quite late in the book, in the rather same old same old discussion of “Sittlichkeit.” “Oh, I 
wasn’t really invited to this party after all: how embarrassing.” Indeed, Beauvoir’s first such 
experience may have been with the text of organized Catholicism, when it dawned on her 
that perhaps the God to whom she’d been avidly devoting her passionate reflections was 
none other than the God of the nuns at her school, concerned with rigid social proscrip-
tions and petty faults: “perhaps God was small-minded and stupid!” [Peut-être Dieu était-
il mesquin et tracassier comme une vieille dévote, peut-être que Dieu était bête! (mjfr, 
187–88).]
92 María Lugones, “On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism,” 74.
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conference in 1999, Samia Issa spoke of being inspired by reading The Second 
Sex at the age of fifteen in a Palestinian refugee camp; Iranian Simine Nouri, of 
the clandestine circulation of Beauvoir’s texts under both the reign of the Shah 
and the “dictature des mollahs” (dictatorship of the mullahs); Chinyere Grace 
Okafor, of the “non-restrictive character of Beauvoir’s ideas” and the applica-
bility of her concept of altérité to an analysis of relegation, resignation and re-
sistance in the oral cultures of the Igbo (Nigeria) and the Shona (Zimbabwe), 
and to modern written literature by African women.93 Gul Ozyegin has written 
of its usefulness in a Turkish context.94 Most recently, Sharon Holland’s expe-
rientially-rooted book, The Erotic Life of Racism, revalues Beauvoir and links 
her “feminist ethics of the erotic” to Audre Lorde’s.95 And the terrible miracle 
of internet procrastination uncovers a syllabus for a course called “Gender 
Studies and Feminist Praxis in Africa,” taught by a Dr. Anneeth Kaur Hundle at 
the Makerere Institute of Social Research in Kampala, Uganda, which assigns 
Beauvoir’s “Women’s Situation and Character” along with Engels, Marx, Woll-
stonecraft, and Anna Julia Cooper.96 Subalterns speak; and they say different 
things. (Who then is “the subaltern”?)
Perhaps this is too obvious to even be interesting. It doesn’t invalidate the 
critique of analogical thinking by philosophers of color, which is raised in a 
thoughtfully nuanced way by Kathryn T. Gines.97 Like Margaret Simons, Gines 
notes the positive influence of Richard Wright on The Second Sex (as well as on 
Sartre’s play, La putain respectueuse [The Respectable Whore]), and notes also 
that Beauvoir does not make the mistake of lumping race and gender together. 
She quotes two important passages from The Second Sex, the first from the con-
clusion and the second from the middle of the “Childhood” chapter.
93 “[C]aractère non-restrictif des idées de Beauvoir” (Chinyere Grace Okafor, “La littérature 
africaine et le beauvoirisme, exemples d’actions de femmes et d’écrivains” 259).
94 Samia Issa, “La libération des femmes, plus qu’une priorité,” Simine Nouri, “Face à une 
misogynie hors du temps,” Okafor, “La littérature africaine,” and Gul Ozyegin, “My Father, 
An Agent of State Feminism and Other Unrelatable Conversations.” See also Leticia Illi-
ana Underwood, “The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir in Mexico: Rosario Castellanos,” and 
now Chahla Chafiq, Le rendez-vous iranien de Simone de Beauvoir.
95 Holland’s uptake of Beauvoir, and of Beauvoir scholarship, is thoroughgoing. For a com-
parably complex next step “à la and contra Beauvoir” see Kyoo Lee, “(Un)naming the 
Third Sex After Beauvoir: Toward a Third-Dimensional Feminism,” and “Asian Female Ste-
reotypes Matter to All: Beyond Black and White, East and West.” Now see also Linda Al-
coff, The Future of Whiteness, 138–40. Alcoff uses Beauvoir’s reflection on her American 
experience paradigmatically to explain white “double consciousness.”
96 “Gender Studies and Feminist Praxis in Africa.”
97 Gines, “The Race/Gender Analogy,” 35–51.
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In Black Boy Richard Wright has shown how the ambitions of a young 
American Negro are blocked from the start and what a struggle he had 
merely in raising himself to the level where problems began to be posed 
for whites. Negroes coming to France from Africa also find difficulties—
with themselves as well as around them—similar to those confronting 
women.98
It is a strange experience for an individual who feels himself to be an au-
tonomous and transcendent subject, an absolute, to discover inferiority 
in himself as a fixed and preordained essence: it is a strange experience 
for whoever regards himself as the One to be revealed to himself as other-
ness, alterity…. This situation is not unique. The American Negroes know 
it, being partially integrated in a civilization that nevertheless regards 
them as constituting an inferior caste; what Bigger Thomas, in Richard 
Wright’s Native Son, feels with bitterness at the dawn of his life is this 
definitive inferiority, this accursed alterity, which is written in the color 
of his skin: he sees airplanes flying by and he knows that because he is 
Black the sky is forbidden to him. Because she is a woman, the little girl 
knows that she is forbidden the sea and the polar regions, a thousand 
adventures, a thousand joys: she was born on the wrong side of the line. 
There is a great difference: the Negroes submit with a feeling of revolt, no 
privileges compensating for their hard lot, whereas woman is offered in-
ducements to complicity.99
98 Gines quotes Parshley’s translation, but I’ll provide the French for easy reference. “Ri-
chard Wright a montré dans Black Boy combien les ambitions d’un jeune Noir d’Amérique 
sont barrées dès le départ et quelle lutte il a à soutenir simplement pour s’élever au niveau 
où les problèmes commencent à se poser aux Blancs; les Noirs qui sont venus d’Afrique en 
France connaissent aussi—en eux-mêmes comme au-dehors—des difficultés analogues 
à celles que rencontrent les femmes” (DS 2:620).
99 “C’est une étrange expérience pour un individu qui s’éprouve comme sujet, autonomie, 
transcendance, comme un absolu, de découvrir en soi à titre d’essence donnée l’infériorité; 
c’est une étrange expérience pour celui qui se pose pour soi comme l’Un d’être révélé à 
soi-même comme altérité. C’est là ce qui arrive à la petite fille quand faisant l’apprentissage 
du monde elle s’y saisit comme une femme. La sphère à laquelle elle appartient est de 
partout enfermée, limitée, dominée par l’univers mâle: si haut qu’elle se hisse, si loin 
qu’elle s’aventure, il y a toujours un plafond au-dessus de sa tête, des murs qui barreront 
son chemin. Les dieux de l’homme sont dans un ciel si lointain qu’en vérité, pour lui, il n’y 
a pas de dieux: la petite fille vit parmi des dieux à face humaine.
Cette situation n’est pas unique. C’est aussi celle que connaissent les Noirs d’Amérique, 
partiellement intégrés à une civilisation qui cependant les considère comme une caste 
inférieure; ce que Big Thomas éprouve avec tant de rancœur à l’aurore de sa vie, c’est cette 
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Gines says, “[w]ith this note, Beauvoir anticipates criticisms of white femi-
nism and white feminist privilege by later Black feminists such as Audre Lorde, 
who declares that ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house.’”100 But Gines continues, I think rightly,
Unfortunately, while Beauvoir and Sartre do recognize problems of white 
privilege, neither of them explicitly engages Black women intellectuals or 
a Black feminist analysis…. Consequently, their usage of the race/gender 
analogy results in the erasure of Black women who experience both ra-
cial and gender oppression.101
Kathy Glass, writing in the same anthology, similarly notes that while “remark-
ably progressive in her observation that both racist and sexist practices rein-
scribe white male power, [Beauvoir] fails to theorize a space for Black women, 
of any economic background, in her study” and thus “puts Black women under 
erasure.”102 But while I think Glass and Gines are correct that Beauvoir does 
not explicitly make a space, I would contend that she doesn’t foreclose that 
space, either: my contention would be that she leaves a space where women of 
many races, or nationalities, or eras, may find or recognize themselves—or 
may not.
What I mean by “leaving a space” is something like Patricia Moynagh’s idea 
of “exemplary validity,” which she sees rooted in Beauvoir’s recognition that 
“every concrete human being is always singularly situated,”103 and her mobili-
zation of a Kantian method by which “examples are the go-cart of judgment.”
définitive infériorité, cette altérité maudite qui est inscrite dans la couleur de sa peau: il 
regarde passer des avions et il sait que parce qu’il est noir le ciel lui est défendu. Parce 
qu’elle est femme, la fillette sait que la mer et les pôles, que mille aventures, mille joies lui 
sont défendues: elle est née du mauvais côté. La grande différence, c’est que les Noirs 
subissent leur sort dans la révolte: aucun privilège n’en compense la dureté; tandis que la 
femme est invitée à la complicité” (DS 2:52–3).
100 Gines, “The Race/Gender Analogy,” 43.
101 Ibid., 43–4.
102 Kathy Glass, “Calling All Sisters: Continental Philosophy and Black Feminist Thinkers,” 
226.
103 “Assurément la femme est comme l’homme un être humain: mais une telle affirmation est 
abstraite; le fait est que tout être humain concret est toujours singulièrement situé. Re-
fuser les notions d’éternel féminin, d’âme noire, de caractère juif, ce n’est pas nier qu’il y 
ait aujourd’hui des Juifs, des Noirs, des femmes: cette négation ne représente pas pour les 
intéressés une libération, mais une fuite inauthentique. Il est clair qu’aucune femme ne 
peut prétendre sans mauvaise foi se situer par-delà son sexe” (DS 1:13). See Chapter 1 above 
for discussion of this passage in a different context.
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This is Beauvoir’s dialogic pitch to her audience: Do you see your life or 
other women’s lived experiences depicted in the examples I present to 
you? Do you see something of yourself or others in my struggles even 
though we are worlds apart? If yes, then they have exemplary validity. To 
the extent that we see within any example she furnishes a similar pattern 
revealed about our own or other women’s lives, her examples are well-
chosen and valid.104
The wager would then be that there would be enough areas of overlap for 
women in very different situations, with different backgrounds, at different 
times, to “write themselves in.” I don’t mean “wager” in the sense of conscious 
intention, exactly—I am not sure Beauvoir really had a very clear idea, or any 
idea, about who she was speaking to or writing for.105 But the wager seems to 
have paid off for many women, including many feminists of color. Moynagh’s 
approach also has the advantage of valuing all of Beauvoir’s book, as I do, and 
not reducing it to the introduction.106
Moynagh’s idea of the examples as “dialogic” seems right to me. The method 
of piling example upon example requires that one supply one’s own stories—
“yes, that reminds me of the time that he”—and women in many walks of life 
and many countries had and have no difficulty coming up with examples of 
their own. But the other side of this coin is what feminist literary critics used to 
call “the resisting reader.”107 It may take only a sentence or two for someone to 
say “Not it!” and shut the book, like the narrator in Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy when 
104 Moynagh, “Beauvoir on Lived Reality,” 26. See also Vintges, Philosophy as Passion. It seems 
to me that Patricia Hill Collins uses a similar method in Black Feminist Thought, where the 
long quotations from Drylongso speak for themselves and carry her argument forward in 
a powerful and convincing way. See also Diane Perpich, “Black Feminism,” especially 24: 
“Collins makes it clear that there is no homogenous Black woman’s standpoint just as 
there is no archetypal Black woman whose experiences stand as normal, normative, and 
thereby authentic.”
105 I believe it is Nancy Bauer who describes Beauvoir as writing to call into being the audi-
ence for her work that did not yet exist.
106 Julien Murphy, Sonia Kruks, and others have sought to address this question by pointing 
to Beauvoir’s vigorous public support of Djamila Boupacha, a victim of French torture 
during the Algerian war. Admirable as this was, I am setting Boupacha aside for now, in 
part because she has been thoroughly discussed, but also because my question here isn’t 
whether Beauvoir was, or later became, a decent or admirable person, but what her femi-
nist ideas are and whether they make sense, what sense different readers can or could 
make of them.
107 The term was first coined by Judith Fetterley, in her 1978 book, The Resisting Reader: Femi-
nist Approaches to American Fiction.
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her well-meaning white employer tries to use The Second Sex to “help” her un-
derstand her hostility toward her mother, who had favored Lucy’s brothers.108
I suddenly had to stop speaking; my mouth was empty, my tongue had 
collapsed into my throat. I thought I would turn to stone just then. Mari-
ah wanted to rescue me. She spoke of women in society, women in his-
tory, women in culture, women everywhere. But I couldn’t speak, so I 
couldn’t tell her that my mother was my mother and that society and 
history and culture and other women in general were something else 
altogether.
Mariah left the room and came back with a large book and opened it 
to the first chapter. I read the first sentence. “Woman? Very simple, say 
the fanciers of simple formulas: she is a womb, an ovary; she is a female—
this word is sufficient to define her.” I had to stop. Mariah had completely 
misinterpreted my situation. My life could not really be explained by this 
thick book that made my hands hurt as I tried to keep it open.109
Since I occupy the subject position of Mariah—the genius of Kincaid’s book is 
to make this identification highly uncomfortable and yet inescapable—my 
first impulse is to say (as I have to many a student in more or less this situa-
tion), “No, she’s quoting that because she disagrees with it as much as you do—
keep reading.” But of course it is Lucy’s business what she wants to read, and 
she has had her fill of well-meaning schoolteacher types in the course of her 
impeccable colonial education. Moreover, if The Second Sex is right, if Beau-
voir’s analysis does apply to Lucy—and I can’t help feeling, as Eleanore Holveck 
does, that Mariah is on to something110—reading it is also unnecessary. Lucy 
can figure out the truth just by looking around her, in much the same way that 
108 I am indebted to Eleanore Holveck, Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience: 
Literature and Metaphysics, for this reference, though my reading is somewhat different 
from hers.
109 Jamaica Kincaid, Lucy, 131–32.
110 Holveck writes, “Kincaid agrees with Beauvoir more than she thinks” (Simone de Beau-
voir’s Philosophy of Lived Experience, 127). But Lucy is a novel, albeit an autobiographical 
one; so really we’d have to say that it’s Lucy (the character), rather than Kincaid the au-
thor, who if she went back and read the book might have agreed with it, like many readers 
including myself (see Chapter 2 above) who initially disliked it or found it puzzling or ir-
relevant to our pressing emotional concerns, but felt differently later. Kincaid the author 
may have realized this, or may not, but that’s a separate issue. In my view anyhow the is-
sue of whether Lucy can or should “learn” from Mariah is separable from the question of 
whether Mariah is “right.”
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Chester Himes did not need to read French absurdist writers to discover that 
his life as a Black man in America was an absurd life.111
If people (of any color) had said to Beauvoir, why should we read this long 
strange book, why not start from our own experience here and now (it’s always 
Year Zero for someone), I think she would have agreed, at least by the 1970s. 
Interviewed then by her friend John Gerassi, she said the US second wave had 
been set in motion by anti-imperialist activism (regarding the Vietnam war), 
not by her book. “They may have become feminists for the reasons I explain in 
The Second Sex; but they discovered those reasons in their life experiences, not 
in my book….” She added that if she were writing it now (then), it
would have to be a collective effort. And then it should be rooted in prac-
tice rather than in theory…. What is really needed is that a whole group 
of women, from all sorts of countries, assemble their lived experiences, 
and that we derive from such experiences the patterns facing women 
everywhere. What’s more, such information should be amassed from all 
classes…112
Perhaps she had in mind something like the 1975 collection, Les femmes 
s’entêtent, for which she had provided an introduction and other important 
support.113
But here’s another thing. Kathryn Gines’s presentation at Diverse Lineages 
of Existentialism sent me back to Beverly Guy-Sheftall’s Words of Fire: An An-
thology of African-American Feminist Thought (I was looking for Anna Julia 
Cooper, about whom more later). And there, hidden in plain sight, was a frag-
ment from an unfinished manuscript by Lorraine Hansberry, “Simone de Beau-
voir and The Second Sex,” which its editor, Margaret B. Wilkerson, dates to 1957, 
the year Hansberry completed her best-known play, A Raisin in the Sun. Hans-
berry greeted Beauvoir’s book as a brilliant revelation. (There could be no clear-
er contrast to the defensive bewilderment Mary McCarthy’s friend Elizabeth 
Hardwick expressed in her influential 1953 review.)114 As Wilkerson observes, 
Hansberry’s piece was “written for thinkers and readers on the left”; it praises 
111 Chester Himes, My Life of Absurdity. See Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and 
Double Consciousness, 159, for a similar comment by Richard Wright (about Kierkegaard).
112 “Interview by John Gerassi,” 79. I am continuing to follow the thread of Holveck’s discus-
sion here.
113 Nicole-Lise Bernheim, Ariane Bruneton, Claude Enjeu, and Joana Savé, Les femmes 
s’entêtent. The title, “Women Are Stubborn” (or “women insist”) puns on “les femmes sans 
têtes,” headless women. 
114 Elizabeth Hardwick, “The Subjection of Women.”
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Beauvoir for her lack of respect for marriage,115 her depiction of looking after 
children as (in Hansberry’s words) “not a proper experience for the adult 
mind”116 and housework as “an indestructible contradiction to usefulness,”117 
and her analysis of the problems of “ornament” and “seduction”:118 one section 
is headed, “An American Myth: We Don’t Wear No Veils.”119 And Hansberry fol-
lows Beauvoir in holding women responsible for their own complicity with the 
system: “Today in the United States our national attitude toward women and 
their place, or finding it, is one of frantic confusion. Women themselves are 
among the foremost promoters of the confusion.” Frankly, I am finding it diffi-
cult not to quote the whole thing, not just because it supports my views about 
Beauvoir, but because it makes so painfully clear what a loss Hansberry’s un-
timely death was for feminist theory as well as American dramatic literature. 
But since you already own Words of Fire (don’t you?) you can go and look for 
yourself.
In short, the question of whether The Second Sex speaks to women of color 
cannot have a single answer. That women of color have more standing than I to 
answer it is undisputable. But when those who have greater standing to speak 
say opposite things, I must think for myself, white though I be. However, Gines 
and Glass are certainly correct to say that Beauvoir nowhere quotes and cites 
the word of a woman of color in The Second Sex, and this certainly does bear 
out Gines’s general point about the exclusion of women of color from the phil-
osophical canon. Rectifying that, and not providing a full and nuanced account 
of Beauvoir’s own thought, is Gines’s main project, and it is an unquestionably 
important one.
4 “Others” and Analogies: Rereading the Introduction after Anna 
Julia Cooper
Gines presented a version of her argument at the 2014 Diverse Lineages of Ex-
istentialism conference, where she was asked a historical question: who were 
the women thinkers of color Beauvoir, in 1948, could have but failed to cite? 
She replied that Beauvoir could and should have drawn on Anna Julia Cooper, 
“who after all had defended her dissertation at the Sorbonne.” Gines’s article in 






Convergences follows up her criticisms of Beauvoir with a strong case that con-
tinental philosophers should attend to Cooper, who is praised for her under-
standing of what would come to be called intersectionality, and also for “taking 
a strong stand against all forms of oppression” simultaneously and giving a 
general account of domination. Gines quotes a famous passage from Cooper’s 
“Woman versus the Indian” (1891–92). There Cooper responded eloquently to a 
talk by suffragist Anna Howard Shaw, in which Shaw had done what we now 
call “ranking oppressions” and had put the cause of women ahead of other 
struggles. Cooper wrote:
Woman should not even by inference, or for the sake of argument, seem 
to disparage what is weak. For woman’s cause is the cause of the weak; 
and when all the weak shall have received their due consideration, then 
woman will have her “rights,” and the Indian will have his rights, and the 
Negro will have his rights, and all the strong will have learned at last to 
deal justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly…. All prejudices, whether 
of race, sect, or sex, class pride, and caste distinctions are the belittling 
inheritance and badge of snobs and prigs.120
Now, if I wanted to be a jerk, I could point out that the second sentence of that 
magnificent paragraph follows the same “all the women were white, all the 
Negroes were men” structure that has been so fully criticized in the theorizing 
of white women, including Beauvoir. But that would be precisely the kind of 
decontextualized nitpicking I am writing this book to oppose. Looking at Coo-
per’s argument, and her work and life as a whole, it’s completely obvious that 
Cooper’s generic “he” does not exclude women. And besides, that kind of thing 
is silly. Feminist history of philosophy, much less feminist theory tout court, 
shouldn’t be a kind of duel where people defend “their author” by attacking 
someone else’s. Still less do I want to resemble a certain sort of deconstruction-
ist who used to delight in ironically cutting the ground from under everyone’s 
feet, including her own, and retire triumphantly to the bar having demonstrat-
ed that everything contains the seeds of its own dissolution. My point is that 
both Beauvoir and Cooper can be right, or at least, right enough that we can 
keep moving.
More to the point, I do not think Beauvoir would have disagreed with the 
substantive purpose of this paragraph from Anna Julia Cooper’s essay, because 
120 Gines then goes on (45) to list other important Black feminist thinkers from Maria Stew-
art to Patricia Hill Collins and to call on the community of continental philosophers to 
take their work into account.
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as I read Beauvoir’s explanation of “the Other” in the introduction to The Sec-
ond Sex, she is concerned to accomplish very much the same thing, though in 
a rather different way. This section of the introduction has been very fully dis-
cussed by many scholars; I ask my reader’s patience for going over familiar 
ground, and especially for the long quotations: I want to emphasize aspects 
usually elided—especially the way Beauvoir populates her account with ex-
amples and illustrations.
To give a general and inclusive account of domination and oppression that 
does not see one form as “worse” than another is her own first “move.”
The category of the Other is as primeval as consciousness itself. In the 
most primitive societies, the most ancient mythologies, there is always a 
duality of Same and Other; this division at first was not placed under the 
sign of the division of the sexes, it was not based on any empirical given:121 
this emerges from the research of Granet on Chinese thought, from 
 Dumézil’s work on Rome and India, among others. In the couples Varu-
na-Mitra, Uranos-Zeus, Sun-Moon, Day-Night, no feminine element is at 
first implied; nor in the opposition between Good and Evil, auspicious 
and inauspicious, right and left, God and Lucifer; alterity is a fundamen-
tal category of human thought. No human group ever sets itself up as the 
One without immediately setting up the Other as its opposite [emphasis 
added].122
To anticipate a later moment in my discussion: please note that in her opening 
exposition of the basic human structure of domination, Beauvoir draws on 
121 It is hard to know how to translate Beauvoir’s word “données,” which means things that 
are “given” or “pre-given,” as well as meaning data, the result of empirical observation. I’ve 
chosen to keep the word “givens” throughout, awkward as this is in English, to indicate 
that both meanings are often implicit in this key philosophical term.
122 “La catégorie de l’Autre [emphasis in original] est aussi originelle que la conscience elle-
même. Dans les sociétés les plus primitives, dans les mythologies les plus antiques on 
trouve toujours une dualité qui est celle du Même et de l’Autre; cette division n’a pas 
d’abord été placée sous le signe de la division des sexes, elle ne dépend d’aucune donnée 
empirique: c’est ce qui ressort entre autres des travaux de Granet sur la pensée chinoise, 
de ceux de Dumézil sur les Indes et Rome. Dans les couples Varuna-Mitra, Ouranos-Zeus, 
Soleil-Lune, Jour-Nuit, aucun élément féminin n’est d’abord impliqué; non plus que dans 
l’opposition du Bien au Mal, des principes fastes et néfastes, de la droite et de la gauche, 
de Dieu et de Lucifer; l’altérité est une catégorie fondamentale de la pensée humaine. 
Aucune collectivité ne se définit jamais comme Une sans immédiatement poser l’Autre 
en face de soi” (DS 1:16, emphasis added).
Chapter 3160
 evidence from non-Western and Western cultures alike, without making any 
distinction or hierarchy between them.
The next bit roots her general point in the everyday experience of everyone, 
then segues into a list of examples of the oppression of one group by another— 
examples she assumes her readers will be familiar with, and will agree in find-
ing unjust.
No human group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up 
the Other as its opposite. If three travelers happen to occupy the same 
compartment, that is enough to turn the rest of the passengers on the 
train into vaguely hostile “others.” For the village-dweller, all those not 
from his village are suspicious outsiders; for the native of a country, those 
who live in countries not his own seem like foreigners; Jews are “the oth-
ers” for the anti-semite, Blacks for American racists, indigenous peoples 
for the colonizers, proletarians for the property-owning class.123
Then she moves back to the account, drawn from structural anthropology, that 
undergirds all the examples.
At the end of an in-depth study on the various forms of primitive societ-
ies, Lévi-Strauss could conclude: “The passage from the state of Nature to 
the state of Culture is defined by man’s ability to conceive biological rela-
tionships as systems of opposites: duality, alternation, opposition and 
symmetry, whether they appear in well-defined or more fluid forms, are 
not phenomena to be explained, but rather the fundamental and imme-
diate givens of social reality.”124
123 Parshley made a smoother sentence here: “Jews are ‘different’ for the anti-Semite, Negroes 
are ‘inferior’ for American racists, aborigines are ‘natives’ for colonists, proletarians are 
‘the lower class’ for the privileged.” I see why he did this, actually, but it mutes the degree 
to which all these oppressions are being described as fully equivalent.
124 “Aucune collectivité ne se définit jamais comme Une sans immédiatement poser l’Autre 
en face de soi. Il suffit de trois voyageurs réunis par hasard dans un même compartiment 
pour que tout le reste des voyageurs deviennent des ‘autres’ vaguement hostiles. Pour le 
villageois, tous les gens qui n’appartiennent pas à son village sont des ‘autres’ suspects; 
pour le natif d’un pays, les habitants des pays qui ne sont pas le sien apparaissent comme 
des ‘étrangers’; les Juifs sont ‘des autres’ pour l’antisémite, les Noirs pour les racistes améri-
cains, les indigènes pour les colons, les prolétaires pour les classes possédantes. À la fin 
d’une étude approfondie sur les diverses figures des sociétés primitives Lévi-Strauss a pu 
conclure: ‘Le passage de l’état de Nature à l’état de Culture se définit par l’aptitude de la 
part de l’homme à penser les relations biologiques sous la forme de systèmes d’oppositions: 
la dualité, l’alternance, l’opposition et la symétrie, qu’elles se présentent sous des formes 
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At this point, a footnote thanks Claude Lévi-Strauss for sharing the manu-
script of Les structures élémentaires de la parenté (The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship) with her before its publication, acknowledging that she used his work 
“largement” in the second section of the book.125 (Notice, by the way, what a 
hash this makes of the Sparknotes version of French intellectual history: “first 
there was existentialism, and then structuralism sprang up and killed it.” Lévi-
Strauss had been a classmate of Beauvoir’s in their first year of supervised 
teaching, and Lacan was older than Sartre.) But Lévi-Strauss’s theory on its 
own is not quite enough:
These phenomena would be impossible to understand if human reality 
was exclusively a Mitsein based on solidarity and friendship. But things 
become clear if, following Hegel, we discern in consciousness itself a fun-
damental hostility toward every other consciousness; the subject sets 
himself up only by setting himself in opposition, affirming his claim as 
essential and constituting the other as inessential, as an object.126
Enter Hegel, to amplify and correct what she sees as the overly static nature of 
the structuralist account (a reproach that has often been made): what she 
needs from Hegel is a dynamic account of consciousness as conflictual.127
définies ou des formes floues constituent moins des phénomènes qu’il s’agit d’expliquer 
que les données fondamentales et immédiates de la réalité sociale’” (DS 1:16–17).
125 “See C. Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship. I thank C. Lévi-Strauss for hav-
ing shown me the printer’s proofs of his thesis, which I have used extensively in the sec-
ond part of this work.” [Voir C. Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté. Je 
remercie C. Lévi-Strauss d’avoir bien voulu me communiquer les épreuves de sa thèse que 
j’ai entre autres largement utilisée dans la 2e partie (DS 1:17N).]
126 “Ces phénomènes ne sauraient se comprendre si la réalité humaine était exclusivement 
un mitsein basé sur la solidarité et l’amitié. Il s’éclaire au contraire si suivant Hegel on dé-
couvre dans la conscience elle-même une fondamentale hostilité à l’égard de toute autre 
conscience; le sujet ne se pose qu’en s’opposant: il prétend s’affirmer comme l’essentiel et 
constituer l’autre en inessentiel, en objet” (DS 1:17).
127 This deployment of Hegel’s account of consciousness in no way implies an agreement 
with Hegel’s theory of history: see Chapter 2 above, and see Altman, “Beauvoir, Hegel, 
War.” It is worth noting that Hegel scholars often puzzle over the relationship between 
these two parts of the Phenomenology, and point to a logical break or jump between the 
early sections which deal with the struggle between master and slave in a seemingly a-
temporal way, and the later parts which sketch a set of progressive “historical” stages in a 
highly problematic and ethnocentric way. See Robert Pippin, “You Can’t Get There from 
Here: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.”
Beauvoir is unquestionably drawing on Hegel’s account of the “master” and “slave” (or, 
as Hegel scholars prefer, the “lord” and the “bondsman”) in this account, but (rather inter-
estingly) she does not use the words “master” and “slave” until a few pages later. To call 
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Part two: Beauvoir follows this general account of domination by acknowl-
edging that, foundational as the “One/Other” structure is, it does not always 
operate in the same way. Sometimes the opposition is reciprocal, reversible, 
relative. This is, or should logically be, the ordinary case.
But the other consciousness opposes him with a reciprocal claim: the na-
tive traveling abroad sees with a shock that natives of nearby countries 
regard him, in turn, as a foreigner;128 between villages, clans, nations, 
classes, there are wars, potlatches, markets, treaties, conflicts which re-
veal that Otherness has a relative, rather than an absolute, meaning; 
whether they like it or not, individuals and groups are still obligated to 
recognize that their relationship is a reciprocal one.129
But strangely enough, the reversibility of “Othering” is not always the case. Re-
lations between men and women do not seem to follow the logical pattern 
whereby “you’re the other, get down” is answered by, “no, dummy, look in the 
mirror: I’m the one: the Other is you. Hah! I spit in your general direction” (or 
whatever), or even by a less aggressive form of reciprocity: “yeah, but you need 
me as much as I need you, so let’s make a deal.” Why don’t they?
How does it happen, then, that between the sexes this reciprocity has not 
been put forward, that one of the two terms asserts itself as the sole es-
sential, denying any relativity with respect to its counterpart, which it 
defines as pure alterity? Why do women not contest male sovereignty? 
No subject sets itself up spontaneously and from the start as inessential; 
it is not the Other which, by defining itself as Other, defines the One; the 
this account “Hegelian” probably confuses as much as it clarifies; she’ll reprise the story at 
least three times, once in an anthropological register, again at the beginning of “Mythes” 
(DS 1:237–39), yet again as part of the (mainly) psychoanalytic account of childhood. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the overall theory, it seems better to me to regard it 
as Beauvoir’s own.
128 Bauer (Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 179) translates “scandale” as “shame,” which 
seems like an interpretive leap too far: she or I might well feel shame in this circumstance, 
as culturally sensitive Americans travelers often do. But the traveler Beauvoir posits here 
is just as likely to be right-wing, and angered rather than educated.
129 “Seulement l’autre conscience lui oppose une prétention réciproque: en voyage le natif 
s’aperçoit avec scandale qu’il y a dans les pays voisins des natifs qui le regardent à son tour 
comme étranger; entre villages, clans, nations, classes, il y a des guerres, des potlatchs, des 
marchés, des traités, des luttes qui ôtent à l’idée de l’Autre son sens absolu et en décou-
vrent la relativité; bon gré, mal gré, individus et groupes sont bien obligés de reconnaître 
la réciprocité de leur rapport” (DS 1:17).
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Other is put in its place as Other by the One setting itself up as One. But 
in order for the reversal from Other to One to be blocked, the Other must 
submit to this alien point of view. Where does this submission in women 
come from?130
Attempting to answer this question, Beauvoir next looks more broadly, to com-
pare and contrast other “Other-ing” situations that involve longstanding struc-
tural oppressions. In exploring how these oppressions come about, she finds a 
series of disanalogies to the submission of women.
There are other cases where one category has succeeded in absolutely 
dominating another, in the short run or for a longer time. Often this privi-
lege is due to uneven numbers: the majority persecutes or imposes its law 
on the minority. But women, unlike Jews or American Blacks, are not a 
minority. There are as many women on earth as there are men.131
So, smaller numbers aren’t the reason. What else could it be?
Often, too, the two groups concerned were originally independent: ei-
ther they were unaware of each other’s existence, or each respected the 
other’s autonomy, until a historical event subordinated the weaker to 
the stronger. The Jewish diaspora, the introduction of slavery to Amer-
ica, the colonial conquests are facts, with dates.132 In these cases, for 
the oppressed there was a time before [emphasis in original]; they have 
a common past, a tradition, sometimes a religion or a culture. Along 
these lines the parallel Bebel makes between women and the proletariat 
130 “Comment donc se fait-il qu’entre les sexes cette réciprocité n’ait pas été posée, que l’un 
des termes se soit affirmé comme le seul essentiel, niant toute relativité par rapport à son 
corrélatif, définissant celui-ci comme l’altérité pure? Pourquoi les femmes ne contestent-
elles pas la souveraineté mâle? Aucun sujet ne se pose d’emblée et spontanément comme 
l’inessentiel; ce n’est pas l’Autre qui se définissant comme Autre définit l’Un; il est posé 
comme Autre par l’Un se posant comme Un. Mais pour que le retournement de l’Autre à 
l’Un ne s’opère pas, il faut qu’il se soumette à ce point de vue étranger. D’où vient en la 
femme cette soumission?” (DS 1:17).
131 “Il existe d’autres cas où, pendant un temps plus ou moins long, une catégorie a réussi à en 
dominer absolument une autre. C’est souvent l’inégalité numérique qui confère ce pri-
vilège: la majorité impose sa loi à la minorité ou la persécute. Mais les femmes ne sont pas 
comme les Noirs d’Amérique, comme les Juifs, une minorité: il y a autant de femmes que 
d’hommes sur terre” (DS 1:18).
132 Parshley weakens the sense of concrete history here, rendering “des faits datés” simply as 
“examples in point”; he also changes “the Jewish diaspora” to “the scattering of the Jews.”
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seems well-founded: proletarians also are not inferior in numbers, and 
they never constituted a separate group. However, a historical develop-
ment explains their existence as a class, and accounts for the distribu-
tion of the individuals within it, even if we cannot pinpoint a singular 
historical event. There have not always been proletarians: there have 
always been women.133
Smaller numbers? No. Geographical separation? No. Historical event, or devel-
opment over historical time? No. What’s left? It would seem that the oppres-
sion of women was a natural fact and therefore inescapable.
There have not always been proletarians: there have always been women. 
They are women by their physiological structure. As far back as history 
can be traced, they have always been subordinated to man. Their depen-
dence is not the consequence of an event or a becoming, it isn’t some-
thing that happened [emphasis in original]. It’s partly because it lacks 
the accidental character of historical fact that women’s alterity appears 
to be absolute.134 A situation which came about in time can be undone 
in another time: the Blacks of Haiti, among others, have proved this very 
well. A natural condition, however, would seem to defy the possibility of 
change.135
133 “Souvent aussi les deux groupes en présence ont d’abord été indépendants: ils s’ignoraient 
autrefois, ou chacun admettait l’autonomie de l’autre, et c’est un événement historique 
qui a subordonné le plus faible au plus fort: la diaspora juive, l’introduction de l’esclavage 
en Amérique, les conquêtes coloniales sont des faits datés. Dans ces cas, pour les oppri-
més il y a eu un avant; ils ont en commun un passé, une tradition, parfois une religion, une 
culture. En ce sens le rapprochement établi par Bebel entre les femmes et le prolétariat 
serait le mieux fondé: les prolétaires non plus ne sont pas en infériorité numérique et ils 
n’ont jamais constitué une collectivité séparée. Cependant à défaut d’un événement, c’est 
un développement historique qui explique leur existence en tant que classe et qui rend 
compte de la distribution de ces individus dans cette classe. Il n’y a pas toujours eu des 
prolétaires: il y a toujours eu des femmes” (DS 1:18, emphasis in original).
134 “Accidental” here has the flavor of the philosophical distinction between “substance” and 
“accidents.”
135 “Il n’y a pas toujours eu des prolétaires: il y a toujours eu des femmes; elles sont femmes 
par leur structure physiologique; aussi loin que l’histoire remonte, elles ont toujours été 
subordonnées à l’homme: leur dépendance n’est pas la conséquence d’un événement ou 
d’un devenir, elle n’est pas arrivée. C’est en partie parce qu’elle échappe au caractère ac-
cidentel du fait historique que l’altérité apparaît ici comme un absolu. Une situation qui 
s’est créée à travers le temps peut se défaire en un autre temps: les Noirs de l’Haïti entre 
autres l’ont bien prouvé; il semble, au contraire, qu’une condition naturelle défie le 
changement” (DS 1:18, emphasis in original).
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If it’s not historical, must it be natural, inevitable? Not so fast, she continues: 
that belief helps explain why women have appeared as, and been treated as, an 
Absolute Other; but that’s no excuse. “In truth, nature is no more an unchange-
able given than historical reality is.”136 The problem is that unlike Blacks and 
proletarians, women have not formed themselves into a collectivity; they have 
not resisted. (We may well find this unfair to the suffragists, and other earlier 
feminists—I do—but that’s not the point right now.)137
If woman perceives herself as the inessential which never returns to be-
ing the essential, it’s because she herself does not put that return into 
motion. Proletarians say “we”; so do Blacks. Setting themselves up as sub-
jects, they turn the bourgeois, the whites, into “others.” Women—except 
at certain congresses which remain abstract manifestations—do not say 
“we”; men say “women” and women adopt their words to refer to them-
selves; but women don’t set themselves up authentically as Subject. The 
proletarians made the revolution in Russia, the Blacks in Haiti, the Indo-
chinese are fighting in Indochina: women’s activism has never been more 
than a symbolic agitation; they have only gained what men were willing 
to grant them, they received rather than taking.138
It appears that the failure of women to resist male domination is itself an odd 
fact of history that needs to be explained. And she explains it precisely by rec-
ognizing the kinds of divisions and differences between women that she is of-
ten said to overlook.
136 “En vérité pas plus que la réalité historique la nature n’est un donné immuable” (DS 1:18). 
It will be the task of the chapter on “Les données de la biologie” (the givens, or data, of 
biology) to explain why this is so.
137 Interestingly, this claim in the introduction does not prevent inclusion of a positive ac-
count of feminist movements in the later history chapter, where Beauvoir directs us in a 
footnote from this.
138 “Si la femme se découvre comme l’inessentiel qui jamais ne retourne à l’essentiel, c’est 
qu’elle n’opère pas elle-même ce retour. Les prolétaires disent ‘nous.’ Les Noirs aussi. Se 
posant comme sujets ils changent en ‘autres’ les bourgeois, les Blancs. Les femmes—sauf 
en certains congrès qui restent des manifestations abstraites—ne disent pas ‘nous’; les 
hommes disent ‘les femmes’ et elles reprennent ces mots pour se désigner elles-mêmes; 
mais elles ne se posent pas authentiquement comme Sujet. Les prolétaires ont fait la 
révolution en Russie, les Noirs à Haïti, les Indochinois se battent en Indochine: l’action 
des femmes n’a jamais été qu’une agitation symbolique; elles n’ont gagné que ce que les 
hommes ont bien voulu leur concéder; elles n’ont rien pris: elles ont reçu” (DS 1:18–19).
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The reason is that they lack the concrete means to join together and stand 
as a unity by opposing the Other. They have no past, no history, no reli-
gion which belongs to them; and unlike the proletarians they have no 
solidarity of work and interests; they are not even crowded together spa-
tially, in the way that makes a community of American Blacks, ghetto 
Jews, or the workers at Saint-Denis or Renault. They live dispersed among 
men, attached through residence, work, economic interest, social stand-
ing to certain men—father or husband—more closely than to other 
women. Bourgeois women feel solidarity with bourgeois men, not with 
women of the proletariat; white women ally themselves not with Black wom-
en but with white men [emphasis added].139
This difference, this failure really, of solidarity is further explained by several 
factors which are not mutually exclusive. One factor is the “fundamental unity” 
of the male-female couple. “The tie which binds her to her oppressors cannot 
be compared to any other. The division of the sexes is in effect a biological 
given, not a moment in human history … she is the Other at the heart of a total-
ity whose two terms are necessary to one another.”140 But other reasons wom-
en fail to resist include (1) simply the self-reinforcing effects of oppression it-
self: women’s lack of power to do so (economic, material, public presence, 
political status) and (2) women’s further complicity with an oppression that 
some of them find to their advantage, because of “economic interests and so-
cial condition.” In the context of my discussion above, I hope my readers can 
139 “C’est qu’elles n’ont pas les moyens concrets de se rassembler en une unité qui se poserait 
en s’opposant. Elles n’ont pas de passé, d’histoire, de religion qui leur soit propre; et elles 
n’ont pas comme les prolétaires une solidarité de travail et d’intérêts; il n’y a même pas 
entre elles cette promiscuité spatiale qui fait des Noirs d’Amérique, des Juifs des ghettos, 
des ouvriers de Saint-Denis ou des usines Renault une communauté. Elles vivent disper-
sées parmi les hommes, rattachées par l’habitat, le travail, les intérêts économiques, la 
condition sociale à certains hommes—père ou mari—plus étroitement qu’aux autres 
femmes. Bourgeoises elles sont solidaires des bourgeois et non des femmes prolétaires; 
blanches des hommes blancs et non des femmes noires” (DS 1:19, emphasis added).
140 “Le lien qui l’unit à ses oppresseurs n’est comparable à aucun autre. La division des sexes 
est en effet un donné biologique, non un moment de l’histoire humaine … elle est l’Autre 
au cœur d’une totalité dont les deux termes sont nécessaires l’un à l’autre” (DS 1:19–20). 
Again, we might want to contest that word “necessary,” especially in the age of mechani-
cal sexual reproduction; but if we remember that for Beauvoir a biological given never 
implies an immutably determined eternal meaning or destiny, this may still stand as a 
reasonable characterization of women’s past situation, which retains a substantial hold 
on our present condition (either because we are heterosexually reproductive, or because 
social norms exert pressure that we ought to be, whether we agree with those norms or 
not).
167Nothing to Say About Race and Class?
understand this, not as a pure philosophical claim, but also as a summary of the 
research findings her book will go on to present.
So to recap: The “One and the Other” is a basic structure of human con-
sciousness; sometimes it is simple and easy to reverse, as when the traveler to 
another country realizes that she is not a “native” everywhere; sometimes it 
describes a sedimented power relationship, which can’t be reversed simply by 
taking thought or by an act of will. In that case a situation of oppression exists, 
and that is bad; examples of oppression include Blacks, the colonized, the pro-
letariat, and also women. But there are certain special features about the situ-
ation of women, including their tendency to complicity, and the particular in-
terdependence of men and women given sexual reproduction. She doesn’t say 
women’s oppression is worse, and she doesn’t say it’s better or easier; she says 
it’s not quite the same thing, and that it’s worth wondering why. Her concern 
here is not to rank oppressions, but to explain women’s lack of the resistance 
they should logically have shown. When she describes the impediments to the 
solidarity of all women that are created by race and class—“bourgeois women 
show solidarity with bourgeois men, not with proletarian women, and white 
women with white men, not Black women”—it seems to me she is placing 
what we’d now call an intersectional analysis right at the heart of her theory. (It 
also seems to me that she is clearly right.)
Now, this argument does rely, in part, on seeing analogies between the situ-
ation of women and girls and the situation of American Blacks. Nobody likes 
to be anybody else’s metaphor. But our evaluation of this particular analogy 
should turn in part on what Beauvoir is using the mention of other oppressions 
to do. Beauvoir draws analogies in the course of trying to understand what 
women’s oppression is, trying to establish that there can even be such a thing. 
But analogical thinking is not where she finally comes to rest. Banal as it may 
seem, one could diagram her argument using that formula we wish students 
would give up: “there are many similarities, but also some differences.” The 
similarities result from the general theory of domination which she adapts 
(more or less) from Hegel; the differences, from what appear to be natural 
causes, which are then however revealed to be historically and culturally con-
ditioned, and thus reversible, in principle if not (yet) in fact. Analogy doesn’t 
mean one can assume solidarity, much less that the boundaries between op-
pressed groups are seamless or invisible or “under erasure.”
A few pages later Beauvoir will make an extended specific analogy between 
the situation of modern women and the situation of Blacks in the Jim Crow 
South. Just when the material situation of women seemed to be improving, 
with the decline of landed property and the entrance of women into the work-
force as cheap competition, antifeminists responded to the threat by adding 
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new arguments to their arsenal (see discussion above); “[a]t best, they agreed 
to grant the other sex ‘equality in difference.’ This well-worn slogan is very 
meaningful: it is exactly the one that Jim Crow laws use with respect to Ameri-
can Blacks; but this so-called ‘separate but equal’ segregation has only served 
to introduce the most glaring discrimination.”141 Unlike in the case of the Jews 
(who the anti-Semite sees as “more an enemy than an inferior”), both Blacks 
and women are said to have a “character,” for which they are both praised (the 
“good Black,” the “true Woman”)—but also thereby kept in their place. “In 
both cases, the ruling caste bases its argument on the state of affairs it created 
itself,” a “vicious circle” of bad faith. This leads to the familiar point about the 
verb “to be”:
bad faith means giving it a substantive value, when in fact it has the sense 
of the Hegelian dynamic: to be is to have become, to have been made as 
one manifests oneself. Yes, women in general are today inferior to men; 
that is, their situation provides them with fewer possibilities: the ques-
tion is whether this state of affairs should be perpetuated.142
141 “Tout au plus consentait-on à accorder à l’autre sexe ‘l’égalité dans la différence.’ Cette 
formule qui a fait fortune est très significative: c’est exactement celle qu’utilisaient à pro-
pos des Noirs d’Amérique les lois Jim Crow; or, cette ségrégation soi-disant égalitaire n’a 
servi qu’à introduire les plus extrêmes discriminations” (DS 1:24).
142 “Cette rencontre n’a rien d’un hasard: qu’il s’agisse d’une race, d’une caste, d’une classe, 
d’un sexe réduits à une condition inférieure, les processus de justification sont les mêmes. 
‘L’éternel féminin’ c’est l’homologue de ‘l’âme noire’ et du ‘caractère juif.’ Le problème juif 
est d’ailleurs dans son ensemble très différent des deux autres: le Juif pour l’anti-sémite 
n’est pas tant un inférieur qu’un ennemi et on ne lui reconnaît en ce monde aucune place 
qui soit sienne; on souhaite plutôt l’anéantir. Mais il y a de profondes analogies entre la 
situation des femmes et celle des Noirs: les unes et les autres s’émancipent aujourd’hui 
d’un même paternalisme et la caste naguère maîtresse veut les maintenir à ‘leur place,’ 
c’est-à-dire à la place qu’elle a choisie pour eux; dans les deux cas elle se répand en éloges 
plus ou moins sincères sur les vertus du ‘bon Noir’ à l’âme inconsciente, enfantine, rieuse, 
du Noir resigné, et de la femme ‘vraiment femme,’ c’est-à-dire frivole, puérile, irrespon-
sable, la femme soumise à l’homme. Dans les deux cas elle tire argument de l’état de fait 
qu’elle a créé. On connaît le boutade de Bernard Shaw: ‘L’Américain blanc, dit-il, en sub-
stance, relègue le Noir au rang des cireur de souliers: et il en conclut qu’il n’est bon qu’à 
cirer des souliers.’ On retrouve ce cercle vicieux en toutes circonstances analogues: quand 
un individu ou un groupe d’individus est maintenu en situation d’infériorité, le fait est 
qu’il est inférieur; mais c’est sur la portée du mot être qu’il faudrait s’entendre; la mauvaise 
foi consiste à lui donner une valeur substantielle alors qu’il a le sens dynamique hégélien; 
être c’est être devenu, c’est avoir été fait tel qu’on se manifeste; oui, les femmes dans 
l’ensemble sont aujourd’hui inférieures aux hommes, c’est-à-dire que leur situation leur 
ouvre de moindres possibilités: le problème c’est de savoir si cet état de choses doit se 
perpétuer” (DS 1:24–5).
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This is not the first time Beauvoir has made the point about Jim Crow. As 
Doris Ruhe points out, the language about être occurs almost identically in 
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, minus the Hegel, and also (this is my point here) 
minus the analogy to women.
But many racists, disregarding scientific precision, stubbornly insist that 
even if the physiological reasons have not been discovered, the fact is 
that Blacks are below whites. A trip through America is enough to con-
vince one of this. But what is meant by the verb “to be”? Does it define an 
unchangeable nature, like that of oxygen? Or does it describe the point in 
time of a situation that, like every human situation, has come to be?143
What this shows, I think, particularly in the context of her “trip through Amer-
ica,” is that Beauvoir cared about racial injustice in itself, and first. (And not all 
the Blacks on that bus were men.)
The analogy between the “separate but equal” claim of Jim Crow racists and 
the ideologies of “separate spheres” that mask gender oppression isn’t the only 
use Beauvoir makes in The Second Sex of what she learned about race in the 
US. She draws on this also when exposing the hypocrisy of attitudes toward 
prostitution, toward the beginning of that chapter:
One of the arguments of American slaveholders and defenders of slav-
ery is that, released from slavish drudgery, Southern whites could estab-
lish the most democratic and refined relations with each other; likewise, 
the existence of a caste of “lost women” makes it possible to treat the 
“virtuous woman” with the most chivalric respect. The prostitute is a 
scapegoat…144
And again, in the chapter on “Situation et caractère de la femme” (Women’s 
Situation and Character), when explaining why men (again hypocritically) 
143 “Mais beaucoup de racistes, passant outre les rigueurs de la science, s’entêtent à déclarer 
que même si on n’en a pas établi les raisons physiologiques, le fait est que les noirs sont 
inférieurs aux blancs. Il suffit de traverser l’Amérique pour en être convaincu. Mais que 
signifie le verbe être: définit-il une nature immuable comme celle de l’oxygène? ou décrit-
il le moment d’une situation qui est devenue, comme toute situation humaine?” (AJ 331).
144 “Un des arguments des esclavagistes américains en faveur de l’esclavage, c’est que les 
Blancs du Sud étant tous déchargés des besognes serviles pouvaient entretenir entre eux 
les relations les plus démocratiques, les plus raffinées; de même, l’existence d’une caste de 
‘filles perdues’ permet de traiter ‘l’honnête femme’ avec le respect le plus chevaleresque. 
La prostituée est un bouc émissaire” (DS 2:429–30).
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 actually prefer women to behave stupidly or badly, because it justifies treating 
them as inferior:
In A Doll’s House, Helmer explains how fair, strong, understanding, and in-
dulgent a man feels when he forgives his weak wife her childish mistakes. 
So the husbands in Bernstein’s novels wax tender—with the complicity 
of their author—about flighty, naughty, adulterous woman; they mea-
sure their own manly wisdom by bending indulgently over her. American 
racists, French colonizers also want the Black to show himself as a petty 
thief, a liar, a layabout; in that way he proves his unworthiness. If he per-
sists in being honest and loyal, he is seen as a troublemaker. Women’s 
faults become even more exaggerated, then, because rather than fighting 
to overcome them, she counts them among her adornments.145
Note that French, as well as American, racism is indicted here.
Toward the beginning of the chapter on “L’initiation sexuelle,” Beauvoir is 
explaining the “double standard” that affects how differently men and women 
experience sex: since going to bed with a man has always been considered a 
“service” (and remunerated as such), since the woman “gives herself” while the 
man “takes,” no reciprocity is possible. In support of her point, she notes that 
men’s “secondary loves” for their social inferiors have always been socially tol-
erated, while “the bourgeois woman who gives herself to a chauffeur or a gar-
dener is socially shunned.” She illustrates this further by noting the hypocriti-
cally different attitude taken to interracial sex in the US, depending on which 
partner was which:
The ferociously racist American Southerners have always been allowed 
by custom to sleep with Black women, before the War between the States 
and still today, and they make arrogant use of this droit de seigneur: a 
white woman who had relations with a Black man in slavery times would 
have been put to death; today she would be lynched.146
145 “Dans Maison de poupée, Helmer explique combien l’homme se sent juste, fort, com-
préhensif, indulgent, quand il pardonne à la faible femme ses fautes puériles. Ainsi les 
maris de Bernstein s’attendrissent—avec la complicité de l’auteur—sur la femme vo-
leuse, méchante, adultère; ils mesurent, en se penchant sur elle avec indulgence, leur sa-
gesse virile. Les racistes américains, les colons français souhaitent aussi que le Noir se 
montre chapardeur, paresseux, menteur: il prouve par là son indignité: il met le bon droit 
du côté des oppresseurs: s’il s’obstine à être honnête, loyal, on le regarde comme une 
mauvaise tête. Les défauts de la femme s’exagèrent donc d’autant plus qu’elle n’essaiera 
pas de les combattre mais qu’au contraire elle s’en fera une parure” (DS 2:507).
146 “Rien n’interdit au mâle de maîtriser, de prendre des créatures inférieures: les amours 
ancillaires ont toujours été tolérées, tandis que la bourgeoise qui se livre à un chauffeur, à 
un jardinier, est socialement dégradée. Les Américains du Sud si farouchement racistes 
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This seems to go beyond analogy, and make a very intersectional point, in 
that the story cannot be understood without grasping both sets of oppression 
at the same time. And overall, it might seem fairer to complain that Beauvoir 
had blithely “appropriated” Wright’s story as an analogy for her “first world 
problems” if she had never done or said anything else to support people of 
color, or to show that she fully understood the stories she was using in them-
selves. Which is far from true.
5 Imaginary Dialogues: Anna Julia Cooper, Other Black Women 
Writers
But I am getting ahead of myself. Going back to her first move, the elaboration 
of a general theory of domination whose explanatory scope embraced all the 
Others, Beauvoir’s idiom is Hegelian where Cooper’s was Christian, but the un-
derlying structure of the reasoning seems very similar. Oppression of anyone is 
wrong; that affirmation precedes, and undergirds, all other protest on behalf of 
any group; what is needed is a view of a world beyond that, of values alterna-
tive to that. The choice of Hegel may not seem obvious to us today, but Coo-
per’s choice of the Bible is hardly more so. Both require fairly selective reading 
of the source, in fact require the kind of contortions of which Lugones speaks.
That Beauvoir ever heard the name of Anna Julia Cooper seems unlikely to 
me. The mention of the Sorbonne makes an excellent point: just because we 
tend to study different authors in different courses (or different departments), 
we shouldn’t forget that they inhabited the same world at the same time. (Su-
san Buck-Morss: “Disciplinary boundaries allow counterevidence to belong to 
someone else’s story.)”147 But in 1925, the year of Cooper’s brief transit through 
Paris to defend her thesis, Beauvoir was a high school student, mooning over 
her cousin Jacques, wondering whether her intellectual ambitions could be 
reconciled with marriage, working her way out from under the stifling Catholic 
ontology of her early teachers, discovering the emptiness of Lady Bountiful 
service work by participating in the Équipes sociales, and beginning to formu-
late her own views. The regally dignified sixty-year-old Cooper could conceiv-
ably have passed her on the street, on the way to courageously defend the PhD 
that vindicated the honor of her race as well as demonstrating her own intel-
lectual eminence; but Cooper was only in Paris for a few weeks, weeks of leave 
ont toujours été autorisés par les mœurs à coucher avec des femmes noires, avant la 
Guerre de Sécession comme aujourd’hui, et ils usent de ce droit avec une arrogance sei-
gneuriale: une Blanche qui aurait eu un commerce avec un Noir au temps de l’esclavage 
aurait été mise à mort, elle serait lynchée aujourd’hui” (DS 2:150–51).
147 Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, 22.
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from her teaching job that she’d had to fight for. This was the culmination of a 
life’s work for Cooper. Beauvoir’s intellectual life was just beginning.
And once Beauvoir did begin her own studies of philosophy at the Sor-
bonne, did any memory of Cooper’s triumph persist there? One can’t be sure. 
But Vivian May says Cooper’s major advisor, Célestin Bouglé, did not fully 
share Cooper’s views, and in fact one of Cooper’s strongest anti-racist essays 
takes off from a criticism of something he wrote. Would he have championed 
her work after he became the head of the École Normale Supérieure? Beau-
voir’s main philosophy teacher, Léon Brunschvicg, did not even approve of 
Hegel; would he have suggested this interdisciplinary, not to mention intercul-
tural, stretch of mind? Race was certainly not a topic on the exam for the agré-
gation…. Judging from Vivian May’s summary, Cooper’s arguments in her PhD 
thesis are indeed brilliant: the “highlight[ing of] Europe’s economic reliance 
on human exploitation,” the emphasis on the agency of slaves and free Blacks 
of color and on the tension between French universalist claims and the brutal-
ity of actual colonial practices, the careful sifting of available documentation, 
reading much against the grain and reading silences.148 If Beauvoir had some-
how read the thesis, she would have found fuel for her argument that people of 
color had risen to consciousness and taken their liberation into their own 
hands, “as the Blacks of Haiti have proved,” and much else in line with what 
Beauvoir herself would say later, in the period of her anti-colonial activism, 
when her interlocutors were Césaire and Fanon. But as far as I can tell from 
excerpts, Cooper’s Sorbonne thesis does not foreground Black women’s experi-
ence. Certainly none of the summaries I have seen mention that. And surely 
this was the right choice: one thing at a time.149
However, if in 1948 Beauvoir had somehow chanced upon a copy of Coo-
per’s major work, A Voice from the South, in the Bibliothèque nationale, it would 
probably not have struck her as helpful to include for other reasons: because its 
language and its underlying assumptions are so thoroughly Christian, and be-
cause Cooper’s argument is rooted in the difference, and superiority, of wom-
en’s perspective, due in part to women’s exclusion from public life. As the 
 introduction to the excerpt in Words of Fire summarizes, “A Voice from the 
South espouses a cultural feminist position which posits that women, because 
of their inherent moral superiority, have the responsibility and capacity to 
148 Vivian S. May, “‘It Is Never a Question of the Slaves’: Anna Julia Cooper’s Challenge to His-
tory’s Silences in Her 1925 Sorbonne Thesis.”
149 As people are always telling me.
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 reform the human race.”150 Feminist readers today, especially if they know 
their US history, may be tolerant of a passage like the following:
There is to my mind no grander and surer prophecy of the new era and of 
women’s place in it, than the work already begun … by the wctu [Wom-
en’s Christian Temperance Union] in America, an organization which…. 
seems destined to permeate and purify the whole civilized world. It is the 
living embodiment of woman’s activities and woman’s ideas, and its ex-
tent and strength rightly prefigure her increasing power as a moral 
factor.151
Whether or not we are Christians or teetotallers ourselves, we can recognize 
this as a strong and meaningful part of feminist tradition, a prime example of 
Cora Kaplan’s point about Mary Wollstonecraft. But to have expected Beauvoir 
(who did not even realize yet that she was writing something called feminist 
theory) to have grasped that point seems to require an unreasonable, or at least 
an implausible, stretch.152 In Cooper’s “Equality of Races and the Democratic 
Movement” (1925), a powerful response to Bouglé and other racists who pro-
claim human rights but would deny them to the colonized, I find the following: 
“Surely we are intelligent enough to ride in common buses without flying into 
one another’s arms for a mongrel progeny. Why not preach self-control and 
150 Beverly Guy-Sheftall, ed., Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist 
Thought, 43.
151 Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice from the South, 44. See also Karen A. Johnson, “Gender and 
Race: Exploring Anna Julia Cooper’s Thoughts For Socially Just Educational Opportuni-
ties,” for an account of Cooper’s views on the complementarity-in-difference of mascu-
line and feminine, which Johnson sees as rooted in the language of Romantic and Tran-
scendentalist writers about the organic oneness of Nature’s unfolding. Again, Beauvoir 
would not have found this language congenial.
152 Beauvoir specifically denounces the attempt of both American and French women to ban 
alcohol (as well as prostitution and pornography): “they are always forming coalitions 
against something … they do not understand that a purely negative effort is doomed to be 
unsuccessful…. As long as woman remains a parasite, she cannot effectively participate in 
the building of a better world.” [Toujours elles se coalisent contre quelque chose: contre 
l’alcool, la prostitution, la pornographie: elles ne comprennent pas qu’un effort purement 
négatif est voué à l’insuccès, comme l’a prouvé en Amérique l’échec de la prohibition, 
en France celui de la loi qu’a fait voter Marthe Richard. Tant que la femme demeure une 
parasite, elle ne peut pas efficacement participer à l’élaboration d’un monde meilleur 
(DS 2:480).] See also her attacks on the opportunism of “Christian feminism” (DS 1:211) 
and on the effect of religious “mystifications” on women’s “Situation and Character” (DS 
2:514–17).
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practice the principles of the Christian religion?”153 Cooper’s justly famous text 
is an extremely powerful sermon, but a sermon is what it is. Beauvoir’s indict-
ment of the identical scandal in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 would be no less 
scathing, and no less rooted in the gut assumption that all human races are 
one; but her humanism would be ruthlessly secular.
Alongside its scorn for masculinist ideas of the “eternal feminine” and the 
“real Woman,” The Second Sex takes a clear position against feminist arguments 
that are rooted in the specialness and superiority of Woman.154 Beauvoir’s dis-
like of arguments based on the supposed moral magic of feminine influence 
permeates the chapters on the society woman and the mystic. I think she had 
had her fill of this kind of gush from the nuns growing up; her distaste for such 
arguments would also inform her aversion to the resuscitation of a woolly mys-
tique of difference by Cixous and Kristeva in the 1970s.155
In a way, the distinction Beauvoir describes between those oppressed groups 
that resist their oppression (American Blacks, proletarians, the Indochinese) 
and women, who mostly fail to resist, makes the opposite point to Cooper’s. 
Women are not morally superior, they are (or at least can be) worse, since fail-
ure to resist, complicity with one’s oppression, is at least sometimes (though 
not always) a moral failure.
Whenever transcendence falls back into immanence, there is a degrada-
tion from existence to the “in-itself,” from freedom to facticity; this fall is 
a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if it is inflicted on him, it takes 
the form of frustration and oppression: in both cases it is an absolute evil 
[emphasis added].156
153 Voice of Anna Julia Cooper, 295–96.
154 “We will not let ourselves be intimidated by the number and violence of the attacks di-
rected against women; nor can we be got round by the self-interested praise awarded to 
‘the Real Woman,’ or touched by the enthusiasm which her destiny arouses on the part of 
men who would not share it for anything in the world.”
[Nous ne nous laisserons donc pas intimider par le nombre et la violence des attaques 
dirigées contre les femmes; ni circonvenir par les éloges intéressés qui sont décernés à la 
“vraie femme”; ni gagner par l’enthousiasme que suscite sa destinée chez des hommes qui 
ne voudraient pour rien au monde la partager (DS 1:28–9).]
155 Claims that Beauvoir “anticipated” some of those later ideas, such as Hélène Cixous’s uto-
pian call for an “écriture féminine” that would “write the body,” ignore Beauvoir’s explicit 
and lucid rejection of that strand of feminism in favor of a more materialist, more activist 
approach. See Altman, “Beauvoir as Literary Writer.”
156 “Chaque fois que la transcendance retombe en immanence il y a dégradation de l’existence 
en ‘en soi,’ de la liberté en facticité; cette chute est une faute morale si elle est consentie 
par le sujet; si elle lui est infligée, elle prend la figure d’une frustration et d’une oppression; 
elle est dans les deux cas un mal absolu” (DS 1:31, emphasis added).
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Beauvoir makes the distinction between women whose oppressed condition 
makes resistance impossible, and women whose position of privilege means 
they could resist, but also explains why they don’t resist: they have too much 
to lose. Either way, she says, it is an absolute evil; but throughout The Second 
Sex she reserves her sympathy for the former, and treats the latter with scorn.
So despite their shared political goals, Beauvoir’s strong intellectual com-
mitments would have left little room for uptake of Anna Julia Cooper, whose 
commitments were very different. However, if one broadens one’s lens beyond 
philosophy, Beauvoir is not really “off the hook” for her failure to quote and cite 
Black women, because within American literature there was by 1948 a pretty 
decent canon of Black women writing about Black women’s lives, of which she 
seems to have remained unaware. (If Gines had not been so concerned to es-
tablish Cooper’s rightful place as a philosopher, within the genealogy of that 
tradition, she could have made a much more damning riposte.)
Actually, the person who may not be off the hook here could be Richard 
Wright. A year before his Native Son became a bestseller, another novel, Ann 
Petry’s The Street (1946), had provided an absolutely intersectional and com-
pletely gripping account of how racism, sexism, and poverty twine an unre-
lenting noose around a talented young woman trapped in Harlem. Petry’s 
stunningly claustrophobic account of the way the lustful eyes of her apartment 
building’s superintendent turn Lutie into a soiled, trapped, lifeless thing would 
fit seamlessly into Beauvoir’s account of the male Look, and she could have 
drawn on the account of Lutie’s young white employer to fill out her picture of 
the shallow, idle society woman. Or: the ending of Nella Larsen’s Quicksand 
(1928) is as good an example as any I know of the deadening immanent drudg-
ery of a life condemned to childbearing and housework. The unreasonable 
constrictions on a young girl’s sexuality imposed by a Christian regime fearful 
of sex, and the criticisms of arranged marriage, could have been illustrated 
from Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937). Along with 
Nelson Algren, Wright was Beauvoir’s main source for books from the US at 
this period; given his vitriolic exchanges with Hurston, and his view of Harlem 
Renaissance writers like Larsen as dated, it may be unsurprising that these 
books weren’t on his syllabus for her, but it’s a shame.157
What this rather strange thought experiment is not finding, however, is an 
example that would have required Beauvoir to alter her argument. Wright 
157 See Wright, “Between Laughter and Tears,” 22–3: “Miss Hurston can write, but her prose is 
cloaked in that facile sensuality that has dogged Negro expression since the days of Phillis 
Wheatley … [she] voluntarily continues in her novel the tradition which was forced upon 
the Negro in the theatre, that is, the minstrel technique that makes the white folks laugh.”
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famously detested Hurston’s eye-rhymes, but suppose he, and then Beauvoir, 
had gotten past them to read “Janie’s first dream was dead, so she became a 
woman”158—would adding this have changed Beauvoir’s account of female 
adolescence as a work of mourning? Well, maybe it would. (That I haven’t 
found an example doesn’t mean that there aren’t any.) But perhaps this coun-
terfactual exercise might suggest areas of experiential overlap, and overlap-
ping concern, that explain why a reader like Lorraine Hansberry did not have 
trouble reading herself into Beauvoir’s pages and appreciating her analysis.
To sum up: on the level of the politics of citation, Gines is right. And that’s 
not unimportant. But there is more to “standpoint” than the politics of cita-
tion. As I’ve said about the question of influence and priorities with respect to 
Beauvoir and Sartre, if an idea is a good one, more than one person will have it. 
Surely our main concern should be with the value of the idea itself. For that 
matter, the question of “standpoint” does not exhaust the question of intersec-
tionality, which requires us to account for people who are simultaneously op-
pressed in one way, oppressors in another, like the Southern white women de-
scribed by Beauvoir (and described much better by Gwendolyn Brooks’s poem 
about Emmett Till, “A Bronzeville Mother Loiters in Mississippi. Meanwhile a 
Mississippi Mother Burns Bacon”). And yet the idea of “standpoint” is one 
without which we cannot do anything political, it seems to me: there needs to 
be someone there to say, you are describing me/us in such a way that I/we do 
not recognize ourselves, there needs to be a place from which to say this. A view 
faithful to Beauvoir’s idea of “situation” might suggest that “standpoint” can be 
morally authentic and yet can, maybe must, keep moving: different people will 
“assume” the situation, or take it up, in different ways at various times.
6 Spelman in Time: What Got Lost, and What Was Needed
But since I am also partly doing reception history here, I want to return to the 
1980s and “think with” Elizabeth Spelman a bit more deeply than is now typi-
cal. Because if the people who say “Beauvoir didn’t say anything about race and 
class” are relying on Spelman for that view, they have not been very careful 
readers of Inessential Woman, either. Spelman’s argument was not that Beau-
voir had nothing to say about race and class; it’s that what Beauvoir actually 
says about race and class (which Spelman notes, agrees with, and thinks is 
good) doesn’t matter, because there’s something else she should have said that 
she didn’t say.
158 Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God, 25.
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Spelman notes the power of Beauvoir’s explanations that, at many historical 
points, women have experienced oppression differently due to differences of 
class and situation (and place, and time) and have failed to show solidarity 
with other women, or have even been oppressive to other women by identify-
ing more directly with the men of their own race and/or class, because it is to 
their pragmatic advantage to do so. But the fact that Beauvoir actually wrote 
quite a lot about people of color and poor women in The Second Sex and else-
where, and that she explicitly took on and took apart class privilege and race 
privilege, gets less weight in Spelman’s assessment than the fact that she some-
times talks about “women” without mentioning color or class, the default as-
sumption being (Spelman thinks) that the “women” she is talking about are 
white and middle-class. The problem as Spelman sees it is that Beauvoir does 
not specify this at every turn.
De Beauvoir explicitly recognized that we live in a world in which there 
are a number of forms of oppression, and she tried to locate sexism in 
that context…. I think that in de Beauvoir’s work, we have all the essential 
ingredients of a feminist account of “women’s lives” that would not con-
flate “woman” with a small group of women—namely, white middle-
class heterosexual Christian women in Western countries. Yet de Beau-
voir ends up producing an account which does just that.159
Beauvoir fails to “embrace the implications of her own views,” “does not heed 
her own insights,” “sabotages her own insights” by comparing women to other 
groups as if those other groups were not themselves half women, and so “fails 
to pay attention to her own significant insights.”160
Spelman argues that (A) by claiming that sexism only obtains where men 
and women are of the same class, or where racism and classism are absent (B) 
“she herself leads us to the conclusion that the sexism she is concerned with in 
The Second Sex is that experienced by white middle-class women in Western 
countries.”161 There are three problems here.
—First, Beauvoir does not make the general claim given in (A). Spelman’s 
citation leads to the middle of a long paragraph in the chapter on “L’amoureuse” 
(The Woman in Love), where Beauvoir is describing the fantasy of an adoles-
cent girl about the man she vaguely hopes will eventually seduce her:




As we’ve seen, the adolescent girl begins by wanting to identify with 
males; when she gives this up she tries to participate in their virility by 
making one of them love her; it is not the individuality of one man or 
another that seduces her, she falls in love with man in general…. Of 
course, the man must belong to the same class and the same race as her 
own: the privilege of sex works only within this framework; for him to be 
a demi-god, he must obviously be a human being first; for the daughter of 
a colonial officer, the native is not a man; if the young girl gives herself to 
an ‘inferior,’ she is trying to degrade herself because she does not think 
she is worthy of love. Normally, she looks for the man who represents 
male superiority.162
This strikes me as a plausible phenomenological account of the influence of 
racism on the sexual imaginary of a young white girl in a colonial culture, and 
could be taken as a sign of Beauvoir’s steady attention to intersections of race 
and sexuality; others may find the account less plausible, but the context hard-
ly seems to support taking it as a general claim about “sexism” on Beauvoir’s 
part. (This is the only example Spelman gives, and I do not know any other 
place in The Second Sex where Beauvoir says anything that bears directly on 
this claim of Spelman’s, in any way. I cannot help seeing in this another in-
stance of the unfortunate habit of decontextualized reading cultivated by an 
education in American analytic philosophy.)163
—Second, it is not obvious how (A) leads logically to (B): I can imagine a 
writer who might claim A and still go on to discuss the sexism of Black men 
toward Black women as well as the sexism of white men toward white women, 
but separately. That would be a strange thing to do, but I’ve seen stranger …
—And actually, third, does it really make sense to use the term “sexism” in 
summarizing Beauvoir’s view, since she never uses the term, and it was not 
available to her (or to anyone else) in 1948?
162 “On a vu que l’adolescente commence par vouloir s’identifier aux mâles; quand elle y re-
nonce elle cherche alors à participer à leur virilité en se faisant aimer par l’un d’eux; ce 
n’est pas l’individualité de cet homme-ci ou de celui-là qui la séduit; elle est amoureuse de 
l’homme en général…. Il faut, bien entendu, que le mâle appartienne à la même classe, à 
la même race que la sienne: le privilège du sexe ne joue que dans ce cadre; pour qu’il soit 
un demi-dieu, il doit évidemment être d’abord un être humain; pour la fille de l’officier 
colonial, l’indigène n’est pas un homme; si la jeune fille se donne à un “inférieur,” c’est 
qu’elle cherche à se dégrader parce qu’elle ne se croit pas digne de l’amour. Normalement, 
elle recherche l’homme en qui s’affirme la supériorité mâle” (DS 2:548).
163 See Chapter 2.
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For Spelman, none of Beauvoir’s actual real world examples of the contra-
dictions of gender, race, and class, none of her demonstration that she under-
stood the paradoxical workings of power and oppression, none of this matters: 
what matters is that she does not theorize race and gender as abstractions in a 
particular correct way.164 “I bring up these comparisons not in order to assess 
their historical accuracy….”165 “The point … is to see where white middle-class 
privilege has to lodge in order to make itself resistant to observations and theo-
retical perspectives that tell against it.”166 Spelman also dismisses what Beau-
voir herself had to say about privilege, a problem of which Beauvoir was well 
aware, as Sonia Kruks has pointed out.167
At this point, I start to ask myself who, in fact, is putting race (and class) 
“under erasure.” Spelman refers to a “truism: that the nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century women’s movements in England, Europe, and the United States were 
founded and maintained by white middle-class women.”168 This is indeed a 
truism, but it wasn’t true, as Kathryn Gines, Beverly Guy-Sheftall, Paula Gid-
dings, Annelise Orleck, and many others have shown.169 It became a truism in 
part because the movement forgot about, or didn’t count, women’s labor move-
ment activism and Black women’s organizing on behalf of their own communi-
ties. (There’s a long list of Black feminist precursors in Some of Us Were Brave, 
which is out of print….) Something similar happens in many overview histories 
of the so-called Second Wave; the women of color whose writing did appear in 
the 1970s anthologies are dismissed as “tokens,” which isn’t wrong exactly; but 
164 And indeed she didn’t, couldn’t have, since our abstract coinage of “gender” had not yet 
entered the theoretical lexicon. But my point is that while The Second Sex did not do what 
Spelman wishes it had done, it didn’t prevent or preclude it, either.
165 Spelman, Inessential Woman, 65.
166 Ibid., 75.
167 Sonia Kruks, “Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Privilege.” Kruks cautions that well-
meaning American attempts to explore and unpack “white privilege” risk becoming pure-
ly individualist “care of the self” or navel-gazing, or alternatively can lead to guilty self-
silencing which is not productive. Kruks writes, “the project of overcoming one’s privilege 
through a politics of self-transformation presupposes … a conception of the self as more 
autonomous than is plausible” (184). And Kruks sees Beauvoir’s movement toward both 
feminist commitments, and commitments (which were serious and sincere) to the anti-
colonialist struggle, as moving in the better direction of recognizing one’s own privilege 
and using it as a positive force. These are ideas we might certainly debate. But the unfor-
tunate effect of Spelman’s book was that people felt free, or even smug and up-to-date, in 
dismissing (and not reading) Beauvoir, and thus did not have access to her insights on 
these and many other matters.
168 Spelman, Inessential Woman, 202n9.
169 See Guy-Sheftall, Words of Fire, and Annelise Orleck, Rethinking American Women’s 
Activism.
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if we just read those overview summaries, we could forget that those women of 
color were even there. As Linda Garber remarked in Identity Poetics, scholars 
who are over-invested in the idea of distinct “waves” tend to forget that Audre 
Lorde belongs to the same generation as Adrienne Rich.170 I am starting to ask 
myself whether white women beating their breasts (or beating other white 
women over the head) about the fact that “feminist history” is really “white 
feminist history,” is helping to solve the problem of “exclusion,” or helping to 
perpetuate it.
Sometimes I think that by repeating (to ourselves and our students) that 
“we” have forgotten Black women, we simply re-forget them. It is striking how 
often one does stumble upon evidence of the alliances and intersectionalities 
that were supposedly impossible in the 1970s. For instance, I happened upon a 
1971 article by Phyllis Chesler, “Women as Psychiatric and Psychotherapeutic 
Patients.” Citing Foucault as her inspiration, Chesler surveys the situation with 
facts and figures and charts, followed by an analysis which concludes that both 
white and Black women are oppressed by the institutions of American psy-
chology and psychiatry, but in different and somewhat paradoxical ways. Or: 
parts of Ntozake Shange’s “For Colored Girls,” which had a successful Broadway 
run in 1977, were first workshopped in a women’s studies program. Kathie Sara-
child’s instructions for consciousness raising, which Robin Morgan includes in 
the introduction to Sisterhood is Powerful, include a step for examining “what-
ever privilege we have.” (Of course this last example cuts both ways: if that 
approach really had any traction, surely it would have worked by now?)171
Either way, it seems to me a highly curious reading strategy to set aside 
what a writer actually said about a question, because she did not say precisely 
what (thirty years on) that question seemed to require. The title of Spelman’s 
chapter, “Just Who Does She Think We Is?” suggests how completely she read 
The Second Sex through the veil of 1980s American intrafeminist debates. 
Beauvoir did not think anything about the question of who “we” refers to; one 
of her key points, in the Introduction and throughout, is precisely that, unlike 
170 Linda Garber, Identity Poetics: Race, Class, and the Lesbian-Feminist Roots of Queer Theory. 
“Contemporary theory adores a vacuum…. I want to resist, kicking and screaming, the 
Oedipal story of generational overthrow—the baby with the bath water—that is the 
heart and twisted soul of the academic conference circuit and the dissertation proposal 
process” (2, 5).
171 Phyllis Chesler, “Women as Psychiatric and Therapeutic Patients”; Ntozake Shange, “a his-
tory: for colored girls who have considered suicide/ when the rainbow is enuf,” 7–8 and 10; 
Robin Morgan, “Introduction,” Sisterhood is Powerful, xxvii. See also Brian Norman, “The 
Consciousness-Raising Document: Feminist Anthologies and Black Women in Sisterhood 
is Powerful.”
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groups that have achieved consciousness of the need to fight oppression on 
the basis of class, race, or resistance to colonization, “women do not say ‘we.’” 
And, while Beauvoir’s conclusion does assert clearly that the liberation of 
women will have to be collective,172 she speaks of women throughout as “they,” 
not “we,”—and for that matter, of “la femme” as “she” and not “I.” Toril Moi has 
made the point that Beauvoir’s questions simply were not “ours”: for her, iden-
tity would be an outcome of liberation, not a precondition, for the good exis-
tentialist reason that existence precedes essence.173 So it seems quite odd to 
criticize Beauvoir for speaking of different identities as discrete when she was 
not talking about “identities,” or identity, to begin with. (Who Did “We” Think 
She Was?) In her own introduction Spelman says, “I have come to think even of 
the phrase ‘as a woman’ as the Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism.”174 
Whether one agrees with this or not, one can note that “As a woman, I” is a 
phrase Beauvoir does not use in The Second Sex, and that her assertion that “ev-
ery human being is always singularly situated”175 also avoids the next set of boo-
by traps: a simple proliferation of identity categories (“as a Black/ Jewish/dis-
abled/lesbian/ woman comma I”) would not get us closer to a non- deterministic 
idea of how subjectivity can ground activist projects. I suspect Spelman actually 
knew this. The last sentence of her book reads, “there are no short cuts through 
women’s lives.”176
Decades later Beauvoir would use the word “we,” but (as she emphasized to 
Alice Schwarzer in 1982) she meant “we feminists” and not “we women.”177 She 
also tended to mention that her experience “as a woman” was not everyone’s. 
For instance, in talking with John Gerassi in that interview on the occasion of 
the book’s twentieth anniversary:
In writing The Second Sex I became aware, for the first time, that I myself 
was leading a false life, or rather, that I was profiting from this male- 
oriented society without even knowing it…. I had the luck to come from 
a sector of society, the bourgeoisie, which could afford not only to send 
me to the best schools but also to allow me to play leisurely with ideas…. 
172 “This liberation can only be collective, and it will require above all that the economic 
evolution of woman’s condition be accomplished.” [Cette libération ne saurait être que 
collective, et elle exige avant tout que s’achève l’évolution économique de la condition 
féminine (DS 2:522).]
173 Moi, What is a Woman?, viii.
174 Spelman, Inessential Woman, x.
175 See above for Patricia Moynagh’s analysis of this passage.
176 Spelman, Inessential Woman, 187.
177 Schwarzer, Simone de Beauvoir Today, 117–18.
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It became, therefore, very easy for me to forget that a secretary could in 
no way enjoy the same privileges…. I tended to scorn the kind of woman 
who felt incapable, financially or spiritually, to show her independence 
from men…. Through The Second Sex I became aware of the struggle 
needed. I understood that the vast majority of women simply did not 
have the choices that I had had, that women are, in fact, defined and 
treated as a second sex by a male-oriented society whose structure would 
totally collapse if that orientation was genuinely destroyed.178
In other words, Beauvoir’s own feminist consciousness would have been in-
conceivable without class consciousness, without coming to an awareness of 
her own “specialness” analogous to the burning sensation of her own white 
skin she felt in the American South.
And finally, Spelman’s complaints about the amount of space The Second 
Sex gives to the lives of bourgeois women ignore how relentlessly negative 
Beauvoir is about them, and how she attributes both their stifling existences 
and their bad behavior to their class situation. I’ve discussed some of this in 
Chapter 1 above; examples might be multiplied. The section called “La vie de 
société” which Parshley unhelpfully translated as “social life,” obscuring the 
fact that it deals exclusively with women of high society, is a veritable patch-
work of evidence for the bad faith of the upper-class “parasite.” Here’s one ex-
ample where cross-class relations are represented:
The mistress of a household has a more intimate relationship with her 
maid than a man—unless he is homosexual—has with his valet or chauf-
feur; they tell each other secrets, and sometimes they are accomplices; 
but there is also a hostile rivalry between them, because while freeing her-
self from carrying out the work, the mistress of the house wants to take 
responsibility and credit; she wants to think of herself as irreplaceable, 
178 Beauvoir continues: “But like economically and politically dominated peoples anywhere, 
it is very hard and very slow for rebellion to develop. First, such peoples have to become 
aware of their domination. Then they have to believe in their own strength to change it. 
Those who profit from their ‘collaboration’ have to understand the nature of their be-
trayal. And finally, those who have the most to lose from taking a stand, that is, women 
like me who have carved out a successful sinecure or career, have to be willing to risk in-
security—be it merely ridicule—in order to gain self-respect. And they have to under-
stand that those of their sisters who are most exploited will be the last to join them. A 
worker’s wife, for example, is least free to join the movement. She knows that her husband 
is more exploited than most feminist leaders and that he depends on her role as the 
housewife-mother to survive himself” (“Interview with John Gerassi,” 79–80). This builds 
on what she said in The Second Sex (see above) but does not really change her position.
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indispensable. “As soon as I’m not there, everything goes wrong.” She tries 
grimly to put the maid in the wrong; if she does her job too well, the mis-
tress could no longer feel proudly unique.179
Two other chapters which deal in very negative terms with the bad faith of 
women who are complicit with the bourgeois patriarchy that traps them—the 
portraits of “La narcissiste” and “La mystique”—indeed contain no reference to 
working-class women, and Beauvoir’s theory predicts why this would be so.
At the end of “Situation et caractère de la femme,” Beauvoir turns briefly to 
the virtues that are the positive side of the coin of women’s characteristic 
faults: sensitivity, refinement, care, spontaneity, generosity, a sense of irony, 
and a version of authenticity.
But she will only have these advantages over her husband if she rejects 
the mystifications he offers her. In the upper classes, women are willing 
accomplices to their masters because they stand to profit from the bene-
fits they are guaranteed. We have seen that women of the high bourgeoi-
sie and aristocracy have always defended their class interests more stub-
bornly than their husbands do: they do not hesitate to radically sacrifice 
their autonomy as human beings…. Their vain arrogance, their radical 
incapability, their stubborn ignorance, turn them into the most useless 
beings, the most idiotic that the human species has ever produced.
It is thus as absurd to speak of “the woman” in general as of “the eternal 
man.” And we can see why all comparisons where we try to decide if the 
woman is superior, inferior, or equal to the man are pointless: their situa-
tions are profoundly different … [emphasis added].180
179 “Une maîtresse de maison a avec sa bonne des rapports bien plus intimes qu’un homme—
à moins qu’il ne soit pédéraste—n’en a jamais avec son valet de chambre ou son chauf-
feur; elles échangent des confidences, par moments elles se font complices; mais il y a 
aussi entre elles une rivalité hostile, car la patronne tout en se déchargeant de l’exécution 
du travail veut s’en assurer la responsabilité et le mérite; elle veut se penser irremplaçable, 
indispensable. ‘Dès que je ne suis pas là, tout va de travers.’ Elle essaie âprement de pren-
dre sa servante en faute; si celle-ci s’acquitte trop bien de ses tâches, l’autre ne peut plus 
connaître la fierté de se sentir unique.” (DS 2:414–15).
180 “Mais elle n’aura sur le mâle ces privilèges qu’à condition de repousser les mystifications 
qu’il lui propose. Dans les classes supérieures, les femmes se font ardemment complices 
de leurs maîtres parce qu’elles tiennent à profiter des bénéfices qu’ils leur assurent. On 
a vu que les grandes bourgeoises, les aristocrates ont toujours défendu leurs intérêts de 
classe avec plus d’entêtement encore que leur époux: elles n’hésitent pas à leur sacri-
fier radicalement leur autonomie d’être humain…. Leur vaine arrogance, leur radicale 
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Since ought implies can, since not all women are equally materially situated 
or practically equipped to step away from sexist arrangements, a call for purely 
personal ethical change will only work for those who are the least constrained 
by material and practical structures. Insofar as Beauvoir was particularly ad-
dressing her own class, her message to them (us) is that unlike farm wives or 
factory workers, they (we) really have no excuse. Perhaps her greatest chal-
lenge, or her greatest accomplishment, was to make (some) women recognize 
themselves in the useless hypocrites patriarchy sometimes makes of us.
Spelman’s lack of interest in that analysis strikes me as curious, but it is not 
at all unusual. Many subsequent commentators reference a cutting remark at-
tributed to Judith Okely, that The Second Sex provides “a village ethnography, 
with Paris as the village.” Okely actually doesn’t quite say this (as an ethnogra-
pher herself, she would presumably be unlikely to misuse that term). What she 
does say is this: “Simone de Beauvoir has in part done an anthropological vil-
lage study of specific women, but without the anthropological theory and fo-
cus. Her village is largely mid-century Paris and the women studied, including 
herself, are mainly middle-class. There are almost no references to working-
class urban women and only rare glimpses of rural, peasant women who still 
made up the majority of French women at that time.”181
Now, the time-hallowed empirical methods of philology (otherwise known 
as, going through a book and noting down examples of a thing, and then sum-
marizing how that thing is dealt with by that author in that book) show Okely’s 
statements to be quite misleading. I think she must have arrived at her view by 
discounting the literary examples, discounting the examples from the psycho-
logical case histories, and discounting most of the discussion in the “Histoire” 
section, because she continues, “[d]espite this hidden subjectivity, her obser-
vations and her recourse to historical, literary and psychoanalytic documenta-
tion raise questions beyond the local study.” But isn’t “Beauvoir” the author of 
those parts of the book, too, and isn’t her use of “documentation”—the fact 
that whenever she didn’t know enough about something, she went to the li-
brary and looked it up—also part of her “subjectivity”? Okely goes on to say that 
 incapacité, leur ignorance butée en font les êtres les plus inutiles, les plus nuls qu’ait ja-
mais produits l’espèce humaine.
Il est donc aussi absurde de parler de ‘la femme’ en général que de ‘l’homme’ éternel. 
Et on comprend pourquoi toutes les comparaisons où l’on s’efforce de décider si la femme 
est supérieure, inférieure ou égale à l’homme sont oiseuses: leurs situations sont profon-
dément différentes” (DS 2:520–21, emphasis added).
181 Judith Okely, Simone de Beauvoir, 71–2. Like Spelman, Okely fails to note that Beauvoir’s 
copious descriptions of middle-class and upper class women are almost unfailingly 
negative.
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“[a] paradoxical strength is in the hidden use of herself as a case study, and it 
was one to which many of her women readers intuitively responded.” This, it 
turns out, is Okely’s real interest; her book tells us a great deal about her own 
early life and how it was the same or different from Beauvoir’s, and also in-
cludes anecdotes collected from people Okely knew. I find great value in this 
sort of writing, but as a scholarly introduction to Beauvoir’s thought, it seems 
oddly limited. One must, of course, set aside large chunks of The Second Sex in 
order to talk well about any of it; what seems strange to me is to then also com-
plain, as Okely and countless others have done, that what’s in the bits one has 
set aside as uninteresting isn’t in the book at all.
The question of which of these parts gives us the “real” Beauvoir is still very 
much with us. Penelope Deutscher is, I think, looking at many of the same pas-
sages as Spelman when she writes, though much less harshly, of the “tensions” 
and “auto-resistances” in Beauvoir’s approach. Deutscher acknowledges that 
Beauvoir’s work instantiates a kind of analysis we might call intersectional.
One way of reading her … is to consider how she foregrounded the mul-
tiple means by which men and women are othered. If we return to the 
early Sartre for the comparison, he depicts an outwardly directed subjec-
tivity temporarily interrupted by the world looking back at it. It is well 
known that Beauvoir interrupts this with her emphasis on the impor-
tance of group objectification and marginalization, the question of who 
becomes a being-for-others becoming less arbitrary, which she does at 
the risk of attributing inflexibility to group and individual patterns. But 
Beauvoir also interrupts this risk, intermittently, with a further reminder. 
Banal in contemporary feminism, it has been overlooked as an important 
component of her work: there is no gender without race, no age without 
gender, no race without class. Once one thinks of a subject in terms of the 
multiple fields by which it is dislocated by alterity, its apparent consolida-
tion as gendered, raced, or classed is dislodged. This is one of the ele-
ments that forms part of the movement in Beauvoir’s own work, in which 
certain positions put forward by her are engaged, answered, or under-
mined by others.
In both L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 and The Second Sex, Beauvoir 
does refer to race relations and to gender relations as if these were sepa-
rable. But inevitably, her own material speaks against her.182
182 Penelope Deutscher, “Vulnerability and Metamorphosis,” 72–3.
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But, who, in the last two sentences, is “Beauvoir”? How do we know? Who de-
cides where “her material” stops and “Beauvoir” begins? (Again this is a ques-
tion of method, too large for me to take up here: what counts as evidence for a 
writer’s view, and what has the status of “exception”?)183
At many points, Deutscher’s criticisms of that first “Beauvoir” echo Spel-
man’s quite closely. Deutscher’s own underlying commitments are sufficiently 
poststructuralist that Beauvoir’s failure (in her view) to sustain a single consis-
tent line of argument strikes her as a strength, not a weakness.184 Beauvoir 
herself, though, was trying to make a consistent argument, though in some of 
the longer loops of the middle of the book it may take us (and indeed may have 
taken her) a long time to figure out what that argument is. But she was not ar-
guing with other feminists: there was no institutional context for that. And she 
also wasn’t arguing with other philosophers in an attempt to correct philo-
sophical thinking.185 Rather, as Michèle Le Dœuff has described the task for 
183 A conscientious student in my literature class asks me, “how many examples from the text 
do I need to prove a point? Like, maybe three?” How should I have answered her? Is the 
answer different for literature than for philosophy? Why? Do the social sciences have a 
clearer answer than the humanities? If so, what can “interdisciplinary feminist methodol-
ogy” actually mean?
184 By the same token, it is hard for me to come to grips with Deutscher’s own argument, or 
to be sure what it really is. I understand that Deutscher would not see that as a problem, 
either—and indeed it may not actually be one. Deutscher’s work has the immense merit 
of fully recognizing that, as Sonia Kruks says, “gender was not Beauvoir’s only concern,” 
and of fully engaging and integrating Beauvoir’s work on aging, which I regret I’ve been 
unable to do in my own work. See Kruks, “Review of Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy 
of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance,” 257, and also Kruks, Simone de 
Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity.
Deutscher’s point in her earlier work, Yielding Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction, and 
the History of Philosophy, that “[i]nterpretations which ask how Beauvoir’s inconsisten-
cies can be explained can contribute to an infantilization of Beauvoir” (170) is a cogent 
one: it certainly will not do to attribute the parts of The Second Sex one disagrees with to 
the unfortunate influence of Sartre (or Hegel, or someone else) and call the rest of it 
“Beauvoir.” But what if the “operative contradictions,” as Deutscher calls them, are not in 
the book or the theory, but in the (lived) world? Could we not hope for a lucid and linear 
descriptive account and analysis of a (ridiculously) contradictory set of social and onto-
logical facts?
185 Deutscher dismisses Beauvoir’s attempts toward a mixed methodology that would ap-
proach a topic or theme like racism (or what we would call sexism or ageism) as a con-
crete problem actually existing in the world, using whatever intellectual tools came to 
hand (The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, 5). In her discussion of L’Amérique au jour le 
jour 1947, Deutscher disparages Beauvoir’s fall into “the social” (65–70); she also dismisses 
Beauvoir’s literary productions as “popular” but “of mixed quality” (20, 67). It would seem 
that only properly philosophical arguments are interesting. Perhaps this is so, but I worry 
that Deutscher’s emphasis on “ethics” and “ethical thinking” has the overall effect of 
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feminist philosophy, she was “arguing with a situation [and] a reality as if it 
were someone’s thesis.”186 It is difficult for me to see how, unless feminist phi-
losophy does that, it can hope to have much effect or indeed much purchase 
on what happens for women (and others) in what we tend to call the real 
world. (Is anyone really sorry that Angela Davis decided not to put finishing 
her philosophy dissertation at the top of her to-do list? Or that Alix Kates Shul-
man found the Columbia philosophy department so rebarbative and dull that 
she wrote Memoirs of an Ex-Prom Queen instead, and helped found Ms. maga-
zine?) And if we are not interested in finding a way to solve actual problems, 
why are we doing this?
...
However there’s an excellent reason why Spelman’s book struck a chord with 
so many readers and has had such staying power: the rest of it performed a 
much-needed intervention into feminist discourse in the United States. The 
chapter on Beauvoir, along with the earlier chapters about Plato and Aristotle, 
are really only the launching pad for Spelman’s genuine contribution. Her next 
chapter is about the false universals implied in Nancy Chodorow’s work: given 
the influence enjoyed in the 1980s by Chodorow’s account of female develop-
ment, and related work by Carol Gilligan and Dorothy Dinnerstein, it was ur-
gent to answer her, as Adrienne Rich and Carolyn Steedman also did.187 Spel-
man’s critique is also certainly a sound one when applied to the way American 
feminists like Betty Friedan and Kate Millett picked up the idealist and indi-
vidualist parts of Beauvoir’s book, leaving out the class analysis, the more ma-
terialist strands, and the nuanced understanding of racial histories.188 One 
depoliticizing the entire discussion, and diminishes Beauvoir’s accomplishment by mini-
mizing the purchase of her theses on the world. See also Tina Chanter, “The Trouble we 
(Feminists) Have Reasoning with Our Mothers.”
Finally, I suspect that Deutscher overstates the extent of Beauvoir’s commitment to 
the idea that racism is a white problem, with analogous formulations for women and for 
old people. Beauvoir provides sufficient phenomenological evidence for the suffering of 
the oppressed that we understand that while the problem is the oppressor’s fault, the 
problems of the oppressed are not imaginary and cannot be analyzed away.
186 Hipparchia’s Choice, 30.
187 Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” and Carolyn Kay Steedman, 
Landscape for A Good Woman.
188 See also Simons, “Racism and Feminism: A Schism in the Sisterhood.” I can’t entirely agree 
with her reading there of Beauvoir (who plays a minor role in the article), but with respect 
to Kate Millett, Shulamith Firestone, and Mary Daly, hers is a typically powerful and well-
reasoned argument that very much needed to be made. See Sandra Dijkstra, “Simone de 
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hypothesis might be that since the mainstream US uptake of Beauvoir’s work 
did not include the anti-racist or anti-colonialist aspects of her work, and de-
emphasized class, the subsequent US critique didn’t see it, either, and “Beau-
voir” became a stand-in for what US feminists had made of her work.
Most critiques of analogical thinking about race and gender assume that to 
think analogically means to subordinate the other term of the analogy to sex/
gender, to see the sex/gender thing as prior to others (temporally or analyti-
cally) and thus deeper, more basic, more foundational. As I’ve explained above, 
I really do not think Beauvoir says this. But Shulamith Firestone, for instance, 
absolutely does say this in The Dialectic of Sex (1971), and formulates it explic-
itly as an interlocution with Beauvoir, to whom the book is dedicated.
Firestone’s opening move certainly has a very different political tone from 
Beauvoir’s introduction. “If there were another word more all-embracing than 
revolution we would use it” is a million miles away from “[f]or a long time I 
have hesitated….” Yet at many points she does follow the line, and the bite, of 
Beauvoir’s argument quite closely. “Why should a woman give up her precious 
seat in the cattle car for a bloody struggle she could not hope to win?” is the 
best gloss on Beauvoir’s idea of “complicity” I know.189 Firestone’s view that 
sexual difference is rooted in biology, but that nonetheless it can and must be 
changed, is generally consonant with Beauvoir’s:
[T]o grant that the sexual imbalance of power is biologically based is not 
to lose our case. We are no longer just animals. And the kingdom of na-
ture does not reign absolute, as Simone de Beauvoir herself admits … “hu-
manity is not an animal species, it is a historical reality. Human society is 
an anti-physis.”190
Firestone’s description of childbirth as “like shitting a pumpkin” is certainly in 
the spirit of Beauvoir’s demystification of the myths of maternity.191 She is not 
far from Beauvoir, either, in her suspicion of altruism and her contempt for 
Beauvoir and Betty Friedan: The Politics of Omission,” for a detailed account of the rela-
tionship between The Second Sex and “its first illegitimate offspring, The Feminine Mys-
tique” (293). “At their anticlimactic meeting in 1975, these two founding mothers of mod-
ern feminism … clarified the ideological differences that still separated them. Although 
the American feminist tried to justify her effort to place a monetary value on housework, 
the French feminist again sounded a more radical note. Her interest was rather ‘to sap this 
regime, not to play its game’” (301). Chapter 4 will discuss this interchange further.
189 Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 11.
190 Ibid., 18.
191 Ibid., 189.
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“the whole spectrum of Organized Ladyhood,” and she is hardly less dismissive 
than Beauvoir of earlier feminisms, both the struggle for suffrage and what we 
might call “lifestyle” solutions.192 (“They sat in front of their various easels in 
tears.”)193
What interests me most here is how, and why, Firestone rewrites Beauvoir’s 
claims about the relationship between women’s oppression and other forms of 
illegitimate domination.
The first women are fleeing the massacre, and, shaking and tottering, are 
beginning to find each other. Their first move is a careful joint observa-
tion, to resensitize a fractured consciousness. This is painful: no matter 
how many levels of consciousness one reaches, the problem always goes 
deeper. It is everywhere. The division yin and yang pervades all history, all 
culture, history, economics, nature itself; modern Western versions of sex 
discrimination are only the most recent layer. To so heighten one’s sensitiv-
ity to sexism presents problems far worse than the black militant’s new 
awareness of racism [emphasis added]: feminists have to question, not 
just all of Western culture [emphasis in original], but the organization of 
culture itself, and further, the very organization of nature. Many women 
give up in despair: if that’s how deep it goes they don’t want to know [em-
phasis in original]. Others continue strengthening and enlarging the 
movement, their painful sensitivity to female oppression existing for a 
purpose: eventually to eliminate it.194
Beauvoir does not say this. She says the oppression of women is different, 
structurally different, in that it cannot be traced to a particular historical mo-
ment or explained by geography or numbers. But she does not say anywhere it 
is worse. In fact, using “nous” to refer to lucky women like herself, whose bat-
tles have been largely won, she suggests that other oppressions may be more 
salient at that moment:
Many women today, having been lucky enough to have seen all the privi-
leges of human beings restored to them, can afford the luxury of impar-
tiality: we feel the need of it, actually. Unlike our older sisters, we are not 
combatants; for the most part, we have won the game; in the most recent 





and repeatedly for the equality of the sexes to be fully accomplished; al-
ready many of us have never had to feel that being a woman was a nui-
sance or an obstacle; many problems seem more pressing to us than those 
that affect us in particular [emphasis added].195
Firestone, however, continues:
Before we can act to change a situation, however, we must know how it 
has arisen and evolved, and through what institutions it now operates. 
Engels: “[We must] examine the historical succession of events from 
which the antagonism has sprung in order to discover in the conditions 
thus created the means of ending the conflict.” For feminist revolution we 
shall need an analysis of the dynamics of sex war as comprehensive as 
the Marx-Engels analysis of class antagonism was for the economic revo-
lution. More comprehensive. For we are dealing with a larger problem, 
with an oppression that goes back beyond recorded history to the animal 
kingdom itself [emphasis added].196
Here again Beauvoir does not say this, she does not “rank oppressions,” and she 
does not link origins and solutions in this direct way.197 Firestone’s discussion 
of the inadequacy of Marx and Engels to explain the oppression of women—
“[t]here is a level of reality that does not stem directly from economics”— 
195 “Beaucoup de femmes d’aujourd’hui, ayant eu la chance de se voir restituer tous les pri-
vilèges de l’être humain, peuvent s’offrir le luxe de l’impartialité: nous en éprouvons 
même le besoin. Nous ne sommes plus comme nos aînées des combattantes; en gros nous 
avons gagné la partie; dans les dernières discussions sur le statut de la femme, l’ONU n’a 
cessé de réclamer impérieusement que l’égalité des sexes achève de se réaliser, et déjà 
nombre d’entre nous n’ont jamais eu à éprouver leur féminité comme une gêne ou un 
obstacle; beaucoup de problèmes nous paraissent plus essentiels que ceux qui nous con-
cernent singulièrement” (DS 1:29).
196 Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 12. This is the sort of argument parodied in the first paragraph 
of Gayle Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex.” For Ru-
bin, the payoff of the joke is that we actually do not need to locate some prehistoric 
“source” for the oppression of women to understand how the oppression of women works, 
and to fight it—a structuralist insight I think Beauvoir herself had, or almost.
197 Beauvoir’s discussion in a later chapter of the “key to the whole problem” of what Engels 
called the “world-historical defeat of the female sex” (that men risk life, whereas women 
merely “give” life) has caused some difficulty in the interpretive tradition, but I have to 
agree with Michèle Le Dœuff that Beauvoir really doesn’t seem to care very much about 
it. It occurs along the way in her paraphrase of Engels, with whom she is preparing to 
partly disagree (DS 1:113–14; Hipparchia’s Choice, 117).
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tracks fairly well with Beauvoir’s demonstration that their account is not 
adequate if read deterministically to exclude all other factors. Firestone says 
even more quickly that “the assumption that, beneath economics, reality is 
psychosexual is often rejected as ahistorical,” then lays out her own thesis:
But there is still an untried third alternative: we can attempt to develop a 
materialist view of history based on sex itself.198
And then she turns directly to “correct” Beauvoir.
The early feminist theories were to a materialist view of sex what Fourier, 
Bebel, and Owen were to a materialist view of class. By and large, feminist 
theory has been as inadequate as were the early feminist attempts to cor-
rect sexism. This was to be expected. The problem is so immense that, at 
first try, only the surface could be skimmed, the most blatant inequalities 
described. Simone de Beauvoir was the only one who came close to—
who perhaps has done—the definitive analysis. Her profound work The 
Second Sex—which appeared as recently as the early fifties to a world 
convinced that feminism was dead—for the first time attempted to 
ground feminism in its historical base. Of all feminist theorists De Beau-
voir is the most comprehensive and far-reaching, relating feminism to 
the best ideas in our culture.
It may be this virtue is also her one failing: she is almost too sophisti-
cated, too knowledgeable. Where this becomes a weakness—and this is 
certainly debatable—is in her rigidly existentialist interpretation of fem-
inism (one wonders how much Sartre had to do with this). This, in view 
of the fact that all cultural systems, including existentialism, are them-
selves determined by the sex dualism. She says:
Man never thinks himself without thinking of the Other; he views the 
world under the sign of duality which is not in the first place sexual in 
character. But being different from man, who sets himself up as the 
Same, it is naturally to the category of the Other that woman is con-
signed; the Other includes woman. [The italics are Firestone’s.]
Perhaps she has overshot her mark: Why postulate a fundamental Hegelian 
concept of Otherness as the final explanation and then carefully document 
the biological and historical circumstances that have pushed the class 
“women” into such a category—when one has never seriously considered 
198 Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 15.
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the much simpler and more likely possibility that this  fundamental dual-
ism sprang from the sexual division itself? To posit a priori categories of 
thought and existence—“Otherness,” “Transcendence,” “Immanence”— 
into which history then falls may not be necessary. Marx and Engels had dis-
covered that these philosophical categories themselves grew out of history. 
Before assuming such categories, let us first try to develop an analysis 
in which biology itself—procreation—is at the origin of the dualism….199
Why on earth would anyone “postulate a fundamental Hegelian concept of 
Otherness as the final explanation”? Well, there is an answer to this, in hind-
sight: not to do so, not to have some generalized account or explanation of 
“oppression” under which more specific types of oppression may be analyzed, 
makes it impossible to account in a full, respectful, accurate way for racism, 
anti-Semitism, colonialism, the immiseration of working class women and 
men, and so forth.200 Firestone’s need to subsume these other issues, of which 
she was well aware, under the sexual theory, led to some bizarre and embar-
rassing contortions later in her book, particularly Chapter 5, “Racism: The Sex-
ism of the Family of Man.”
I shall attempt to show that racism is a sexual phenomenon. Like sexism in 
the individual psyche, we can fully understand racism only in terms of 
the power hierarchy of the family: in the Biblical sense, the races are no 
more than the various parents and siblings of the Family of Man; and as 
in the development of sexual classes, the physiological distinction of race 
became important culturally only due to the unequal distribution of 
power. Thus, racism is sexism extended [emphasis in original].201
What follows is an utterly ahistorical Oedipal myth, which turns Blacks into 
(you guessed it) the children, and touches reality at no point. Firestone makes 
use of the writings of Eldridge Cleaver and Bobby Seale as well as other first-
person accounts from the radical press to set out “what everyone had known 
all along: that sex and racism are intricately interwoven,” as seen in “the obvi-
ous: that white men have a thing for black women, that black men have a thing 
199 Ibid., 15–16.
200 I’ve argued above that Beauvoir’s focus on sexuality, rather than (as Firestone puts it) 
“procreation,” was an important distinction. And I will not linger here on Firestone’s (ut-
terly unsatisfactory) views of homosexuality.
201 Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 105.
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for white women, that black men can’t respect black women and white men 
can’t get turned on by white women, that white women have a secret sympathy 
and curiosity about black men, that black women hate and are jealous of white 
women, and so on.”202 Now, I might be prepared to accept that some of this ac-
curately transcribes the subjective experience of some people at that particular 
point in history, even though none of it seems “obvious” to me: it is one read-
ing, though a tendentious one, of the situation Alice Walker fictionalized in 
her first novel, Meridian. But a novel is one thing and a theory is another. To 
present this while writing schematically as though one took a “view from 
 nowhere”—well, frankly, this has to be read to be believed.
Let us now apply our political application of the Electra complex to the 
psychology of the black woman. If the black man is Son to the American 
family, then the black woman is Daughter. Her initial sympathy with the 
white woman (mother), her bond of oppression with her (mother) 
against the white man (father) is complicated by her later relationship 
with the white male (father). When she discovers that the white male 
owns that “world of travel and adventure,” she, in the subservient position 
of child, attempts to identify with him, to reject the female in herself. 
(This may be the cause of the greater aggressiveness of the black woman 
compared with the docility of her white sisters.) In the effort to reject the 
womanly (powerless) element in herself, she develops contempt for the 
Mother (white woman). Like the young girl, she may react to her power-
lessness in one of two ways: she may attempt to gain power directly by 
imitating white men, thus becoming a “big achiever,” a woman of strong 
character who rises high (“especially for a black woman”), or she may at-
tempt to gain power indirectly by seducing the Father (voilà the black 
sexpot), thus putting herself in sexual competition with the white wom-
an for the Father’s favor—causing her to hate and be jealous of the white 
woman, whom she must now attempt to imitate.203
I cannot deny that I prefer the fleeting presence of Black women in Beauvoir’s 
book to the level of arrogant (and ignorant) contempt I read in Firestone’s 
 description—which goes on for pages and pages and pages. What is most 
deeply unsatisfactory here has its source in the decision to make racism simply 
a subset or offshoot of sexism, to make its causes all psychosexual, as though 




excursus might shed some light on why Beauvoir bothered with Hegel: look at 
what became of Firestone without him.
Spelman has a cogent takedown of Firestone, whom she groups with Kate 
Millett in her chapter on “The Ampersand Problem.”204 But her critique is curi-
ously bloodless. Surely there is more wrong with a statement like “the All-
American family is predicated on the existence of the black ghetto whore-
house” than that it muddles the sequence of propositions about how racism 
and sexism interact.205 “[T]he racism of white women … perhaps produces an 
even greater bitterness in black men than the more immediately understand-
able racism of these women’s husbands; for it betokens a betrayal by the 
Mother.”206 The problem isn’t what Firestone leaves out, or renders theoreti-
cally incoherent. The problem is what she says, which is not simply an embar-
rassing gaffe or two, but follows directly from what she proudly claims as her 
theoretical breakthrough. That feminist theorists are currently attempting to 
recuperate Firestone without even mentioning any of this, as Stella Sandford 
does in an otherwise fascinating article, is interesting.207 Have we become so 
sophisticated in identifying “the absence of a Black standpoint” that we don’t 
have anything left to say about the kind of racism that stands up and squirts us 
in the eye?
The analysis of these issues in The Dialectic of Sex which Margaret Simons 
gave in 1979 was typically thorough; she also points to the ethnocentrism of Fire-
stone’s concept of the “family of man,” and notes that Firestone explicitly de-
parts from Beauvoir in her deployment of analogical reasoning. Simons makes a 
parallel case about Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics, which was less careful about 
signaling its extensive indebtedness to Beauvoir. Simons writes: “Unlike Beau-
voir, Millett denies the differences in the situations of minority and white wom-
en, dismissing the power and privileges accorded to white women as mere mys-
tifications,” quoting Millett as follows: “In a society where status is dependent 
upon the economic, social, and educational circumstances of class, it is possible 
for certain females to appear to stand higher than some males. Yet not when one 
204 Spelman, Inessential Woman, 118–19.
205 Firestone, Dialectic of Sex, 113.
206 Ibid., 107.
207 Stella Sandford, “Sexmat, Revisited.” The best recent work on Firestone I know is Eliza-
beth Subrin’s film Shulie, which gives her as she was, racism and all: a human being with 
a singular take on the world.
The question of whether/how to teach The Dialectic of Sex in an inclusive classroom, 
acknowledging its historical importance without giving it more weight than it finally de-
serves, is a tricky one. The usual solution is to excerpt the parts one likes and keep mum 
about the rest. Well…
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looks more closely at the subject.” Beauvoir really does not say this. Throughout 
the long chapter on history, she shows at length exactly the opposite.208
7 Different Legacies: From Audre Lorde to Judith Butler
Perhaps my reader feels I am beating a dead horse here, and perhaps she is 
right. Certainly the critiques made by Spelman, and those who follow her, are 
good enough critiques of what happened to Beauvoir’s theories once they 
reached the land of White. But my point is that if you walk back upstream, you 
find that the problems are not in The Second Sex itself, which could (and also 
did) flow in healthier directions. And I’m building a case against a reading of 
The Second Sex that would throw out the existentialism and “just keep the good 
parts.” I’ll put my cards on the table. I think the existentialist parts are the good 
parts. Or at least, they made the good parts possible.
Let me suggest some alternate genealogies. In the articles I discussed earlier, 
Glass and Gines both adduce Audre Lorde’s “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dis-
mantle The Master’s House” for succeeding where Beauvoir failed.209 Gines 
mentions in a footnote that Lorde actually cites Beauvoir in that essay, which 
took me back to Lorde’s powerful final paragraph.
Simone de Beauvoir once said: “It is in the knowledge of the genuine con-
ditions of our lives that we must draw our strength to live and our reasons 
for acting.” Racism and homophobia are real conditions of all our lives in 
this place and time. I urge each one of us here to reach down into that 
deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing 
208 Simons, “Racism and Feminism,” 31.
209 Glass moves on from her discussion of Beauvoir to criticize Hélène Cixous for a similar 
failure: “While [Cixous] acknowledges that ‘there is … no general woman, no one typical 
woman,’ she nonetheless lapses into essentialism via racially charged figurative language. 
In claiming Africa, for women in general, as the site of danger, darkness, and femininity, 
she merely reinforces romantic and problematic assumptions about the continent. Thus 
her appropriation of ‘blackness’ furthers the goals of women in general [I’d debate this] 
but has ambivalent implications for black women” (“Calling All Sisters,” 226). The critique 
of Cixous is certainly apt (and then some). But it seems odd to bring these two French 
writers together without mentioning that the Cixous essay in question (“The Laugh of the 
Medusa”) was a not-so-veiled attack on everything Beauvoir stood for, and also an attack 
on the materialist faction of the mlf (Christine Delphy and Questions Féministes) to 
whom Beauvoir gave her strong support. Beauvoir was well aware of the dangers of pre-
cisely this analogy—sexy mysterious Woman, sexy mysterious Africa—as her discussion 
of Claudel would show.
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of any difference that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the per-
sonal as the political can begin to illuminate all our choices.210
To me, it sounds as if Lorde—speaking her bitterness against the organizers of 
a too-white conference convened in honor of The Second Sex211—is calling her 
sisters back to Beauvoir, as she calls for a kind of feminist realism, rooted in 
lived experience.
What also struck me, rereading Lorde’s very familiar essay, was how thor-
oughly imbued it is by a Hegelian/existentialist sense of struggle—e.g., “Differ-
ence must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities 
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic”—which brings it as 
close to Sartre, Beauvoir, and Fanon as it is to the work by bell hooks or Kim-
berley Crenshaw with which we often group it now. Lorde’s vision of desiring 
and nurturing relationships between “women-identified women” is light-years 
away from anything Beauvoir says about lesbians in The Second Sex. Yet here 
are the words she uses to describe them:
Interdependency between women is the way to a freedom which allows 
the I to be, not in order to be used, but in order to be creative. This is a 
difference between the passive be and the active being.212
“C’est sur la portée du mot être qu’il faudrait s’entendre?”213 “What we make of 
what they make of us?” When Lorde says that
[w]ithin the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies 
that security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge 
and return with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant 
power to effect those changes which can bring that future into being,
210 Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” 113.
211 “The Second Sex—Thirty Years Later: A Commemorative Conference on Feminist Theory,” 
September 27–9, 1979, New York Institute for the Humanities.
212 Lorde, “The Master’s Tools,” 111.
213 (DS 1:25). “[W]hat we must understand is the range of the verb ‘to be’: bad faith consists in 
giving it the value of a static substance, when it has the dynamic Hegelian meaning: to be 
is to have become, to have been made as one now discloses oneself to be.” [mais c’est sur 
la portée du mot être qu’il faudrait s’entendre; la mauvaise foi consiste à lui donner une 
valeur substantielle alors qu’il a le sens dynamique hégélien: être c’est être devenu, c’est 
avoir été fait tel qu’on se manifeste.] See discussion in Chapter 2 above.
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are we not hearing about what Beauvoir called “the mutual recognition of two 
liberties,” now applied to a personal and political solidarity between women 
Beauvoir in the 1940s could barely sketch?214 And when Lorde says that “[o]nly 
within a patriarchal structure is maternity the only social power open to wom-
en,” I hear a critique of the traditional family, and women’s confinement to it, 
with which Beauvoir would certainly have agreed.215 The overall key to Lorde’s 
uptake of existentialism here is a dynamic understanding of difference: to 
paraphrase E. P. Thompson on “class,” difference for Lorde is expressed through 
relationships; it is not a “thing.”
I’ve referred several times above to Toril Moi’s point that for Beauvoir, iden-
tity would be an outcome of liberation, not a precondition, for the good exis-
tentialist reason that existence precedes essence. I was reminded of this again 
when Kathy Glass quoted Angela Davis, from a 1995 interview with Lisa Lowe.216 
Davis is talking there about productive “formations” for political organizing 
that would not be conceived of as coalitions between already existing identity 
groups. For example,
[a] woman of color formation might decide to work around immigration 
issues. This political commitment is not based on the specific histories of 
racialized communities or its constituent members, but rather constructs 
an agenda agreed upon by all who are a part of it. In my opinion, the most 
exciting potential of women of color formations resides in the possibility 
of politicizing this identity—basing the identity on politics rather than the 
politics on identity [emphasis added].217
Later she says, “I think we should focus on the creation of unpredictable or 
unlikely coalitions grounded in political projects [emphasis added]”;218 asked 
about early influences on her political thought, she mentions Sartre alongside 
Marcuse and Marx.219 But I’m not making some kind of antiquarian point 
214 Ibid., 111.
215 Ibid., 111.
216 Angela Davis, “Reflections on Race, Class, and Gender in the usa,” quoted in Glass, “Call-
ing All Sisters,” 232.
217 Davis, “Reflections on Race, Class, and Gender in the usa,” 318.
218 Ibid., 322.
219 “As an undergraduate, my interest in Marxism was further stimulated by professors like 
Herbert Marcuse. As a French major, I became very interested in the way Marxism was 
integrated into existentialist philosophy—and by Sartre’s political activism” (ibid., 312). 
See also Alice Kaplan, Dreaming in French: The Paris Years of Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, 
Susan Sontag, and Angela Davis.
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about sources here; I don’t know whether or not Davis ever read Pour une mo-
rale de l’ambiguïté, where Beauvoir argues for freely chosen projects as the best 
ethical ground for solidarity. My point is that these were good ideas, and they 
are still alive. (I hope this genealogy ultimately supports the project of Conver-
gences to argue that the study of continental philosophy holds value for the 
study of race, and vice versa.)
Returning to Spelman for just one moment: I also want to push back (brief-
ly) against the blanket condemnation of analogy her critique inaugurated. The 
general condemnation of “analogical thinking” about oppressions suggests 
that if A is said to be like B, it is then impossible to see intersections or overlaps 
between A and B. This may be rigorously true in analytic philosophy for all 
I know, but it’s not a very good account of how analogies and metaphors work. 
The more usual case (classically described by Paul de Man in Blindness and 
Insight) brings together two things that are not alike in a (nonpermanent) mo-
ment, to assert a similarity which will clarify and highlight certain truths while 
necessarily placing others in shadow. This isn’t something only poets do (i.e. 
it’s not one more good reason to throw them out of the Republic); it’s arguably 
basic to human thinking, unavoidable even in the most scientific and objective 
discourses.220 The honest strategy is to know and admit this, for instance by 
saying “on the one hand this, on the other hand that” (as I’ve argued above 
Beauvoir does), or perhaps in some more elegant way.
Judith Butler may or may not have had Beauvoir in mind when she wrote, in 
the part of the introduction to Bodies That Matter that explains the “trajectory” 
of her table of contents:
It seems crucial to resist the model of power that would set up racism 
and homophobia and misogyny as parallel or analogical relations. The 
assertion of their abstract or structural equivalence not only misses the 
specific histories of their construction and elaboration, but also delays 
the important work of thinking through the ways in which these vec-
tors of power require and deploy each other for the purpose of their own 
articulation.221
This passage is often quoted in support of the urgency of “intersectional” think-
ing. But on the next page, Butler says:
220 See Sheldon Sacks, ed., On Metaphor.
221 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” 17.
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This demand to think contemporary power in its complexity and interar-
ticulations remains incontrovertibly important even in its impossibility. 
And yet it would be a mistake to impose the same criteria on every cul-
tural product, for it may be precisely the partiality of a text which condi-
tions the radical character of its insights….222
Butler’s “and yet” occurs as she’s moving to introduce sections of her book that 
engage in close textual analyses of representational narratives, including the 
documentary Paris is Burning and Nella Larsen’s novel of the color line, Pass-
ing. It is almost as if Butler’s own decision to attend more concretely to the 
lived experience of women and queers of color, and her need to answer the 
challenge often posed to her as the author of Gender Trouble—“what about the 
real, Judy?”—pulled in this direction: a turn from philosophical agon toward 
(if not actually to) narrative, and an acknowledgement that to demand that 
every form of oppression be represented simultaneously means that no oppres-
sion can be represented intelligibly, in a way that those subjected to the op-
pression can recognize and then act upon.223
Well, maybe. Anyhow, I would submit that the real-world situation cogently 
described in 1982 by women of color as “[a]ll the women are white, all the 
Blacks are men” was made possible, not by “analogical thinking,” or any other 
theoretical flaw, but by actually existing racism in the American women’s 
movement. Or, as Barbara Smith put it in that anthology: “Feminism in and of 
itself would be fine. The problems arise with the mortals who practice it.”224 
Policing the texts of the past for lapses from theoretical purity is not going to 
fix that. Or at least, not on its own.
8 Beauvoir’s Other “Others”: Nation, Class, Colonialism
There were indeed blind spots in Second Wave American feminist theory 
which needed criticism; but I’d attribute them, not to Beauvoir’s legacy, but to 
some habits of mind typical of the land of White that L’Amérique au jour le jour 
1947 already criticizes. In the same way that white people are reminded to be 
aware of our own whiteness, it might not be a bad idea for people from the US 
to study our own US-ness. That’s an awkward term, but what I’m talking about 
222 Ibid., 18.
223 Ibid., iv-xii. In speaking of “intelligibility” and of the importance of narrative I am follow-
ing the thread of Butler’s later article about David Reimer, “Doing Justice to Someone.”
224 Barbara Smith, “Racism: A White Issue,” 51.
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doesn’t reduce to “Western” (or “Northern”), and it also doesn’t reduce to White. 
One thing we might notice is that when we let “African-American” stand in for 
difference or inequality more generally, we limit our ability to notice that class, 
nation, colonialism were also key parts of Beauvoir’s frame.
Glass is not at all unusual when she boils down Beauvoir’s list of other Oth-
ers, referring to “the insight that ‘no group ever sets itself up as the One without 
at once setting up the Other over against itself ’; just as woman ‘assume[s] the 
status of the Other’ to man, Jews are ‘different’ for the anti-Semite, [and] Ne-
groes are ‘inferior’ for American racists.”225 As I said above, I don’t find the deci-
sion of Glass and Gines to focus on Beauvoir’s discussion of American racism 
in any way problematic, given the purpose of their work: I want very much not 
to be engaging in “whataboutism” here, or attempting to mitigate the force of 
one critique because it does not mention all conceivable others. But if we look 
again at the lists of “others” in the introduction to The Second Sex, we can no-
tice that the specific items in Beauvoir’s “checklist” do not reduce to the ab-
stract trilogy of “gender, race, and class” (or “race, class, and gender”) that be-
came a litany in the 1980s and 1990s.
For the village-dweller, all those not from his village are suspicious out-
siders; for the native of a country, those who live in countries not his own 
seem like foreigners; Jews are “the others” for the anti-semite, Blacks for 
American racists, indigenous peoples for the colonizers, proletarians for 
the property-owning class.226
A situation which came about in time can be undone in another time: 
the Blacks of Haiti among others have proved this very well.227
The proletarians made the revolution in Russia, the Blacks in Haiti, the 
Indochinese are fighting in Indochina….228
What tends to drop most completely out of our sight, when we paraphrase 
these lists, is the struggle between “l’indigène” and “le colon.”
225 Glass, “Calling All Sisters,” 227.
226 “Pour le villageois, tous les gens qui n’appartiennent pas à son village sont des ‘autres’ 
suspects; pour le natif d’un pays, les habitants des pays qui ne sont pas le sien apparais-
sent comme des ‘étrangers’; les Juifs sont ‘des autres’ pour l’antisémite, les Noirs pour les 
racistes américains, les indigènes pour les colons, les prolétaires pour les classes possé-
dantes” (DS 1:16).
227 “Une situation qui s’est créée à travers le temps peut se défaire en un autre temps: les 
Noirs d’Haïti entre autres l’ont bien prouvé” (DS 1:18).
228 “Les prolétaires ont fait la révolution en Russie, les Noirs à Haïti, les Indochinois se battent 
en Indochine” (DS 1:19).
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Does that matter? After all, most of the colonized are Black (or “yellow”), 
and that is hardly a coincidence. But it does matter, because “le colon” and 
“l’indigène” are positions in a particular system with a particular history, not 
identities or attributes like “le Noir” or “une Française.” Nor is “l’indigène” re-
ducible to “le prolétaire”: Beauvoir had made this point explicitly in Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté,229 and the behavior of the French proletariat (and its 
elected representatives) during the Algerian crisis would prove her correct. 
And note the present tense of the last example I quoted above: the Indochi-
nese are fighting. I want to suggest that we think of these comparisons, not as 
static entities which may be similar or dissimilar, but as points of connection 
to political reality that anchor the argument in place and time. Her “Indochi-
nese” of 1948 are hardly the “Indochinese” of 1968, much less the “Indochinese” 
of today, if that term even makes sense now. What happens with “the Jew” is 
also interesting. In the immediate post-war period, readers probably saw more 
easily that when she (and Sartre) talked about “le Juif” they were responding to 
a particular twentieth-century human state of affairs, in a situation where sim-
ply being a Jew in any sense of the word “être” could get you killed. “The Jew” 
in that context is closer to “the Indochinese” than we might think.230
229 See discussion below.
230 Continuities between “the Jew” in that sense, and Jews today, are frequently asserted, of 
course, and a certain political discourse deploys them as synonyms, but that assertion is 
itself contingent, not to say contentious. Meanwhile, in a certain highly formalized ana-
lytic philosophy, “the Jew” persists, accompanied by his double, Hitler, frozen around 
1940, as a hypostatized quasi-hypothetical dead metaphor, standing for “that which is to 
be annihilated” (or not). And to pose the question of a “Jewish woman’s standpoint” with-
in American feminism is I think to immediately see why “standpoint” analysis on its own 
simply will not do.
Here are three cans of worms I simply must not allow myself to open properly if I am 
to have a prayer of ever finishing this project. But Jews (real ones) were at least as impor-
tant to Beauvoir’s development of the concept of “situation” as any other Others. There’s 
a famous anecdote from La force de l’âge where her student Olga, fresh from hearing her 
expound on her earlier idealist theory, announces to a group of her Jewish friends, “you 
don’t exist, my philosophy teacher says so!” Beauvoir tells this story against herself: it was 
the rise of Fascism that showed her Jews existed. We can hear the echo of that realization 
in The Second Sex: “if woman did not exist, men would have invented her. They did invent 
her. But she also exists” (DS 1:303).
In La force de l’âge she glosses the story as follows: “On many points, I was deplorably 
abstract (and the same was true for Sartre, though perhaps to a lesser degree). I recog-
nized the reality of social classes, but by reaction against the ideologies of my father, I 
complained if anyone spoke to me of the French, the German, the Jew. Only singular hu-
man beings existed. I was right to refuse essentialism. I already knew to what abuses no-
tions like the Slavic soul, the Jewish personality, the primitive mentality, the eternal femi-
nine, would lead. But the universalism I rallied to in reaction took me far away from the 
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Another example: For many years, I read Beauvoir’s phrase, “as the Blacks of 
Haiti, among others, have proved” and thought vaguely that it must refer to 
Toussaint L’Ouverture and the distant past. It now seems equally likely to me 
that Beauvoir had in mind the Haitian resistance to American occupation that 
began in the 1930s: that was a period of intense cultural interchange between 
Haiti and the French metropole, including interventions by such French allies 
as André Breton, and also saw a lively back-and-forth between Haitian and 
African-American artists, activists and scholars. During the 1930s, “writers on 
the left” from all these locations frequently made analogies between, for in-
stance, the oppression of Blacks and Jews, or between “American Negroes” and 
those struggling against colonialism elsewhere (Césaire and Fanon do this, 
Langston Hughes did it) and claimed that struggles against “the color bar” and 
against the capitalist system were similar (or debated how they did or didn’t 
interlock). One can call this metaphorical or analogical thinking, but it is clear-
ly intended as a gesture of solidarity.231
real world. What I was missing was the idea of situation, which alone makes it possible to 
define human groupings without enslaving them to a timeless fate. But no one at that 
time was suggesting that to me, outside the frame of the class struggle.” [Sur un grand 
nombre de points, j’étais—Sartre aussi, quoique peut-être à un moindre degré—déplo-
rablement abstraite. Les classes sociales, j’en reconnaissais la réalité; mais par réaction 
contre les idéologies de mon père, je protestais si on me parlait du Français, de l’Allemand, 
du Juif: il n’existait que des personnes singulières. J’avais raison de refuser l’essentialisme. 
Je savais déjà à quels abus entraînent des notions telles que l’âme slave, le caractère juif, la 
mentalité primitive, l’éternel féminin. Mais l’universalisme auquel je me ralliais 
m’emportait loin de la réalité. Ce qui me manquait, c’était l’idée de “situation” qui seule 
permet de définir concrètement des ensembles humains sans les asservir à une fatalité 
intemporelle. Mais personne alors, dès qu’on sortait du cadre de la lutte des classes, ne me 
la fournissait (FA 191).] This passage has been well discussed by, among others, Moynagh, 
“Beauvoir on Lived Reality,” 11–12.
231 See for example Fanon, Peau noire masques blancs: “It was my philosophy professor, origi-
nally from the Antilles, who reminded me one day: ‘When you hear someone speak ill of 
the Jews, prick up your ears, they’re talking about you.’ And I thought he was right from a 
universal point of view, meaning to say that I was responsible, body and soul, for my 
brother’s lot. Later I understood that he simply meant: an anti-semite is bound to be racist 
[négrophobe].” [C’est mon professeur de philosophie, d’origine antillaise, qui me le rap-
pelait un jour: “Quand vous entendez dire du mal des Juifs, dressez l’oreille, on parle de 
vous.” Et je pensais qu’il avait raison universellement, entendant par là que j’étais respon-
sable, dans mon corps et dans mon âme, du sort réservé à mon frère. Depuis lors, j’ai 
compris qu’il voulait tout simplement dire: un antisémite est forcément négrophobe 
(pnmb 98; bswm 92, translation altered).
Or Aimé Césaire: “To leave. / As there are hyena-men and panther-men, I will be a Jew-
man / a Kaffir-man / a Hindu-from-Calcutta-man / a Harlemite-who-doesn’t-vote-man // 
the famine-man, the insult-man, the torture-man / at any moment one could grab him 
beat him, kill him—kill him completely—without having to explain oneself to anyone 
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Notice too that in the examples above the analogy is an implicit one, made 
by parataxis, by constructing a simple list, and that it is not always the same 
list: sometimes it includes the Indochinese, sometimes not; on other  occasions, 
she includes “the Slavs,” which would have had more resonance in the immedi-
ate aftermath of Hitler’s ideological and military assaults on Eastern Europe 
than it does here and now.232 I do think Beauvoir understood how femininity 
could be a damaging effect of oppression better because she had seen Jim 
Crow in action: what she learned in the US informed her thinking in non- 
superficial ways. But this was only one of many “lightbulbs,” and the lightbulb 
wasn’t just about who was oppressed, it was about how oppression worked, not 
about who (or what) people (or groups) are but about what they do. I want to 
widen the context in which we see Beauvoir thinking about the many vectors 
of oppression. What can happen as a result of what one might call the “Spel-
man moment” in feminist theory is that all the intersectionalities are Black. To 
return to my opening anecdote: It took me a shocking length of time to recog-
nize that the girl who was going to Hereford had, actually, introduced herself 
with the most salient thing about her identity: that she was working class. It 
was the prospect of crossing that boundary that was sending her scrabbling for 
the inhaler. Carolyn Steedman: “I read a woman’s book, meet such a woman at 
a party (a woman now, like me) and think quite deliberately, as we talk: we are 
divided; a hundred years ago I’d have been cleaning your shoes. I know this and 
you don’t.”233 It seems fair to say that in the US today hyper-awareness of race 
quite often blocks understanding of economic inequalities, even among femi-
nists. But this is our problem; it was not Beauvoir’s.
In part our inattention to some of the other intersectionalities is a function 
of which voices have and haven’t yet been part of the conversation. But it is 
also because some of Beauvoir’s other “Others” actually do not lend themselves 
at all well to being thought about through identity categories or “standpoints.”
without having to excuse oneself to anyone / a Jew-man / a pogrom-man / a little dog / a 
beggar.” [Partir. / Comme il y a des hommes-hyènes et des hommes-panthères, je serais un 
homme-juif / un homme-cafre / un homme-hindou-de-Calcutta / un homme de Harlem-
qui-ne-vote-pas // l’homme-famine, l’homme-insulte, l’homme-torture / on pouvait à 
n’importe quel moment le saisir le rouer de coups, le tuer—parfaitement le tuer—sans 
avoir de compte à rendre à personne sans avoir des excuses à présenter à personne / un 
homme-juif / un homme-pogrom / un chiot / un mendigot (Césaire, Cahier d’un retour au 
pays natal, 20).]
232 See FA 191 (quoted above); see also Doris Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of 
the Holocaust.
233 Steedman, Landscape for a Good Woman, 2.
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For starters, this is true of “class.” I hope I’ve demonstrated above that Beau-
voir did, in fact, pay attention to the lived experience of women who lacked 
economic privilege, as well as to the oppressive behavior of women who did 
have that privilege. In the next chapter below, I’ll detail some historical/con-
textual reasons why American observers in particular, whether fans or critics 
of Beauvoir, may have found this hard to see. One big reason is that class con-
sciousness (in the Marxist sense of “nous, les prolétaires”) has been thin on the 
ground in the US since before the Second World War. Even the current political 
foregrounding of economic inequality tends to be couched in terms of unfair-
ness to “the middle class.” This is, of course, a mystification, but it is easier to 
say so than to suggest what might sensibly replace it, even for purposes of aca-
demic analysis.234
What do we talk about when we talk about “class”? The term refers, in a 
blurry way, to both economic and cultural factors, and must do so (the impov-
erished graduate student may have less money than the securely employed de-
partment secretary she patronizes, and yet …). Plus, that “class” for women is 
different than for men, even in a European context, has been well-demonstrat-
ed from Woolf to Steedman to Nancy Folbre. It is a clumsy concept, albeit one 
without which we cannot do. One needn’t be an orthodox Marxist, or any kind 
of Marxist really, to appreciate E. P. Thompson’s point that “class is not a thing.”
To explain this a different way: “nothing to say about race” and “nothing to 
say about class” are not entirely parallel formulations. The former usually 
means the absence of a racial “standpoint,” and then the absence of an analysis 
that would logically arise from such a standpoint. A “class standpoint,” though, 
is hard to pin down. So “don’t forget about class” might mean, “don’t forget 
about poor women—really poor women”; it might mean, “don’t forget about 
ordinary working women, who are not intellectuals”; it might even mean, 
“don’t forget about Marx,” though anymore it usually doesn’t. (There are still 
socialist feminists in the United States—Barbara Ehrenreich comes to mind—
but they are not mostly interested in the finer points of arguments about inte-
grating Marxism with feminist theory. Hm.)
Moreover, racism and classism are not just about inclusion and exclusion.235 
To speak of “exclusion” rather than “exploitation” or “domination” is a choice; if 
234 “The ninety-nine percent” is, at worst, another mystification, at best another illustration 
of “blindness and insight,” since it encourages solidarity by blocking awareness of what 
the lived experience of poverty actually entails.
235 Students and faculty of color on campuses across the United States have been drawing 
our attention to this point; for traditionally white institutions, “getting our diversity num-
bers up” is hardly the end of the story. What happens after people of color come to 
campus?
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recent feminists within the US have tended to make that choice, we might 
think about why.236 Those who say Beauvoir’s is not a “standpoint analysis” are 
absolutely right, but “standpoint” must not be where intersectionality begins 
and ends. (It certainly can’t be where it ends; perhaps it need not be where it 
begins, either.)
When Sally Markowitz, in her 2009 article “Oriental Dreams,” finds Beau-
voir’s views incompatible with what she calls a “post-colonial perspective,”237 I 
think she’s dead right also, though not in the way she means it. For a citizen of 
the French empire to be “post-colonial” in 1948, he or she would have needed a 
time machine. Theorists now use “colonial” and “post-colonial” now almost as 
metaphors; for Beauvoir and Sartre, as for Fanon, colonialism referred to a spe-
cific, actually existing economic system, whereby resources were extracted, 
and human beings brutally exploited, for the benefit of the metropole. As 
Fanon memorably put it, “le colonialisme n’est pas une machine à penser”: co-
lonialism is not a thinking-machine.238
Beauvoir’s commitments to the anti-colonial struggle in the Maghreb in the 
1960s have been very well-discussed by Julien Murphy, Sonia Kruks, and others, 
particularly in respect to her vigorous public support of torture victim Djamila 
Boupacha. (I’ll take this up in more detail in Chapter 5.) What I am contending 
here is that if we remember to look for it, we can find that commitment also in 
The Second Sex, and even earlier. Even though in her memoirs she represents 
her activism of the 1960s and 1970s as a shift in her consciousness and world-
view, what shifted was her understanding of what she needed to publicly do, 
and a growing awareness that she could and should do it. The knowledge and 
analysis behind that stance had been in place for decades.
And what about first-generation college students who may be white? Talk about “di-
versity” and “multiculturalism” cannot easily speak to their condition. The discourse of 
“privilege,” which is better in that respect, is static—and partly that is right, because privi-
lege is historically sedimented, it is not entirely up to us who we are. (Depending on the 
meaning of the word “are” …) But perhaps one reason a language of “privilege” has re-
placed a language of “oppression” and “exploitation” is that it feels less threatening.
236 We also tend to use “voice” as synecdoche for “power,” which makes a lot of sense as long 
as we don’t forget that “taking the part for the whole” doesn’t mean the part actually is the 
whole. (Blindness and insight.)
237 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams: Orientalism and History in The Second Sex,” 273. See fur-
ther discussion below.
238 “Colonialism is not a thinking-machine, it is not a body endowed with reason. It is a vio-
lence in the state of nature, and it can bend only before a greater violence.” [[L]e colonia-
lisme n’est pas une machine à penser, n’est pas un corps doué de raison. Il est une violence 
à l’état de nature et ne peut s’incliner que devant une plus grande violence (Fanon, Les 
damnés de la terre, 66).]
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9 Beauvoir’s Early Political Thinking and Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté
What we have been missing, I think, is an understanding that Beauvoir “was 
always, and consistently a woman of the left,” an awareness of “how much Poli-
tics with a capital P were part of de Beauvoir’s world,” as the editors of the 
European Journal of Women’s Studies put it in 1999.239 Beauvoir’s earliest and 
deepest political commitments—long before she saw being a woman as a po-
litical matter—had to do with class and colonialism; she came to the question 
of women after she had already thought, and thought deeply, about other 
forms of oppression. When she says, in partially dismissing the issue of femi-
nism as already almost solved, “many problems seem more pressing to us than 
those which particularly affect us,”240 the “problems” she meant were non-
trivial: economic inequality and global injustice, a possible new rise of Fas-
cism using the communist threat as an excuse … and the hypocrisy of a na-
tionalist bourgeois discourse of “universal freedom and equality” that was 
falsified by the governing class’s actual behavior on a daily basis. Beauvoir saw 
quite accurately that the oppression of women is not the only oppression in 
the world, and was unwilling to globalize her own experience, philosophically 
239 wise, “Editorial,” 260. A good and careful article by Lawrence Kritzman, “Simone de Beau-
voir, The Paradoxical Intellectual,” while noting that she was “a woman of the left,” none-
theless concludes that she “remained ambivalent about political activism to the end of 
her life” (212). This is a plausible reading of his sources (which unfortunately include Deir-
dre Bair’s biography), but I don’t think it is right: I think Beauvoir may well have main-
tained an ambivalence about the particular politics Sartre engaged in at various points, 
which may account for his statement to Madeline Gobeil in 1965 that “[i]t is on only one 
subject that she leaves me flat, and that is politics” (Gobeil, “Sartre Talks of Beauvoir,” 
72–3). In some earlier work, I took this statement too much at face value, I now believe. 
Sartre continues: “She doesn’t give a damn about it. It’s not that she actually doesn’t give 
a damn about it, but she doesn’t want to get involved in the political rat race.” She did 
decline at various points to participate in electoral politics, because no candidate seemed 
sufficiently radical, because of a suspicion of “the system,” etc., but such refusals were 
tactical rather than total; and she does seem to have correctly predicted the futility of 
some of Sartre’s efforts to create an independent left grouping through the Rassemble-
ment démocratique révolutionnaire. But many other avenues of political activism, in-
cluding (but not limited to) feminist ones, were open to her, and she participated fully 
and energetically. I discuss this further in Chapter 5 below.
In Politics With Beauvoir: Freedom in the Encounter, Lori Jo Marso now makes a strong 
case for Beauvoir as “a far more complex and nuanced thinker about political processes 
than we have previously recognized” (19), noting that Beauvoir “named enemies, devel-
oped allies, and sought to solicit new friendships” (37) in explicit and polemical ways.
240 “[B]eaucoup de problèmes nous paraissent plus essentiels que ceux qui nous concernent 
singulièrement” (DS 1:29). See above.
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or rhetorically.241 It is quite true that the “us” in that sentence is not “all wom-
en,” that it amounts to “lucky women situated like me”—she clearly marks 
this—but it seems to me that she should be praised, rather than vilified, for 
such self-awareness.242
But insofar as Beauvoir was “doing intersectionality,” it’s important to no-
tice that she was starting from the other end. Rather than trying to answer 
a question like “how can we make our movement and our scholarship more 
diverse and inclusive,” the question she was trying to answer was, does the situ-
ation of women even qualify to be called an “oppression,” is the oppression of 
women systematic, is the oppression of women political, and if so, how? As 
Doris Ruhe, discussing Beauvoir’s observation about the hollowness of segre-
gationist claims regarding “separate but equal,” points out, “[t]o carry over this 
observation to the relation between men and women seems obvious today; 
that wasn’t so in 1949.”243 If we see feminism in a 1980s or 1990s frame as a 
roomful of white women from which other Others are excluded, it is harder 
to remember that gender was a relatively late addition to that checklist: in the 
1940s, it was gender (or rather, “the woman question”) that was the unthought, 
or at best the afterthought.
Beauvoir’s opposition to colonialism, understood as an economic system 
underpinned by racist ideologies, was part of a generally leftist and anti-estab-
lishment orientation that long predated her encounter with Richard Wright 
and indeed predated her commitment to political “engagement.” Looking back 
to the years before the Second World War when she and Sartre held themselves 
apart from politics, she condemns their misplaced optimism that “the wheel of 
history would turn in the right direction” without any actual effort on their 
241 See also Hélène Wenzel, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir.” Wenzel, preparing to edit 
the Yale French Studies special issue on Beauvoir, asked, “[t]he articles and scope would be 
focused on your treatment of the ‘woman question,’ which has come to be called as well, 
the ‘feminine question,’ the ‘feminist question.’ Which of these do you prefer as a descrip-
tion of the question? After all these years, is there one which pleases you more or better 
describes your subject matter?” Beauvoir responded: “I don’t know. I’ve spoken of women, 
I’ve also spoken of many other things. As a result, I’d prefer that a focus on my writing and 
my work not be absolutely limited … to the woman question” (6). But Wenzel was unin-
terested in discussing “other things.”
242 Another advantage of such a stance is that one can move forward politically in meaning-
ful ways without having to argue from the depressive position, hold onto left melancholy, 
or think oneself into a position of greater oppression or victimization than the position 
one actually (materially) occupies. Michèle Le Dœuff has written of the value to the wom-
en’s movement of political statements which begin “Many of us …” (Hipparchia’s Choice, 
125). See also Kruks, “The Politics of Privilege.”
243 “Transférer cette constatation à la relation homme-femme paraît aujourd’hui évident; 
cela ne l’était pas en 1949” (Ruhe, “Femmes, Juifs, Noirs,” 87).
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part, in terms that nonetheless show how fully an anti-colonial stance was part 
of their world-view—and this at a time when many of their classmates were 
destined for the highest echelons of the Colonial Service.244
Considering society in its current form, we were against it; but there was 
nothing sullen in our antagonism, which implied a robust optimism. 
Man was to be recreated, and this invention would be in part our life’s 
work. Not that we pictured ourselves playing a part, other than by writing 
books; public affairs bored us; but we figured that events would turn out 
the way we wanted without our having to do anything; on this point, in 
the fall of 1929, we shared the happy delusion of the entire French left. 
Peace seemed definitely assured; the expansion of the Nazi party in Ger-
many was just an epiphenomenon, nothing serious. Colonialism would 
be liquidated within a short time; the campaign launched by Gandhi in 
India and the communist agitation in Indochina was making sure of that. 
And the exceptionally bad financial crash that was shaking the capitalist 
world seemed an omen that this society wouldn’t hold out much longer…. 
It seemed to us we already lived in a golden age.245
She tells us how naïve and misguided she and Sartre were as a result of their 
middle-class position: the next paragraph begins, “[w]e were ignorant in ev-
ery respect of the weight of reality.”246 What is at stake is an exploration of 
the inadequacy of a completely individualized notion of “freedom,” which the 
war would show them needed to be revised to account for political and social 
244 Sartre’s close friend Nizan actually took up a post, then conveyed his disgust for the whole 
enterprise in the novel Aden Arabie; that the hero (if that is the word) of La nausée has 
given up a government or business career in the East usually goes unremarked.
245 “La société, sous sa forme actuelle, nous étions contre; mais cet antagonisme n’avait rien 
de morose: il impliquait un robuste optimisme. L’homme était à récréer et cette invention 
serait en partie notre œuvre. Nous n’envisagions pas d’y contribuer autrement que par des 
livres: les affaires publiques nous assommaient; mais nous escomptions que les événe-
ments se dérouleraient selon nos désirs sans que nous ayons à nous en mêler; sur ce point, 
en cet automne 1929, nous partagions l’euphorie de toute la gauche française. La paix 
semblait définitivement assurée; l’expansion du parti nazi en Allemagne ne représentait 
qu’un épiphénomène sans gravité. Le colonialisme serait liquidé dans un bref délai: la 
campagne déclenchée par Gandhi aux Indes, l’agitation communiste en Indochine le ga-
rantissaient. Et la crise, d’une exceptionnelle virulence, qui secouait le monde capitaliste 
laissait présager que cette société ne tiendrait pas le coup longtemps. Il nous semblait 
déjà habiter l’âge d’or qui constituait à nos yeux la vérité cachée de l’Histoire et qu’elle se 
bornerait à dévoiler” (FA 21–2).
246 “Nous ignorions sur tous les plans le poids de la réalité” (FA 22).
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situation. She refers to their “political blindness”:247 “Our ignorance hid from 
us most of the problems that should have troubled us.”248
Our indifference to money was a luxury we could afford because we had 
enough of it not to suffer from want and not to be driven to take hard or 
unpleasant jobs. As for our open-mindedness, we owed that to an educa-
tion and a prospective future that were only accessible to our class. Our 
social status, that of young petty-bourgeois intellectuals, was what en-
couraged us to think social status did not affect us.249
If it remains important to us that Beauvoir “examine her own privilege,” these 
sections show her doing so.250
My point here, however, is to trace the thread of reflexive anti-colonialism as 
far back in her work as it will go. Even the earliest volume of her memoirs de-
scribes her childhood resistance to the nationalist and anti-semitic rhetoric of 
her parents’ milieu, with respect to the aftermath of the Dreyfus case, and to the 
bourgeoisie’s use of universalist rhetoric to mask class interests, as seen in her 
father’s talk of the “yellow peril” and his liking for Gobineau.251 When she and 
Sartre first read Céline’s work, they liked it, in part because of the virulence of 
his attack on colonialism (his later books “opened their eyes” to his fascism).252 
At her first teaching job in Marseille, she got in trouble with the authorities for 
teaching Gide and other writers on sexuality but also for attacking colonialism, 
as Gide himself had done in Voyage au Congo (Travels in the Congo).253
247 “[A]veuglement politique” (FA 22).
248 “[N]otre ignorance nous dissimulait la plupart des problèmes qui auraient dû nous in-
quiéter” (FA 23).
249 “Notre indifférence à l’argent était un luxe que nous pouvions nous offrir parce que nous 
en possédions assez pour ne pas souffrir du besoin et pour n’être pas acculés à des travaux 
pénibles. Notre ouverture d’esprit, nous la devions à une culture et à des projets accessibles 
seulement à notre classe. C’était notre condition de jeunes intellectuels petits- bourgeois 
qui nous incitait à nous croire inconditionnés” (FA 28).
250 See Kruks, “The Politics of Privilege.”
251 Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, 177. Beauvoir used this story pretty much verbatim in 
Les mandarins, where Henri explains the roots of his political commitments to a reporter 
from Samedi Soir, who doesn’t get the point (both because she is too cynical, and because 
she is too naïve) (1: 171). This kind of recycling happens frequently in Beauvoir’s work: 
another example involving her developing awareness of poverty and injustice is the story 
about the death of the nursemaid’s little boy, which she dramatized in Le sang des autres 
(16–18) and worked into a psychological parable in Pyrrhus et Cinéas (241) before describ-




Those are retrospective accounts, of course. But her early philosophical 
work also shows that she was first opposed to colonialism, racism, and other 
forms of domination as absolute evils in themselves, not simply insofar as they 
might philosophically or intellectually illuminate the situation of women like 
herself.
To show this, I need to look briefly at Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté and 
some other non-fictional texts she wrote after L’invitée but before The Second 
Sex, and for that matter before her trip to the United States, during what is of-
ten called (following her own terminology) her “moral period.” There is already 
a strong ethical and political critique of nationalism and colonialism in those 
texts. It does seem important to recall that Beauvoir herself came to dislike 
them. About Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, she would say:
Of all my books, it is the one that irritates me the most today…. [T]he at-
titudes I examine are explained by objective conditions; I limited myself 
to isolating their moral significance, to such an extent that my portraits 
are not situated on any level of reality. It was absurd to pretend one could 
define an ethics independent of social context….254
And about three essays from Les Temps Modernes that would be reprinted in 
L’existentialisme et la sagesse des nations, she said later:
What I find hard to understand is the idealism that blemishes these es-
says. In fact, men defined themselves for me by their bodies, their needs, 
their work; I set no form, no value, higher than individuals of flesh and 
bone…. Why then, to justify the fundamental importance of basic need 
(which I recognized), did I take this detour through values other than 
need itself? Why did I write “concrete freedom” instead of “bread,” and 
subordinate the life force to the meaning of life? Like Sartre, I had not 
freed myself far enough from the values of my class: even at the moment 
of repudiating them, I was still using their language. It has become hate-
ful to me because, as I now know, to search for reasons why one should 
not tread on the face of another human being is to accept stepping on his 
face.255
254 “De tous mes livres, c’est celui qui aujourd’hui m’irrite le plus…. les attitudes que j’examine 
s’expliquent par des conditions objectives; je me suis bornée à en dégager les significa-
tions morales si bien que mes portraits ne se situent à aucun niveau de la réalité. Il était 
aberrant de prétendre définir une morale en dehors d’un contexte social” (FCh 1:99).
255 “Ce que je comprends mal, c’est l’idéalisme qui entache ces essais. En fait, les hommes se 
définissaient pour moi par leur corps, leurs besoins, leur travail; je ne plaçais aucune 
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But as when she said she’d want to add more about “scarcity” to The Second 
Sex, she was not being quite fair to her own earlier work. The discussion of social 
justice in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté is abstract, but it is a recognizably left 
abstraction, refuses any distinction between ethics and politics, and includes 
a strong attack on colonial imperialism and on nationalism, which she regards 
as dangerous mystifications. Many philosophers have written about Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté as though the examples she gives are hypotheticals. But 
while they may sometimes sound like hypotheticals, they are drawn from life.
It is not my purpose here to give a full account of Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté, which is in large measure a defense of existentialism from the 
charges that it is solipsistic, nihilistic, or absurdist.256 Many have observed that 
she defended Sartre by changing his theory so that it was no longer those 
things; as Nancy Bauer puts it, “the views Beauvoir expresses in Sartre’s defense 
often do not jibe with what’s in Being and Nothingness.”257 To put it schemati-
cally, the problem Beauvoir is trying to solve is how to move from a philosophy 
of individual “liberté” to an ethics of “libération” that could ground collective, 
concrete political engagement.
As in The Second Sex, Beauvoir relies on a Hegelian dynamic that moves 
through conflict toward freedom, without adopting Hegel’s system wholesale.258 
The structure of past, present, future is central; so is the way that the subject, 
caught in ambiguity, keeps moving forward, or at least should do so. Those who 
fall back into a static sense of who they “are” (in the bad, in-itself, “being” sense of 
“are”) are in bad faith. From start to finish she trenchantly dissents from Hegel’s 
triumphalist optimism:259 the book concludes by denouncing his unconcern for 
forme ni aucune valeur au-dessus des individus de chair et d’os…. Mais alors, pour justi-
fier la fondamentale importance que je lui reconnaissais, pourquoi passais-je par le dé-
tour de valeurs autres que le besoin même? Pourquoi écrivais-je “liberté concrète” au lieu 
de pain et subordonnais-je au sens de la vie la volonté de vivre? … J’étais—comme 
Sartre— insuffisamment affranchie des idéologies de ma classe; au moment même où je 
les repoussais, je me servais encore de leur langage. Il m’est devenue odieux car, je le sais 
maintenant, chercher les raisons pour lesquelles il ne faut pas marcher sur la figure d’un 
homme, c’est accepter qu’on lui marche sur la figure” (ibid., 1:100–101).
256 The “ambiguities” which require and receive an ethical rethinking include life and death, 
subject and object, means and end, solitude and engagement with the world, freedom 
and servitude: “man” [sic] consists of, is pulled forward by, a constant tension between 
those poles.
257 Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 141.
258 As I’ve argued elsewhere, and above, Beauvoir uses Hegel as a tool or lens to interpret the 
world she sees; when he becomes useless to that task, she says so, puts him aside and 
picks up another. See also Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism.
259 Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (hereinafter pma). Translations are from The Ethics of Am-
biguity, translated by Bernard Frechtman (hereinafter EA). The very few changes I’ve 
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the victims of History with a capital H as a supreme mystification. She never 
loses sight of the more Kantian view that others must be treated as ends in them-
selves, not as means to an end, and that not to see this is an absolute evil; Hegel 
fails to see people in their singularity, and refuses the thickness of the world, and 
thus his theory is useful to dictators and fascists.
Beauvoir describes a number of ways human beings can refuse their free-
dom, but makes a distinction between those who are constrained to do so by 
situation, and those (more fully culpable) who resign their freedom in return 
for some ready-made “value” that places them in a position of power, and then 
hypocritically impose those Values (we might call them, reifications) on the 
oppressed. Like Sartre, Beauvoir refers to such a person (ironically) as “the seri-
ous man.” The serious man is, more or less, simply a conformist, who denies his 
own freedom in favor of a preordained set of values which he erects into an 
absolute. One important example here is “le colon,” a term often translated as 
“the colonial administrator,” but “the colonizer” would fit just as well, and 
might include those in France who support colonial policies as well as those 
whose paid job involves carrying them out. Le colon shows his bad faith, not 
just by treating human beings instrumentally, as though they were objects, but 
by insisting that the people he is oppressing are better off for his intervention, 
and that because they are really “children” they would be worse off if they were 
set free.
[The serious man] accords an absolute meaning to the epithet useful, 
which, in truth, has no more meaning if taken by itself than the words 
high, low, right, and left. It simply designates a relationship and requires a 
complement: useful for this or that. The complement itself must be put 
into question, and, as we shall see later on, the whole problem of action 
is then raised.
But the serious man puts nothing into question. For the military man, 
the army is useful; for the colonial administrator, the highway; for the se-
rious revolutionary, the revolution—army, highway, revolution, produc-
tions becoming inhuman idols to which one will not hesitate to sacrifice 
found necessary to make are explained in my notes. Here and throughout, where he trans-
lated her use of “L’Esprit” for Hegel’s “Geist” as “Mind,” I have preferred “Spirit.” See pma 11, 
EA 6–7; pma 24, EA 16; pma 149–52, EA 105 (“Spirit is subject; but who is subject?” [l’Esprit 
est sujet; mais qui est sujet?]; “a game of hide and seek … the whole system seems to be a 
vast mystification” [C’est ici que s’effectue un tour de passe-passe…. Tout le système ap-
paraît comme une vaste mystification]); and pma 162, EA 111 (“absolute universal Man 
exists nowhere” [L’homme universel, absolu, n’existe nulle part]). Is this book Hegelian? 
It is, but it is also anti-Hegelian. (Which I suppose is quite Hegelian of it…) It argues in his 
idiom, but plainly refuses his conclusion.
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man himself. Therefore, the serious man is dangerous. It is natural that 
he  makes himself a tyrant. Dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his 
choice, he pretends that the unconditioned value of the object is being 
asserted through him; and by the same token he also ignores the value of 
the subjectivity and freedom of others, to such an extent that, sacrificing 
them to the thing, he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is noth-
ing. The colonial administrator who has raised the highway to the stature 
of an idol will have no scruple about assuring its construction at the price 
of a great number of lives of the natives; for, what value has the life of a 
native who is incompetent, lazy, and clumsy when it comes to building 
highways?260
Beauvoir’s examples of “the serious man” include the doctrinaire communist 
who gives up thinking for himself. But most of her scorn is reserved for right-
wingers; those writers she names (Jouhandeau, Drieu de la Rochelle, Claudel, 
Maurras) were mainly Catholic ultras; some were Nazi collaborators; Claudel 
was also a prominent colonial bureaucrat.
Seriousness leads to a fanaticism which is as formidable as that of pas-
sion. It is the fanaticism of the Inquisition which does not hesitate to 
impose a credo, that is, an internal movement, by means of external con-
straints. It is the fanaticism of the Vigilantes of America who defend mo-
rality by means of lynchings. It is the political fanaticism which empties 
politics of all human content and imposes the State, not for individuals, 
but against them.261
260 “[L’homme sérieux] accorde un sens absolu à cette épithète utile qui, en vérité, n’a pas 
plus de sens, si on la prend isolément, que les mots haut, bas, droite, gauche; elle ne dé-
signe qu’un rapport et elle appelle un complément: utile à ceci ou cela; le complément 
lui-même doit être mis en question…. Mais l’homme sérieux ne met rien en question; 
pour le militaire, l’armée est utile; pour l’administrateur colonial, la route; pour le révolu-
tionnaire sérieux, la révolution: armée, route, révolution, production deviennent des 
idoles inhumaines auxquelles on n’hésitera pas à sacrifier l’homme lui-même. Par là, 
l’homme sérieux est dangereux; il est naturel qu’il se fasse tyran. Méconnaissant avec 
mauvaise foi la subjectivité de son choix, il prétend qu’à travers lui s’affirme la valeur de la 
subjectivité et de la liberté d’autrui, si bien que, les sacrifiant à la chose, il se persuade que 
ce qu’il sacrifie n’est rien. L’administrateur colonial qui a élevé la route à la hauteur d’une 
idole n’aura pas de scrupule à en assurer la construction au prix d’un grand nombre de 
vies d’indigènes; car quelle est la valeur d’une vie d’indigène maladroit à construire des 
routes, inefficace ou paresseux?” (pma 70–1, EA 47–9).
261 “Le sérieux conduit à un fanatisme aussi redoutable que le fanatisme de la passion; c’est 
le fanatisme de l’Inquisition qui n’hésite pas à imposer un credo, c’est-à-dire un mouve-
ment intérieur, par des contraintes extérieures; c’est le fanatisme des Vigilants d’Amérique 
qui défendent la moralité par des lynchages; c’est le fanatisme politique qui vide la 
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To avoid misunderstanding, she makes clear that “the serious man” can of-
ten be funny—or at least, he thinks he is:
In order to justify the contradictory, absurd, and outrageous aspects of 
this kind of behavior, the serious man readily takes refuge in disputing 
the serious, but it is the serious of others which he disputes, not his own. 
This, the colonial administrator is not unaware of the trick of irony. He 
contests the importance of the happiness, the comfort, the very life of the 
native, but he reveres the Highway, the Economy, the French Empire; he 
reveres himself as a servant of these divinities. Almost all serious men 
cultivate an expedient levity; we are familiar with the genuine gaiety of 
Catholics, the fascist “sense of humor.”262
Perhaps she had in mind something that happened while she was writing the 
book: La force des choses describes, in a section that quotes directly from her 
diary, an encounter with “a highly-placed French official” while she and Sartre 
were traveling in Switzerland.
B is hateful when he talks about the Arab midwives with whom he trav-
eled by truck in Africa. In the evenings they were herded into a separate 
encampment “because they smelled bad.” They had been converted to 
Catholicism and they protested in the name of religion: “But we have 
souls, just as you do.” “All one could do was laugh,” says B; he tells this 
story with a smug self-satisfaction that is unbearable.263
 politique de tout contenu humain et impose l’État non pour les individus, mais contre 
eux” (pma 71–2, EA 50).
262 “Pour justifier ce que ces conduites ont de contradictoire, d’absurde, de scandaleux, 
l’homme sérieux se réfugie volontiers dans une contestation du sérieux, mais c’est le sé-
rieux d’autrui qu’il conteste, non le sien propre. Ainsi l’administrateur colonial n’ignore 
pas le jeu de l’ironie; il conteste l’importance du bonheur, du confort, de la vie même de 
l’indigène, mais il révère la Route, l’Économie, l’Empire français, il se révère lui-même 
comme serviteur de ces divinités. Presque tous les hommes sérieux cultivent une légèreté 
profitable; on connaît la gaîté de bon aloi des catholiques, le ‘sens de l’humour’ fasciste” 
(pma 72, EA 49).
263 “[U]n officiel français, très haut placé … B. est odieux quand il parle des sages-femmes 
arabes, avec qui il voyageait en camion, en Afrique, et qu’on parquait à part, le soir, ‘parce 
qu’elles sentaient mauvais’; elles avaient été converties au catholicisme et elles pro-
testaient au nom de la religion: ‘Mais on a des âmes comme vous.’ On ne faisait qu’en rire, 
dit B.; il raconte ça avec une complaisance insupportable” (FCh 1:128).
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But intellectuals are not off the hook. A certain class of disengaged thinker 
also comes in for scorn.
Critical thought claims to bring about a universal contestation of all as-
pects of the serious,264 but without foundering in the anguish of pure 
negation. It sets up a superior, universal, and timeless value, objective 
truth. And correlatively, the critic defines himself positively as the inde-
pendence of the mind…. Thus he thinks that he himself escapes all earth-
ly criticism. He does not have to choose between the highway and the 
native, between America and Russia, between production and freedom. 
He understands, dominates, and rejects, in the name of total truth, the 
necessarily partial truths which every human engagement discloses.265
But in laying claim to this “view from nowhere,” the disengaged intellectual is 
kidding himself; the critic is still a man among men, and if he doesn’t assume 
his subjectivity he is caught in the trap of the serious man. “Instead of the in-
dependent mind he pretends to be, he is only the shameful servant of a cause 
to which he has not chosen to rally.”266
Many arguments in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté will feel somewhat famil-
iar to readers of The Second Sex, except that they are made mostly without 
reference to women, who appear only fleetingly: two sustained discussions 
264 Frechtman has: “Critical thought attempts to militate everywhere against all aspects of 
the serious but without foundering in the anguish of pure negation.”
265 “[L]a pensée critique prétend effectuer une contestation universelle de tous les aspects 
du sérieux, mais sans sombrer dans l’angoisse de la pure négation; elle pose une valeur 
supérieure, universelle, intemporelle, qui serait la vérité objective; et corrélativement le 
critique se définit positivement lui-même comme l’indépendance de l’esprit…. Ainsi il 
croit échapper lui-même à toute critique terrestre; il n’a pas à choisir entre la route et 
l’indigène, entre l’Amérique et la Russie, entre la production et la liberté; il comprend, il 
domine et il refuse, au nom de la vérité totale, les vérités nécessairement partielles que 
dévoile tout engagement humain. Mais l’ambiguïté est au cœur de son attitude même, car 
l’esprit indépendant, c’est encore un homme avec sa situation singulière dans le monde, 
et ce qu’il définit comme vérité objective, c’est l’objet de son propre choix. Ses critiques 
tombent dans le monde des hommes singuliers; il ne décrit pas seulement, il prend parti. 
S’il n’assume pas la subjectivité de son jugement, il est pris infailliblement au piège du 
sérieux” (pma 98–9, EA 67).
266 “Au lieu de cet esprit indépendant qu’il prétend être, il n’est que le serviteur honteux d’une 
cause à laquelle il n’a pas choisi de se rallier” (pma 99, EA 67). The critic is contrasted to 
“l’artiste” and “l’écrivain.” I wonder whether she is thinking here of Maurice Blanchot, 
whether this may be a veiled jab in response to his criticism of Le sang des autres, which 
she’d be more polite about in her essay on the metaphysical novel. See Doris Ruhe, “Beau-
voir, Blanchot, et Sartre: dialogues ambigus autour du Sang de autres.”
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(a few pages apiece) and a number of passing mentions add up to perhaps six 
pages out of the two hundred and thirty. When Beauvoir describes the way op-
pressors mask their oppression as an inevitable natural fact, her example is not 
women, but the proletariat:
[O]ne of the ruses of oppression is to camouflage itself behind a natural 
situation since, after all, one cannot revolt against nature. When a conser-
vative wishes to show that the proletariat is not oppressed, he declares 
that the present distribution of wealth is a natural fact and that there is 
thus no means of rejecting it.267
Similarly, a long discussion of complicity takes place without any reference to 
women.
[T]he oppressor would not be so strong if he did not have accomplices 
among the oppressed themselves; mystification is one of the forms of op-
pression; ignorance is a situation in which man may be enclosed as nar-
rowly as in a prison; as we have already said, every individual may prac-
tice his freedom inside his world, but not everyone has the means of 
rejecting, even by doubt, the values, taboos, and prescriptions by which 
he has been surrounded.268
(Complicity is importantly distinguished from actual guilt. “When a young 
sixteen-year-old Nazi died crying ‘Heil Hitler!’ he was not guilty, and it was not 
him whom we hated but his masters.”269) There is also a discussion of love, pas-
sion, and generosity, which some commentators (especially Debra Bergoffen) 
267 “[U]ne des ruses de l’oppression sera de se camoufler en situation naturelle: puisqu’en 
effet on ne saurait se révolter contre la nature. Lorsqu’un conservateur veut démontrer 
que le prolétariat n’est pas opprimé, il déclare que la distribution actuelle des richesses est 
un fait naturel et qu’il n’y a donc pas moyen de la refuser” (pma 120–21, EA 62). Here the 
person she is arguing with is her father. See mjfr, 178–85.
268 “[L]’oppresseur ne serait pas si fort s’il n’avait des complices parmi les opprimés eux-
mêmes; la mystification est une des formes de l’oppression; l’ignorance est une situation 
où l’homme peut être enfermé aussi étroitement que dans une prison; nous l’avons dit 
déjà, tout individu peut exercer sa liberté à l’intérieur de son monde: mais tous n’ont pas 
les moyens de refuser, fût-ce par le doute, les valeurs, les tabous, les consignes dont on les 
a entourés” (pma 141, EA 97). (I’ve changed Frechtman’s “by which he is surrounded” to 
“by which he has been surrounded,” because the passive voice seems important: other 
people, “on,” have done this.)
269 “Quand un jeune nazi de seize ans mourait en criant: ‘Heil Hitler!’, il n’était pas coupable, 
et ce n’est pas lui qu’on haïssait, mais ses maîtres” (pma 141, EA 97).
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have made much of, but here it takes place without particular attention to sex 
or gender.
Sometimes a woman will appear very briefly in an example, as when the bad 
faith of the serious man is compared to “the mythomaniac who while reading 
a love letter pretends to forget that she has sent it to herself.”270 Other passing 
references: in explaining that “the serious man” need not be grim (see above), 
she tells us that “a frivolous lady of fashion can have the mentality of the seri-
ous as well as an engineer”;271 in explaining that true generosity, pace Kant, is 
not abstract and general but addressed to people in their singularity, she draws 
a contrast with the activities of the “charity lady”;272 a slap at Claudel’s con-
formism includes a “by the way” criticism of “masculine arrogance”;273 the let-
ters of Julie de Lespinasse are one example among others of how “the passion-
ate man” can come to enjoy the grief and torment of loss or hopeless devotion: 
the other examples are men.274 In criticizing the “Don Juan” type of adventurer, 
270 “La mauvaise foi de l’homme sérieux provient de ce qu’il est obligé de sans cesse renouve-
ler le reniement de cette liberté; il choisit de vivre dans un monde infantile: mais à l’enfant 
les valeurs sont réellement données; l’homme sérieux doit masquer ce mouvement par 
lequel il se les donne, telle la mythomane qui feint d’oublier, en lisant une lettre d’amour, 
qu’elle se l’est envoyée à elle-même” (pma 68, EA 47).
271 “[U]ne élégante frivole peut avoir l’esprit de sérieux autant qu’un ingénieur” (pma 67, 
EA 45).
272 “It is not the fault of the dame de charité if she is apt to be odious; because, her money and 
time being limited, she hesitates before distributing it to this one or that one, she appears 
to others as a pure externality, a blind facticity.” [Ce n’est pas tout à fait la faute de la dame 
de charité si elle est facilement odieuse; du fait que, disposant de son temps, de son argent 
en quantité limitée, elle hésite avant de le distribuer à celui-ci ou à celui-là, elle apparaît 
en face d’autrui comme pure extériorité, facticité aveugle (pma 208, EA 143).] Frechtman 
translates “dame de charité” as “district social worker,” but the Collins gives “benefactress,” 
and in context I think the woman Beauvoir has in mind is an unpaid Lady Bountiful type.
273 “At the beginning of Claudel’s The Satin Shoe, the husband of Dona Prouhèze, the Judge, 
the Just, as the author regards him, explains that every plant needs a gardener in order to 
grow and that he is the one whom heaven has destined for his young wife; beside the fact 
that we are shocked by the arrogance of such a thought (for how does he know that he is 
an enlightened gardener? Isn’t he just a jealous husband?) this likening of a soul to a plant 
is not acceptable; for, as Kant would say, the value of an act lies not in its conformity to an 
external model, but in its internal truth.” [Au début du Soulier de Satin, de Claudel, le mari 
de Dona Prouhèze, le Juge, le Juste, selon la pensée de l’auteur, explique que toute plante 
a besoin pour pousser droit d’un jardinier et qu’il est celui que le ciel a destiné à sa jeune 
épouse; outre qu’on est choqué par l’arrogance d’une telle pensée (car d’où sait-il qu’il est 
ce jardinier éclairé? n’est-il pas seulement un mari jaloux?), cette assimilation d’une âme 
à une plante n’est pas acceptable; car, pour reprendre le mot de Kant, la valeur d’un acte 
n’est pas dans sa conformité à un modèle extérieur, mais dans sa vérité intérieure (pma 
199, EA 137).]
274 “[L]’homme passionné” (pma 91, EA 66).
Chapter 3218
she notes that in the end he’ll have to confront Elvira and admit that he’s less 
free than he pretends.275 And under the question of whether saving someone 
from suicide against their wishes is ethical, one of her examples is a young 
girl.276 None of these examples is present because of “what it tells us about 
women” or gender, and none is built on in any way beyond the point they are 
meant to briefly illustrate. What I’m trying to establish here—and I realize the 
philology is tedious, sorry—is that the issues of race, class, and colonialism 
raised in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté cannot be seen as mobilized solely in 
the service of “white feminism,” or any other kind of feminism, since women 
barely come into the picture. We’ll meet some of these unhappy women again 
at greater length in The Second Sex, but Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté is not 
about women, it’s about people, human beings, into which category some 
women do happen to fall.
A few more substantive passages do show more interest in the situation of 
women as a class. One paragraph uses Nora from Ibsen’s A Doll’s House as one 
among several examples of those who are “enslaved” or “mystified,” and who 
don’t seem to deserve quite as severe condemnation as the serious man who 
“has the necessary instruments to escape this lie and who does not want to use 
them.”277 Another passage examines (and eviscerates) bad faith excuses that 
275 “The adventurer always meets others along the way; the conquistador meets the Indians; 
the condottiere hacks out a path through blood and ruins; the explorer has comrades 
about him or soldiers under his orders; every Don Juan is confronted with Elviras.” 
[L’aventurier sur son chemin rencontre toujours autrui; le conquistador rencontre les In-
diens; le condottiere se fraie une route à travers le sang et les ruines; l’explorateur a des 
camarades autour de lui ou des soldats sous ses ordres; en face de tout Don Juan il y a des 
Elvire (pma 86, EA 60).]
276 pma 206, EA 141.
277 “We have already pointed out that certain adults can live in the universe of the serious in 
all honesty, for example, those who are denied all instruments of escape, those who are 
enslaved or who are mystified. The less economic and social circumstances allow an indi-
vidual to act upon the world, the more this world appears to him as given. This is the case 
of women who inherit a long tradition of submission and of those who are called the 
‘humble.’ There is often laziness and timidity in their resignation; their good faith [Frecht-
man has ‘honesty’] is not quite complete; but to the extent that it exists, their freedom 
remains available, it is not denied. They can, in their situation of ignorant and powerless 
individuals, know the truth of existence and raise themselves to a properly moral life. It 
even happens that they turn the freedom which they have thus won against the very ob-
ject of their respect; thus, in A Doll’s House, the childlike naïveté of the heroine leads her 
to rebel against the lie of the serious. On the contrary, the man who has the necessary 
instruments to escape this lie and who does not want to use them consumes his freedom 
in denying them. He makes himself serious. He dissimulates his subjectivity under the 
shield of rights which emanate from the ethical universe recognized by him; he is no 
longer a man, but a father, a boss, a member of the Christian Church or the Communist 
219Nothing to Say About Race and Class?
oppressors give for keeping the masses, women, and “indigenous people in the 
colonies” from voting. Beauvoir does not deny that some people are better edu-
cated than others, who may be characterized as “backward,” but that does not 
give the “enlightened elites” the right to make choices supposedly “on their 
behalf”: such choices are exposed as self-serving.
I recall, among others, the naïveté of a girl from a conservative family who 
said, ‘The vote for women is all well and good in principle, only, if women 
get the vote, they’ll all vote Red.’278 With like impudence it is almost 
unanimously stated today in France that if the natives of the French 
Union were given the rights of self-determination, they would live quietly 
in their villages without doing anything, which would be harmful to the 
higher interests of the Economy.279
The third passage, which occurs in the middle of a discussion of childhood and 
irresponsibility, has received a certain amount of attention: I’ll follow Nancy 
Party.” [Nous avons indiqué déjà que, dans l’univers du sérieux, certains adultes peuvent 
vivre avec bonne foi: ceux à qui est refusé tout instrument d’évasion, ceux qu’on asservit 
ou qu’on mystifie. Moins les circonstances économiques et sociales permettent à un indi-
vidu d’agir sur le monde, plus ce monde lui apparaît comme donné. C’est le cas des 
femmes qui héritent d’une longue tradition de soumission, et de ceux qu’on appelle les 
humbles; il y a souvent de la paresse et de la timidité dans leur résignation, leur bonne foi 
n’est pas entière; mais dans la mesure où elle existe, leur liberté demeure disponible, elle 
ne se renie pas; ils peuvent dans leur situation d’individus ignorants, impuissants, con-
naître la vérité de l’existence et s’élever à une vie proprement morale. Il arrive même que 
la liberté ainsi conquise, ils la retournent contre l’objet même de leur respect; ainsi, dans 
Maison de Poupée, la naïveté enfantine de l’héroïne la conduit à une révolte contre le 
mensonge du sérieux. Au contraire, l’homme qui a les instruments nécessaires pour 
s’évader de ce mensonge et qui ne veut pas en user, celui-là consume sa liberté à la refuser; 
il se fait lui-même sérieux, il dissimule sa subjectivité sous l’armure de droits qui émanent 
de l’univers éthique reconnu par lui; il n’est plus un homme, mais un père, un chef, un 
membre de l’Église chrétienne ou du Parti communiste (pma 69–70, EA 47–8).]
278 Frechtman has “a right-thinking girl,” but “bien-pensante” is, or at least was, used to refer 
to middle- and upper-class Catholic respectability. This same anecdote appears at greater 
length in Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, 355; see also 179–80 on her father’s arguments 
against giving the vote to the poor.
279 “Je me rappelle, entre autres, la naïveté d’une jeune fille bien pensante qui disait: ‘Le vote 
des femmes, c’est très bien en principe; seulement si on donne le vote aux femmes, elles 
voteront rouge.’ Avec une même impudence, on déclare à peu près unanimement 
aujourd’hui en France qui si on permettait aux indigènes de l’Union française de disposer 
d’eux-mêmes, ils vivraient tranquillement dans leurs villages sans rien faire, ce qui serait 
néfaste aux intérêts supérieurs de l’Économie” (pma 200–203, EA 138–39).] Translation 
altered: I’ve changed “one” to “people.”
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Bauer’s lead in quoting the whole thing, so my readers can make up their own 
minds.
There are beings whose life slips by in an infantile world because, having 
been kept in a state of servitude and ignorance, they have no means of 
breaking the ceiling which is stretched over their heads. Like the child, 
they can exercise their freedom, but only within the universe that has 
been set up before them, without them. This is the case, for example, of 
slaves who have not raised themselves to the consciousness of their slav-
ery. The southern planters were not altogether in the wrong in consider-
ing the negroes who docilely submitted to their paternalism as “grown-up 
children.” To the extent they respected the world of the whites the situa-
tion of the Black slaves was exactly an infantile situation. This is also the 
situation of women in many civilizations; they can only submit to the 
laws, the gods, the customs, and the truths created by the males. Even 
today in western countries, among women who have not had in their 
work an apprenticeship of freedom, there are still many who take shelter 
in the shadow of men; they adopt without discussion the opinions and 
values recognized by their husband or their lover, and that allows them to 
develop childish qualities which are forbidden to adults because they are 
based on a feeling of irresponsibility. If what is called women’s futility 
often has so much charm and grace, it is because it manifests a pure and 
gratuitous taste for existence, like the games of children; it is the absence 
of the serious. The unfortunate thing is that in many cases this thought-
lessness, this gaiety, these charming inventions imply a deep complicity 
with the world of men which they seem so graciously to be contesting, 
and it is a mistake to be astonished, once the structure which shelters 
them seems to be in danger, to see sensitive, ingenuous, and light-minded 
women show themselves harder, more bitter, and even more furious and 
cruel than their masters. It is then that we discover the difference which 
distinguishes them from an actual child: the child’s situation is imposed 
upon him, whereas the woman (I mean the western woman of today) 
chooses it or at least consents to it. Ignorance and error are fates as ines-
capable as prison walls. The negro slave of the eighteenth century, the 
Mohammedan woman locked up280 in a harem have no instrument, be it 
in thought or by astonishment or anger, which permits them to attack the 
civilization which oppresses them. Their behavior is defined and can be 
280 Frechtman translates “enfermée” as “enclosed,” but the Collins dictionary gives only “shut 
up” and “locked up.”
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judged only within this given situation, and it is possible that in this situ-
ation, they realize a perfect assertion of their freedom. But once there 
appears a possibility of liberation, it is resignation of freedom not to ex-
ploit the possibility, a resignation which implies bad faith and which is a 
positive fault.281
Now, the problem Beauvoir has been trying to solve throughout her essay is an 
abstract one: how to bring the general ethical theory—that people are born 
with the capacity for freedom, but must still will themselves free, and are at 
fault if they don’t—into conjunction with the truth that on the other hand, 
some people really are freer than others, because of their situation and history. 
281 Again, Frechtman has “dishonesty” for “mauvaise foi.” “Il y a des êtres dont la vie tout en-
tière s’écoule dans un monde infantile, parce que, maintenus dans un état de servitude et 
d’ignorance, ils ne possèdent aucun moyen de briser ce plafond tendu au-dessus de leurs 
têtes; comme l’enfant lui-même ils peuvent exercer leur liberté, mais seulement au sein de 
cet univers constitué avant eux, sans eux. C’est le cas par exemple des esclaves qui ne sont 
pas encore élevés à la conscience de leur esclavage. Ce n’est pas tout à fait à tort que les 
planteurs du Sud considéraient comme de ‘grands enfants’ les noirs qui subissaient docile-
ment leur paternalisme; dans la mesure où ils respectaient le monde des blancs, la situa-
tion des noirs était exactement une situation infantile. Dans beaucoup de civilisations, 
cette situation est aussi celle des femmes qui ne peuvent que subir les lois, les dieux, les 
mœurs, les vérités créées par les mâles. Même aujourd’hui, dans les pays d’Occident, il y a 
encore beaucoup de femmes, parmi celles qui n’ont pas fait dans le travail l’apprentissage 
de leur liberté, qui s’abritent dans l’ombre des hommes; elles adoptent sans discussion les 
opinions et les valeurs reconnues par leur mari ou leur amant, et cela leur permet de 
développer des qualités enfantines interdites aux adultes parce qu’elles reposent sur un 
sentiment d’irresponsabilité. Si ce qu’on appelle la futilité des femmes a souvent tant de 
charme et de grâce, si parfois elle possède même un caractère émouvant d’authenticité, 
c’est que, tout comme les jeux enfantins, elle manifeste un goût gratuit et pur de l’existence, 
elle est absence de sérieux. Le malheur est qu’en beaucoup de cas cette insouciance, cette 
gaîté, ces inventions charmantes, impliquent une profonde complicité avec ce monde des 
hommes qu’elles semblent si gracieusement contester, et c’est à tort qu’on s’étonne de voir, 
dès que l’édifice qui les abrite semble en danger, des femmes sensibles, ingénues, légères, 
se montrer plus âpres, plus dures, voire plus furieuses ou plus cruelles que leurs maîtres. 
Alors on découvre quelle différence les distingue d’un véritable enfant: à l’enfant sa situa-
tion est imposée, tandis que la femme (j’entends la femme occidentale d’aujourd’hui) la 
choisit ou au moins y consent. L’ignorance, l’erreur sont des faits aussi inéluctables que les 
murs d’une prison; l’esclave noir du xviiie siècle, la musulmane enfermée au fond d’un 
harem, n’ont aucun instrument qui leur permet d’attaquer, fût-ce en pensée, fût-ce par 
l’étonnement ou la colère, la civilisation qui les opprime: leur conduite ne se définit et ne 
saurait se juger qu’au sein de ce donné; et il se peut que dans leur situation, limitée comme 
toute situation humaine, elles réalisent une parfait affirmation de leur liberté. Mais, dès 
qu’une libération apparaît comme possible, ne pas exploiter cette possibilité est une 
démission de la liberté, démission qui implique la mauvaise foi et qui est une faute posi-
tive” (pma 54–6, EA 37–8).
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On the one hand, “freedom can always save itself” (or so Frechtman’s transla-
tion has it; “se sauver” can also mean “run away”).282 But on the other hand 
“situations are not equivalent.”283 How can we avoid blaming the victim, with-
out granting what would now be called “agency” only to the oppressors?
As Bauer notes, commentators disagree about the value of these moral pe-
riod essays. Bauer herself finds them “marked by a certain vagueness, an im-
precision of thought that disqualifies them, on my view, contra Bergoffen, from 
serious independent philosophical consideration.”284 This section in particu-
lar has come in for a great deal of criticism. That the discussion of “the slave” 
here is more satisfying than what Sartre says about slaves in L’être et le néant is 
indisputable, but that is a pretty low bar. Bauer quotes some of what he said:
A man cannot ever abdicate his liberty; when he feigns to renounce it, he 
does nothing but mask it, and mask it freely. The slave who obeys chooses 
to obey and his choice must be renewed at each instant.285
You can throw a man in prison, leave him there, cut off his arms, lend 
him wings; but his liberty remains infinite in every case. The automobile 
and the airplane do not change anything with regard to our liberty, and 
neither do the chains of the slave.286
That this was not a promising start for a discussion of oppression is rather 
obvious,287 and Beauvoir’s version is certainly preferable; but her discussion of 
whether and how slaves are free seems frankly muddled. And many feminists 
have been troubled by Beauvoir’s use of the term “harem,” and by the distinc-
tion she sometimes draws between “the Western woman of today” and … 
someone else. This is the first appearance of that crux in her published work.
282 “On voit que d’une part la liberté peut toujours se sauver, car elle se réalise comme 
dévoilement d’existence à travers ses échecs mêmes et elle peut encore se confirmer par 
une mort librement choisie” (pma 45, EA 31).
283 “Mais d’autre part les situations qu’elle dévoile à travers son projet vers elle-même 
n’apparaissent pas comme équivalentes” (pma 45, EA 30–1).
284 Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 140. Bauer sees them as mostly interesting for 
what they tell us about who she was (as a philosopher appropriating the work of other 
philosophers) before she wrote The Second Sex, and basically I agree, though my interest 
is not primarily in her philosophic method.
285 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 72.
286 Ibid., 86.
287 The difficulty lies, as many have noted, in Sartre’s conception of human beings as either 
subjects or objects; the subjectivity of the other person can thus only be experienced as a 
threat. Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 148: “That there is something positive 
about the Other’s freedom is a possibility never raised by Being and Nothingness.”
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I’ll discuss the “harem” problem in more depth in Chapter 5. For now, I’ll just 
suggest that in this passage the emphasis is not on “musulmane” but on “enfer-
mée” (locked up, imprisoned, confined). The opposition here is not between 
western and “Eastern” women, or between modern women and some group of 
women that have been left behind; the opposition is between those who are 
able to free themselves and those who aren’t, and there are some of these in 
each (geographical and temporal) category. Some harem women and some 
slaves, she says at the end of the paragraph, are free, and some western women 
of the past and of today are not free. (Indeed, in the passage about A Doll’s 
House I discussed above,288 she makes the same point, illustrating it with the 
example of Ibsen’s heroine, who is clearly European, white, and modern.)
Rather than speak of the Situation of Woman, she uses a restrictive “qui” 
(who) to set apart those women to whom her statement applies: “la situation 
est aussi celle des femmes qui ne peuvent que subir les lois, les dieux, les mœurs, 
les vérités créées par les mâles” (the situation is also that of women who can 
only submit to the laws, gods, customs, and truths creates by males), and “[c]’est 
le cas des femmes qui héritent d’une longue tradition de soumission” (this is 
true of women who inherit a long tradition of submission)289—not for women 
who don’t submit to or inherit those things. For any grammar mavens listening: 
there is no comma before “qui,” “who,” right? Even apart from that rather pe-
dantic point, though, the paragraph wouldn’t make any sense if the expression 
was meant to apply to women tout court.290
What Beauvoir is trying to do here, as overall, is get some people (including 
some women) off the hook of moral condemnation for not assuming their 
288 pma 68–9, EA 48. See note 273 above.
289 pma 54, EA 37; pma 69, EA 48.
290 Women in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté are just that, women, not Woman. Beauvoir 
here uses the collective singular “la femme” only twice in the book: once for “la femme 
occidentale d’aujourd’hui,” in apposition to “la musulmane,” and once, near the discus-
sion I quoted earlier about votes for women and the inhabitants of colonies, where she 
explores the bad faith analogy conservatives make between women and slaves on the one 
hand, and children on the other. “To the extent that woman or the happy or resigned slave 
lives in the infantile world of ready-made values, calling them ‘an eternal child’ or ‘a 
grown-up child’ has some meaning, but the analogy is only partial.” [Dans la mesure où la 
femme, l’esclave heureux ou résigné vivent dans le monde infantile des valeurs toutes 
faites, cela a un sens de les appeler “une éternelle enfant,” “un grande enfant,” mais 
l’analogie n’est que partielle (pma 204, EA 141).] This occurs in the context of reported 
speech, and speech with which Beauvoir disagrees (she is also not associating herself 
with the idea that slaves are “happy,” though she’ll have more to say about that in her next 
book than she does here). For the most part, women in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté are 
singular or plural people, not a Concept or a Question.
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freedom.291 You can’t assume what you haven’t got. But she is not at all clear 
here, as Bauer shows, about which women are exceptions to the rule of bad 
faith, or when, or why. (Is the situation of such men and women “limited as all 
human situations are limited,” or is it limited in some different and special 
way?)292 This is one place that fully justifies her self-criticism I quoted above: 
“the attitudes I examine are explained by objective conditions; I limited myself 
to isolating their moral significance, to such an extent that my portraits are not 
situated on any level of reality.” The question is posed too abstractly to admit of 
any useful answer, or rather, it is entirely circular, since the question of who 
belongs in which category is itself the point at issue. (In The Second Sex, as 
we’ve seen, she will cut the Gordian knot by saying that the fall into imma-
nence is an absolute evil whether the subject consents to it or not.) My pur-
pose in discussing Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté at this juncture, though, was 
to show the political bent and intention behind the philosophical language: an 
intention to which women are, at best, an afterthought or, as here, a sketch to-
ward what further work might investigate.
Now, I have been present in many rooms where philosophers discussed Pour 
une morale de l’ambiguïté, and I have rarely heard it discussed as a text about 
colonialism. The people involved are good people, and many of them are also 
political people. So I am forced to conclude that in one important respect, 
Beauvoir’s retrospective judgement of her moral period work was right: if she 
wanted to raise her voice on behalf of the oppressed, this sort of philosophical 
writing was not the way to do it, because nobody could hear that that was what 
she was trying to do. (Her next book after Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté would 
be L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947.) To argue abstractly against abstraction made 
no sense: she would never do it again.293
But if Beauvoir was right to find her essay “deplorably abstract,” others seem 
to find it deplorably concrete. An updated example is provided by a 2011 article 
by Sabine Broeck, “Re-Reading de Beauvoir ‘After Race.’” Broeck writes, in 
explaining why she agrees with Spelman (and not with Deutscher and Simons) 
291 Sonia Kruks has a good explanation of this word: “the French word assumer … has the 
sense of ‘taking up the responsibility for something.’ The English verb ‘to assume’ may 
have a similar sense when one talks of ‘assuming’ a burden of some kind, or of ‘assuming’ 
a debt” (“Living on Rails: Freedom, Constraint, and Political Judgement in Beauvoir’s 
‘Moral’ Essays and The Mandarins,” 83).
292 See Bauer, Beauvoir, Philosophy, & Feminism, 167–71, for a fuller discussion of this passage, 
which Bauer sees as an early sketch of “an idea that is fundamental to The Second Sex, 
namely that being a woman constitutes a situation,” though she also notes that “we see 
Beauvoir hesitating to invest herself fully in the idea.” This is true; but I see that “hesita-
tion” as grounded in an understanding that being a woman does not always constitute the 
same situation.
293 She wouldn’t let her characters in Les mandarins get away with it, either.
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about the pernicious legacy of Beauvoir’s work, that “even though individuals 
like Sartre and de Beauvoir became part of anti-colonial mobilizations, this 
anti-colonial sentiment never translated into a philosophical questioning of 
the white premises of the Enlightenment beyond a local engagement with bla-
tant racism in the French metropolis, or later support of the Algerian resistance.”294 
(The italics in all these quotations are mine.)
Beyond Sartre’s anti-colonial protestations in Black Orpheus (1948), no 
thorough epistemic revision of Enlightenment based on a confluence of 
anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-colonial knowledge present in the 
post-World War ii situation in Paris, was developed. However much the per-
sonal and collective exchanges, friendships, collaborations between and 
arguments across camps, between various strands of Negritude, African- 
American civil rights discourse, post-Stalinist Marxist analyses, psycho-
analysis, late surrealism, anti-fascism, progressive ethnography, and Jewish 
post-Shoah ethical critiques of the collapse of western civilization created 
a significant chance for the possible generation of a relentless deconstruc-
tion of “capitalist colonialist modernity,” a concerted epistemically pro-
grammatic critique did not emerge from those crosscurrents.295
Considered as a reading of Beauvoir’s work, Broeck’s article has some puzzling 
features. For one thing, she treats Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté as though it 
were a text about women, when it barely mentions them. She has a lot to say 
about what’s wrong with Beauvoir’s use of “immanence” there, but while “im-
manence” is an important term in The Second Sex, it barely appears in Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté, even when Beauvoir is speaking of the “sous-homme” 
(sub-man), who refuses transcendence and takes refuge in his own facticity. 
(The term does come into play briefly where she is discussing the way tyrants 
imprison the oppressed in “immanence” by reducing them to the status of 
things rather than people.)296 When Broeck writes of “the upheaval of de 
Beauvoir’s ‘discovery’ of the subjective voice of the first person female,” she 
cannot be referring to Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, which takes an entirely 
genderless “view from nowhere”;297 but “first person female” is not really an 
294 Broeck, “Re-Reading de Beauvoir ‘After Race,’: Woman-as-Slave Revisited” 170, emphasis 
added.
295 Ibid.
296 pma 144–48, EA 100–103. The word is used a total of five times.
297 Broeck, “Re-Reading de Beauvoir ‘After Race,’” 171. Where “nous” is not a pure abstraction 
of the “we tend to say” variety, it may be taken to refer to existentialists as a group: a group 
of which Beauvoir was at that stage the only female member.
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accurate characterization of the “voice” of The Second Sex, either. When Broeck 
writes, “the rhetorical construction that casts woman as slave in opposition to 
man as master has long allowed white western women to enter critical negotia-
tions of subjectivity in western (post)-Enlightenment thought,”298 she may be 
right about something, but she is not right about Beauvoir’s uptake of Hegel, as 
Eva Lundgren-Gothlin demonstrated twenty years ago.299
Now, I agree with Broeck that what Beauvoir says in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté about whether slaves can, or can’t, have freedom, is muddled, and 
somewhat patronizing; this is one respect in which The Second Sex shows an 
improvement, rather than a simple continuity. However, her claim that Beau-
voir reduces the slave to his slavishness by neglecting to speak of the agency of 
the slave revolt is false.300 Beauvoir does so in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté—
“the fact is that he decides against oppression, and it is then that the moment 
of emancipation really begins”301—and (see above) she does so in The Second 
298 Ibid., 171.
299 See Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Sex & Existence. As Bauer summarizes (Beauvoir, Philosophy, & 
Feminism, 177–78): “Lundgren-Gothlin parts ways quite sharply with the usual breezy un-
derstanding of how we are to understand Hegel’s place in The Second Sex. She claims, in 
effect, that Beauvoir uses the master-slave dialectic not as a philosophical model of the 
way things stand between the sexes but as a philosophical foil: rather than simply recall-
ing Hegel’s figures of the master and the slave to dramatize the inequality between men 
and women, Lundgren-Gothlin argues, Beauvoir is contrasting the position of women 
with that of the slave…. Lundgren-Gothlin sees that ‘it won’t do to shoehorn what Beau-
voir says about the situation of women into Hegel’s master-slave model.’” Bauer herself 
sees “a genuine reworking of the Hegelian notion of ambiguity, one motivated by Beau-
voir’s giving a face—and a body—to the master, and the slave”; her own analysis shows 
The Second Sex’s theory as emerging from Beauvoir’s realization that the analogy between 
women and slaves would not work, that she had to do something else, she had to think it 
otherwise.
In my view, the master/slave story in The Second Sex is a mobile metaphor, that some-
times applies and sometimes does not; and it is also a strong general account of the mech-
anism of domination that underlies everything, but is not attached to any particular iden-
tity or any particular struggle. Beauvoir is inconsistent about whether the “slave” is Black, 
and commentators on Beauvoir are not consistent, either. And Susan Buck-Morss makes 
a convincing argument in Hegel and Haiti that we shouldn’t even assume that Hegel’s ac-
count was univocally un-raced. Interestingly, Buck-Morss’s attention to the historical par-
ticular in her contextualized reading of Hegel—bringing her to conclude that yes, the 
slave in the Phenomenology is Black—leads to a call for us to reexamine and revalue hu-
man universals, if only so that the (particular) oppressed can appeal to them in time of 
dire need: she suggests that we reject the bad universal for the aspiration toward a real 
one. But I really can’t get into this here.
300 Broeck, “Re-Reading de Beauvoir ‘After Race,’” 174.
301 “Le fait est qu’il se décide contre l’oppression et c’est alors que le mouvement 
d’affranchissement commence véritablement” (pma 125–26, EA 87).
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Sex as well, more clearly and vigorously. But when Beauvoir describes the re-
volt of the slave or the indigène, and when she outlines the culpability of the 
white slavemasters and colonizers, she tends to refer to things actual people 
have actually done, or could do, and for some reason Broeck feels this doesn’t 
count. Beauvoir’s strong attack on the self-justifications of the colonialist 
state—an attack that few, at that time, were willing to make—is condescend-
ingly dismissed as mere “anecdote.”
[Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté] moves from abstract musings at the be-
ginning to rather anecdotal argumentation, densely packed with exam-
ples from de Beauvoir’s contemporaneous political moment…. Over and 
against reading the text as a document of purely intra-philosophical 
speculation of the depths of existential freedom, it displays a drive to-
wards a very mundane concreteness….
Crucially, the text does not explore the relation between transcen-
dence and immanence as a hybrid of interchangeable, permeable, recip-
rocal, and flexible locations: its empathy privileges the subject’s transcen-
dent desire for freedom over against actions by clearly and obviously 
separable bearers of unfreedom and immanence. It not only positions 
those poles as ontological givens, but also has them—in a series of anec-
dotes that relate historically identifiable occurrences—acquire social and 
historical materiality. Such episodes naturalize those oppositions so that, 
structurally speaking, it appears as if the struggle between transcendence 
and immanence is an inevitably binary struggle…
The challenge I see here is that the text, repeatedly and without neces-
sity of its own logic, relies on historical contingency in its very anecdotal-
ism: Stalinism, colonialism, lynching, French collaboration with Nazism, 
the resistance, are all neatly narrativized. The effect of this is that the phil-
osophical, and from the outset rather abstract meditation changes its 
mode to draw attention to excessive historical contingency, and supposed 
veracity.302
Yes, these matters are “narrativized;” as Merleau-Ponty put it at the time, la 
guerre a eu lieu, the war has taken place. Something happened. And yes, Beau-
voir believes in “clearly and obviously separable bearers of unfreedom and 
immanence”—such people have, for instance, names, faces, and addresses, 
can be sent to death camps, are subjected to real (as opposed to merely epis-
temic) violence. How does it become possible to regard examples that deal 
302 Broeck, “Re-Reading de Beauvoir ‘After Race,’” 172–73.
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with lynching, the holocaust, the massive death toll of colonial road-building, 
etc., as “mere anecdotes”?303 “Why is it that de Beauvoir’s transnational, multi-
ethnic and anti-racist intellectual friendships did not lead her to an examina-
tion of her own epistemic position?”304 I am tempted to respond that her 
friends, and she, had other fish to fry.
Broeck is certainly accurate when she writes that
[t]here are no postmodern equivocations [in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté] about the impossibility of ethical judgment, or about the 
contingency of diverse subjects’ competing instantiations of freedom: 
for  de Beauvoir, freedom reigns absolute, even in the ambiguity of its 
achievement.305
If the problem she sees is simply that Beauvoir’s epistemology is “modern” 
rather than “postmodern,” well, ok, we knew that. If the complaint is that she 
didn’t reject Enlightenment values such as freedom, reason, rights—no, she 
didn’t, and this isn’t because she was regrettably “of her time”—even after such 
postmodern possibilities were part of the French intellectual milieu, she ac-
knowledged and rejected them, by mocking a certain strand of Foucauldian-
ism in Les belles images, and in her debate with the Tel Quel group.306 The 
continuing complaint that Beauvoir and Sartre are insufficiently postmodern 
reminds me of the books written by some of their contemporaries deploring 
that they were insufficiently Catholic. Readers are expected to take on faith 
the superiority of the doctrine, and concur in pitying the poor authors who 
had not yet agreed to see by its light. Sorry, but non serviam.307 If I am to accept 
303 I am reminded of Beauvoir’s unpleasant characterization of “la pensée critique” which 
pretended to be above all partisan political questions by virtue of the standpoint of objec-
tive and absolute Truth; one strand of “critical thought” today finds an alibi in the impos-
sibility of such Truth. But I digress.
304 Ibid., 173.
305 Ibid., 174.
306 Beauvoir’s contribution to a 1964 roundtable bringing together representatives of “littéra-
ture engagée” with proponents of the nouveau roman was printed in Yves Buin, Que peut 
la littérature? For a translation, see Beauvoir, The Useless Mouths and Other Literary Writ-
ings, 191–210. See also Moi, “What Can Literature Do?: Simone de Beauvoir as Literary 
Theorist.”
307 Actually, several of the stars of the Tel Quel group’s epistemic revolution have since actu-
ally become Catholics, haven’t they? Hm. Sorry, that actually is an anecdote, never mind.
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that Beauvoir’s view of race is “problematic,” I need to hear about something 
besides her lack of a thoroughgoing “epistemic critique.”308
The part of Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté that seems of most lasting useful-
ness for feminists is the section called “Les antinomies de l’action” (The An-
tinomies of Action), which doesn’t talk about women at all, but does lay some 
groundwork for an intersectional analysis proper to a theory of action, which is 
to say, one which could acknowledge complexity without leading to paralysis.
As we have seen, the situation of the world is so complex that one cannot 
fight everywhere at the same time and for everyone. In order to win an 
urgent victory, one has to give up the idea, at least temporarily, of serving 
certain valid causes; one may even be brought to the point of fighting 
against them. Thus, during the course of the last war, no anti-fascist party 
could have wanted the revolts of the natives in the British Empire to be 
successful;309 on the contrary, these revolts were supported by the Fascist 
regimes; and yet, we cannot blame those who, considering their emanci-
pation to be the more urgent action, took advantage of the situation to 
obtain it.310
308 I’m well aware that modern epistemologies have been entwined with actually oppressive 
practices such as slavery. However, people managed to oppose slavery before postmodern 
epistemology existed; indeed, Enlightenment arguments were deployed with rather 
marked success by people like Frederick Douglass, Wilberforce, Wollstonecraft … What 
do I mean by “success”? Well, The Confederate flag is still with us, but the plantation is a 
museum. Between “participation in a problematic discourse” and leg shackles, I will take 
the discourse, thanks.
And anyhow, Where is it leading us, this signifying chain of epistemic critiques? I drafted 
this section in the summer of 2016, during the run-up to the American elections: on one 
side of my Facebook feed, a former student was going, “yo, if Trump gets elected he will 
deport half my family, does anybody care?” and on the other side, some highly educated 
political “activists,” for whom any concern with the material effects of the coming election 
on actually existing people of color, immigrants, women, etc., would be embarrassingly 
impure and retrograde, were debating the relative merits of two third-party candidates in 
order to artisanally craft a vote that would “make a statement” … in contrast to which the 
fate of Areli’s family would certainly look like an “anecdote”…
309 Frechtman says simply, “no anti-Fascist could have wanted,” omitting to translate “parti,” 
which would refer to a political party.
310 “Nous l’avons vu aussi: la situation du monde est si complexe qu’on ne saurait lutter par-
tout à la fois et pour tous. Pour remporter une victoire urgente, on devra renoncer, du 
moins provisoirement, à servir certaines causes valables, on pourra même être amené à 
les combattre. Ainsi aucun parti anti-fasciste ne pouvait souhaiter, au cours de la dernière 
guerre, le succès des révoltes indigènes au sein de l’empire britannique; ces révoltes 
étaient appuyées au contraire par les régimes fascistes; et cependant on ne blâmera pas 
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This strikes me as a sketch of what I’m calling her “intersectional” analysis. 
It matters where she chooses her examples, which are indeed “narrativized.”
The problem is complicated in practice by the fact that today oppression 
has more than one face; the Arabian fellah is oppressed by both the sheiks 
and the French or English administration;311 which of the two enemies is 
to be combatted? The interests of the French proletariat are not the same 
as those of the natives in the colonies: which are to be served? But here 
the question is political before being moral: we must end by abolishing 
all suppression; each one must carry on his struggle in connection with 
that of the other and by integrating it into the general pattern. What or-
der should be followed? What tactics should be adopted? It is a matter of 
opportunity and efficiency. For each one it also depends on his singular 
situation.312 It is possible that he may be led to sacrifice temporarily a 
cause whose success is subordinate to that of a cause whose defense is 
more urgent; on the other hand, it is possible that one may judge it neces-
sary to maintain the tension of revolt against a situation to which one 
does not wish to consent at any price; thus, during the war, when Negro 
leaders in America were asked to drop their own claims for the sake of 
the greater interest, Richard Wright refused; he thought that even in time 
of war his cause had to be defended. In any case, morality requires that 
the combatant not be blinded by the goal which he sets up for himself to 
the point of falling into the fanaticism of seriousness or passion. The 
cause which he serves must not lock itself up and thus create a new ele-
ment of separation: through his own struggle he must seek to serve the 
universal cause of freedom.313
ceux qui, considérant leur affranchissement comme l’action la plus urgente, profitaient 
de la situation pour l’obtenir” (pma 142, EA 98).
311 Frechtman: “today oppression has more than one aspect; the Arabian fellah is oppressed 
by both the sheiks and the French and English administration.”
312 Frechtman has “individual,” which is a fine translation, but Emily Ann Parker has con-
vinced me that Beauvoir makes a distinction between “singulière” and “individuel.”
313 “Le problème se complique pratiquement du fait qu’aujourd’hui l’oppression a plus d’un 
visage: le fellah arabe est opprimé à la fois par les cheiks et par l’administration française 
ou anglaise; lequel des deux ennemis faut-il combattre? L’intérêt du prolétariat français 
n’est pas le même que l’indigène colonisé: lequel servir? Mais la question ici est politique 
avant d’être morale; il faut aboutir à ce que toute oppression soit abolie; chacun doit me-
ner sa lutte en liaison avec celle des autres et en l’intégrant au dessin général; quel ordre 
suivre? Quelle tactique adopter? c’est affaire d’opportunité et d’efficacité. Cela dépend 
aussi pour chacun de sa situation singulière. Il se peut qu’il soit amené à sacrifier provi-
soirement une cause dont le succès est subordonné à celle d’une cause plus urgente à 
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For each one it also depends on his singular situation. Beauvoir is clear that 
those who are oppressed are best positioned to carry out their own “luttes,” but 
she has been equally clear about the bad faith of the conservative who asks, 
“what right does one have to will something for others?” as an excuse for wash-
ing his hands of abuses carried on by his country or his class.314 The cause of 
liberty, she says, is everyone’s.
Further discussion draws on two other examples from (fictionalized) Amer-
ican labor history. Steinbeck’s In Dubious Battle, where a union leader does not 
hesitate to launch a costly walkout with a doubtful outcome, hoping to raise 
the consciousness of the workers to the possibility of revolt, makes sense to 
her. But she contrasts this to an incident from a Dos Passos story, “The Adven-
tures of a Young Man”: some miners have been condemned to death as a result 
of a strike, and the leader must decide whether to conciliate the authorities 
(and save their lives), or call in the Communist Party, which will create an in-
ternational cause célèbre that will be good for the cause of the Revolution (or at 
least the party), but give up the chance of actually saving the men. The Dos 
Passos hero chooses to save his men, and Beauvoir thinks he is right. “If it is 
really men which the movement claims to be serving, in this case it must prefer 
saving the lives of three concrete individuals to a very uncertain and weak 
chance of serving a little more effectively, by their sacrifice, the mankind to 
come.”315 Also, in the Steinbeck case, even as a failure the strike is an immedi-
ate and honest call to the liberté of the workers, whereas in the Dos Passos ex-
ample refusing to settle the men’s case would amount to duping them, “and the 
whole proletariat [would be] duped with them.”316
Beauvoir’s discussion of these dilemmas has the undeniable flavor of trol-
leyology, the kind of abstract and arid philosophical reasoning that Jake, the 
kid in Carol Gilligan’s A Different Voice, memorably called “a math problem 
défendre; il se peut au contraire qu’on juge nécessaire de maintenir la tension de la révolte 
contre une situation à laquelle on ne veut à aucun prix consentir; ainsi, l’Amérique en 
guerre ayant demandé aux leaders noirs de renoncer dans l’intérêt général à leur revendi-
cations propres, Richard Wright a refusé, estimant que même à travers la guerre sa cause 
devait être défendue. En tout cas, ce qu’exige la morale, c’est que le combattant ne soit pas 
aveuglé par le but qu’il se propose au point de retomber dans le fanatisme du sérieux ou 
de la passion; la cause qu’il sert ne doit pas se refermer sur elle-même, créant un nouvel 
élément de séparation: à travers sa propre lutte il doit chercher à servir la cause univer-
selle de la liberté” (pma 128–29, EA 88).
314 “[D]e quel droit voudrait-on quelque chose pour autrui?” (pma 124, EA 85).
315 “Si ce sont vraiment des hommes que le mouvement prétend servir, il doit ici préférer la 
vie de trois individus concrets à une très incertaine et faible chance de servir un peu plus 
efficacement par leur sacrifice l’humanité à venir” (pma 218–19, EA 150).
316 “[O]n dupe avec eux tout le prolétariat” (pma 219, EA 324).
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with humans.”317 But it is a math problem based on real humans. (Indeed, such 
situations, which really did arise during the Second World War, seem to be 
where the “trolley problem” came from in the first place.)318 The dilemmas 
posed by the Steinbeck and Dos Passos cases have different answers, not by 
some categorical yardstick, but because of concrete features of their situation; 
the larger point she is making is that “[e]thics does not furnish recipes, any 
more than do science and art. One can merely propose methods.”319
We are not really all that far, here, from the style of contextualized reasoning 
Gilligan’s book was asking us to prefer, nor from the further extrapolation of 
Gilligan’s view by such feminist moral philosophers as Margaret Urban Walker, 
who develops the idea of “moral remainders”: “genuine moral demands which, 
because their fulfillment conflicted with other genuine moral demands, are 
“left over” in episodes of moral choice, and yet are not just nullified.”320 Qres-
cent Mali Mason describes an equally suggestive parallel between Beauvoir’s 
317 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 26.
318 See Cass Sunstein, “How Do We Know.”
At pma 164, EA 113, Beauvoir says: “I have known a Kantian rationalist who passion-
ately maintained that it is as immoral to choose the death of a single man as to let ten 
thousand die…. This position of the problem is rather abstract, for one rarely bases a 
choice on pure quantity.” [J’ai connu un rationaliste kantien qui soutenait avec passion 
qu’il est aussi immoral de choisir la mort d’un seul homme que d’en laisser périr dix 
mille…. Cette position du problème est d’ailleurs assez abstraite, car il est bien rare qu’on 
fonde le choix sur la pure quantité.] But she would later be equally unsatisfied by the ab-
stract level on which she responded to the “problème,” and it is hard to disagree. As Sartre 
says somewhere, “on pense mal quand on pense par problème.”
319 “La morale, pas plus que la science et l’art, ne fournissent des recettes. On peut proposer 
seulement des méthodes” (pma 194, EA 134).
320 Margaret Urban Walker, “Moral Understandings: Alternative ‘Epistemology’ for a Femi-
nist Ethics,” 20–1. While Beauvoir would have been quite unsympathetic to the “ethic of 
care” background on which Walker’s ideas emerge, some further echoes are suggestive. 
Opposing what she calls the “universalism” of most ethical theory, Walker proposes an 
“alternative moral epistemology [which] holds … that adequacy of moral understanding 
decreases as its form approaches generality through abstraction.” Here and elsewhere, she 
talks about the importance of narrative, and other extraphilosophical modes of inquiry, 
in reaching moral understanding:
“A lively interest in understanding how various factors (semantic, institutional, politi-
cal) shape our ability to arrive at shared interpretations is needed, as is a questioning of 
barriers between philosophical, literary, critical, and empirical investigations of moral 
life. These endeavors can, however, be carried out in a cheerfully piecemeal fashion; we 
need not expect or require the results to eventuate in a comprehensive systematization.”
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statement that “ethics does not furnish recipes” and the long article in which 
Kimberlé Crenshaw first used the term “intersectionality.” Mali Mason writes:
It is important to remember that Crenshaw’s initial argument for inter-
sectionality is based in the field of law. She has in mind a particular way 
in which particular deployments of antidiscrimination laws tend to erase 
or render incomprehensible the experiences of Black women. In this 
sense, they are grounded in their attendance to practical action and in 
their calls for policy change.321
My point here, though, is simply that statements like “lynching is an absolute 
evil”322 predate any mobilization as an analogy within Beauvoir’s feminism. 
“When one fights for the emancipation of oppressed indigènes, the liberation 
of American Blacks, the establishment of a Palestinian State, the socialist revo-
lution, it is obvious that one aims at a long-term goal.” But “the tasks we have 
set up for ourselves and which, though exceeding the limits of our lives, are 
ours, must find their meaning in themselves and not in a mythical End of 
History.”323 “When one fights [Quand on lutte]” does not argue that one should 
fight for these things, it assumes that of course one does, it tells us something 
about who “one [on]” is, something that seemed at the time too obvious to say.
Oh, by the way, did you know that Simone de Beauvoir was concerned about 
“the establishment of a Palestinian state” in the 1940s? If you did know that, 
thank a French teacher. Because Frechtman gives only: “When one fights for 
the emancipation of oppressed natives, or the socialist revolution, he … ” Per-
haps he thought American readers would be confused about what sort of state 
Beauvoir might have been hoping for (and also about what the “liberation” of 
American Blacks might consist in).324 But why ask why? Compared to Parshley, 
321 Qrescent Mali Mason, “Intersectionality, Ambiguity and Feminist Ethics.”
322 “Lyncher un nègre ou supprimer cent oppositionels, ce ne sont pas deux actes analogues. 
Le lynchage est un mal absolu” (pma 211, EA 146). Frechtman has eliminated “un nègre.”
323 “Quand on lutte pour l’affranchissement des indigènes opprimés, la libération des noirs 
d’Amérique, l’édification d’un État palestinien, la révolution socialiste, il est évident qu’on 
vise un but à longue échéance … les tâches que nous nous proposons et qui, tout en 
débordant les limites de nos vies, sont nôtres, doivent trouver leur sens en elles-mêmes et 
non dans une fin mythique de l’Histoire” (pma 184–85, EA 128). Where Frechtman has “a 
mythical Historical end,” I’ve changed this to “a mythical End of History,” because Hegel.
324 This is a legitimately complicated question, and to answer it would require more research 
(in the Temps Modernes archive, perhaps) than I can undertake right now. However, 
Claude Lanzmann’s autobiography, Le lièvre de Patagonie, suggests that he, and the Temps 
Modernes team in general, strongly supported the rights of Palestinian Arabs alongside a 
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or to whoever made the cuts in the first English version of L’Amérique au jour le 
jour 1947, Frechtman is a prince among translators, even if the alterations I’ve 
needed to correct all tend to point the reader away from the text’s historical 
and political specificity.
Beauvoir’s own lists of worthwhile “luttes” are not always the same. Other 
examples are drawn from the French revolution, the Resistance to the Nazis, 
“the insurrections in Paris and Lyons at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury” and “the revolts in India.”325 (Despite the centrality of the proletariat to 
her views, she reserves judgment as to whether the ussr represents a truly 
socialist society: there is bad faith on both sides of the question and, as we saw, 
“les Staliniens” can be an example of the serious man, if they give up the right 
to think for themselves.)326 She does not yet include (anywhere) “la lutte des 
femmes.” She would continue till the end of her life fighting for all the others, 
and resolving the “antinomies” based on the concrete situations she saw.
And oddly enough, despite the text’s aridity and its other lapses, Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté does seem to have found some readers. Remember that 
sentence Audre Lorde quoted, in the peroration to “The Master’s Tools”?327 It 
doesn’t come from The Second Sex. Here it is in context, in the opening section 
of Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.
There was Stalingrad and there was Buchenwald, and neither of the two 
wipes out the other. Since we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us therefore 
try to look the truth in the face. Let us try to assume our fundamental 
ambiguity. It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our lives that 
we must draw our strength to live and our reasons for acting [emphasis 
added].328
belief in the legitimacy of the Jewish state of Israel. (Best known outside of France for his 
film Shoah, Lanzmann was Beauvoir’s companion and shared her apartment from 1952–
59; afterwards they remained friends and close collaborators.)
325 “[L]es insurrections de Paris et de Lyon, au début du xixième, ou les révoltes des Indes” 
(pma 217, EA 149).
326 pma 180, EA 125.
327 Lorde, “Master’s Tools,” 113.
328 “Il y a eu Stalingrad et Buchenwald et aucun des deux n’efface l’autre. Puisque nous ne 
réussisons pas à la fuir, essayons donc de regarder en face la vérité. Essayons d’assumer 
notre fondamentale ambiguïté. C’est dans la connaissance des conditions authentiques 
de notre vie qu’il nous faut puiser la force de vivre et des raisons d’agir” (pma 12–13, EA 8).
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10 Last Thoughts
Finally, let me also put my earlier quotation—“She was always, and consis-
tently, a woman of the left”—in a little more context, by handing the micro-
phone back to the editors of the European Journal of Women’s Studies, who 
have more standing to explain than I.
When the Special Issue on The Second Sex was planned and discussed … 
few of us supposed that in March 1999 nato would begin a campaign of 
systematic bombing in Yugoslavia. As a result of this action, one of our 
Associate Editors, Jasmina Lukic from Belgrade, is now living in a city 
which is under daily threat of destruction … The tragic irony of this new 
war in Europe is that it recalls only too vividly words that de Beauvoir 
wrote in the third volume of her autobiography…. De Beauvoir, like every-
one of her generation, rejoiced in the beginning of a new peace and wel-
comed the Allied military forces that had defeated the Germans. Men in 
uniforms were agents of a just war and a hopeful peace. Only a few years 
later, many of those same uniforms had become not the symbols of 
peace, but the representatives of repression and a new form of cultural 
and economic materialism, that of the usa…. What is striking about re-
reading Force of Circumstance in 1999 is how much of the book is domi-
nated by a discussion of world politics, and in particular the attempt of 
de Beauvoir and Sartre to identify and articulate a politics which did not 
embrace either the free market ideology of the usa or the repression of 
state socialism….
In re-reading de Beauvoir we need, therefore, to recognize how much 
Politics with a capital ‘P’ were part of de Beauvoir’s world…. It is very 
easy to read de Beauvoir, and particularly The Second Sex, and recognize 
the dynamics of relations with individual men or the continuing mi-
sogyny of many aspects of our culture. But, at the same time as we do 
this, we may be in danger of forgetting [that] she was always and consis-
tently a woman of the Left. She identified with those politics which ap-
peared to empower and improve the living conditions of the poor and 
the  disadvantaged…. Rethinking the relationship of women to formal 
politics still requires discussion and debate. Nevertheless, at this mo-
ment of writing, Jasmina Lukic and every other woman in Yugoslavia 
and Kosovo is living in real physical danger. Equally, all women in the 
Balkans face the terrible prospect of the death of others, the absolute 
disruption of their lives and the destruction of civil society. It is one of 
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the great strengths of de Beauvoir’s feminism that she placed it outside 
the Anglo-American discourse of legal rights and institutional emanci-
pation. In celebrating The Second Sex at this particular and specific his-
torical moment we should perhaps remember in particular de Beau-
voir’s dissent from the assumptive world which has brought war to 
Europe.329
So to sum up my argument so far: here is the third example where I answer “we 
wouldn’t say that now” with “true enough, but you say that like it’s a bad thing.” 
Also, do you really mean “we wouldn’t say that now” or “we wouldn’t say that 
here”? And just who do you think “we” are?
329 wise, “Editorial,” 260–62.
Chapter 4
Beauvoir and Blackness
Nous faisons ici le procès des mystifiés et des mystificateurs.
frantz fanon, Peau noire masques blancs1
I’ll return to some of the critiques of Beauvoir’s “ethnocentricity” later. But 
first, I want to change the conversation by situating Beauvoir in the left context 
of her time: which is to say, intellectually between Wright and Fanon; and po-
litically, between Europe and America.
1 Two-Way Streets: Richard Wright, Psychology, and Politics
Beauvoir always acknowledged Richard Wright as a good friend and a key intel-
lectual influence. Margaret Simons’s groundbreaking 1997 essay followed her 
lead, taking up Paul Gilroy’s challenge in The Black Atlantic to look at the influ-
ence Wright has had on the European thinkers he came into contact with.2 Gil-
roy’s overall agenda was first to restore awareness of the Black contribution to 
modernity, showing that its intellectual ships sailed in both directions, and sec-
ond to make clear the limitations of a simple kind of Afrocentric Black nation-
alism, “to demonstrate why the polarisation between essentialist and anti-es-
sentialist theories of black identity has become unhelpful.”3 (There’s a parallel 
to Toril Moi’s discussion of a similar impasse with reference to sex and gender.)4 
In the decades since Gilroy’s book appeared, his view seems to have largely won 
out: see, for instance, Satya Mohanty’s call for the study of “alternative moder-
nities,” a “disaggregated modernity”—“[c]ultural chauvinism is toxic”—and 
the work of Duncan McEachern Yoon and others on excavating “Bandung 
1 “We here put on trial both those who have been swindled and those who swindled them.” 
Frantz Fanon, Peau noire masques blancs (hereinafter pnmb), 25; Black Skin, White Masks, 
translated by Charles Lam Markmann (hereinafter bswm), 17. Throughout this chapter 
and the chapter that follows, I will give page numbers from Markmann’s translations in 
the Pluto Press edition, and my translations are based on his, but I have made a very large 
number of changes, some of them significant. This particular passage, for instance, is almost 
unrecognizable.
2 Margaret Simons, “Richard Wright, Simone de Beauvoir, and The Second Sex.”
3 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, x.
4 Toril Moi, What is A Woman?, especially vi-xvi and 3–21.
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Humanism.”5 The motto of the Caribbean Philosophers’ Association— “shifting 
the geography of reason”—is a beautiful way of stating this larger project. As 
Jane Anna Gordon explained at the Diverse Lineages of Existentialism confer-
ence, “to do rigorous work we need to understand the transnational networks 
our figures worked in.”6
Working along those lines, then, Simons credits Richard Wright’s influence 
with moving Beauvoir beyond an apolitical consideration of ethics in the 
“moral period” works. The break between Beauvoir’s early philosophical essays 
and The Second Sex seems less sharp to me (see chapter 3 for discussion of 
Beauvoir’s critique of nationalism and colonialism in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté). But I am otherwise very much in agreement with Simons’s view 
that Wright’s analysis helped Beauvoir see and explain the simultaneously free 
and unfree situation of women.7
It’s important that Wright offers an account of Blackness that we could call 
social constructionist, without falling into a purely “humanist” race-neutral 
position.8 Gilroy quotes Wright: “the word Negro in America means something 
not racial or biological, but something purely social, something made in the 
United States.”9 And yet obviously, for Wright, race remains the central fact of 
Black lived experience, and those who seek to deny this become, quite literally, 
crazy. This is very close to Beauvoir’s position.10 “If woman did not exist, men 
would have invented her. They did invent her. But she also exists.”11
5 See Columbia University Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Bandung Hu-
manisms.” See also Satya Mohanty, “Literature to Combat Cultural Chauvinism: From In-
dian Literature to World Literature,” and Duncan Yoon, “The Global South and Cultural 
Struggles: On the Afro-Asia People’s Solidarity Organization.”
6 Jane Anna Gordon, Opening Plenary, Diverse Lineages of Existentialism conference. St. 
Louis, Missouri, June 2014.
7 See now also Lori Marso, Politics with Beauvoir: Freedom in the Encounter, 122–47, for a 
parallel account.
8 The scare quotes around “humanism” are mine, not his—what I mean is that he didn’t use 
“humanism” as an excuse to pretend race, or racism, did not exist.
9 Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, 149, quoted from Richard Wright, White Man, Listen!, 80.
10 “To decline to accept such notions as the eternal feminine, the Black soul, and the Jewish 
character, is not to deny that Jews, Blacks, women exist today—such a denial would not 
represent a liberation for those concerned, but rather a flight from reality. It is clear that 
no woman can claim without bad faith to situate herself beyond her sex.” [Refuser les no-
tions d’éternel féminin, d’âme noire, de caractère juif, ce n’est pas nier qu’il y ait des Juifs, 
des Noirs, des femmes: cette négation ne représente pas pour les intéressés une libération, 
mais une fuite inauthentique. Il est clair qu’aucune femme ne peut prétendre sans mau-
vaise foi se situer par-delà son sexe (DS 1:13).] See chapter 1 above for discussion of this 
point in a different context.
11 “[S]i [la femme] n’existait pas, les hommes l’auraient inventée. Ils l’ont inventée. Mais elle 
existe aussi sans leur invention” (DS 1:303).
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Simons lists a number of other ways Wright importantly influenced Beau-
voir’s understanding of oppression, including “his subjectivist approach, his 
critical analysis of the limitations of Marxist ideology … and his militant 
engagement.”12 She sees Wright as passing on to Beauvoir W. E. B. DuBois’s idea 
of “double consciousness,” which served as a model for Beauvoir’s concept of 
women as split and divided against ourselves: both integrated into and alien-
ated from the dominant culture which defines us as defective human beings. 
She also notes Wright’s demystification of “the claims by segregationists that 
blacks are happy and contented with their naturally inferior place in society” 
as a parallel to Beauvoir’s debunking of myths about women, quoting from 
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947: “the famous laughter of blacks … is often only a 
mask that the black dons in the presence of whites because he knows that it is 
demanded of him.”13 Beauvoir’s crucial abandonment of the concept of “hap-
piness” and her choice to speak instead of “freedom,” which I discussed in 
chapter 1 above, may thus rest in part on Wright’s analysis, and the illustrations 
he provides.14
Another important confluence between Beauvoir’s thinking and Wright’s 
has to do with the specifically psychological account The Second Sex provides of 
the damage oppression does. Jay Garcia’s 2012 book, Psychology Comes to Har-
lem, has underscored the centrality of psychoanalysis and related versions of 
psychological and social research to Wright’s work as both novelist and activist. 
When Wright dedicated himself to exposing “‘the unconscious machinery of 
race relations’ in modern American life,” which led ineluctably to violence and 
might lead to fascism, he seems to have meant “unconscious” in a literally 
Freudian way.15 Like many progressives in the 1940s, Wright “recognize[d] the 
field as a resource for alternative and dissident interpretations of the racialized 
12 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 176. Simons sees Wright’s “phenomenological descriptions of 
black experience of oppression” as an alternative both to Myrdal’s social science ap-
proach and “the economic reductionism of Marxist orthodoxy,” though she notes also 
that “[h]is critique of liberal individualism is as resounding as his critique of Marxism” 
(181).
13 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 178.
14 “[T]here is no way to measure someone else’s happiness and it is always easy to declare 
that the situation one wants to impose on him is a happy one: in particular, those who one 
condemns to stagnation one declares happy, under the pretext that happiness is immobil-
ity.” [[I]l n’y a aucune possibilité de mesurer le bonheur d’autrui et il est toujours facile de 
déclarer heureuse la situation qu’on veut lui imposer: ceux qu’on condamne à la stagna-
tion en particulier, on les déclare heureux sous prétexte que le bonheur est immobilité 
(DS 1:31).]
15 Jay Garcia, Psychology Comes to Harlem: Rethinking the Race Question in Twentieth- Century 
America, 14.
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social order”;16 his collaboration with Fredric Wertham to found the Lafarge 
Clinic in Harlem showed on a small scale that segregation could be reframed as 
a “public health problem” without being de-politicized;17 in novels and essays, 
his analysis of the relationship between frustration and aggression, between 
fear and rage, diagnosed a sickness that damaged both whites and Blacks and 
called into question the patriotic idea of America as an ethical ideal. For in-
stance, his introduction to Black Metropolis drew attention to “how any human 
beings can become mangled, how any personalities can become distorted 
when men are caught in the psychological trap of being emotionally commit-
ted to living a life of freedom that is denied them,”18 and quoted Life magazine’s 
analysis of “Myrdal’s notion of dissonance in American consciousness”:
The dilemma, of course, is this: the basic tenets of the American creed 
make all men free and equal in rights. Yet in fact we deny equal rights to 
our largest minority, and observe a caste system which we not only criti-
cize in other nations but refuse to defend in ourselves. This makes us liv-
ing liars—a psychotic case among the nations.19
When Faulkner, who had encouraged “the Negro” to “go slow” in demanding 
human rights, won the Nobel Prize in 1950, Wright remarked, “[i]t would be a 
great mistake to feel that the Negro was the only victim of the white South’s 
proud neurosis.”20
Medical and moral language are inextricable in terms like “neurosis” and 
“psychotic”; Garcia convincingly traces this discourse through a number of 
writers who followed Wright (Chester Himes, Lillian Smith, Ralph Ellison, to 
some extent James Baldwin), and reminds us that the case in Brown v. Board of 
Education was built largely from expert evidence about the psychological dam-
age done to children by segregation in schools. So from Wright’s perspective, 
and from a mid-century perspective generally, Myrdal’s idea of “pathology” 
seems less problematic than it did to Simons (and might seem to most readers 
now).
Narrative depictions of psychological dysfunction (glossed as such) in 
Wright’s work might be multiplied almost endlessly—Bigger Thomas in Native 
16 Ibid., 53.
17 Wertham said that psychotherapy must be discussed “at this time and at this place” (Gar-
cia, Psychology Comes to Harlem, 62).
18 Richard Wright, “Introduction” to St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A 
Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, xxvi. See Garcia, Psychology Comes to Harlem, 40.
19 Wright, Black Metropolis, 41.
20 Michel Fabre, The World of Richard Wright, 89.
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Son is the best-known example. Less melodramatically, in his autobiographical 
Black Boy Wright describes African Americans “transferring” hatred to other 
African Americans, and explores problems of “adjustment,” “self-hatred,” and 
being at war with reality. Passages like his descriptions of co-workers in a 
hotel— “how smoothly the black boys acted out the roles that the white race 
had mapped out for them … [T]hey knew … what not to aspire to”21—make it 
easy to understand why Black Boy was attacked for “negative portrayals” of Af-
rican American life, even though Wright is describing a mutually reinforcing 
system: “Whites would rather have had negros who stole, work for them than 
negros with self-respect.”22 Reading this, it’s hard not to be struck by the simi-
larities to Beauvoir’s account of the “feminine” personality formed as a result 
of male domination, whether directly or through complicity or both—the 
“negative portrayals” of women for which she, too, was attacked, especially in 
discussions of her fiction.23
But Wright and the others Garcia discusses wrote with an ultimately thera-
peutic aim. (Even the decision in Brown v. Board can be read that way.) And 
as I’ve said in chapter 1 above, Beauvoir was relentlessly opposed to both the 
formal institution of psychotherapy, and its prevalence as a cultural practice—
she saw it as a quintessentially American project of conformity and normal-
ization.24 She would not change her mind about this: the late novel Les belles 
images puts therapy in parallel with the “reassuring lies” of the Catholic Church 
and technocratic capitalism, and the dénouement turns on the heroine’s 
21 Richard Wright, Black Boy, in Later Works, 188.
22 Ibid., 191. See Garcia, Psychology Comes to Harlem, 43.
23 For fuller discussion, see Altman, “Beauvoir as Literary Writer.”
24 In this, she was closer to the Jamaican C. L. R. James, who, while, in Garcia’s words, 
“buoyed” by his “wonderful” meeting with Wright, still judged psychoanalytic thought in 
the modern world not liberatory but “a refuge from social ills” and “found ‘the football 
that American intellectuals had made of it’ disturbing” (Garcia, Psychology Comes to Har-
lem, 100). James lived in the United States between 1938 and 1953, after he’d already writ-
ten The Black Jacobins; his book American Civilization was written quickly, before he was 
deported. Beauvoir did not read The Black Jacobins until much later.
The irony that “American” psychoanalysis was almost entirely the creation of Europe-
an émigrés would take entirely too long to follow up here, but it’s worth noting, as Garcia 
does, the importance of Freud to studies of fascism such as Adorno’s The Authoritarian 
Personality which in turn influenced Wright, Wertham, Brown v. Board, etc. Adorno’s work 
of this period also combined what we would call “theory” with empirical social science 
methodology deployed on a large scale; his psychohistorical exploration of fascism did 
not prevent criticisms rather similar to Beauvoir’s of the negative cultural effects of popu-
lar Freudianism from emerging in his Minima Moralia. The methodologies seemed com-
plementary rather than conflicting. See Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno: An Intellectual 
Biography.
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success in resisting “treatment” for her daughter. So, as with her use of Stekel, 
and of Freudians generally, we could see Beauvoir following Wright’s descrip-
tive account but unhooking herself from the prescriptions that follow.
It’s easy to trace continuities between Wright’s discussion of American pa-
thologies and a term in current use, “historical trauma.” (Ta-Nehisi Coates 
makes this connection: the title of his powerful 2015 book, Between the World 
and Me, is a line from an early poem by Wright.) But the distinction Wright and 
Beauvoir make between “happy” and “free” is not much heard today. Wright 
and Beauvoir are both concerned with the psychological damage oppression 
does, on the level of what we might now call “affect.” Affect matters. But the 
question of who affectively experiences/feels the effect of oppression, and the 
question “who is oppressed,” are distinct questions: while the epistemology of 
affect is important, it does not block other epistemologies.25 That seems to me, 
for lack of a better term, healthy. As Beauvoir makes clear in Pour une morale 
de l’ambiguïté, situations do occur that pit the need of one oppressed group 
against another in irreconcilable ways. If the measure of oppression is taken 
solely in terms of affect, a kind of “race to the bottom” or competition around 
who feels worse becomes inevitable; even though all the feelings involved may 
be both authentic and legitimate, the resulting negative spiral can do damage 
to all concerned, without pointing toward solutions.
We should remember, too, that Bigger Thomas is hardly presented as a mor-
al exemplar: Wright’s view included the idea that racism creates criminals, but 
criminality as such is not glorified or romanticized as “resistance.” This seems 
to me consistent with Beauvoir’s refusal to romanticize women damaged by 
oppression: as I discussed above, for her, the harmed person could not be good, 
and that was part of the harm.
2 Lost in Translation
Simons also points out that by “presenting Wright as her mentor, her guide not 
only to the sights of Harlem, but to the intellectual terrains of racism, Beau-
voir’s narrative legitimizes Wright’s analysis—perhaps the reason that an 
American edition of America Day by Day 1947 did not appear until 1953, with 
25 Consider this, from White Man, Listen: “Recently a young woman asked me: ‘But would 
your ideas make people happy?’ and before I was aware of what I was saying, I heard my-
self answering with a degree of frankness that I rarely, in deference to politeness, permit 
myself in personal conversation: my dear, I do not deal in happiness, I deal in meaning” 
(xxix).
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most of the discussion of Myrdal’s text and the passages in which Wright ap-
pears to be teaching Beauvoir deleted.”26 Michael Barber gives more detail:
Although Beauvoir’s preoccupation with the anti-black racism she expe-
riences in the United States appears in the first English translation, the 
translation fails to convey the intensity of her concern since it omits at 
least fifteen discussions, often pointed, about race relations, including 
Beauvoir’s most extensive reflections on race in the United States, an 
important account of a visit to an African-American church with Rich-
ard Wright, and a rather long discussion of the treatment of African- 
Americans within the cotton industry in the South.27 When one consid-
ers these key omissions, including a regular deleting of comments on 
labor relations, red-baiting, and Truman’s foreign policy, with which 
Beauvoir often introduces her daily entries, one realizes that the English 
translation has been depoliticized and actually so deformed that it is 
hardly the same book.28
So while it’s tempting (and not incorrect) to attribute the deletion of Wright’s 
role to the same American racism he and Beauvoir were both analyzing, I’d 
argue that’s just one part of a broader depoliticization of the texts, a refusal to 
take political ideas seriously.
This may have been the first such transatlantic “revision” of a Beauvoir text 
but it was hardly the last. Something similar happened with Les mandarins, 
Beauvoir’s 1954 “condition of France” novel about the post-war period. While 
the central ethical drama of Les mandarins involves French intellectuals com-
ing to terms with the aftermath of the Second World War, a significant portion 
of its action unfolds in the United States. Its clearest fictional precursor is John 
Dos Passos’s trilogy, u.s.a.: both books cogently explore the failings of almost 
every faction on the left, and yet leave us with a sense that a leftist perspective 
remains urgent, that no other road is possible. Les mandarins was reviewed in 
the New Republic under the title “Simone Go Home,” even though, as Bill Mc-
Bride has shown, the translation softened its politics to the point of incoher-
ence. (McBride points in particular to the disappearance of the word “hege-
mony” from Beauvoir’s descriptions of post-war American domination.)29
26 Simons, “Richard Wright,” 181; L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 (hereinafter AJ), 181–82.
27 AJ 231–42, 265–69, 207–10.
28 Barber, “Phenomenology and the Ethical Bases of Pluralism,” 161–62.
29 William McBride, “The Conflict of Ideologies in The Mandarins: Communism and De-
mocracy, Then and Now,” 33–45. The negative review (Donald Malcolm, “Simone Go 
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The de-politicized translation of L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 wasn’t the 
first time a publisher thought Americans were too stupid, or too lazy, to under-
stand the political context and implication of European intellectual work, and 
it wasn’t the last time, either. How many generations of American graduate 
students devoured Roland Barthes’s Mythologies without realizing that some-
thing like a third of the original book had been silently deleted, eliminating all 
the topical references and distorting Barthes’s political critique? The lack of 
cultural and political context that accompanied the importation of Foucault 
and Derrida led American readers to lump them together as “post- structuralists,” 
to the irritation of both. Another example is the selling of the “New French 
Feminism” in the 1980s.30 Mistranslations of Fanon’s work could hardly con-
ceal that he was a political writer, but with mistakes like changing “l’expérience 
vécue du noir” to “The Fact of Blackness” Charles Lam Markmann certainly 
made a Parshley-sized hash of his views.31 Fair or unfair, the assumption that 
“American readers won’t get it” has been a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more we 
receive our “theory” with the politics excised, the less likely we are to under-
stand, or even notice it, when it is there. L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 diag-
nosed this problem, as well as falling victim to it.32 Beauvoir’s frustration that 
Home”) is cited in the introduction to Sally Scholz and Shannon M. Musset, eds., The Con-
tradictions of Freedom: Philosophical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir’s The Mandarins, 22.
30 See Christine Delphy, “The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move,” and Claire 
Moses, “Made in America: ‘French Feminism’ in Academia.”
31 See Nigel Gibson, “Fanon and the Pitfalls of Cultural Studies,” and David Macey, Frantz 
Fanon: A Biography, 25–6. Richard Serrano describes pointing out the mistranslation to a 
keynote speaker who was using it in a project on “the poetics of Fanon”: “The speaker in-
formed me that others had already pointed out these errors to him, but added that he 
considered the mistranslation of Fanon a crucial part of the text’s history” (Against the 
Postcolonial: Francophone Writers at the End of the French Empire, 174).
32 While the 1998 translation by Carol Cosman restored the cuts, I noticed that all the 
 English-language versions continue to drop “1947” from the title, presumably to increase 
sales by making the book seem less “dated”; but the result distorts Beauvoir’s intentions 
by implying a more totalizing view: the date implied a more local and direct political 
“take” on rapidly changing conditions that the writer might hope to influence. (Around 
the same time Sartre was arguing that engaged writing should be designed to be con-
sumed quickly on the spot, like bananas; if a text became “dated,” that was a good sign 
rather than a problem [What is Literature, 74].) In contrast, a 1969 translation from Bue-
nos Aires is titled Norteamérica al desnudo, which perhaps unbalances Beauvoir’s view 
too far in the other direction.
The cover of the new British paperback edition shows an African- American couple in 
1940s hats sitting on an old-fashioned bus (we see them from the back); but the cover of 
the newer American edition is a nice picture of a young, rather innocent-looking Simone 
alone, looking out diagonally over a snowy street that could be anywhere—the same pic-
ture appears on La force de l’âge and indeed on a number of books about Beauvoir. The 
245Beauvoir and Blackness
hardly anyone in the United States was willing to discuss, for instance, the im-
plications of the atomic bomb, or the rise of McCarthyism, is palpable through-
out the long sections about her visits to college campuses: both students and 
faculty members seem clueless, careerist, cowed, or simply paralyzed by the 
prevailing conformism.
That The Second Sex also came to American audiences in a significantly 
truncated and distorted form is well known. But not all of what I’m going on 
about can be blamed on Parshley or his editors.33 Which parts do you assign? 
Which parts do you skip because “they won’t understand it anyway, and it will 
take too long to explain”? I asked a bunch of reasonably clever college seniors 
what they already knew about Marx, what associations they had. No one spoke 
at first; then one of them raised her hand and ventured, “Was he the one who 
worked on the fish?” (She must have been thinking of Darwin.) Let me be clear: 
I don’t think this was the student’s fault.
And you know, Audre Lorde was a woman of the international left, too. 
When that class of seniors came to read Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, I 
gave them a reading quiz that included:
– Who were the Rosenbergs?
– When Audre and Ginny ride the bus downtown singing “union songs,” what 
are these?
– Why don’t the women in the factory use the protective shields on their 
machines?
– What is a “speedup”?
– Why is Rhea crying? (Answer: she’s a Party member, and they’ve threatened 
to exclude her for living with Audre.)
– Why was Eudora living in Mexico? (Answer: she’s a journalist, and she’s 
been blacklisted.)
Stopping to explain these things did slow us down in getting to the famous pas-
sage about “the very house of difference,” but I think it added to their under-
standing of the book, and of American history.
current French paperback uses Bernice Abbott’s dreamy-looking headshot, and in the 
excerpt on the back cover Beauvoir describes her text as tentative and subjective, and 
draws attention to her own incompetence. (Ironically, my favorite cover is the one on the 
1953 Dudley translation: a stylized design based on the American flag, with one rather 
lopsided star.)
33 Anna Bogic (“Uncovering the Hidden Actors with the Help of Latour: The ‘Making’ of The 
Second Sex”) has painstakingly excavated the archive of correspondence to show Parshley 
in a more sympathetic light, as having fought unsuccessfully for a better translation than 
the one we’ve all been blaming him for.
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And to go back to the “Master’s Tools” essay I discussed above: the antholo-
gized version of this piece many of us religiously teach does end, as I said 
above, with the strong peroration quoting Beauvoir. Interestingly, though, an 
earlier version of the text exists, and in the earlier version something came af-
ter that paragraph. Lorde gave the last word to Aimé Césaire, the revolutionary 
poet and statesman from Martinique.
Prospero, you are the master of illusion.
Lying is your trademark.
And you have lied so much to me
(Lied about the world, lied about me)
That you have ended by imposing on me
An image of myself.
Underdeveloped, you brand me, inferior,
That is the way you have forced me to see myself
I detest that image! What’s more, it’s a lie!
But now I know you, you old cancer,
And I know myself as well.
caliban, in aime césaire’s A Tempest34
Why did the anthology-makers cut this? “Oh, people won’t know who Aimé 
Césaire was.” Too right, they won’t. And cuts like this are why.35
Oh, and then look: the first essay in Sister Outsider is about Lorde’s trip to 
Moscow, where she is pleased to find that the Russian people aren’t racist 
and  that health care is provided free. And we don’t teach that essay because … 
 because … well … So there is an endless regress here.
34 This version of Lorde’s text circulates on-line, with the source given as follows: Lorde, 
Audre. “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” 1984. Sister Outsid-
er: Essays and Speeches. Ed. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press. 110–14. 2007. Print. I found it at 
https://www.muhlenberg.edu/media/contentassets/pdf/campuslife/SDP%20Read-
ing%20Lorde.pdf.
However, all the editions of Sister Outsider I have been able to locate omit this ending. 
So I am unable to determine at what stage the cut was made, or whether the decision was 
Lorde’s or someone else’s. I think I remember a stand-alone pamphlet version of the essay, 
with a stapled cardboard cover, being sold in feminist bookstores in the early 1980s; this 
may be that, but I can’t find it, and must leave any further investigation for others.
35 And anyhow, I have international students from Africa and the Caribbean in my classes 
now. Maybe they do know who Césaire and Senghor were. And maybe if they don’t, they 
need to.
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But can it be right to present this material in a way that denies our students 
and readers, Black and white, full knowledge of the sources from which the 
authors we revere drew some of their analysis, and some of their strength?
…
To return to Gilroy’s point about the “two-way streets,” and by way of filling in 
the historical record, I want to underline that Wright was present, active, and 
important at the founding moment of Les Temps Modernes, as well as helping 
to co-found the Paris-based Pan-Africanist Présence Africaine right around the 
same time.36 A translation of Wright’s “Fire and Cloud” appeared in the very 
first issue of Les Temps Modernes in October 1945. It comes after Sartre’s fa-
mous “présentation,” where he called for the writer to be “engagé” and an-
nounced an “anthropologie synthétique,” and right before Merleau-Ponty’s 
important argument for intellectual responsibility, “La guerre a eu lieu” (The 
War Took Place). Wright’s stories in this and later issues aren’t relegated to the 
back of the book where we find the sociologically and politically valuable Doc-
uments that are meant to contribute to that “synthetic anthropology;” he’s in 
the front section with the political and literary theorists. The 1946 special issue 
Les Temps Modernes devoted to the United States included another story of 
Wright’s, and other texts he helped them select; they serialized Black Boy 
alongside with excerpts from Beauvoir’s Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté and 
Sartre’s Qu’est ce que la littérature?, which both mention it. Wright was clearly 
36 Doris Ruhe draws our attention to the close collaboration between the two journals: “Sar-
tre’s attention was drawn to African and Caribbean authors, if not earlier, thanks to his 
work on a ‘committee of support’ for the review Présence Africaine which Alioune Diop 
had just founded, a committee which also included such other intellectuals as Richard 
Wright, André Gide, Albert Camus, and Michel Leiris.” [L’attention de Sartre fut attirée au 
plus tard sur les auteurs d’Afrique et des Caraïbes grâce à son travail dans un “comité de 
patronage” pour la revue Présence Africaine que venait de fonder Alioune Diop, comité 
auquel appartenaient également d’autres intellectuels tels que Richard Wright, André 
Gide, Albert Camus et Michel Leiris (Ruhe, “Femmes, juifs, noirs,” 79–80).] The first issue 
of Présence Africaine (October-November 1947) included Alioune Diop, “Niam N’Goura, or 
Présence Africaine’s raison d’être,” translated by Richard Wright and Thomas Diop (190–
91). The French original appears in the same issue (7–14). So does Wright’s “Bright and 
Morning Star,” translated by Boris Vian, and Gwendolyn Brooks’s poem “The Ballad of 
Pearl May Lee.” Wright, working with the journal’s editorial board until 1950, was also re-
sponsible for Présence Africaine’s publishing Frank Marshall Davis, Samuel Allen, Horace 
Cayton, and C. L. R. James. Like La Revue du Monde Noir in the early 1930s, Présence Afric-
aine also published an English edition. See Toro Kiuchi and Yoshinobu Hakutani, Richard 
Wright: A Documented Chronology, and Brent Hayes Edwards, “The Uses of Diaspora.”
Chapter 4248
someone the Temps Modernes group were thinking with, not just someone they 
were thinking about.37
From its first issue, Les Temps Modernes was the voice of an independent 
and anti-imperialist French left.38 As Sonia Kruks notes, its editors were early 
and consistent opponents of colonialism.
Anticolonial resistance had begun in Vietnam by 1945. As early as 1946, 
the journal Les Temps Modernes (for which Beauvoir was a member of the 
editorial board) took a firmly anticolonial position. Indeed, the journal 
adhered to a pro-independence position for all the French colonies well 
before most of the French left, including the highly influential Commu-
nist Party, did so. Most of the left urged a degree of reform in the French 
colonies, but until the late 1950s, saw actual independence as far fetched.39
Beauvoir’s level of responsibility for Les Temps Modernes is often not marked as 
clearly as it should be. (Disappointingly, even the excellent New History of French 
Literature, which is organized through a series of significant events serving as 
windows on larger movements, covers the publication of the first issue of Les 
37 My point here is to undo any impression that Beauvoir was simply appropriating or “sam-
pling” Wright’s work as a jumping-off point for her own analysis. For further details, see 
Simons, “Richard Wright”; Kiuchi and Hakutani, Richard Wright: A Documented Chronol-
ogy; and Michel Fabre, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir.” Fabre describes Wright as in 
some ways closer to Beauvoir than to Sartre because Beauvoir, unlike Sartre, spoke Eng-
lish (Wright’s French was never all that good) and because she was “more congenial and 
less impressive than Sartre and Camus …. Not that her thinking was less vigorous than 
theirs, but her manners were more open and her metaphysical interest always focused 
upon everyday implications and applications” (World of Richard Wright, 169). See Gines, 
“The Race/Gender Analogy,” for Wright’s influence on Sartre’s play, La putain respectueuse, 
based on the case of the Scottsboro Boys.
38 Indeed, that honorable tradition continued for as long as the journal lasted: until Galli-
mard stopped publication at the end of 2018, following the death of its last editor, Claude 
Lanzmann. (See Agnès Poirier, “Les Temps Modernes: Paris mourns the passing of the in-
tellectual left’s bible.”)
39 Kruks, “Politics of Privilege,” 200N21, referencing David Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in 
Postwar France. Elsewhere she notes that “[i]n the context of the intensifying cold war in 
the late 1940s, the journal took a position of ‘critical support’ for the Soviet Union, arguing 
that although a return to the prewar capitalist status quo was unacceptable, the Soviet 
Union could not be fully supported either” (Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recog-
nition in Feminist Politics, 30). See also Ian Birchall, Sartre Against Stalinism. But the de-
tails of Sartre’s interactions with the Communist Party are of less interest to me here than 
the unwavering support the journal provided to the anti-colonial struggle, and to anti-
racist efforts in France.
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Temps Modernes as though Sartre had created the journal  single-handedly.)40 
But as Doris Ruhe reminds us, the first issue, which appeared in October 1945, 
was “signed by Simone de Beauvoir, alongside Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, as 
official co-editor.”41 Stève Bessac-Vaure has given a full (though oddly depo-
liticized) account of Beauvoir’s role in sustaining the magazine’s international 
character; letters to Algren make clear the level of her day to day attention 
to the often tedious tasks of maintaining its work, year after year, although 
this has seemed less interesting to her biographers than the details of her sex 
life and other emotional ups and downs.42 And in a way, the clearest evidence 
for Beauvoir’s leftist and anti-colonialist work is the least newsworthy—what 
Auden called “the expending of powers / On the flat ephemeral pamphlet and 
the boring meeting”43—the parts of La force des choses and Tout compte fait 
that even the most well-meaning of American readers tend to skip: acronyms 
of organizations that only lasted for a few years, numbers of people impris-
oned or killed, lists of who signed or didn’t sign the protest letter, explanations 
of why we quarreled with this person or that.44 This is the sort of work that 
Henri in Les mandarins would really like to put aside in order to work on his 
40 Denis Hollier, ed., A New History of French Literature, 82. Most of the article concentrates 
on the later quarrel between Sartre and Camus. The only reference to Beauvoir in that 
article is a footnote to Les mandarins. To be fair, later entries in Hollier’s history give Beau-
voir her due: the publication of The Second Sex gets its own article, written by Toril Moi, 
who attributes the hostility with which that book was received by both left and right to 
the Cold War—“a deeply divided intellectual climate”—and the fact that “[i]n 1949 Beau-
voir, like the rest of the group around Les Temps Modernes, belonged to the beleaguered 
non-aligned French left.” The article on what came to be called the “new French femi-
nisms,” written by Jane Gallop, begins with the special issue of L’arc devoted (supposedly) 
to Beauvoir’s work.
41 “En octobre 1945 avait paru le premier numéro … pour lequel Simone de Beauvoir avec 
Sartre et Merleau-Ponty signe en tant que coéditrice responsable” (Ruhe, “Femmes, juifs, 
noirs, ” 82).
42 Stève Bessac-Vaure, “Simone de Beauvoir as Mediator of Foreign Literature in Les Temps 
Modernes,” 2015. According to Bessac-Vaure, Beauvoir’s choices included Böll, Pavese, and 
Mayakovsky as well as Algren and Wright; he seems to be arguing that unlike Sartre, the 
fellow-traveler, Beauvoir’s tastes were philosophical and literary rather than political, and 
notes that authors published by Les Temps Modernes diverged from the more restrictive 
list promulgated by the Communist party. What seems missing here is the whole concep-
tion of an independent left perspective. Both Communists and right-wing thinkers (on 
both sides of the Atlantic) sneered at that very conception, but we need not agree with 
them.
43 Auden, “Spain,” in Selected Poems, 54.
44 Like L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, those volumes of her autobiography were not written 
“for the ages” and we are not the audience to whom they are addressed. And yet historians 
of the post-war period, even those hostile to Beauvoir, still turn to them.
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novel. But he does not put it aside, and neither did Beauvoir, including in that 
novel.45
3 Violence and Authenticity
But if Richard Wright prepared Beauvoir to understand America, and America 
prepared her to understand women … who or what prepared her to under-
stand Richard Wright? What made it possible for Beauvoir to take a subject 
position by his side, or at least approach the world through his lens, given his 
explicit project in Native Son to make sympathy from whites, and especially 
from white women, impossible? He explains in a frequently-quoted passage 
from “How Bigger Was Born”:
I had written a book of short stories which had been published under the 
title of Uncle Tom’s Children. When the reviews of the book began to ap-
pear, I realized that I had made an awfully naïve mistake. I found that I 
had written a book which even bankers’ daughters could read and weep 
over and feel good about. I swore to myself that if I ever wrote another 
book, no one would weep over it; that it would be so hard and deep that 
they would have to face it without the consolations of tears. It was this 
that made me get to work in dead earnest.46
I want to pair this with a quotation from an interview Beauvoir gave Michel 
Fabre, who asked how she first came across Native Son in 1940.
Sylvia Beach had told me: “You like violent books, well, here is a violent 
one, it will hit you hard.” And I said, “Yes, I’ll read it.” I read it and I was 
very, very much impressed.47
45 See Les mandarins chapter 11, especially 2:440–49. When Les mandarins won the Gon-
court prize, Beauvoir wrote that “Some young Malagasy sent me a wooden statue, appre-
ciating that I had spoken of the repression of ’47.” [De jeunes Malgaches m’envoyèrent 
une statuette en bois, touchés que j’eusse parlé de la répression de 47” (FCh 2:57).]
46 Wright, “How Bigger Was Born,” 874.
47 Michel Fabre, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir,” World of Richard Wright, 253. The in-
terview took place on June 24, 1970. Sylvia Beach was the owner of “Shakespeare and 
Company,” the famous English language bookstore in Paris, across the street from the 
Maison des amis des livres founded by her companion Adrienne Monnier. Beauvoir fre-
quented both shops beginning in her student days: see mjfr, 258, 307, 369, and La force de 
l’âge (hereinafter FA), 57, 62. Beach is also well-known as the first publisher of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses.
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And the fact is, Beauvoir did like violent books. One thing she and Sartre had 
in common with Richard Wright was a deep affinity for True Detective maga-
zine and other gory real-life sources of faits divers.48 She is not an exception to 
the general existentialist tendency to associate violence with freedom: one 
might wonder why the acte gratuit, from Gide’s Les caves du Vatican to Camus’s 
L’étranger and Beauvoir’s own L’invitée, and well beyond, is so frequently an act 
of murder. Somehow violence functions as a sign of authenticity: the eruption 
of violence into the everyday (or, the recognition that our notion of “the every-
day” rests on a tacit acceptance of the violence it leaves unspoken) can put 
paid to a certain kind of bourgeois hypocrisy.
Beauvoir would recognize, in her self-criticism about the melodramatic 
conclusion of L’invitée, that there is a world of difference between killing some-
one off in a book and really killing them.49 But this doesn’t mean that portray-
ing Black men as killers in books can’t have real-world dangerous effects down 
the line. The idea of racial “authenticity” has a troubled history, with which the 
other, existentialist meaning of “authenticity” is both productively and prob-
lematically intertwined. The question is, at what point does a search for raw 
authenticity in the experience of Others spill over into exoticism and/or radi-
cal chic: in today’s terms, when does cultural appreciation become cultural 
appropriation?
Disentangling this is no simple matter. Consider something else that was 
going on in Beauvoir’s Paris circle around the same time, the publication of a 
book called J’irai cracher sur vos tombes (I’ll Spit on Your Graves). The book’s 
real author was a young white Frenchman, Boris Vian, a trumpeter and pas-
sionate aficionado of jazz and all things American, and a key entrepreneur of 
the underground social scene in Saint-Germain-des-Prés that was becoming 
associated with tabloid versions of “existentialism.” Vian was also a serious 
writer (he’d just been passed over for the Prix de la Pléiade for his quite good 
novel L’écume des jours, and was very angry about it), and he and his wife Mi-
chelle were quite close to Sartre, who invited him to contribute a column called 
“Chronique du menteur” (Liar’s Chronicle) to Les Temps Modernes. In the case 
of J’irai cracher sur vos tombes, however, Vian claimed that he was only the 
48 “Faits divers” refers to short news items or “human interest stories”; those Beauvoir men-
tions in La force de l’âge are often violent, including the crime of the Papin sisters on 
which Jean Genet would base his play, Les bonnes, and the story of Violette Nozières, on 
trial for killing her abusive father. See FA 151–54.
49 “Novelists too often forget that in reality a gulf separates a dream of murder from a mur-
der: to kill is not an everyday act.” [Les romanciers oublient trop souvent que dans la ré-
alité un abîme sépare un rêve de meurtre d’un meurtre; tuer n’est pas un acte quotidien 
(FA 386–87).]
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translator, and that the author of the novel (and its several sequels) was a light-
skinned American Black man named Vernon Sullivan. The book itself is a sort 
of trashy thriller mystery. The hero and narrator, Lee Anderson, passes for 
white in order to seduce young white women (“bobby-soxers”). His plan is to 
avenge the lynching of his younger brother by deliberately “ruining” and then 
murdering a very rich man’s daughter; he does so in a highly sadistic way, and 
then is himself lynched. (How he nonetheless manages to narrate the book is 
never explained.) So there is a double movement of passing here: Vian ven-
triloquizes a Black American whose hero pretends to be white in order to kill. 
However, Vian was exposed as the book’s real author in 1947, because in real 
life a French man killed a woman, and when the police found the body, Vian’s 
book was in the room, open to the page where Lee commits the murder. This 
led to a prosecution for obscenity, and J’irai cracher sur vos tombes was banned.
J’irai cracher sur vos tombes is, by any measure, a very bad book. However, in 
some ways it’s not quite bad enough: it “works” both as a piece of pornography 
and as a crime novel, and the first-person narrative is skillful enough at placing 
us inside the main character’s subjectivity that we are seduced into complicity 
with his crime. The sex scenes owe a lot to Henry Miller (who was prosecuted 
for obscenity at the same time as Vian) and the sexual violence, especially at 
the end, owes a lot to Bataille and to the surrealist tradition. Faulkner’s Light in 
August is also a pretty evident influence.50
A successful fraud that crosses ethnic or gender lines is always interesting, 
because it reveals a cultural consensus about the plausible features of identity: 
the stunt “comes off” because of shared myths about gender and race. I’m of-
fering Vian in part as an example of the Foucauldian point that at this time 
(and perhaps more generally), racist and anti-racist discourses were too close 
for comfort, so close as to be inextricable. Vian could claim to have exposed, or 
at least told some compelling stories about, the habitual casual violence and 
racism of Southern whites that motivates Anderson’s revenge.51 But when the 
main character is lynched at the end, the reader (or anyhow this reader) feels 
that he deserves to die. So one is left wondering, wait a minute, what was the 
author trying to say?52 In the fake publicity surrounding the hoax, Vian claimed 
50 This is even truer of Vian/Sullivan’s second attempt, Les morts ont tous la même peau (The 
Dead All Have the Same Skin), whose desperately “passing” murderer turns out in the end 
to be white.
51 The rich white girl’s family made their money in West Indies rum, much as in Native Son 
Mary Dalton’s “progressive” father is a Chicago slumlord. Unlike Mary Dalton, however, 
the murder victim in Vian’s novel is herself a blatant racist.
52 As literary critic Mounia Benalil explains: “The sadistic violence of the novel’s closing 
scenes explosively unsettles the reading, while stripping bare the social diaspora and psy-
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that “Vernon Sullivan” could not step forward as the author because an actual 
Black man would have been lynched for writing such a book; and that claim 
was plausible. What then is the political effect of a white man’s fantasy engage-
ment with that real danger from a position of safety?
Vian’s main motivation appears to have been simply to make a little money 
(and prove that he was capable of doing so). And yet, he seems to have held 
other political commitments that were somewhat sincere. (During the Algerian 
crisis he’d become famous again for writing and singing a breezy but devastat-
ing anti-war anthem, “Le déserteur”: “M. le président, je vous fais une lettre….”) 
Critics have noted how strongly J’irai cracher sur vos tombes draws on Wright’s 
Native Son; Vian (with his wife’s help) had already translated a short story of 
Wright’s for Les Temps Modernes, and his translation of Wright’s “Bright and 
Morning Star” also appeared in the first issue of Présence Africaine, in 1946. But 
J’irai cracher sur vos tombes is a pretty perverse reading of Native Son, where the 
murder is accidental and the white woman is not raped: if anything, it is Bigger’s 
fear of being wrongfully accused of rape that leads to Mary Dalton’s death. Boris 
Vian today remains something of a cult figure, as though his “problematic” texts 
are just light-hearted kitsch; other critics have taken him seriously as a prema-
ture post-modernist about race, language, and the impossibility of authenticity. 
Stephanie Brown makes a strong case for this; but to do so, she must sidestep 
political questions entirely.53 Perhaps the lapse of time makes this reasonable. 
One contemporary reader, Frantz Fanon, found himself in a quandary with 
rather higher stakes, when dealing with white negrophobia (and fetishism) in 
his clinical practice:
chic homelessness of ‘mixed-blood’ identity. No program of social or political reform for 
the Black condition is proposed. The lynching of Lee that ends the novel signifies a return 
to the white man’s order, a return through which the racial status quo is maintained.” [La 
violence sadique des scènes qui clôturent le roman “dérange” la lecture au même moment 
où elles représentent une mise à nu profonde de l’errance psychique et de la diaspora so-
ciale de l’identité des “sang-mêlés.” Aucun programme de réforme sociale ou politique de 
la condition des Noirs n’est proposé. Le lynchage de Lee en conclusion du roman traduit 
un retour à l’ordre de l’homme blanc, un retour par lequel le statu quo racial est maintenu 
(“Boris Vian face à l’institution littéraire: le cas de J’irai cracher sur vos tombes,” 51).]
53 Stephanie Brown, “Black Comme Moi: Boris Vian and the African American Voice in 
Translation.” Brown’s reading is made plausible by Vian’s many “knowing” metatextual 
asides, which seem to position the author as above the fray. For instance, the white wom-
an, Lou, comments on the main character’s voice: “‘I suppose you couldn’t do anything 
about it,’ she said. ‘You were born like this.’ ‘No. I became like this.’” [Je suppose que vous 
n’y pouviez rien, dit-elle. Vous êtes né comme ça.—Non. Je suis devenu comme ça (J’irai 
cracher, 136).] For a general account of Vian’s career, see Philippe Boggio, Boris Vian.
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Another woman developed negrophobia after reading J’irai cracher sur 
vos tombes. We attempted to demonstrate the irrationality of her position 
in bringing her to see that the white victims were as morbid as the nègre. 
Moreover, we added, it was not a question of Blacks taking revenge as the 
title seemed to say, since the author was Boris Vian. We had to recognize 
that our efforts were in vain. This young woman would not understand. 
Anyone who has read the book will easily understand what ambivalence 
the phobia expresses.54
The whole episode reveals a dangerous slippage between a spectacular, sensa-
tionalized view and the voice of political commitment: both claim to be break-
ing silence as a challenge to the bourgeois social order, but this bare claim is 
not enough. Discourses speak through us, speak us, in ways that common-
sense analysis (whether psychoanalytic or literary) can’t disarm.
While Vian’s view may be one plausible reading of Native Son and Black Boy, 
Beauvoir and Sartre (in La putain respectueuse) had a different reading. But it 
is not a simple matter to disentangle Beauvoir’s relationship to some of the 
exoticizing discourses about race that she found in her social and intellectual 
circle in Paris. For instance, in La force de l’âge, she explains that before the war, 
during the avant-garde vogue for African art, she liked “les masques nègres” for 
the same reason she liked hermetic poems, surrealist films, abstract painting, 
old illuminations, and marionettes: they satisfied her taste for the supernatu-
ral, for a kind of stand-alone absolute, that persisted after she had given up her 
faith in God.55 She connects this also to what drew her to les faits divers in the 
54 “Une autre femme avait la phobie du nègre depuis la lecture de J’irai cracher sur vos 
tombes. Nous avons essayé de lui montrer l’irrationalité de sa position en lui faisant re-
marquer que les victimes blanches étaient aussi morbides que le nègre. De plus avions-
nous ajouté, il ne s’agit pas de revendications noires comme le laisserait entendre le 
titre, puisque Boris Vian en était l’auteur. Nous dûmes constater la vanité de nos efforts. 
Cette jeune femme ne voulait rien entendre. Quiconque a lu ce livre comprendra aisé-
ment quelle ambivalence exprime cette phobie” (pnmb 129–30; bswm 123, translation 
altered).
55 “Sartre found it idle to deplore the gap between word and thing, between the given world 
and the created work of art; he saw this, on the contrary, as the underlying condition of 
literature and its reason for being; rather than dream of abolishing it, the writer should 
use it: his successes come from assuming this failure.
“Be that as it may, I had trouble getting used to this divorce; I wanted to write books 
without renouncing my ‘trances’; I was torn. Because of this conflict I persisted for a long 
time in the conception of art I’d decided on before I met Sartre, which was rather different 
from his. I liked hermetic poems, surrealist films, abstract paintings, old engravings, an-
tique tapestries, negro masks. I had an immoderate liking for puppet-shows; Podrecca’s 
had displeased me on account of their realism, but I had seen some, including at [Dullin’s] 
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newspapers, and magazines like Détective: how violent and “extreme cases” 
disclosed the “unshakeable core of night” at the heart of every being, knocked 
down bourgeois façades, and led to a radical sense of freedom.56 It’s also true 
that some of the lesbian eroticism of L’invitée takes place with an “exotic” back-
ground filling in for what Beauvoir’s heroine cannot quite verbalize about her 
own desire: an important early scene unfolds as Françoise and Xavière watch 
Arab women dance in a café, and the younger woman has a passion for the fa-
mous “bal nègre,” which the novel also labels the “bal colonial.” Beauvoir de-
scribes that venue rather dispassionately in La force de l’âge; she says she liked 
to watch the “splendid animality” but that she didn’t dance herself, and thought 
those whites who did looked ridiculous, “like hysterics having fits.”57 And she 
Atelier, whose deliberate naïveté enchanted me. These predilections were partly ex-
plained by the influences of my youth. I had given up on God, but not on everything su-
pernatural. Obviously I knew that a work created on earth could never speak any but an 
earthly language. But some seemed to me to have escaped from their author and taken 
back for themselves the meaning he’d wanted to give them; they stood up without any-
one’s help, mute and indecipherable, like great abandoned totems; these alone brought 
me in contact with something necessary and absolute.”
[Sartre trouvait oiseux de déplorer cet écart entre le mot et la chose, entre l’œuvre 
créée et le monde donné: il y voyait au contraire la condition même de la littérature et sa 
raison d’être; l’écrivain doit en jouer, non rêver de l’abolir: ses réussites sont dans cet échec 
assumé.
Soit; je m’accommodais tout de même difficilement de ce divorce; je voulais faire des 
livres, mais non renoncer à mes “transes”: j’étais tiraillée. C’est à cause de ce conflit que je 
persévérai longtemps dans la conception de l’art à laquelle je m’étais arrêtée avant de con-
naître Sartre, et qui s’éloignait de la sienne …. J’aimais les poèmes hermétiques, les films 
surréalistes, les tableaux abstraits, les vieilles enluminures, les tapisseries anciennes, les 
masques nègres. J’avais un goût immodéré pour les spectacles de marionnettes; celles de 
Podrecca m’avaient déplu par leur réalisme, mais j’en avais vu, entre autres à l’Atelier, dont 
la naïveté appuyée m’avait charmée. Ces prédilections s’expliquent en partie par les influ-
ences que j’avait subies dans ma jeunesse. J’avais renoncé au divin, non à toute espèce de 
surnaturel. Évidemment, je savais qu’une œuvre forgée sur terre ne peut jamais parler 
qu’une langue terrestre; mais certaines me semblaient avoir échappé à leur auteur et ré-
sorbé en elles le sens dont il avait voulu les charger; elles se tenaient debout, sans le se-
cours de personne, muettes, indéchiffrables, pareilles à de grands totems abandonnés: en 
elles seules, je touchais quelque chose de nécessaire et d’absolu. (FA 50–51).]
56 FA 150–51, 153. I discuss these passages further below.
57 “Sunday nights, we would leave behind the bitter elegance of skepticism and be excited by 
the splendid animality of the Blacks of the rue Blomet. I went many times with Olga to 
this ball, which Sonia and her friends also frequented. I ran into Marie Giraud, who had 
hardly changed since Berlin; she was hanging around Montparnasse and the places that 
the Montparnasse crowd favored. We were the exceptions: at that time few white women 
mixed with the Black crowd, fewer still ventured onto the dance floor: next to the agile 
Africans, the quivering Antillais, their stiffness was distressing to see; when they tried to 
shake it off, they started to look like hysterics having fits. I didn’t go along with the snob-
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describes also being profoundly moved and attracted by American films fea-
turing Black actors, such as Green Pastures and King Vidor’s Hallelujah, and by 
Black American music, which (as she later realized) she didn’t distinguish very 
clearly by genre.
Like most young people of our generation, we were deeply moved by negro 
spirituals, “work songs,” and the “blues.” The grab-bag of songs we loved 
included “Old Man River,” “St James Infirmary,” “Some of These Days,” “The 
Man I Love,” “Miss Hannah,” “St Louis Blues,” “Japansy,” and “Blue Sky”: 
men’s mournful sorrows, wild joys, and broken hopes had found a voice 
that flew in the face of artistic “good manners,” a voice that burst brutally 
from the heart of their night, racked by rebellion; born from vast collective 
emotions, those felt by each and by all, these songs touched us at a deep 
and personal place, one all humans share.58
bishness of the Café de Flore, I didn’t imagine I was participating in Africa’s grand erotic 
mystery; but I liked to watch the dancers; I drank punch; the noise, the smoke, the fumes 
of alcohol, the orchestra’s violent rhythms put me in a daze; through the fog I saw beauti-
ful happy faces drifting by. My heart beat a bit faster when the last dance broke into a tu-
mult: as the festive bodies let loose, they seemed to bring me closer to my own ardor for 
life.”
[Le dimanche soir, on délaissait les amères élégances du scepticisme, on s’exaltait sur 
la splendide animalité des Noirs de la rue Blomet. J’accompagnai plusieurs fois Olga à ce 
bal où venaient aussi Sonia et ses amies. J’y rencontrai Marie Giraud qui avait peu changé 
depuis Berlin: elle traînait à Montparnasse et dans les endroits que les gens de Montpar-
nasse fréquentaient. Nous étions des exceptions: à cette époque, très peu de Blanches se 
mêlaient à la foule noire; moins encore se risquaient sur la piste: face aux souples Afri-
cains, aux Antillais frémissants, leur raideur était affligeante; si elles tentaient de s’en 
départir, elles se mettaient à ressembler à des hystériques en transe. Je ne donnais pas 
dans le snobisme des gens du Flore, je n’imaginais pas que je participais au grand mystère 
érotique de l’Afrique; mais j’aimais regarder les danseurs; je buvais du punch; le bruit, la 
fumée, les vapeurs d’alcool, les rythmes violents de l’orchestre m’engourdissaient; à tra-
vers cette brume je voyais passer de beaux visages heureux. Mon cœur battait un peu plus 
vite quand explosait le tumulte du quadrille final: dans le déchaînement des corps en fête, 
il me semblait toucher ma propre ardeur à vivre (FA 400).]
58 “Comme la plupart des jeunes gens de notre temps, nous étions passionnément émus par 
les ‘negro spirituals,’ par les ‘chants de travail,’ par les ‘blues.’ Nous aimions pêle-mêle Old 
Man River, St. James Infirmary, Some of these days, The man I love, Miss Hannah, St. Louis 
Blues, Japansy, Blue Sky; la plainte des hommes, leurs joies égarées, les espoirs brisés 
avaient trouvé pour se dire une voix qui défiait la politesse des arts réguliers, une voix 
brutalement jaillie du cœur de leur nuit et secouée de révolte; parce qu’ils étaient nés de 
vastes émotions collectives, celles de chacun, de tous—ces chants nous atteignaient cha-
cun en ce point le plus intime de nous-mêmes qui nous est commun à tous” (FA 161).
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All this comes together in an admiration for Faulkner: both for Sanctuary—
“sex, in Faulkner, literally turned the world to fire and blood”59—and later for 
Light in August:
The events that throw Christmas into the hands of the lynch mob are 
both as heartbreaking as life and as ineluctable as death. In this South, 
stripped of its future, with no truth left except its legend, the most turbu-
lent explosions are frozen in place ahead of time by fate. Faulkner found 
a way to let his story unfold in time while also abolishing time… for 
Christmas, [the present day] is only a break between two chains of events, 
one running back to the day of his birth, the other running down to his 
horrific end, both embodying the same curse: black blood in his veins.60
Even if we remember that Wright himself, and later Toni Morrison, would ac-
knowledge the influence of Light in August and draw deeply and productively 
on Faulkner’s image-repertory, none of this is especially reassuring.
However, to return to the question I started from—what prepared Beauvoir 
to understand Richard Wright?—I’d argue that two preexisting strands pre-
pared the ground for Wright’s influence. One was the deep-seated disgust for 
European colonialism I discussed in chapter 3; the other was a fascination with 
the “otherness” of both African and African American art and music, a fascina-
tion she shared with many of her Parisian contemporaries. For both these 
strands, she was indebted, strangely enough, to surrealism.61
4 Surrealism’s Paradoxical Legacy
I say “strangely enough” for several reasons. For one thing, post-war stand-offs 
between existentialists and surrealists could get quite vicious. There were 
59 “[L]e sexe, chez Faulkner, met littéralement le monde à feu et à sang” (FA 214).
60 “[L]’aventure qui jette Christmas aux mains des lyncheurs fut à la fois poignante comme 
la vie et aussi inéluctable que la mort. Dans ce Sud, dépouillé de son avenir, et qui n’a plus 
d’autre vérité que sa légende, les plus tumultueux déchaînements sont figés d’avance par 
la fatalité; Faulkner avait su donner une durée à son histoire tout en annulant le temps .… 
[P]our Christmas, il n’est que la coupure entre deux séries, l’une qui remonte vers la jour 
de sa naissance, l’autre qui descend vers l’heure de son horrible fin, toutes deux manifes-
tant une même malédiction: du sang noir dans les veines” (FA 271–72).
61 In what follows, I am construing “surrealism” broadly to include those who became dis-
sidents or even constructed important works in opposition to the charismatic despotism 
of Breton.
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 genuine philosophical points of non-coincidence between the groups,62 but 
political maneuverings played a larger part. The battle lines were drawn by Sar-
tre’s attack on surrealism in his polemic for engagement (the essays in Les 
Temps Modernes that became Qu’est-ce que la littérature?), the surrealists coun-
terattacked in Rupture intégrale (1947), and the argument went on for decades; 
both groups were dancing the masochism tango with the French communist 
party, seeking ways to be politically effective while remaining independent, 
but they only rarely found themselves dancing in the same direction at the 
same time.63
Another reasons the pairing seems strange is that, while surrealism strident-
ly presented itself as a revolutionary movement, it often does not look that way 
to us now, because its formal strategies have been so fully recuperated by con-
sumer culture that what was once shocking is now cliché. Their particular 
claim of sexual non-conformism has a grain of truth, but only a grain. As Amy 
Lyford sees it, “the surrealist agenda for social transformation failed,” because
[t]he myriad surrealist works that dramatize femininity as “other,” devi-
ant, deformed or violated are legendary for consistently promoting a 
power differential between men and women and for drawing on gender 
stereotypes…. Viewed at a distance, surrealist images of the 1920s and 
1930s seem to have laid the groundwork for an increasingly sexualized 
rhetoric of the mass media while opening up new terrain for social and 
sexual regulation.64
Lyford’s discussion of the surrealists’ supposedly liberatory “Recherches sur 
la  sexualité” of 1928 shows that the sexual non-conformism they embraced 
62 See Bruce Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism.
63 See Susan Suleiman, “Le mythe de la femme et les écrivains: Breton ou la poésie.” Sulei-
man points out (236) that Breton nonetheless was briefly a member, along with Beauvoir 
and Sartre, of the Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire, Sartre’s post-war at-
tempt to create a non-Communist “third way” on the left, and that all three would later 
sign the same protest letters against the Prague trials and the Manifeste des 121 against the 
French war on Algeria.
64 Amy Lyford, Surrealist Masculinities: Gender Anxiety and the Aesthetics of Post-World War 
I Reconstruction in France, 186. She continues: “Aragon’s words (in ‘1930’) presage T. J. 
Clark’s ‘bad dream of modernism,’ a nightmare in which avant-garde explorations of new 
forms of consciousness simply make it easier for cultural institutions to colonize the spac-
es the avant-garde had cleared for the road to a liberated future” (186).
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was  relentlessly heterosexual, and for the most part “dismissed women’s 
experiences.”65
The now-familiar feminist critique of surrealism began, in fact, with Simone 
de Beauvoir. The Second Sex is highly critical of surrealist myths. After discuss-
ing women’s position as “Other” in three otherwise very different writers, Mon-
therlant, D. H. Lawrence, and Claudel, Beauvoir skewers André Breton by quot-
ing extensively from texts which swear undying total Amour for a series of 
different women; his supposedly “idealizing” (and supposedly avant-garde) 
view, she says, just amounts to one more objectification.
Despite the gulf that separates Claudel’s religious world from Breton’s po-
etic universe, there is an analogy in the role they assign to woman: she is 
an element of perturbation…66
This unique woman, both flesh and artifice, natural and human, has 
the same magic spell as the ambiguous objects the surrealists love: she 
is like the spoonshoe, the wolftable, the marble sugar-cube which the 
poet finds at the flea market or invents in a dream; she participates in 
the secret of familiar objects suddenly unveiled, the secret of plants and 
stones.67
Since Breton’s perspective is exclusively poetic, it is exclusively as po-
etry, thus as other, that he contemplates woman…. She is poetry itself, in 
the here and now, that is to say for the man; whether she is also this for 
herself, we are not told. Breton does not speak of woman insofar as she is 
Subject …. Truth, Beauty, Poetry, she is Everything …. Everything, except 
herself.68
65 “[F]or all their efforts to promote new ideas about sexuality and sexual practice, the par-
ticipants stuck to rather traditional ideas about sex and sexual difference. Some anxiety 
about the stability of male sexuality also permeated the discussions” (ibid., 144–45).
66 “Malgré l’abîme qui sépare le monde religieux de Claudel de l’univers poétique de Breton, 
il y a une analogie dans le rôle qu’ils assignent à la femme: elle est un élément de pertur-
bation” (DS 1:366).
67 “Cette femme unique, à la fois charnelle et artificielle, naturelle et humaine a le même 
sortilège que les objets équivoques aimés des surréalistes: elle est pareille à la cuiller-
soulier, à la table-loup, au sucre de marbre que le poète découvre à la foire aux puces ou 
invente en rêve; elle participe au secret des objets familiers soudain découverts dans leur 
vérité; et à celui des plantes et des pierres” (DS 1:370).
68 “La perspective de Breton étant exclusivement poétique c’est exclusivement comme 
poésie donc comme autre que la femme y est envisagée…. Elle est la poésie en soi, dans 
l’immédiat, c’est-à-dire pour l’homme; on ne nous dit pas si elle l’est aussi pour soi. Breton 
ne parle pas de la femme en tant qu’elle est sujet…. Vérité, Beauté, Poésie, elle est Tout…. 
Tout excepté soi-même” (DS 1:374–75).
Chapter 4260
Much subsequent feminist writing on surrealism takes its cue from these 
observations. Xavière Gauthier followed Beauvoir’s lead in one of the first 
works of second-wave feminist literary criticism in France, Surréalisme et 
sexualité,69 which argues for the movement’s intrinsic misogyny: “the surreal-
ist woman is a male forgery.”70 Beauvoir has often been a jumping-off point, 
too, for feminist writers who wish to complicate Gauthier’s view by pointing to 
and re-valuing the many women painters, writers, and photographers who 
somehow did find surrealism artistically fruitful and productive, and still do.71 
But some tight-rope walking is always necessary. There’s stuff one can’t un-see. 
As Mary Ann Caws memorably puts it:
Headless. And also footless. Often armless too; and always unarmed, ex-
cept with poetry and passion. There they are, the surrealist women so 
shot and painted, so stressed and dismembered, punctured and severed: 
it is any wonder she has (we have) gone to pieces? … Sure and strident, 
ready to do anything we can—except we can neither speak nor think nor 
Susan Suleiman sees Beauvoir’s takedown of Breton in The Second Sex as a “oui, mais”: 
“[The method] consists of summing up the author’s vision with a great deal of under-
standing, even a certain sympathy, only to ask one or two questions at the end which, like 
the serpent’s tail where the poison is, attack where he is weakest…. The last sentences of 
the chapter are an execution: a gentle execution, but an undeniable one.” [Cela consiste à 
résumer avec beaucoup de compréhension, voire avec une certaine sympathie la vision 
de l’auteur, pour poser à la fin une ou deux questions qui—semblables à la queue du 
scorpion où se trouve le poison—attaquent son point faible…. Ces dernières phrases du 
chapitre sont une exécution—exécution douce, mais indéniable (“Breton ou la poésie,” 
228–30).] Suleiman also reminds us that Montherlant, Claudel, and Breton were living 
authors (not subjects of academic study), underlining the polemical quality of Beauvoir’s 
intervention.
69 Xavière Gauthier, Surréalisme et sexualité, 1971.
70 “La femme surréaliste est une forgerie de mâles” (Gauthier, 190). Anna Watz (“Angela 
Carter and Xavière Gauthier’s Surréalisme et sexualité”) calls this “an assertion that might 
serve as a summary of her main argument” (101). Watz traces the further influence of 
Beauvoir, through Gautier, on Angela Carter’s work, especially The Sadeian Woman, which 
itself had a strong influence on later feminist writers, especially in England. See Suleiman, 
“Breton ou la poésie,” for a fuller discussion of the broader influence of this section of The 
Second Sex on feminist literary criticism.
71 See Katharine Conley, Automatic Woman: The Representation of Woman in Surrealism; Su-
san Suleiman, Subversive Intent: Gender, Politics, and the Avant-Garde; Mary Anne Caws, 
“Seeing the Surrealist Woman: We Are a Problem.” In her commentary on Beauvoir’s Bret-
on chapter Suleiman goes farther, seeing all of second-wave feminist literary criticism, 
including her own work, as growing from this section of The Second Sex, in ways later 
writers usually failed at the time to acknowledge (Suleiman, “Breton ou la poésie”).
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see, nor walk and run, certainly not love and paint and write and be. Sur-
realist woman, problematic and imprisoned, for the other eyes.72
So it is strange to note how often in Beauvoir’s memoirs she marks an affinity, 
especially in her youth, to the surrealist world view. She credits them with a 
transition, while still a (somewhat bored) philosophy student, not just in her 
literary tastes, but in the attitude to society these implied:
For the most part I came around to Brunschvicg’s version of critical ideal-
ism, even though it left me unsatisfied on a number of points. On the 
boulevard Saint-Michel, Picart’s bookshop welcomed students; there I’d 
leaf through the avant-garde reviews that were born and died like flies in 
those days. I read Breton, I read Aragon; surrealism won me over. After a 
while the literature of “inquiétude” struck me as insipid; I prefered the 
excesses of pure negation. Destruction of art, of morality, of language, 
systematic derangement of the senses, despair to the point of suicide: 
these excesses delighted me.73
This enthusiasm dates back to her student days, when she was still liberating 
herself from the “proper young lady” persona of her Catholic upbringing. But it 
persisted, as when she mentioned surrealist films in the same breath with “les 
poémes hermétiques” and “les masques nègres” as continuing to satisfy her 
taste for the supernatural and the absolute in art, in a passage I referred to 
above.74 Later, in explaining why she was loath to analyze and interpret the 
behavior of those around her (and not especially good at it), she’ll say that “sur-
realism had marked [her]” with a lasting attraction to what is mysterious and 
72 Caws, “Seeing the Surrealist Woman,” 11.
73 “En gros je me ralliai à l’idéalisme critique, tel que nous l’exposait Brunschvicg, bien que, 
sur bien des points, il me laissât sur ma faim. Je repris du goût pour la littérature. Sur le 
boulevard Saint-Michel, la librairie Picart s’ouvrait libéralement aux étudiants: j’y feuille-
tais les revues d’avant-garde qui en ce temps-là naissaient et mouraient comme des 
mouches: je lus Breton, Aragon; le surréalisme me conquit. L’inquiétude, à la longue, 
c’était fade; je préférai les outrances de la pure négation. Destruction de l’art, de la morale, 
du langage, dérèglement systématique, désespoir poussé jusqu’au suicide: ces excès me 
ravissaient” (Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, hereinafter mjfr, 324–25). “Inquiétude” 
here refers to an earlier literature, to which she’d been introduced by her cousin Jacques, 
for instance Gide’s Nourritures terrestres, which served as her bedside book for a time: 
writers who later seemed like rather timid bourgeois rebels, rather than revolutionaries. 
She would satirize them, and Jacques, relentlessly in Quand prime le spirituel.
74 FA 50–51. See note 53 above for the full quotation.
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silent about human beings.75 She also acknowledges a more serious intellec-
tual debt, crediting the surrealists with having helped her and Sartre admit 
(though incoherently) the existence of an unconscious:
Extreme cases fascinated us, for the same reason as neuroses and psycho-
ses; the attitudes and passions of so-called normal people stood out in 
relief, purified and exaggerated. They also touched us in a different way. 
All perturbations satisfied our anarchism; we were charmed by the gro-
tesque. One of our contradictions was that we denied the existence of the 
Unconscious; and yet Gide, the surrealists, and (despite our resistances) 
Freud himself, had convinced us that in every human being there lurks 
[what André Breton called] an unbreakable kernel of night [infracassable 
noyau de nuit], something that hides behind everyday social routine and 
cliché, but now and then bursts out with shock and scandal. Such explo-
sions always reveal a truth, and those which gave rise to a freedom seemed 
especially stunning. We set particular store by all upheavals that laid bare 
the defects and hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie, knocking down the façades 
behind which the homes and hearts were hiding…. We were pleased to 
confirm that our own society was no more enlightened than those it la-
bels “primitive.”76
In La force de l’âge, we accompany Beauvoir and Sartre to an early showing of 
Un chien andalou; we see them agreeing with and absorbing Antonin Artaud’s 
praise of the “non-sens” of the Marx brothers; we go along to the surrealist 
exhibition of January 1938, with works by Duchamp and others; she describes 
in particular Salvador Dali’s startling installation, a life-size taxicab with a 
75 FA 146. “Le surréalisme m’avait marquée.”
76 “Les cas extrêmes nous attachaient, au même titre que les névroses et les psychoses; on y 
retrouvait exagérées, épurées, dorées d’un saisissant relief les attitudes et les passions des 
gens qu’on appelle normaux. Ils nous touchaient encore d’une autre manière. Toute per-
turbation satisfaisait notre anarchisme; la monstruosité nous séduisait. Une de nos con-
tradictions, c’est que nous niions l’inconscient; cependant Gide, les surréalistes, et, malgré 
nos résistances, Freud lui-même, nous avaient convaincus qu’il existait en tout être un 
‘infracassable noyau de nuit’; quelque chose qui ne réussit à percer ni les routines sociales 
ni les lieux communs du langage mais qui parfois éclate, scandaleusement. Dans ces ex-
plosions, toujours une vérité se révèle; et nous trouvions bouleversantes celles qui dé-
livrent une liberté. Nous accordions un prix particulier à toutes les turbulences qui met-
taient à nu les tares et les hypocrisies bourgeoises, abattant les façades derrière lesquelles 
se déguisent les foyers et les cœurs” (FA 150–51). “Nous nous plaisions à constater que 
notre société n’était pas plus éclairée que celles qu’elle appelle ‘primitives’” (FA 153).
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mannequin inside, sitting in a heap of vegetables and snails.77 The show left its 
mark.
Amid an aroma of Brazilian coffee, objects emerged from carefully calcu-
lated shadows: a table-setting made of fur, a footstool whose supports 
were a women’s legs; human hands came out of walls, doors, vases, every-
where. I don’t think surrealism had a direct influence on us, but the air we 
breathed was heavy with it. It was the surrealists, for instance, who had 
started the fashion for the flea market, where I often spent my Sunday 
afternoons with Sartre and Olga.78
Never card-carrying members, they nonetheless swam in the same cultural wa-
ters and in the same direction.79 During and after the Second World War they 
would become close to several members of the original surrealist group, in-
cluding the poet and ethnographer Michel Leiris, who had been a card- carrying 
member.
One attraction of the group we became part of was that almost all its 
members were former surrealists, who had broken with the movement 
at various times. For Sartre and me, our age, our University education, 
had kept us aside from the movement which indirectly had counted a 
great deal for us: we had inherited its contributions and its failures. When 
Limbour recounted the sessions of automatic writing, when Leiris and 
Queneau would hark back to the excommunications pronounced by 
Breton, his diktats and his rages, their accounts were more detailed, more 
77 FA 60, 128–29, 370.
78 “Dans une odeur de café du Brésil, des objets émergeaient d’une obscurité soigneusement 
dosée: un couvert en fourrure, une table-tabouret soutenue par des jambes de femme; des 
portes, des murs, des vases, de partout s’échappaient des mains. Je ne crois pas que le sur-
réalisme ait eu sur nous une influence directe; mais il avait imprégné l’air que nous res-
pirions. C’était les surréalistes, par exemple, qui avaient mis à la mode la foire aux puces 
où souvent je passais avec Sartre ou Olga mes dimanches après-midi” (FA 370).
79 In L’invitée, as war threatens, dramatist Pierre Labrousse (who isn’t Sartre exactly, but … ) 
rejects the idea of fleeing France to live abroad: “‘I was formed by a whole past,’ continued 
Labrousse. ‘The Ballets Russes, the theatre of the Vieux-Colombier, Picasso, surrealism, I’d 
be nothing without all that. Of course, I want the art of the future to be original, thanks to 
my work, but it will still be that tradition’s future. One can’t work in a vacuum, that leads 
nowhere.’” [“J’ai été formé par tout un passé, reprit Labrousse. Les Ballets russes, le Vieux-
Colombier, Picasso, le surréalisme, je ne serais rien sans tout ça. Et bien sûr, je souhaite 
que l’art reçoive de moi un avenir original, mais qui soit l’avenir de cette tradition. On ne 
peut pas travailler dans le vide, ça ne mène à rien” (L’invitée 324).]
Chapter 4264
alive, more true than any book, and they put us into possession of our 
prehistory. One day on the second floor of the Café de Flore, Sartre asked 
Queneau what had stayed with him from surrealism. “The impression of 
having once been young,” he said. His response struck us, and we envied 
him.80
Leiris and his wife Zette became very close personal friends to Beauvoir and 
Sartre.81 As the Allies were closing in on Paris, when Camus advised them to 
go into hiding (one of his associates had named names under torture), they 
would take shelter briefly in the Leiris apartment, joining a list of Jews and 
résistants who hid out there during the Occupation. The two couples were 
clearly inseparable during the terrifying but exhilarating days that preceded 
the liberation of Paris.82 Leiris was a key member of the group that started 
Les Temps Modernes.83 Indeed (another strange thing) Beauvoir credits Leiris’s 
autobiographical “essai-martyr,” L’âge d’homme, with inspiring the project that 
became The Second Sex;84 she also credits her conversations with Zette, and 
some of the other wives of the post-surrealists, with awakening her to the exis-
tence of something she calls “la condition féminine,” the situatedness of “rela-
tive creatures.”85
5 Surrealism and Politics: More Two-Way Streets
Now, some of what is strange about my claim that Beauvoir was politicized by 
surrealism rests on a strangeness or a fracture that is intrinsic to the  surrealist 
80 “Un des attraits de ce cercle dans lequel nous entrâmes, c’est que les membres en étaient 
presque tous d’anciens surréalistes dont la dissidence remontait à des temps plus ou 
moins lointains; notre âge, notre formation universitaire, nous avaient tenus, Sartre et 
moi, à l’écart de ce mouvement qui indirectement avait pourtant beaucoup compté pour 
nous; nous avions hérité de ses apports, de ses échecs; quand Limbour nous racontait des 
séances d’écriture automatique, quand Leiris et Queneau évoquaient les excommunica-
tions prononcées par Breton, ses diktats, ses colères, leurs récits, bien plus détaillés, plus 
vivants, plus vrais qu’aucun livre, nous mettaient en possession de notre préhistoire. Un 
jour, au premier étage du Flore, Sartre demanda à Queneau qu’est-ce qui lui restait du 
surréalisme: ‘L’impression d’avoir eu une jeunesse,’ nous dit-il. Sa réponse nous frappa, et 
nous l’enviâmes” (FA 654).
81 See FA 640–41 for details of how the friendship and partnership began and developed.
82 FA 674. The account of “fiestas” or “fêtes” that closes La force de l’âge (and the related scene 
that opens Les mandarins) owes a great deal to Leiris’s essay on the sacred in everyday life, 
as well as to the work of Roger Caillois and the Collège de Sociologie.
83 FA 643.
84 FCh 1:135–36.
85 “[Ê]tres relatifs” FA 654.
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movement itself. This may have been one more instance of Beauvoir’s “genius 
for the inappropriate,” although it seems to have been widely shared. For 
starters, it is not obvious how a mystical aesthetic that involves a dérègle-
ment of language, a refusal of visual representativity, an embrace of opacity, 
could really come together with committed politics, which we might tend to 
associate with a view of language as transparent and suited to communica-
tion. And yet somehow this did happen. The legacy of surrealism was also a 
strong legacy of anti-colonial political engagement, and of disengagement 
from nationalist and racist mystification. These moves took place in the real 
world (it was not simply as a matter of “subversive images”), and this was a 
two-way street: we can recognize the reciprocal influence between European 
surrealists and anti-colonialist artistic and militant movements in the French 
Caribbean and in Africa, resulting in enduring and mutually sustaining cross-
cultural alliances.
French surrealists are rightly credited with drawing attention to the value of 
African and African-American cultural productions, an attention that would 
be enormously productive for modernism in the visual arts. James Clifford, in 
The Predicament of Culture, also makes a strong case for the value of what he 
calls “ethnographic surrealism,” with Leiris as his prime example. But the group 
has also been attacked as participating in what critics have called the “negro-
philia” of the 1920s, vigorously defined by Petrine Archer-Straw in her book of 
that name; her examples range from the popular craze for Josephine Baker’s 
banana dance to such serious works such as Picasso’s “Les demoiselles 
d’Avignon.” “Negrophilia” as she describes it involved almost a worship of 
Blackness, based on its supposed connection with the irrational, the “animal” 
nature of the body, the unconscious, and so forth. Archer-Straw notes that “the 
receptiveness of Europe’s avant-garde toward this anti-aesthetic must be 
viewed against the background of their disillusionment with the social and po-
litical concerns of their own postwar culture”—in other words, this Blackness 
was really about whiteness.86
This is undeniably true: it is child’s play to find examples of the sexually 
tinged “négritude blanche” that functioned as the very sign of the modern, at 
least as far back as Baudelaire’s poems about Jeanne Duval. Surrealism from its 
very beginning, however, involved both a set of overexcited essentializing 
myths about Africa, the unconscious, the primitive, which we might reason-
ably find troubling, and a radical questioning of bourgeois French nationalism, 
86 Petrine Archer-Straw, Negrophilia: Avant-Garde Paris and Black Culture in the 1920s, 87. See 
also Mariana Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. For a different 
view, see Marjorie Perloff, “Tolerance and Taboo: Modern Primitivisms and Postmodern-
ist Pieties.”
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which saw clearly the links between conservative views about the family and 
conservative views about “civilizing mission” of the imperialist nation-state.
One familiar touchstone for this argument is the 1931 surrealist slogan, “Ne 
visitez pas l’Exposition Coloniale,” which protested the European triumpha-
lism that put actual African human beings on display with other “products.” 
The surrealist counter-exposition, mounted in collaboration with the commu-
nists, displayed among other things “a group of statues on a table—one of a 
South Pacific girl wearing a grass skirt; another of a barefoot, Black child beg-
ging for money; and the third of the Virgin Mary holding the infant Jesus—
with the heading ‘Fétiches Européens.’”87 As Jonathan Eburne puts it, “Éluard 
and the surrealists argued that the immensely popular exposition, which pa-
raded the ‘success’ of French colonial ventures in Africa, Vietnam and the West 
Indies, tacitly extended the legacy of ‘villages pillaged and destroyed, crops 
burned, massacres from a hail of bullets, bombardments from the air, men 
working chained like beasts, women serving the amusements of commis-
sioned louts.’”88 The terms of this debate had been set earlier, as in this ex-
change in 1925 with Paul Claudel, who had said in an interview:
As for the present movements, not one can lead to a genuine renewal or 
creation. Neither Dadaism nor surrealism, which have only one meaning: 
homosexuality. Many are surprised that I am [not only] a good Catholic, 
but a writer, a diplomat, French ambassador, and a poet. But I find noth-
ing strange about this. During the war, I went to South America to buy 
wheat, tinned meat, and lard for the army, and managed to save my coun-
try some two hundred million francs.89
The surrealists responded: “The only homosexual thing about our activity is 
the confusion it introduces into the minds of those who do not take part in 
it…. We take this opportunity to dissociate ourselves publicly from all that is 
French, in words and in actions.”90 Visible in both conservative attack and 
87 Linda M. Steer, “Photographic Appropriation: Ethnography and the Surrealist Other,” 74.
88 Jonathan Eburne, Surrealism and the Art of Crime, 169.
89 Quoted in Helena Lewis, Dada Turns Red: The Politics of Surrealism, 26.
90 Maurice Nadeau, The History of Surrealism, 194. The reciprocal homophobia is also char-
acteristic. A curious echo of this occurred in 1949, as Martine Reid mentions in her analy-
sis of the responses to the publication of The Second Sex. François Mauriac had attacked 
the surrealists and existentialists together as harmful to the youth of France. The surreal-
ists were not pleased to be put in the same sac. “Here, for instance, is the surrealist Jean 
Schuster: ‘First, I challenge you to visit the surrealist continent and to look closely at its 
flora and fauna. Know that, just like any continent, it has its volcanos, whose eruptions 
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radical riposte is the inextricable knotting-up of sexual and nationalist poli-
tics; Jonathan Eburne nicely describes this as “the ideological closed circuit of 
contemporary thought in the aftermath of the Great War, with its emphasis on 
continuity, patriotism, and domesticity.”91 He also notes “a steady stream of 
[surrealist] political tracts and pamphlets that sought to expose the forms of 
violence, both explicit and latent, exercised in the name of the state, the fam-
ily, the middle-class, and even the values of Western humanism.” One of these 
tracts, included in Nancy Cunard’s 1934 Negro Anthology, was called “Murder-
ous Humanitarianism”; drafted by René Crevel and signed also by Breton and 
others, it vigorously listed out the crimes of European colonialism, especially 
in Africa.92 While Sonia Kruks is right to point out that Les Temps Modernes 
was unusually early in articulating a consistent anti-colonial program, they 
had important surrealist precursors—one of whom, Michel Leiris, was on 
their editorial board.
Another familiar story is the surrealist disruption in 1925 of the Closerie des 
Lilas banquet to take a position against the Guerre du Rif (French suppres-
sion of an anti-colonialist revolt in Morocco), and also to confront the writer 
Rachilde, who had written a chauvinistic tract arguing that no patriotic French 
person could marry a German. Supposedly Philippe Soupault swung from the 
chandelier, sweeping the glasses and plates off the table, and Michel Leiris “al-
most got himself lynched,” in Breton’s rather infelicitous words, by shouting 
“Vive l’Allemagne” out the window. The confrontation with Rachilde in par-
ticular emphasizes what seems to me their most radical move: to trouble the 
will not cease to surprise you. Second, we have never had anything to do with Mr. Sartre 
and Mr. Gide, and we refuse any supposedly dialectical comparison between their think-
ing and ours…. Third, we have said over and over that there is nothing in common, except 
accidentally, between us and the nation (France), and that we are proud to constitute a per-
manent danger to her institutions…. Fourth, our aggressive withdrawal from your decaying 
society, our hostility toward its degrading ideas, find their corollary in our burning zeal to 
bring erotic hallucination to life.’” [Ainsi le surréaliste Jean Schuster, par exemple: “1o Je 
vous défie bien de faire le tour du continent surréaliste, et d’en observer de près la faune 
et la flore. Sachez que, comme tout continent, il possède des volcans dont les éruptions 
n’ont pas fini de vous surprendre. 2o Nous n’avions jamais rien à voir avec MM. Sartre et 
Gide et nous nous refusons à toute confrontation prétendue dialectique entre leur esprit 
et le nôtre … 3o Nous avons répété maintes fois qu’il n’y avait rien de commun qu’accidentel 
entre nous et la nation (la France), et que nous nous flattons de constituer un danger perma-
nent pour ses institutions … 4o Notre retranchement agressif de votre société déliques-
cente, notre hostilité vis-à-vis de ses idéaux dégradants trouvent leur corollaire dans 
l’ardeur que nous mettons à oniriser érotiquement la vie” (Martine Reid, “Anatomie d’une 
réception: Le deuxième sexe,” 211, emphasis added).]
91 Eburne, Surrealism and the Art of Crime, 21.
92 In Nancy Cunard, Negro Anthology, 574–75.
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whole idea of “Frenchness” that brought together both patriotism and what the 
American Claudels of today call “family values.” Even their most obscure and 
experimental work could carry through this political stance: Leiris’s Glossaire 
j’y serre mes gloses, a kind of “devil’s dictionary” based on exploring puns and 
linguistic resonances within commonplace words, included “démocratie—la 
demi-crotte des assis … famille—fameuse charmille d’infamie … national—
passionément anal … patrie—tripaille …”93
Seen in the context of then-ongoing debates, the surrealist affirmation of 
“Blackness,” self-involved though it may have been, looks like part of a distinct-
ly political and social program, directed against a particular set of mystifica-
tions, including patriotic and nationalist ones. But as Edward Hughes observes 
in his study of twentieth-century French exoticism, “the crucial question is the 
extent to which … iconoclasm and gesturing toward the other ever becomes 
relationality.”94 That question is never easy to answer. But rather than continu-
ing to analyse it as a rhetorical stance, I want to note that the deployment of 
Blackness as a strategy of desublimation and dérèglement for Western intel-
lectuals could and did lead to genuine commitments of solidarity with anti-
racist and postcolonial struggle.
I see the main indication that they are “genuine” in that they were embraced 
by a number of the poets and legislators of anti-colonialism—who were, sur-
prisingly enough, quite often the same people. Perhaps the oddest example of 
this was how a visit from André Breton to Haiti triggered (sort of) a political 
rebellion there. Here is Breton’s account, from a interview with Jean Duché 
included in the book Conversations.
Jean Duché: It seems you had a hand in the Haitian revolution. Could you 
comment on exactly what happened?
André Breton: Let’s not exaggerate. At the end of 1945, the poverty, and 
consequently the patience, of the Haitian people had reached a breaking 
point. You have to realize that, on the huge Île de la Gonâve off the Hai-
tian coast, men earned less than one American cent for an entire day’s 
labor, and that, according to the most conservative newspapers, children 
in the suburbs of Port-au-Prince lived on tadpoles fished out of the sew-
ers. This situation was made all the more poignant by the fact that the 
Haitian spirit, more than any other, miraculously continues to draw its 
93 Democracy is half a turd, from comfortably well-off folks; the family is a famous tree-lined 
walk of shame; to be national is to be passionately anal; the fatherland is a heap of tripe 
… it’s much funnier than this, but the puns are untranslatable, sorry.
94 Edward Hughes, Writing Marginality in Modern French Literature, 168.
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vigor from the French Revolution; that the striking outline of Haitian his-
tory shows us man’s most moving attempts to break away from slavery 
and into freedom.
In a first lecture on “Surrealism and Haiti,” I tried, both for the sake 
of clarity and out of deference to the underlying spirit of this history, to 
align Surrealism’s aims with the age-old goals of the Haitian peasantry. In 
conclusion, I felt driven to condemn “the imperialisms that the war’s end 
has in no way averted and the cruelly maintained game of cat and mouse 
between stated ideals and eternal selfishness,” as well as to reaffirm my 
allegiance to the motto on the Haitian flag: “Union makes strength.” The 
newspaper La Ruche, the voice of the younger generation, which devot-
ed the next day’s issue to me, said that my words were electrifying and 
decided to take an insurrectional tone. Its confiscations and suspension 
immediately led to a student strike, followed within twenty-four hours 
by a general strike. Several days later, the government was held hostage. 
Unions were being started everywhere and free elections were promised.95
I am unsure how much credence to give this account, but I note that Breton’s 
own view of his agency is rather modest—“let’s not exaggerate”—and, more to 
the point, that the true causes he assigns behind the revolt are pragmatically 
materialist. (This is the same set of events I think Beauvoir is referring to when 
she says, in the introduction to The Second Sex, “the Blacks of Haiti have proved” 
that historically-based oppressions can be overturned.)
T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting calls our attention to early writing by Suzanne 
Césaire, who studied philosophy in Paris in the 1930s, and founded Tropiques 
with her husband and René Ménil—all three were teachers of Fanon. In a 1942 
attack on some Martinican poets she found insipid and overly academic and 
Parnassian, she wrote, “Martinican poetry will be cannibal or it will not be,” 
appropriating Breton’s declaration that “beauty will be convulsive or it will not 
be.” In another essay, she wrote: “Surrealism, with its emphasis on writing from 
the unconsciousness, gave us back some of our possibilities…. It’s up to us to 
find the rest. By its guiding light.”96 Fanon was right to ask why Breton, in his 
adulatory preface to Aimé Césaire’s Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (Notebook 
95 André Breton, Conversations, translated by Mark Polizotti. Quoted in “Breton and Haiti, 
Again,” on Criticism &c.
96 Quoted in T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, “Tropiques and Suzanne Césaire: The Expanse of 
Negritude and Surrealism.” For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Lori Cole, 
“Légitime défense: From Communism and Surrealism to Caribbean Self-Definition,” and 
Robin Kelley, who writes in “A Poetics of Anti-Colonialism”: “It is not too much to pro-
claim Suzanne Césaire as one of surrealism’s most original theorists.”
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of a Return to the Native Land), found it necessary to refer to Césaire as a great 
Black poet rather than simply a great poet.97 Yet it was not that Breton “appro-
priated” Césaire: Césaire had already “appropriated” surrealism, not in a “natu-
ral” way (as when Chester Himes described his “absurd” life as predating any 
acquaintance with “absurdist” literature), and not naïvely, but in the sense of 
James Clifford’s story about “the first Thanksgiving”: when the Pilgrim Fathers 
met Squanto, he had just returned from England.98 We would hardly want to 
describe the writers and artists of color who participated in these movements 
as dupes: surely it is better to speak of the relationship of the surrealist and 
negritude movements as dialectic and mutually nourishing, through a collab-
orative process and a reciprocal human gaze.99
What overall judgement can we come to, though, of the politics (and ethics) 
of the European surrealists? When Beauvoir took up this question directly in 
Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté her answer was, it depends. After the consider-
ation of the “serious man” I discussed above, she describes the radical disorder 
of the nihilist: her examples include Baudelaire, and Jouhandeau’s “demonia-
cal man” who “stubbornly maintains the values of childhood, of a society, or of 
a Church in order to trample upon them.”100 The “démoniaque” is still pretty 
similar to the serious man, though; it is possible to go further, attempting “not 
97 pnmb 31, bswm 26.
98 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, 
and Art, 16. I am avoiding the terms “hybridity” and “contact zones”: it is too easy to lose 
track of the dimension of power when speaking only of space and not of time.
99 Sam Bardaouil shows this dynamic at work in his book on the Egyptian surrealist group 
“Art and Liberty”: a confluence of international networks and local political conditions in 
Cairo led in 1938 to the manifesto “Long Live Degenerate Art.” Bardouil refers to
the risk of situating this study within the exonerating didactic of post-colonial polem-
ics [and of] reducing the case of Art and Liberty into another juxtaposition of so-
called centers and peripheries, a binary which was not of concern to Art and Liberty … 
Instead of picturing them as victims to a marginalizing Western-centrism, it is more 
adequate to highlight their role as active catalysts who contributed to the evolution 
and widening up of the formalistic qualities of surrealism at the time.
Bardouil, Surrealism in Egypt: Modernism and the Art and Liberty Group, 31–2. Perhaps a 
similar dynamic informed the writing of the tract, “Murderous Humanity,” for Nancy Cu-
nard’s Negro Anthology, as the group that signed it included Martiniquans Pierre Yoyotte 
and J.M. Monnerot alongside Paul Éluard, Benjamin Peret, Yves Tanguy, Breton and Crev-
el. (The piece was translated into English by Samuel Beckett.)
100 Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (hereinafter pma) 76–7; The Ethics of Ambiguity, translated 
by Bernard Frechtman (hereinafter EA), 52–3. “[L]’attitude du démonique, telle que l’a 
décrite Jouhandeau: on maintient avec entêtement les valeurs de l’enfance, celles d’une 
société ou d’une Église, afin de pouvoir les fouler aux pieds.”
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just to trample but to annihilate” the world by ruining all projects, including 
one’s own.
[Such] constant negation of the word by the word, of the act by the act, 
of art by art, took shape in the incoherence of Dadaism: by following 
strict instructions for disorder and anarchy, one would abolish all courses 
of conduct; all possible goals; oneself.
But this will to negate is self-refuting, for as soon as it appears it mani-
fests as a presence…. If one is not resigned to suicide, one slides toward a 
more stable attitude than nihilism’s tense refusal. Surrealism provides a 
historical and concrete example of the different possible developments. 
Certain initiates, such as Vaché and Crevel, chose the radical solution and 
killed themselves. Others destroyed their bodies and ruined their minds 
with drugs. Still others succeeded in committing a sort of moral suicide: 
by depopulating the surrounding world they found themselves in a des-
ert, reduced to the level of the sub-human; they are no longer just trying 
to flee, they are fleeing. Then there are those who have gone back to seek 
the security of the serious man: they have returned to orderly life, choos-
ing at random to take refuge in marriage, politics, or religion. Even those 
surrealists who have wanted to keep the faith could not help returning to 
the positive, the serious. Negation of aesthetic, spiritual, and moral val-
ues has become an ethics; unruliness [dérèglement] has become a rule. 
We have witnessed the establishment of a new Church, with dogmas, 
rites, priests, faithful flock and even martyrs; nothing today remains of 
Breton the wild destroyer: he’s a pope. And since every assassination of 
painting is still a painted picture, many surrealists have found themselves 
authors of positive works; from the raw material of their rebellion they’ve 
built successful careers. Finally there are some who have been able to 
realize their freedom in an authentic return to the positive; without dis-
avowing their freedom, they have given it substance. They have engaged 
themselves, without losing themselves, in political action, in intellectual 
or artistic research, in family or social life.101
101 “On peut aller beaucoup plus loin dans le refus, s’employant non à bafouer, mais à anni-
hiler le monde refusé et soi-même avec lui …. La constante négation du mot par le mot, de 
l’acte par l’acte, de l’art par l’art, s’est trouvée réalisée par l’incohérence dadaïste; en ap-
pliquant une consigne de désordre et d’anarchie, on obtenait une abolition de toutes les 
conduites, donc de toutes les fins et de soi-même.
Mais cette volonté de négation se donne un perpétuel démenti, car dans le moment 
où elle se déploie elle se manifeste comme présence …. Si on ne se résigne pas au suicide, 
on glisse facilement vers une attitude plus stable que le refus crispé du nihilisme. Le 
Chapter 4272
The test of any aesthetic theory, then, was not what it claimed to do (ethi-
cally or politically), but what the claimants actually made of it, what they actu-
ally did do. Official surrealism may have betrayed its origins and become a reli-
gion (note that in mocking André Breton, she speaks almost like a movement 
insider); but an authentic development from surrealism was still possible. The 
point is that “surrealism,” like Judaism, Frenchness, woman’s situation, lesbian-
ism, or anything else, can be lived in various ways, in bad faith or in freedom.
This view (though awfully abstract) has a certain explanatory power: we can 
account for the non-accidental importance of surrealism to Suzanne and Aimé 
Césaire, or Wifredo Lam, without extending our political blessing to such ca-
reerists of the Void as Salvador Dali (commercial, fascist, etc).102 When she 
turns to the more positive portrait of the surrealist who maintains his good 
faith, she is probably thinking of her new postwar friends, who included the 
poet and editor Raymond Queneau, and the sculptor Giacometti, whose emer-
gence from the surrealist conception of an art independent of reality, and de-
velopment of a different kind of experimental realism, she takes up later in her 
memoir and, transposed onto the character of Marcel, in Le sang des autres.103 
But the best candidate for the “good” surrealist is Beauvoir’s close friend and 
collaborator, Michel Leiris.
 surréalisme nous fournit un exemple historique et concret de différentes évolutions pos-
sibles. Certains de ses adeptes, tel Vaché, Crevel, ont eu recours à la solution radicale du 
suicide; d’autres ont détruit leur corps et ruiné leur esprit par les drogues; d’autres ont 
réussi une sorte de suicide moral; à force de dépeupler le monde autour d’eux, ils se sont 
trouvés dans un désert, eux-mêmes descendus au niveau du sous-homme; ils n’essaient 
plus de fuir, ils fuient. Il y en a aussi qui ont recherché à nouveau la sécurité du sérieux; il 
se sont rangés, choisissant arbitrairement comme refuges le mariage, la politique, la reli-
gion. Ceux mêmes des surréalistes qui ont voulu demeurer fidèles à eux-mêmes n’ont pu 
éviter le retour au positif, au sérieux. La négation des valeurs esthétiques, spirituelles, 
morales, est devenue une éthique; le dérèglement, une règle; on a assisté à l’édification 
d’une nouvelle Église avec ses dogmes, ses rites, ses fidèles, ses prêtres et même ses mar-
tyrs; plus rien de destructeur aujourd’hui chez Breton: c’est un pape. Et comme tout assas-
sinat de la peinture est encore un tableau, bien des surréalistes se sont trouvés les auteurs 
d’œuvres positives: leur révolte est devenue la matière sur laquelle s’est édifiée leur car-
rière. Enfin quelques-uns d’entre eux ont su, dans un authentique retour au positif, ré-
aliser leur liberté; ils lui ont donné un contenu sans la renier; ils se sont engagés sans se 
perdre dans une action politique, dans des recherches intellectuelles ou artistiques, dans 
une vie familiale ou sociale” (pma 77–9, EA 52–5, translation substantially altered).
102 James Clifford makes a very similar point when he says that “[s]urrealism coupled with 
ethnography recovers its early vocation as critical cultural politics, a vocation lost in later 
developments (Max Ernst devoting his energies to designing an oneiric double bed for 
Nelson and Happy Rockefeller, the general production of ‘art’ for the ‘art world’)” (Predica-
ment of Culture, 147).
103 See FA 558–59 and 620.
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6 Who Was Michel Leiris?
Michel Leiris began his career as a surrealist poet, fascinated by language, dérè-
glement, women, and Africa, where he traveled as part of the infamous French 
Dakar-Djibouti “ethnographic” expedition of 1931–33. While that trip was billed 
as scientific, Leiris himself described it as a search for his own unconscious, as 
a “cure” for the neurosis that was (as he then saw it) modernity. The Dakar-
Djibouti trip was not fieldwork as we now understand it, with participant/ 
observers ethically constrained to minimize disruption; rather it was a collect-
ing trip on behalf of the French government, and the information was gathered 
more or less in the same way as the objects. Clifford: “the mission’s ‘booty,’ in 
Rivet and Rivière’s term, included among its many photos, recordings, and 
documents 3,500 objects destined for the Trocadéro museum, soon to become 
the Musée de l’homme.”104 In the course of the twenty-one months in Sudan 
and Ethiopia, Leiris became strongly disillusioned with the “mission” even as 
he helped to carry it out, and he revealed this on his return by publishing his 
diary of the journey, as L’Afrique fantôme. In a letter home, he wrote:
the methods by which we collect the objects, nine times out of ten, in-
volve forced purchase, not to say requisition. All this casts something of 
a shadow over my life…. Indeed, I have the feeling that we are caught 
in a vicious circle: we loot from the Africans, with the pretext of teach-
ing people to know and love them, which is to say, at the end of the day, 
to train other ethnographers who will go out and “love” them, and loot 
them, too.105
Another well-known quote from the diary itself:
August 29. While Lutten visits the village, I am working in the administra-
tor’s office with the interpreters. The objects arrive. Payment. The little 
black bag that contains the coins—the bag of tricks—is unknotted and 
reknotted over and over. The inventory notebook is filling up. It hasn’t yet 
104 Clifford, Predicament of Culture, 56.
105 “Les méthodes de collecte des objets sont, neuf fois sur dix, des méthodes d’achat forcé, 
pour ne pas dire de réquisition. Tout cela jette une certaine ombre sur ma vie … [J]’ai bien 
l’impression qu’on tourne dans un cercle vicieux: on pille des Nègres, sous prétexte 
d’apprendre aux gens à les connaître et à les aimer, c’est-à-dire, en fin de compte, à former 
d’autres ethnographes qui iront eux aussi les ‘aimer’ et les piller” (Leiris, Miroir de l’Afrique, 
204). See also Katharine Conley, “What Makes a Collection Surrealist? Twentieth-Century 
Cabinets of Curiosities in Paris and Houston.”
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happened that we purchase all of a man’s or woman’s clothing and leave 
them naked in the road, but that will certainly come.106
Neither the uneasiness expressed here, nor the fact that he published L’Afrique 
fantôme over the objections of the mission’s organizers, kept him from a suc-
cessful career as an ethnographer and, ultimately, the director of the Musée de 
l’homme. He is remembered today mainly for his heterodox multi-volume au-
tobiography, but also as a crusader against colonialism, whose work Fanon 
cites approvingly in several places.107
Looking at Leiris’s trajectory can help us contextualize and understand the 
transformation in Beauvoir’s own ideas about Blackness. The passages in her 
autobiography about negro spirituals, African masks, jazz and les faits divers 
have an exact analogue in Leiris’s enthusiastic essays which appeared between 
1929 and 1930 in the dissident surrealist magazine Documents, describing his 
enthusiasm for Vidor’s Hallelujah and Lew Leslie’s Black Birds Revue, which 
visited the Moulin Rouge. It is hard not to flinch when reading, for instance, in 
“Civilisation”:
Spectacles like the Black Birds take us far deeper than art, to a point of 
human development where that bastard conception had not yet become 
overdeveloped…. We suffer from terrible regret, regret that we are so rig-
idly incapable of such simple and beautiful expression, regret that we are 
mediocre people living mediocre lives, so flat and ugly compared to these 
touching creatures who live like trees…. Thus this music and dance, far 
from lingering on our skin, plunge into us deep, organic roots which pen-
etrate with a thousand branchings, a painful surgery transfusing a stron-
ger blood.108
106 “29 août. Pendant que Lutten visite le village, je travaille dans le bureau de l’administrateur 
avec les interprètes. Les objets arrivent, paiement. Le petit sac noir qui contient la 
monnaie— le sac à malice—est plusieurs fois dénoué et renoué. Le carnet d’inventaire 
s’emplit. Il ne nous est pas encore arrivé d’acheter à un homme ou une femme tous ses 
vêtements et de le laisser nu sur la route, mais cela viendra certainement” (Miroir de 
l’Afrique, 184–85).
107 See pnmb 22, 31–2; bswm 16, 26–7. The article Fanon uses is Leiris, “Martinique- 
Guadeloupe-Haiti.”
108 “Des spectacles tels que la revue des Black Birds nous ramènent très en deçà de l’art, à un 
point du développement humain où n’est pas encore hypertrophiée cette conception 
 bâtarde …. [N]ous souffrons d’un terrible regret, regret d’être si durement incapables 
d’une expression aussi simple et aussi belle, regret d’être médiocres, vivant d’une vie mé-
diocre, si plats et si laids devant ces créatures émouvantes comme des arbres…. C’est ainsi 
que ces musiques et ces danses, loin de s’attarder à notre peau, plongent en nous des 
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Later, in L’âge d’homme, he would speak retrospectively of having found in 
jazz an “abandon to animal joy,” the “myth of Edens of color.”109 Timothy Bewes 
forthrightly calls this “fetishization of the exotic,” which he compares to Con-
rad’s Heart of Darkness, a “reverse racism.”110 Indeed, Leiris himself came to 
describe his young view that pre-modern cultures were superior to the “green 
scum” of civilisation as “a kind of inverted racism.”111
The question is how the writer of those naïvely admiring lines became, in 
the words of James Clifford, “perhaps the first professional ethnographer to 
name and analyse colonialism, in 1950, as an inescapable ideological ground,” 
the man whose final understanding of the relationship of the metropole to the 
“dark continent” was “Africa does not need me.”112 Perhaps ethnography could 
only be decolonized by those who started with a deep suspicion of civilization 
and its normativities. Somehow Leiris’s trip to Africa and the daily writing he 
did there, helped him move from a fascination with the racialized Other as a 
(usefully distorting) mirror of the self, through unease about the relationships 
of commerce and exploitation this inevitably creates, toward actual relation-
ships of collaboration, reciprocity, and responsibility. The improvisatory auto-
biographical project that followed—L’âge d’homme and the four volumes of La 
règle du jeu—made it possible to dramatize his own “désarroi,” and that of his 
national culture, rather than seeking to cure it by quasimagical means.
The clearest statement of this progress is the essay “L’ethnographe devant le 
colonialisme,” which was first published in 1950 in Les Temps Modernes. Ac-
cording to the chronology in the Pléiade edition, this was first delivered as a 
talk with both Aimé Césaire and Claude Lévi-Strauss in the audience: he was 
literally facing both of them. And “colonialism” in 1950 was not the abstraction 
or metaphor it sometimes becomes in literary and cultural studies today. It is 
clearly understood here as an economic system, accompanied by its enabling 
mystifications to be sure, but distinguishable from them: the issue is not 
 racines profondes et organiques, qui nous pénètrent de leurs mille ramifications, chirur-
gie douloureuse mais nous communiquant un sang plus fort” (Documents 4, reprinted in 
Brisées, 31–7). See also Dawn Ades and Simon Baker, Undercover Surrealism: Georges Ba-
taille and Documents.
109 “[A]bandon à la joie animale,” “mythe des édens de couleur” (Leiris, L’âge d’homme, 
189–90).
110 Timothy Bewes, “From the Shameful Order of Virility: Autobiography After Colonialism.” 
(Bewes references Chinua Achebe’s famous essay on Conrad.)
111 Sally Price and Jean Jamin, “Conversation with Michel Leiris,” 162. See also “Jazz: An Inter-
view with Michael Haggerty,” 102, and Sally Price, “Michel Leiris, French Anthropology, 
and a Side Trip to the Antilles.”
112 “[L]’Afrique n’a pas besoin de moi” (Miroir de l’Afrique, 89). Quoted in Clifford, Predica-
ment of Culture, 173.
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cultural “difference,” but brutal economic exploitation, the extraction of 
resources.
Leiris begins by noting that ethnography developed alongside the spread of 
colonialism, still (in 1950) functions under its protective aegis, and is inextrica-
bly intertwined with it, whether or not the ethnographer wants that to be the 
case: “like it or not, they are part of the game.”113 The ethnographer’s subjects of 
study perceive him as part of the colonial administration, and they are not 
wrong to do so, since he cannot operate without that administration’s support. 
Also, his investigations change the culture he is studying. All this gives the eth-
nographer an inescapable obligation toward the people he studies: he cannot 
close his eyes or wash his hands. Indeed, properly accurate research requires 
that he take into account the “perturbations” introduced by colonialism, and 
study societies in their real and current state, rather than referring back to 
some imagined idea of cultural “integrity”—imaginary, because even before 
colonialism no group lived in complete isolation.
Leiris deplores the “vaguely humanitarian veil” under which colonialism 
spread—pointing out that the Nazis made very similar claims.114 And yet hu-
manism is central to his argument.
In spite of differences of color and culture, when we do ethnographic re-
search we are always observing our fellow-creatures and we cannot adopt 
toward them the same indifference of, say, an entomologist casting a curi-
ous eye on insects fighting or devouring one another.115
Beyond the obligation of every citizen and every intellectual to speak out 
against injustices committed in his name, the ethnographer has a particular 
responsibility to serve as the advocate of the colonized vis-à-vis the metropole. 
But in working to safeguard the cultures they study, ethnographers should be 
careful not to confuse this with preserving them in some sort of intact state in 
order to continue to study them: culture is inseparable from history, not a stat-
ic but a moving thing.116 The existentialist language, the echo of Hegel, should 
be familiar to my reader by now:
113 “[I]l est, bon gré mal gré, intégré à ce jeu” (“L’ethnographe devant le colonialisme,” 85).
114 “[V]oile vaguement humanitaire” (ibid., 83). Note the echo of the surrealist manifesto, 
“Murderous Humanitarianism.”
115 “En dépit des différences de couleur et de culture, quand nous faisons une enquête eth-
nographique ce sont toujours nos semblables que nous observons et nous ne pouvons 
adopter à leur égard l’indifférence, par exemple, de l’entomologiste qui regarde d’un œil 
curieux des insectes en train de se battre ou de s’entredévorer” (ibid., 85).
116 “[C]ette culture n’est pas une chose figée mais une chose mouvante” (ibid., 91).
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Once all of culture appears to us as a perpetual becoming, as the object of 
continual dépassements through which the underlying human group 
makes itself new, a desire to preserve the cultural particularisms of a col-
onized society no longer means anything. Or rather, such a desire means, 
practically, opposing oneself to that culture’s very life.117
Attempts to preserve “traditional” cultures through a system of “reservations” 
are especially unacceptable: “There is something shocking about putting a so-
ciety under a bell jar, treating human beings like animals penned in a zoo or 
isolated for a lab experiment,”118 and the idea that the people would be “hap-
pier” in that situation is a ruse: “We are only too eager to describe as ‘happy’ a 
people who make us happy when we look at them, because the spectacle gives 
us a poetic or aesthetic feeling.”119 (This is the same distinction we saw, in both 
Beauvoir and Wright, between “happy” and “free.”)
What is at stake here, in part, is the meaning of the term “culture”: Leiris is 
opposed to the idea of culture as frozen into folklore for tourists (or scholars). 
And, as Bewes explains, for Leiris “the most ‘authentic’ Africans … may be 
those who are more rather than less ‘adulterated’ by contact with the West—
that is to say, those who are aware of their status as colonized people, and who 
become promoters of an emancipation articulated in universal terms, in-
formed by a sense of solidarity defined ‘less by race than by condition.’”120 
 According to Leiris, it is especially with this group—the group we might call 
“subalterns” but who were then called “évolués”—that the ethnographer must 
stand in a (non-paternalistic) solidarity, including by encouraging the devel-
opment of archives and indigenous ethnographers. And it is important for 
ethnographers in the metropole to be encouraged to study societies “in their 
entirety”—including studying the whites, and the relationships involved in 
colonialism itself, and seeing “rituals” and the like as embedded in social con-
texts and “everyday life.” In short, Leiris in 1950 proposed a kind of solidarity 
117 “Or, dès l’instant que toute culture apparaît comme en perpétuel devenir et faisant l’objet 
de dépassements constants à mesure que le groupe humain qui en est le support se re-
nouvelle, la volonté de conserver les particularismes culturels d’une société colonisée n’a 
plus aucune espèce de signification. Ou plutôt une telle volonté signifie, pratiquement, 
que c’est à la vie même d’une culture qu’on cherche à s’opposer” (ibid., 92).
118 “[I]l y a quelque chose de choquant dans le fait de mettre une société sous cloche (car 
c’est traiter des hommes comme des animaux qu’on parque dans un zoo ou qu’on enfer-
me en vase clos pour une expérience de laboratoire)” (ibid., 94).
119 “[L]’on n’est que trop porté à regarder comme heureux un peuple qui nous rend, nous, 
heureux quand nous le regardons, en raison de l’émotion poétique ou esthétique que son 
spectacle nous donne” (ibid., 95).
120 Bewes, “From the Shameful Order of Virility,” 464.
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that understood cultures as dynamic and developing, that recognized the situ-
ation of the colonized person as always mediated and mediating, and that left 
the destiny of indigenous peoples in their own hands. It is not so much a ques-
tion of “working on,” and more a question of “working with.”
If we leave aside the Hegelian language of “dépassement” and “devenir,” this 
essay may seem like a simple statement of what anthropologists now generally 
believe. At the time, however, it was directly opposed by none other than Pierre 
Bourdieu, who began his own fieldwork in Algeria as part of the occupying 
French army;121 and the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss was continuing in a rather 
different direction, away from the affirmation of human relationships and val-
ues, and toward a rather static, abstract conception of culture.122 Both Bour-
dieu and Lévi-Strauss are major figures to anthropology students today, unlike 
Leiris; for example, “L’ethnographe devant le colonialisme” has never been 
translated into English. And we might be less sanguine about “what anthro-
pologists now generally believe” if we thought about the many anthropologists 
employed by the World Bank, and those embedded with armies in places like 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
But can we leave aside that existentialist language, that dynamic Hegelian 
sense of authenticity that speaks of “dépassement” and “devenir”? For anthro-
pology in particular the sense of “progress” and improvement may feel em-
barassing, especially in the light of the many failures of decolonialization in 
Africa and elsewhere. (The hopeful tone of Leiris’s comments about Mao now 
have a particular ring of unintended irony.) On the other hand, if one thinks of 
this from the point of view of a colonized subject, a dynamic sense of culture 
could well be an improvement over a static sense of structure, and wouldn’t 
that be the viewpoint we should seek to adopt? Perhaps it is impossible to de-
cide this question as a general matter. “L’ethnographe devant le colonialisme” 
is an existentialist ethics and, as Beauvoir said, an existentialist ethics has to be 
anchored in a concrete human situation. There are no recipes.123
121 See Derek Robbins, “The Responsibility of the Ethnographer: An Introduction to Pierre 
Bourdieu on ‘Colonialism and Ethnography,’” 11–12, and Jane Goodman and Paul A. 
Silverstein, Bourdieu in Algeria: Colonial Politics, Ethnographic Practices, Theoretical 
Developments.
122 See Sally Price, “Michel Leiris, French Anthropology, and a Side Trip to the Antilles.” See 
also Clifford, Predicament of Culture: “The great narrative of entropy and loss in Tristes 
tropiques expresses an inescapable, sad truth. But it is too neat, and it assumes a question-
able Eurocentric position at the ‘end’ of a unified human history, gathering up, memorial-
izing the world’s local historicities” (14).
123 pma 194, EA 134. See chapter 3 above.
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While some Leiris scholars have seen his postwar transformation, and many 
of the ideas in this essay, as a result of Sartre’s influence, I would argue as usual 
for more of a two-way street, less an appropriation or an influence than a col-
laboration and a dialogue. Long before Leiris met Sartre and Beauvoir, he was 
already an example of what they were working toward, or hoping for—an eth-
ics of movement that would not degrade into the fixed content of the bour-
geois serious man, a freedom that would move beyond theory (or fantasy) to 
find a purchase on, a genuine participation in and with, a demystified but 
meaningful world. Much of Leiris’s mature literary work involves the reader in 
dizzing series of oscillations, digressions, and ironies which (unlike in Beau-
voir’s resolutely realist “metaphysical” novels) do not work toward or look for 
resolution.124 As Beauvoir put it in the long passage I quoted above, the idea 
was to “become engaged, without getting lost.”125 How to do that, though? How 
to take yourself seriously without taking yourself too seriously, how to accept 
responsibility for your weight on the earth without turning into the “serious 
man” who clings to a set of unrevisable fixed ideas, with which he defends 
himself against all comers?126
7 Beauvoir and Surrealism: L’invitée (Again)
In my view, Beauvoir followed a similar path to her good friend Leiris in leav-
ing voyeuristic “negrophilia” behind and moving toward a fully responsible 
124 It is gratifying to see that Leiris’s mature works are now getting the English translations 
they have so long deserved, by the wonderful Lydia Davis. Leiris mattered. It is rarely not-
ed that one of Derrida’s earliest forays into deconstruction, “Tympan,” takes off from a 
long quoted passage from Leiris … and even the short passages I quoted from Glossaire j’y 
serre mes gloses should suffice to indicate a broader indebtedness. Indeed, observing the 
contortions Derrida went through, at the end of his life, to articulate the kind of stable, 
committed ethical “position” he had done so much to render inarticulable, I might be 
tempted to … a further digression, sorry.
125 pma 79, EA 55.
126 In Nuits sans nuit et quelques jours sans jour [nights with no night and some days without 
sun], which Leiris published in 1961, he drew on notebooks and files to record in chrono-
logical order, with minimal comment, a series of dreams starting in the 1920s. Here in his 
nightmares is the real horror of the Occupation, and also of colonial life, along with more 
personal terrors. Here too he revisits, and revises, some of the troubling sexualized and 
racialized images I discussed earlier. He dreams in 1942 of a revue nègre like the Black 
Birds—which leads to boats full of corpses and rotting fish; in 1946, after the inauguration 
of an exhibit on Madagascar, he dreams that his “patron” Paul Rivet (the founding director 
of the Musée de l’homme) is directing a traveling circus or Buffalo Wild West traveling 
show in which he must perform … Leiris, Nuits sans nuit, 140, 166.
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attention to colonial histories, an evolution that begins to be visible in the 
moral period, and solidifies with L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 and The Second 
Sex. Such attention certainly animated Beauvoir’s committed collaborative 
work with Les Temps Modernes, and her crucial and risky public anti- colonialist 
activism during the Algerian war and afterward. One thing we can learn, per-
haps, from Leiris, is that the quest to isolate genuine or authentic “difference” 
is, not just an unattainable fantasy, but actively dangerous, and at odds with 
real possibilities for effective relationship and solidarity.
If I pose to Beauvoir (as it were) the question Sartre asked Queneau—what 
remained to you from surrealism—one answer might not be entirely dissimi-
lar: there is an association with youth, with books that shocked her parents, 
with an iconoclastic anti-rationalism and a critique of the West and of civiliza-
tion, that was particularly helpful as a corrective to the aridity of the idealist 
philosophy she was learning at the Sorbonne, and as a liberating “déclic” to 
shake off the influence of two writers, Barrès and Claudel, who looked radical, 
but were actually quite right-wing. (Both had been important to her in girlhood, 
along with Gide; Barrès, forgotten today, wrote a very influential and terribly 
anti-semitic book called Les déracinés.)127 Surrealism itself, though, wouldn’t 
be allowed to serve as any kind of alibi: in Quand prime le spirituel, it is the con-
man and masher Denis who pushes Marguerite to read the “Manifestos of Sur-
realism” and praises the idea of the acte gratuit as an explanation for his own 
bad faith and bad behavior. (There’s more than a little of cousin Jacques in De-
nis as well.) It’s important to keep in mind that the autobiographical works re-
cord a process of Bildung, of development and change—that same devenir and 
dépassement, in a way—and this is true not just for the first volume, but per-
haps even more for La force de l’âge: an important theme is, how mistaken 
Beauvoir and Sartre both were, before the war, in not truly understanding the 
political stakes of their own privilege. Insofar as Beauvoir links her lingering 
taste for surrealist poems and African masks with a nostalgia for the absolute, 
she marks the process of leaving that behind: the pursuit of a totality, without 
limits, is not what a grown-up existentialist ought to do.
Perhaps the writing of L’invitée involved a similar process. She records an 
encounter during the Occupation, while she was writing it, with the avant-
garde playwright Arthur Adamov (he was associated with the surrealists and 
with the Theatre of the Absurd).
I was working, just as I used to do, in a booth at the back [of the Café 
Dôme], but there were no more refugees reading the papers or playing 
127 See Altman, “Necessity but [unintelligible].”
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chess; most of the foreigners had disappeared, and almost all the faces I 
knew. From time to time Adamov would loom up by my table, his eyes 
growing wider and wider, endlessly questioning everything…. “What are 
you writing?” he asked me once. I was brave enough to confess: “A novel.” 
“A novel?” he repeated. “A real novel? With a beginning, a middle, an 
end?” He seemed as dumbfounded as my father’s friends had been, long 
ago, by the poems of Max Jacob.128
Adamov might well have been surprised to see her writing “a real novel,” that 
is to say, a traditional one, after the explosions of surrealism had (supposedly) 
demolished referentiality—not to mention, in the middle of a war. This is ad-
ditionally surprising as we’ve seen Beauvoir’s own tastes, at least as a reader, 
put her in sympathetic contact with the movement whose slogan was “de-
struction et poésie,” and which had declared such novels dead and buried. But 
interestingly, when L’invitée was published, to general acclaim, Adamov did 
not dislike it.
I anticipated that Adamov would be scornful. “So,” I said to him, “have 
you seen it? A real novel with a beginning, a middle, and an end, do you 
utterly despise it?” He shook his head and looked at me gravely: “I wouldn’t 
go that far. There’s Xavière,” he said. “There is Xavière.”129
Indeed, Xavière functions a bit like Breton’s Nadja, or the unnamed woman in 
Philippe Soupault’s Dernières nuits à Paris, as that “infracassable noyau de 
nuit,” the silent, mysterious, possibly mad object whom the other characters pas-
sionately attempt and fail to “read,” understand, possess. Pierre calls her a “perle 
noire,” a black pearl:
128 “Je travaillais, comme autrefois, dans un des boxes du fond, mais il n’y avait plus de 
réfugiés occupés à lire les journaux ou à jouer aux échecs; la plupart des étrangers avaient 
disparu, et presque tous les visages que je connaissais. De temps en temps, Adamov sur-
gissait devant ma table, les yeux de plus en plus écarquillés, dans une interrogation sans 
fin…. ‘Mais qu’est-ce que vous écrivez?’ me demande-t-il une fois. J’avouai courageuse-
ment: ‘Un roman.—Un roman? répéta-t-il, un vrai roman? Avec un commencement, un 
milieu, une fin?’ Il avait l’air aussi abasourdi que les amis de mon père, autrefois, devant 
les poèmes de Max Jacob” (FA 543).
Max Jacob, the friend of Picasso and Apollinaire, was a precursor of surrealism and a 
favorite of Beauvoir’s cousin Jacques. See Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, hereinafter 
mjfr, 279–80, 312–13.
129 “Je m’attendais au dédain d’Adamov. ‘Alors, lui dis-je, vous avez vu? C’est un vrai roman 
avec un commencement, un milieu, une fin; ça vous déplaît bien fort?’ Il hocha la tête, son 
regard s’alourdit: ‘Pas tant que ça. Il y a Xavière, dit-il. Il y a Xavière’” (FA 637–38).
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“Everything about her is so pure, and so violent.”
“Why black?” asked Françoise.
“Because there’s a kind of perversity about her. It’s as if she has a need, 
sometimes, to do harm, to do herself harm and make herself hated.”130
Xavière is associated with “mysterious perturbations” and obscure, self- absorbed 
rituals: along with “perversité,” the words “sorcière” and “sorcellerie,” witch and 
witchcraft, accompany her throughout the novel.131 Where Françoise initially 
sees an “enfant capricieuse,” a capricious child, Pierre sees “a fierce and exact-
ing soul”: “I find it moving, this inability of hers to form human relationships 
with people.”132 Pierre treats Xavière as a “Pythie,” a Pythian priestess or sybil, 
and a “living question mark.”133 Françoise comes to espouse his view to the 
point of being distressed that Pierre himself will destroy it: “This black pearl, 
this austere angel, with his caressing man’s hands Pierre will turn her into a 
swooning woman … [Françoise] looked on with a kind of horror.”134
In their more rational moments, the adult tête-à-têtes for which Xavière 
jealously despises them, Pierre and Françoise debate whether Xavière’s refusal 
or inability (but which is it?) to work or study, to make plans or keep appoint-
ments, to consider the feelings or needs of others, and her insistence that any-
thing but living in the moment is “bourgeois,” constitute a genuine alternative 
ethic (“morale”), a challenge to the rules for living Pierre and Françoise have 
carefully worked out for themselves—or whether it is simply “veulerie” (spine-
lessness). Pierre argues that “when inertia is taken to such an extreme point, 
one can’t go on calling it spinelessness; it takes on a kind of power of its own.”135 
(At one point Pierre and Françoise, listening at her door, hear her making 
non-human moaning sounds, a “plainte animale,” and are afraid to go in.)136 
And insofar as Françoise finally does buy into this, Xavière’s power becomes 
real. “This sorceress had made off with her image and subjected it to the worst 
130 “Tout est si pur en elle et si violent.
—Pourquoi noire? dit Françoise.
—À cause de cette espèce de perversité qu’elle a. On dirait que c’est un besoin chez 
elle par moments de faire du mal, de se faire mal et de se faire haïr” (L’invitée, 164).
131 “[D]e mystérieuses perturbations” (L’invitée, 45). See also for instance L’invitée 164, 190, 
226, 253.
132 “[Â]me exigeante et farouche” (L’invitée, 164). “[Ç]a me touche, cette incapacité où elle est 
d’avoir des rapports humains avec les gens” (164).
133 “[U]ne Pythie” (L’invitée, 140); “un vivant point d’interrogation” (156).
134 “[C]ette perle noire, cet ange austère, avec ses mains caressantes d’homme, Pierre en fe-
rait une femme pâmée; déjà il avait écrasé ses lèvres contre les lèvres douces … Elle le re-
garda avec une espèce d’horreur” (L’invitée, 260).
135 “[Q]uand on pousse l’inertie jusqu’au point où elle la pousse, le nom de veulerie ne con-
vient plus, ca prend une espèce de puissance” (L’invitée, 163).
136 L’invitée, 386.
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of spells, just as she pleased.”137 (One way to understand Françoise’s over-the-
top murderous solution: if what she’s up against is voodoo, sending Xavière 
back to Rouen won’t make a bit of difference. Witches can fly.)
The uncanny connection between the heart of darkness that is Xavière and 
actual dark-skinned people from warm places is also explicit throughout 
L’invitée. Her irrational, alluring, but dangerous sensuality is especially on view 
in four bar scenes involving dancing, one set in the famous Bal Nègre, two in a 
“café maure” (moorish café) with belly-dancing, and one in a Spanish flamenco 
establishment, to which the trio is introduced by an accomplished actress and 
dancer, Paule Berger: it is there that Xavière appears most seriously disturbed, 
burning her own hand studiously with her cigarette, a gesture that Pierre finds 
“sacrée” and “expiatoire.”138 Three of the four scenes have the same structure 
Beauvoir described when evoking the Bal Nègre in her memoir: Xavière watch-
es the dancers, absorbed, envious, wanting to become them, nearly succeeding 
(but not quite); Françoise enjoys herself but does not dance. She watches 
Xavière. In chapter 2, we are introduced both to the moorish café and to 
Xavière:
“I wish I knew how to dance like that,” said Xavière; her shoulders shiv-
ered, a slight undulation ran over her body. Françoise smiled at her. She 
was sorry the day was coming to an end; Xavière had been charming.
“In Fez, in the red-light district, Labrousse and I saw some of them 
dancing naked,” said Françoise, “but it was a bit too much like an anato-
my lesson.”
“What things you’ve seen!” said Xavière, with a touch of resentment…139
The dancer moved toward the middle of the floor; her haunches undu-
lated, her belly rippled to the rhythm of the tambourine.
“It’s as if a demon was trapped in her body and trying to escape,” said 
Xavière. She leaned forward, fascinated. Françoise settled deeper into the 
137 “[C]ette sorcière s’était emparé de son image et lui faisait subir à son gré les pires envoûte-
ments” (L’invitée, 298).
138 See Toril Moi, “L’invitée: An Existentialist Melodrama.” As I said in chapter 2, I am not in 
sympathy with the psychoanalytic “payoff” of Moi’s reading, but her analysis of this scene 
is a powerful one.
139 “Assises au fond du café maure sur des coussins de laine rêche, Françoise et Xavière regar-
daient la danseuse arabe.
—Je voudrais savoir danser ainsi, dit Xavière; ses épaules frémirent, une ondulation 
légère parcourut son corps. Françoise lui sourit, elle regrettait que la journée s’achevât; 
Xavière avait été charmante.
—À Fez, dans le quartier réservé, nous en avons vu, Labrousse et moi, qui dansaient 
nues, dit Françoise, mais ça ressemblait un peu trop à une démonstration anatomique.
—Vous en avez vu des choses! dit Xavière avec une nuance de rancune” (L’invitée, 21).
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cushions; she, too, was touched by all this cheap glitter, but what delight-
ed her more than anything was that she’d brought Xavière’s sad little exis-
tence into her own life.140
The scene in the Bal Nègre itself—labelled the “Bal colonial” by a sign on its 
door—uses some of the very same language as the autobiographical passage I 
quoted above.
In that wide room with its pale frescos, banal as a banqueting hall, nearly 
all one saw were faces of color; all shades of skin were there, from ebony 
black to rose-ochre. These Blacks danced with lewd abandon, but such 
pure rhythm was in their movements that even the rumba, crude and 
naïve as it was, retained the sacred character of primitive ritual. The 
whites who mixed with them did less well; the women in particular re-
sembled stiff wind-up toys, or hysterics having fits. All except Xavière, 
whose perfect grace flew in the face of both decency and indecency.141
But Xavière, as usual, is not satisfied. “They have the devil under their skin, 
these négresses,”142 she said angrily. “I’ll never be able to dance like that.” Fran-
çoise disagrees. “You know, you dance very well [drôlement bien].”143
140 “La danseuse s’avança vers le milieu de la salle; ses hanches ondulaient, son ventre tres-
saillit au rythme du tambourin.
—On dirait un démon qui cherche à s’échapper de son corps, dit Xavière. Elle se pen-
cha en avant, fascinée…. Françoise s’enfonça dans les coussins; elle aussi, elle était tou-
chée par tout ce clinquant facile, mais ce qui l’enchantait surtout s’était d’avoir annexé à 
sa vie cette petite existence triste….” (L’invitée, 22–3).
141 “Dans cette grande pièce décorée de fresques pâles et qui ressemblait dans sa banalité à 
une salle de noces et banquets, on ne voyait guère que des visages de couleur: du noir 
d’ébène à l’ocre rosé, on trouvait là toutes les nuances de peau. Ces noirs dansaient avec 
une obscénité déchaînée, mais leurs mouvements avaient un rythme si pur que dans sa 
rudesse naïve cette rumba gardait le caractère sacré d’un rite primitif. Les blancs qui se 
mêlaient à eux avaient moins de bonheur; les femmes surtout ressemblaient à de raides 
mécaniques ou à des hystériques en transes. Il n’y avait que Xavière dont la grâce parfaite 
défiât à la fois l’obscénité et la décence” (L’invitée, 310).
142 As in my discussion of L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 above, I have decided to leave the 
words négresse and nègre in French because there is no way to get this right. Today’s dic-
tionary leaves no doubt that the terms are “injurieux,” insulting, in the same way that 
“Negro” would be in today’s United States. But language changes; it is less clear whether 
either of these terms would have been insulting in the 1940s; probably it depended on 
context; any choice on my part would be tendentious.
143 “D’un signe de tête, Xavière déclina une nouvelle invitation et elle revint s’asseoir à côté 
de Françoise.
—Elles ont un diable dans la peau, ces négresses, dit-elle avec colère. Jamais je 
n’arriverai à danser comme ça.
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Now, if we were in American literature, or some Vian-like imitation thereof, 
Xavière’s uncanny dancing ability and the way she is drawn to the dance floor 
might foreshadow a revelation that she had some “Black blood,” was, in short, 
a tragic mulatto, like Faulkner’s Joe Christmas. But that’s not where this is 
going.
“You dance really well, you know,” said Françoise.
“Yes, not too bad for a civilized person,”144 said Xavière in a disdainful 
tone. She was staring at something in the middle of the dance floor. “She’s 
dancing with that little Creole again,” she said, pointing to Lise Malan 
with her eyes. “She hasn’t let go of him since we got here. He’s shamefully 
pretty.”
It’s true he was charming, slim as could be in his tight brown jacket. 
An even more plaintive moan slipped from Xavière’s lips:
“Ah! she said, I would give a year of my life to be that négresse for one 
hour.… Or else, one would have to be rich enough to buy her and lock her 
up,” said Xavière. “Isn’t it Baudelaire who did that? Imagine, when you go 
home, instead of a dog or a cat, to find this sumptuous creature purring 
beside a wood fire?”145
Actually, Baudelaire did not do this: for the record, the Haitian-born dancer 
Jeanne Duval was his mistress, his “Vénus noire,” and his “muse” (as Wikipedia 
puts it); but he never literally “owned” or confined her. He had hardly any more 
Elle trempa ses lèvres dans son verre.
—Que c’est sucré! Je ne peux pas le boire, dit-elle.
—Vous dansez drôlement bien, vous savez, dit Françoise” (L’invitée, 311).
144 See also the following exchange: “‘In the end you’ll dance just as well as the négresse does.’ 
‘Alas, it’s impossible,’ said Xavière.” [Vous finirez par danser aussi bien que la négresse.—
Hélas! ce n’est pas possible, dit Xavière (L’invitée, 315).]
145 “—Vous dansez drôlement bien, vous savez, dit Françoise.
—Oui, pour une civilisée, dit Xavière d’un ton méprisant. Elle regardait fixement 
quelque chose au milieu de la piste.
—Elle danse encore avec ce petit créole, dit-elle; ses yeux désignaient Lise Malan. Elle 
ne l’a pas lâché depuis que nous sommes arrivées. Elle ajouta d’un ton plaintif: il est hon-
teusement joli.
C’est vrai qu’il était charmant, tout mince dans une veste cintrée couleur bois de rose. 
Des lèvres de Xavière s’échappa un gémissement plus plaintif encore:
—Ah! dit-elle, je donnerais un an de ma vie pour être pendant une heure cette né-
gresse…. Ou alors, il faudrait être assez riche pour l’acheter et pour la séquestrer, dit 
Xavière. C’est Baudelaire qui avait fait ça, n’est-ce pas? Vous imaginez, quand on rentre 
chez soi, au lieu d’un chien ou d’un chat, trouver cette somptueuse créature en train de 
ronronner au coin du feu de bois!” (L’invitée, 311).
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money than she did, by the end. Objectified, yes; enslaved, no.146 One suspects 
Françoise knows the difference, but she is not in a pedagogical mood.
A Black naked body stretched out before a wood fire … was this what 
Xavière dreamed of? How far did her dream go?147
Now, this whole novel is about looking, about the Look of the Other and its 
power to steal the world. (Pierre is amazed at Françoise’s ability to experience 
a philosophical issue in such a visceral manner: but she does, and so, appar-
ently, did her creator.)148 For now, though, suppose we focus not on what hap-
pens when Xavière’s ability to look back at Françoise contests Françoise’s mo-
nopoly of the subject position, but what happens when that (Sartrean) either/
or power problematic intersects (so to speak) with something that is problem-
atic for us: the well-sedimented tendency for white people to see people of 
color, particularly entertainers of color, as objects who exist purely for our 
viewing pleasure, like zoo animals. To answer Petrine Archer-Straw’s question, 
what I need to decide is first whether Françoise shares, or merely envies, 
Xavière’s problematic “gaze”;149 and then, whether “Beauvoir,” or at least the 
novel as a whole, shares in it, or merely describes it. There is, indisputably, “ne-
grophilia” in this scene. Whose negrophilia is it?
146 Angela Carter, who retold their story from Jeanne’s point of view in “Black Venus,” sum-
marized it in a 1985 interview: “He treated her, as they say, ‘Quite well,’ except that he ap-
pears not to have taken her in any degree seriously as a human being” (Kerryn Goldswor-
thy, “Angela Carter,” 11).
147 “—Un corps noir et nu couché de tout son long devant un feu de bois … était-ce cela que 
Xavière rêvait? Jusqu’où allait son rêve?” (L’invitée, 311, ellipsis in original).
148 See L’invitée, 376. Margaret Simons has drawn attention to a line from Beauvoir’s student 
diary, where she is reflecting on the difference between herself and Merleau-Ponty, a fel-
low student: “those problems that he lives in his mind, I live them with my arms and my 
legs” (Beauvoir, Diary of a Philosophy Student, 2). Any reading of Beauvoir’s letters and 
autobiography certainly bears out this claim.
149 The issue of “sexual tourism” with respect to the Bal Nègre and desire between women is 
very well discussed in Michel Lucey, “Simone de Beauvoir and Sexuality in the Third Per-
son,” using the methodology of literary pragmatics. As I wrote in chapter 2 above, the 
possibility of lesbian intersubjectivity (between Xavière and Françoise) is expressed in 
scenes like these (and there are others) where both women together look at other women, 
and assess them from a physical point of view. These involve both objectification and 
desire (obviously), but there’s often, as here, a blurring or slippage between a competitive, 
comparing gaze, and desire tout court, that is between the desire to be and the desire to 
have what one is looking at. I suspect Beauvoir saw this as a stable feature of the condition 
of women: even Pierre’s aggressively heterosexual sister Elisabeth indulges in it.
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I think a case can at least be made that Françoise takes a step, or a half-step, 
back from her own attraction to the “letting go” of the Bal Nègre and from the 
nexus of association that brings dark skin, and Xavière herself, closer to the 
animal kingdom than to civilization. Like Leiris in Africa, Françoise deplores 
her own ability to “let go,” but in the end it is Françoise’s consciousness, and 
consciousness tout court, that is to say, consciousness rather than the dark 
night of the Unconscious (“l’infracassable noyau de nuit”), which must tri-
umph, as a matter of life and death. If we want to talk about violence, it is the 
hyper-rational, over-civilized Françoise who suddenly becomes a killer. So the 
end of the book leaves me in a similar quandary as the end of J’irai cracher sur 
vos tombes: Wait, what? Where are my sympathies supposed to be here? What 
is this book trying to say?
The turning point, I think, comes when a friend, the dancer Paule Berger 
(who is a serious artist, as well as a woman with enviably fluid command of her 
body) invites the trio for an evening at the Spanish club: it reminds Françoise 
of trips she and Pierre used to take to Seville, and Paule notes with pleasure 
that there is no “faux pittoresque”—this is an authentic place where real Span-
ish people go. The musicians and especially the flamenco dancers are de-
scribed in terms that recall the Arab dancer in the moorish café and the né-
gresses of the Bal Nègre:
“These women are astonishing,” said Françoise. “They have layers and lay-
ers of paint on their faces, and yet it doesn’t make them look artificial, the 
face stays quite lively and animal.”150
Xavière, as usual, is entranced: “Her cheeks were pink, she was no longer in 
control of her own face and her eyes followed the movements of the dancer, 
dazed with rapture.”151 But when Françoise next looks at her, she has turned 
inward and is torturing herself, slowly and deliberately burning her hand with 
the glowing end of her own cigarette: “a bitter smile curled back her lips, an 
intimate solitary smile like the smile of a madwoman, the voluptuous tortured 
smile of a woman gripped by pleasure, one could hardly bear to look at her.”152 
150 “—Elles sont étonnantes, ces femmes, dit Françoise. Elles ont des couches de fard sur la 
peau et pourtant ça ne leur donne pas l’air artificiel, leur visage demeure tout vivant et 
animal” (L’invitée, 351).
151 “Ses pommettes étaient roses, elle ne contrôlait plus son visage et ses regards suivaient les 
mouvements de la danseuse avec un ravissement hébété” (L’invitée, 353).
152 “[U]n sourire aigu retroussait ses lèvres; c’était un sourire intime et solitaire comme un 
sourire de folle, un sourire voluptueux et torturé de femme en proie au plaisir, on pouvait 
à peine en soutenir la vue” (L’invitée, 354).
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This is Xavière’s most “Nadja” moment.153 Pierre interprets the gesture as sa-
cred: Françoise, however, has had enough. By the end of the chapter she will 
have decided, once and for all, that Xavière’s “extase hystérique” reveals an “en-
emy presence,” and that what she feels for Xavière henceforth will deserve the 
name of hate.154
But before Françoise reaches that point, the novel has had enough: the stage 
set falls apart and reality breaks through, in a long, very moving passage about 
the Fascist destruction of Spain.
A young woman stood up from a neighboring table and began to recite a 
Spanish poem in a harsh voice; a vast silence fell over the room and all 
eyes were fixed on her. Even without understanding the meaning of the 
words one was gripped to one’s guts by this passionate tone of voice, this 
face distorted by pathos and ardor; the poem spoke of hatred and death, 
perhaps also of hope, and through its rising and falling tones of grief it 
was Spain, Spain torn to pieces, that was suddenly present to every heart. 
Gunfire and blood had driven the guitars, the songs, the gay shawls, and 
the fragrant flowers from her streets; the dancing-schools were in ashes, 
and bombs had burst the goatskins full of wine; in the gentle warmth of 
the evening, hunger stalked those streets, and fear. The flamenco, the in-
toxicating taste of the wine, were funereal echos of a dead past.155
Something is happening, and it’s not about them. From this point on, the novel 
deserts fantasies of escape into Otherness for the morning-after bitterness of 
153 There is even a reference to the beauty of ghosts (L’invitée, 360).
154 “[Cette] présence ennemie,” L’invitée, 363. In Françoise’s final rage, which ends both the 
novel and Xavière’s life, the myth of Xavière dies first: “‘the black pearl, the precious one, the 
spell-binder. Just a female [animal],’ she thought, passionately.” [La perle noire, la précieuse, 
l’ensorceleuse, la généreuse. Une femelle, pensa-t-elle avec passion (L’invitée, 491).]
155 “À une table voisine, une jeune femme venait de se lever et elle commençait à déclamer 
d’une voix rauque un poème espagnol; un grand silence se fit et tous les regards se 
posèrent sur elle. Même si l’on ne comprenait pas le sens des mots, on était pris aux en-
trailles par cet accent passionné, par ce visage que défigurait une ardeur pathétique; le 
poème parlait de haine et de mort, peut-être aussi d’espoir, et à travers ses sursauts et ses 
plaintes, c’était l’Espagne déchirée qui se faisait soudain présente à tous les cœurs. Le feu 
et le sang avaient chassé des rues les guitares, les chansons, les châles éclatants, les fleurs 
de nard; les maisons de danse s’étaient effondrées et les bombes avaient crevé les outres 
gonflées de vin; dans la chaude douceur des soirs rôdaient la peur et la faim. Les chants 
flamencos, la saveur des vins dont on se grisait, ce n’était plus que l’évocation funèbre d’un 
passé défunt” (L’invitée, 362–63).
289Beauvoir and Blackness
adult life. Even Xavière feels it. Françoise tries to rescue the evening, sounding 
a false note of social good manners:
“We still have some time …. Paule was right, it’s a good place.”
Xavière let out a bizarre laugh.
“Don’t you think we looked like American tourists visiting ‘Paris at 
Night’? We sat down, off to the side, so as not to get dirty, we looked, with-
out touching anything …”
Pierre’s face darkened.
“What, you would have liked us to snap our fingers and shout Olé?”156
(When Pierre was offered a wineskin to drink, and showed how to do it “prop-
erly,” he choked and got wine all over his tie.) It is a good place, a “real” place, 
as Paule had promised; but they don’t belong there.
A bit later, Françoise and Xavière return to the Moorish café, but it has lost 
its magic. “‘How sad it’s become,’ Xavière said.”157 The danseuse is no longer 
beautiful.
“What big thighs she has,” said Xavière with disgust, “she’s gotten fat.”
“She was always fat,” said Françoise.
“It’s very possible,” said Xavière. “It used to be so easy to dazzle me.”158
Was this novel, then, sadly “of its time” in its images of people of color, and 
how it uses those images? Or is something more complex going on?
It does seem fair to say that both Beauvoir and Sartre in their early literary 
works made use of Blackness as an avant-garde and anti-establishment trope. 
So, in the early pages of La nausée, a nègre, dressed in yellow socks, a green hat, 
156 “[N]ous avons encore du temps devant nous, c’est plaisant d’être ici. Elle se tournait vers 
Xavière: N’est-ce pas? Paule n’avait pas menti, c’est un bon endroit.
Xavière eut un rire bizarre.
—Vous ne trouvez pas qu’on a l’air de touristes américains en train de visiter ‘Paris la 
Nuit.’ Nous sommes installés un peu à l’écart, pour ne pas nous salir, et nous regardions, 
sans toucher à rien …
Le visage de Pierre s’assombrit.
—Quoi! vous voudriez que nous fassions claquer nos doigts en criant: ‘Ollé!’ dit-il” 
(L’invitée, 361, ellipsis in original).
157 “—Comme c’est devenu triste, dit Xavière” (L’invitée, 422).
158 “—Comme elle a de grosses hanches, dit Xavière avec dégoût, elle a engraissé.
—Elle a toujours été grosse, dit Françoise.
—C’est bien possible, dit Xavière. Il en fallait si peu autrefois pour m’éblouir” (L’invitée, 
425).
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and a raincoat, comes whistling around a streetcorner in the middle of the 
afternoon. Just then, a woman in a sky-blue coat is running backwards down 
the street, laughing, waving a handkerchief; right under an unlit street lamp, 
she crashes backwards into his arms. He almost seems like a refugee from an 
absurdist painting, an objective correlative for the narrator’s state of mind, a 
sign that the perceptual world has gone slightly out out of whack (but only 
slightly).159 We’ve never seen these people before and we’ll never see them 
again. The blues song “Some of These Days” will fill a similar gap at the end of 
La nausée: it is something from far, far outside that nonetheless, uncannily, 
penetrates the narrator to the core, in the way Leiris described the dancers of 
the Black Birds revue. Xavière certainly seems to participate in the same dy-
namic, as in an early scene when the two women are eating sandwiches in 
Xavière’s room.
“Something very lucky just happened to me,” said Xavière in a confiding 
tone.
“And what was that?” asked Françoise.
“The beautiful nègre dancer!” said Xavière. “He spoke to me.”
“Be careful, or the blonde will scratch your eyes out,” said Françoise.
“I passed him on the stairs, as I was going up with my tea and all my 
little packages.” Xavière’s eyes lit up. “He was so nice! he was wearing a 
light-coloured raincoat and his hat was pale grey, which goes so well with 
that dark skin. All the packages fell out of my hands. He picked them up 
and gave them back to me with a big smile and he said to me, ‘Good eve-
ning, Mademoiselle, bon appetit.’”
“And what did you say back to him?”
“Nothing!” said Xavière, as if she’d heard something scandalous. “I ran 
away.”
She smiled.
“He’s graceful like a cat, so unconscious, and so sly.”160
159 “[T]out l’invraisemblable … tout ce qui ne pourrait pas être cru dans les cafés, on ne le 
manque pas. Par exemple samedi, vers quatre heures de l’après-midi, sur le bout du trot-
toir en planches du chantier de la gare, une petite femme en bleu ciel courait à reculons, 
en riant, en agitant un mouchoir. En même temps, un Nègre avec un imperméable crème, 
des chaussures jaunes et un chapeau vert, tournait le coin de la rue et sifflait. La femme 
est venue le heurter, toujours à reculons, sous une lanterne qui est suspendue à la palis-
sade et qu’on allume le soir. Il y avait donc là, en même temps, cette palissade qui sent si 
fort le bois mouillé, cette lanterne, cette petite bonne femme blonde dans les bras d’un 
Nègre, sous un ciel de feu” (Sartre, La nausée, 22).
160 “—Il m’est arrivé un grand bonheur tout à l’heure, dit Xavière d’un ton de confiance.
—Et quoi donc? dit Françoise.
—Le beau danseur nègre! dit Xavière. Il m’a adressé la parole.
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A better illustration of the failure of intersubjectivity Edward Hughes was 
warning about would be hard to find: Xavière has had a marvelous encounter; 
she hasn’t had a human interaction, and seems barely able to conceive such a 
thing.
But there is more to this nègre than to La nausée’s one-dimensional whistler: 
he speaks, though his speech is not “recognized.” And we see more sides to him 
than Xavière does. It was Françoise who first mentioned him to Xavière in the 
early days of introducing her to the varied gens du quartier. (They were sitting 
with Pierre’s sister Elizabeth in a place called the Prairie, which the older wom-
en frequented in their youth.)
“See that woman at the bar with the turned-up nose? She lives in my 
building. She slinks around the hallways for hours, in a sky-blue night-
gown; I think she’s trying to seduce the nègre who lives in the apartment 
above mine.”
“She’s not that pretty,” said Xavière. Her eyes grew wide. “There’s a 
brown-haired woman next to her who is really beautiful.”161
The nègre doesn’t have much of a speaking part in the novel, and he doesn’t 
affect the plot, but he certainly (for lack of a better term) exists, for himself and 
for autrui. He lives in their building; he has friends, he has a girlfriend, maybe. 
At one point, Françoise sits down to work but has troubling concentrating:
—Prenez garde que la blonde ne vous arrache pas les yeux, dit Françoise.
—Je l’ai croisé dans l’escalier comme je remontais avec mon thé et tous mes petits 
paquets. Les yeux de Xavière s’illuminèrent. Qu’il était plaisant! Il avait un pardessus tout 
clair et un chapeau gris pâle, c’était si joli avec cette peau sombre. Mes paquets m’en sont 
tombés des mains. Il me les a ramassés avec un grand sourire et il m’a dit: ‘Bonsoir, Made-
moiselle, bon appétit.’
—Et qu’est ce que vous avez répondu? dit Françoise.
—Rien! dit Xavière d’un air scandalisé. Je me suis sauvée.
Elle sourit.
—Il est gracieux comme un chat, il a l’air aussi inconscient et aussi traître” (L’invitée, 
169).
161 “Regardez au bar, la blonde au nez retroussé; elle habite dans mon hôtel; elle traîne pen-
dant des heures dans les couloirs, en chemise de nuit bleu ciel; je crois que c’est pour 
aguicher le nègre qui habite au-dessus de ma tête.
—Elle n’est pas jolie, dit Xavière; ses yeux s’agrandirent. Il y a une femme brune à côté 
d’elle qui est bien belle” (L’invitée, 33–4).
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In the next room the nègre was giving the blonde hooker a tap-dancing 
lesson; a little Spanish woman who tended bar at the Topsy was with 
them, too. Françoise recognized their voices.162
On another occasion Françoise is sick in bed:
A door slammed on the landing and someone went down the corridor, 
slippers dragging; it must be the blonde hooker, who was just waking up; 
in the room above, the nègre’s phonograph was softly playing “Solitude.”163
This nègre is the subject of his own story, going on in another part of the build-
ing; he and his story are real in ways that don’t depend on Françoise or Xavière. 
He’s not a “symbol” of anything. (Perhaps he was based on a real person, like 
the intersexed refugee from Nazi Germany who also fascinates Xavière, and 
who shows up also in La force de l’âge.) In the end, how important is any of 
this? My answer has to be, it’s actually not important at all, that’s the point. A 
Black man lives in my apartment building, he’s good-looking and kind of nice, 
and (unlike us) he has a phonograph. So what?
Now, obviously Sartre’s thinking on race did not end with La nausée’s whis-
tling Negro. It would be possible to chart the shifts in his thinking about race 
by comparing the one-dimensional use of “local color” in his early fiction to 
the fullfledged anti-racism of La putain respectueuse: a melodrama, for sure, 
but a politically correct one. After a great deal of assistance from Richard 
Wright, that play’s “nègre,” though he still lacks a name, is certainly a man and 
not a myth. What I’m describing was in those years a common trajectory; and 
at the time of L’invitée, I think, Beauvoir was somewhere in the middle of it. If 
L’invitée cannot quite stage a passage from fascination to solidarity, at least it 
achieves the recognition of the racial other as an everyday human being, the 
recognition that is a necessary (though not a sufficient) ground for solidarity.
It’s worth noting also that at least some of its earliest readers seem to have 
experienced L’invitée as a critique, rather than a celebration, of the avant-garde 
mystique it puts on display. To finish the passage I quoted earlier:
162 “Dans la chambre voisine le nègre donnait une leçon de claquettes à la putain blonde; il y 
avait avec eux une petite Espagnole qui était barmaid au Topsy, Françoise reconnaissait 
leurs voix” (L’invitée, 138).
163 “Une porte claqua sur le palier et quelqu’un traversa le couloir en traînant des savates, ça 
devait être la putain blonde qui se levait; dans la chambre du dessus, le phonographe du 
nègre jouait doucement: ‘Solitude’” (L’invitée, 217).
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I anticipated that Adamov would be scornful. “So,” I said to him, “have 
you seen it? A real novel with a beginning, a middle, and an end, do you 
utterly despise it?” He shook his head and looked at me gravely: “I wouldn’t 
go that far. There’s Xavière,” he said. “There is Xavière.” Because of Xavière, 
some of the habitués of the Café de Flore allowed for extenuating cir-
cumstances, but the great majority saw me in an unfavorable light; they 
complained to Olga, to Mouloudji: I had spoken in a very mediocre way of 
the Bal Nègre and its splendid animality. They did not find any of their 
myths in the novel, and the character of Françoise exasperated them.164
For the gens du Flore, as for Xavière herself, the novel’s negrophilia (or what-
ever) does not go far enough; present-day readers may still feel it goes a bit too 
far. But the novel overall includes an awareness that there is something im-
possible, and also something vaguely sick, about making use of the Other in 
that way.
Within L’invitée these gens du Flore are associated with the “clan Péclard” 
that Gerbert has outgrown,165 and who are faintly suspicious of Pierre’s experi-
ments as a dramatist.166 Pierre’s sister, Elizabeth, who incarnates artistic bad 
faith (and every other kind) describes herself as working in the surrealist tradi-
tion, but in a way that doesn’t make much sense.167 To use Beauvoir’s phrase 
from La force de l’âge, surrealism is the air the novel breathes. But both ethi-
cally and aesthetically speaking, it doesn’t inhale.
164 “Je m’attendais au dédain d’Adamov. ‘Alors, lui dis-je, vous avez vu? C’est un vrai roman 
avec un commencement, un milieu, une fin; ça vous déplaît bien fort?’ Il hocha la tête, son 
regard s’alourdit: ‘Pas tant que ça. Il y a Xavière, dit-il. Il y a Xavière.’ À cause de Xavière, 
quelques habitués du Flore m’accordaient des circonstances atténuantes; mais la grande 
majorité me regardait d’un mauvais œil; ils se plaignirent à Olga, à Mouloudji: j’avais piè-
trement parlé du Bal nègre et de sa splendide animalité. Ils ne retrouvaient dans ce roman 
aucun de leurs mythes et le personnage de Françoise les exaspérait” (FA 637–38).
165 “[Gerbert] crossed the place Saint-Germain-des-Prés; [Pierre and Françoise] had ar-
ranged to meet him at the café de Flore; the spot amused them because they rarely went 
there, but as for him, he’d had it up to here with that whole enlightened elite.” [Il traversa 
la place Saint-Germain-des-Prés; ils lui avaient donné rendez-vous au café de Flore; 
l’endroit les amusait parce qu’ils n’y venaient pas souvent, mais pour lui, il en avait par-
dessus la tête, de toute cette élite éclairée” (L’invitée, 317).]
166 See L’invitée, 112.
167 Pierre says she is right to give up realism in treating of war subjects. “Yes, you see the di-
rection I’m working in now, she said. I’m trying to use the incoherence, the freedom, of 
the surrealists, but to remain in control.” [Tu as vu, c’est dans ce sens-là que je travaille 
maintenant, dit-elle. J’essaye d’utiliser l’incohérence et la liberté des surréalistes, mais en 
les dirigeant” (L’invitée, 275).]
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As Doris Ruhe has discussed, Beauvoir left the drafting of literary manifestos 
to Sartre, and rarely even published books reviews. But L’invitée makes an im-
plicit critique on the level of literary form. If Xavière is Nadja—and both Toril 
Moi and Susan Suleiman agree with the gens du Flore that she is168—then 
L’invitée also explores what happens when the mysterious surrealist Other 
turns out after all to have une vie à elle and something to say. A surrealist “nov-
el” is not really a novel as such: it never has more than one real character. Beau-
voir would later explain, in her debate with Blanchot, her own sense that nov-
els, at least good ones, operate dialectically, to provide the texture of the real.169 
She came to prefer L’invitée, and even more so Les mandarins, which stages an 
unresolvable political argument among many voices, to Le sang des autres, a 
“thesis novel” whose voice came too close to the didactic hectoring of the mor-
al period essays with which she groups it. It would be a particular error, then, 
to take these café scenes, the image-repertory they make use of, the allusion to 
a common context, nexus, discourse, as “Beauvoir.”
Insofar as L’invitée engages with race, it does so on the level of myth, not on 
the level of politics (or even ethics). But I think we must see it as reporting on 
the myths rather than sharing in or succumbing to them—much as Beauvoir 
will do in The Second Sex, where the question of “myth” is, obviously, extremely 
salient.
8 Myths and Travels
Thinking about the extremely diverse and heterogeneous material she discuss-
es in The Second Sex under the heading of “mythes” reminds us that a myth is 
not just any old story that turns out not to be true: it is a culturally powerful 
168 See Moi, “L’invitée: An Existentialist Melodrama,” 123: “As the repressed unconscious, the 
mysterious X that always escapes a final, controlling interpretation, Xavière comes across 
as a traditional patriarchal representation of femininity in modernist garb: Xavière’s clos-
est fictional sister is surely André Breton’s Nadja. Her power to stir and unsettle all fixed 
representations, to incarnate a certain revolutionary hysteria, may also awake associa-
tions from Freud’s Dora to Marguerite Duras’s Lol V. Stein. But where Breton and Duras—
in widely different ways, to be sure—valorize the transgressive, disordering power of their 
heroines, Beauvoir feels deeply threatened by it: not for her the delights of unconscious 
femininity or the jouissance of the disruptive sliding of the signifier.” I would dissent only 
from the psychoanalyzing word “threatened” here: I think Beauvoir made this decision in 
full conscious lucidity.
169 This has been so well discussed by Ruhe (“Beauvoir, Blanchot, et Sartre”), Moi (“What Can 
Literature Do?”), Fallaize (The Novels of Simone de Beauvoir), and others that there is no 
reason to belabor it here.
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story that despite, or even because of, not being true has an enormous hold on 
people (“je sais très bien, mais quand même … ”). And it seems important that 
Beauvoir’s take-down of Breton occurs at toward the end of her long section 
about “myths of woman.” When second-wave American feminist criticism 
picked up on the methodology (so to speak) of The Second Sex, they (we) tend-
ed to speak of “images of women” in works of art by men. But there’s a differ-
ence. If Beauvoir had just been looking for “negative images” of the female 
body in surrealist and post-surrealist literature, there are actually plenty of 
examples from Leiris’s literary work that could have given Breton a run for his 
money. She does draw on his autobiographical L’âge d’homme for some fairly 
striking descriptions of the female body; in the course of discussing how Chris-
tian “puritanism” has afflicted men’s view of sexuality, she quotes Leiris’s de-
scription of his symptom: “I have a tendency to consider the feminine organ as 
a dirty thing or a wound, not less attractive though for that, but dangerous in 
itself, as everything that is bloody, viscous, and contaminated.”170 However, she 
makes an interesting distinction.
Myth must not be confused with the grasp of a meaning [signification]; 
meaning is immanent to the object; it is revealed to consciousness in a 
living experience, whereas a myth is a transcendent Idea that escapes any 
conscious awareness. When Michel Leiris in L’âge d’homme describes his 
vision of female organs, he shows us meanings and does not develop any 
myth. Wonderment at the sight of a woman’s body or disgust for men-
strual blood are apprehensions of a concrete reality. There is nothing 
mythical in the experience of uncovering the voluptuous qualities of 
womanly flesh, and one does not turn the experience into myth by trying 
to express these qualities through similes, as flowers or as pebbles. But to 
say that Woman is Flesh, to say that Flesh is Night and Death, or that she 
is the splendor of the Cosmos, is to leave earthly truth behind and fly off 
into an empty sky. After all, man is also flesh for woman, and woman is 
more than a fleshly object; and the flesh takes on singular meanings, for 
each person, in each encounter.171
170 “Michel Leiris écrit dans L’âge d’homme: ‘J’ai couramment tendance à regarder l’organe 
féminin comme une chose sale ou comme une blessure, pas moins attirante pour cela, 
mais dangereuse en elle-même, comme tout ce qui est sanglant, muqueux, contaminé’” 
(DS 1:279). The other example Beauvoir gives is from Faulkner’s Light in August.
171 “Il ne faut pas confondre le mythe avec la saisie d’une signification; la signification est 
immanente à l’objet; elle est révélée à la conscience dans une expérience vivante; tandis 
que le mythe est une Idée transcendante qui échappe à toute prise de conscience. Quand 
dans L’âge d’homme Michel Leiris décrit sa vision des organes féminins, il nous livre des 
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I don’t find this distinction easy to understand, to be honest. But the point 
seems to be that not every negative apprehension of the female body, and not 
every use of the female body as metaphor, is a problem for Beauvoir. Leiris in 
her example does those things, but as part of his attempt to chronicle and anal-
yse his own singular subjective experience: we might say he doesn’t theorize, 
or he doesn’t totalize, his experiences. He remains a good phenomenologist; 
what he uncovers in himself is often as tough to take for the reader as it was 
and is for him (L’âge d’homme is called an “essai-martyr,” remember).172 Per-
haps Beauvoir’s own engagement with images of women we find troubling can 
be understood in the same way.
Or perhaps the distinction between developing a myth and reporting on 
one is not, in the end, as clearcut as she (and we) would like such things to be.
...
Fall 2010. I am sitting on the floor in the middle of the night, surrounded by a 
chaos of books and papers relating to Michel Leiris. I am supposed to be pack-
ing for my sabbatical trip. Instead, I am watching King Vidor’s 1929 film, Halle-
lujah. (It needs to go back to Netflix, like, yesterday.) The film seems to have 
been enormously important to Leiris and Beauvoir both, that is a point of 
significations et n’élabore aucun mythe. L’émerveillement devant le corps féminin, le dé-
goût du sang menstruel sont des appréhensions d’une réalité concrète. Il n’y a rien de 
mythique dans l’expérience qui découvre les qualités voluptueuses de la chair féminine et 
on ne passe pas au mythe quand on tente de les exprimer par des comparaisons avec des 
fleurs ou des cailloux. Mais dire que la Femme, c’est la Chair, dire que la Chair est Nuit et 
Mort, ou qu’elle est la splendeur du Cosmos, c’est quitter la vérité de la terre et s’envoler 
vers un ciel vide. Car l’homme aussi est chair pour la femme; et celle-ci est autre qu’un 
objet charnel; et la chair revêt pour chacun et dans chaque expérience des significations 
singulières” (DS 1:398).
172 How Beauvoir could, after reading that intimate exploration of a man’s difficulties in 
coming to sexual maturity, have concluded that male adolescence was easy, is one mys-
tery I cannot fathom.
Leiris makes two other appearances in The Second Sex. In a discussion about the pow-
ers (beneficent and/or threatening) given to the Mother, she quotes in a footnote a long 
section of his disturbing poem “La mère,” commenting on “why rebels attack the mother-
figure so furiously; in scorning her, the appointed guardian of custom and morality, they 
refuse the pre-given values society seeks to impose.” [[C]’est pourquoi aussi tous les ré-
voltés s’acharnent sur la figure de la mère; en la bafouant, ils refusent le donné qu’on 
prétend leur imposer à travers la gardienne des mœurs et des lois (DS 1:286).] And in the 
section on “Formation,” when explaining what is terrifying of a girl’s first sexual experi-
ence, she reaches for his bull-fighting metaphor of the bed as a “terrain de vérité”— 
literally a “place of truth,” this refers to the part of the ring where either the bull or the 
matador will die (DS 2:158).
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 connection between them: I’m looking for a neutral point to judge their re-
sponse. But I can’t make head or tail of what’s been written about the film. Some 
commentators describe a stunningly beautiful, dignified evocation of African 
American life, others find an embarrassing collection of racist stereotypes.
So I watch it. And I still can’t make up my mind. I watch the commentary that 
comes with it on the dvd: the scholars, who seem unusually ill at ease, can’t 
seem to make up their minds whether the film is retrograde or revolutionary, 
either. (The film itself seems unsure whether it is a documentary or a melodra-
ma.) Outdated ethnocentrism? Lost beauty? It is very compellingly both. (Could 
I prove that? How would one begin to go about proving such a thing?) What I 
can say is that it is definitely still worth watching.
...
There’s a scene in Les mandarins where Paule rather pathetically asks Anne, as 
they are getting ready for a high-society party, whether she should wear her 
African necklace. Anne thinks, you know, probably not: the necklace repre-
sents the defiance/eroticism of a previous era, which Paule is vainly trying to 
recapture.173 Henri in that novel’s opening pages is longing for the East, to feel 
the sun on his face as he used to do before the war … and he, too, attempts to 
recapture the past by locating it east and south (Portugal), and going to Portu-
gal with a different, younger woman, Nadine. But it doesn’t work. Neither Hen-
ri nor Nadine can avoid noticing, first the abundance of food (compared with 
the wartime austerity of Paris) and then—worse—that amid this plenty most 
of the Portuguese, too, are starving. Henri’s vacation time is swallowed up by 
the very sort of political conversation he had hoped to escape.174
The political commitment to which Henri returns at the end of that book is 
very much anti-colonial. In L’invitée the East and South are still, to some extent, 
barely distinguished, mysterious and alluring realms of desire; by the time of 
Les mandarins, the colonized world has become a political sphere about which 
Henri informs himself, with respect to which he takes on certain political re-
sponsibilities. So to my mind, as with Leiris, the question is, not whether the 
initial sources of Beauvoir’s interest were pure, but what she made of them.
It would be fair to say that when she embarked for the United States, it was 
not the land of White but the land of Black that she contemplated seeing with 
the greatest fascination, as though she were about to take a trip to the bottom 
of the Unconscious.
173 Les mandarins, 2:80.
174 Les mandarins, 1:138–58.
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So for us America was first, a saraband of images, on a background of 
raucous voices and jagged rhythms: the trances and dances of Hallelujah, 
the buildings reared up against the sky, prisons in revolt, high smoke-
stacks, strikes, long silky limbs, locomotives, planes, wild horses, rodeos. 
When we looked away from this bric-à-brac, we thought of America as 
the country where capitalist oppression was triumphing most detestably; 
we hated it for exploitation, unemployment, racism, lynchings. Nonethe-
less, beyond good and evil, life there had something giant and wild that 
fascinated us.175
Note, however, that Beauvoir retrospectively characterizes what she anticipat-
ed seeing as a “sarabande des images” and as “ce bric-à-brac.” It seems like the 
trip to America—the real trip to the real United States, which Boris Vian by the 
way never took—operated as a kind of cure “dans le vrai,” and was theoretically 
and politically productive.176
In L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 Beauvoir records a long conversation she 
and Wright had, while they were eating barbecue in Harlem, where Wright was 
very critical of whites who “go to Blacks” in order to appreciate their suppos-
edly greater musical abilities, their sensual power, and so on. Wright uses the 
language of psychology (projection, neurosis) to condemn even such well-
meaning “amis des noirs” as the jazz musician Mezz Mezzrow for missing the 
point about racial oppression.
Wright deplores, among many other things, the sort of attraction many 
whites in the North and especially in New York feel with regard to Blacks. 
They define them as the antithesis of American civilization: magnifi-
cently gifted in music and dance, rich in animal instincts and especially 
an extraordinary sexual potency, insouciant, unconscious, dreamers, 
poets, open to religious sentiments, undisciplined, child-like, such is the 
175 “Ainsi l’Amérique, pour nous, c’était d’abord, sur un fond de voix rauques et de rythmes 
brisés, une sarabande d’images: les transes et danses des noirs d’Hallelujah, des buil-
dings dressés contre le ciel, des prisons en révolte, des hauts fourneaux, des grèves, de 
longues jambes soyeuses, des locomotives, des avions, des chevaux sauvages, des rodéos. 
Quand nous nous détournions de ce bric-à-brac, nous pensions à l’Amérique comme au 
pays où triomphait le plus odieusement l’oppression capitaliste; nous détestions en elle 
l’exploitation, le chômage, le racisme, les lynchages. Néanmoins, par-delà le bien et le 
mal, la vie avait là-bas quelque chose de gigantesque et de déchaîné qui nous fascinait” 
(FA 162).
176 The closing scene of La nausée, too, evokes New York in a way that would no longer be 
possible once Sartre had been there.
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conventional image of Blacks they are happy to hold. And they “go to 
Blacks” because they have projected onto them what they themselves 
wish to be and are not; but the most fascinated are those who feel them-
selves most profoundly deficient; so that these “nigger-lovers,” as south-
erners would call them, are for the most part bitter, sick, neurotic, ravaged 
by inferiority complexes. That Mezzrow goes to live in Harlem and sys-
tematically prefers Blacks to whites stems from this attitude; Wright finds 
it harmful, because it hangs onto the gulf between Blacks and whites. 
The evident differences between the two castes come from differences 
in historical, economic, social, cultural situation, which could—at least 
theoretically—be abolished. But this is one of the truths which even the 
most well-meaning Americans do not want to hear.177
Wright’s view here is quite close to Fanon’s in the opening pages of Peau noire 
masques blancs: “To us, the man who adores the Negro is as ‘sick’ as the man 
who abominates him.”178 It was a lesson she’d take fully on board.
177 “Tout en mangeant des côtes de porc et des frites, buvant de l’eau—car ces endroits 
modestes n’ont pas la licence qui permet de vendre des spiritueux—nous sommes na-
turellement ramenés à discuter encore de la question noire. Wright déplore entre autres le 
genre d’attirance que beaucoup de blancs dans le Nord et spécialement à New York éprou-
vent à l’égard de noirs. Ils les définissent comme l’antithèse de la civilisation américaine: 
magnifiquement doués pour la musique et la danse, riches d’instincts animaux et entre 
autres d’une extraordinaire puissance sensuelle, insouciants, étourdis, rêveurs, poètes, ou-
verts au sentiment religieux, indisciplinés, enfantins, telle est la conventionnelle image 
qu’ils se font volontiers des noirs. Et ils ‘vont aux noirs’ parce qu’ils ont projeté en eux ce 
qu’ils souhaiteraient être et ne sont pas; mais les plus fascinés sont ceux qui sentent en 
eux-mêmes les plus profondes déficiences; si bien que ces nigger-lovers, comme les ap-
pelleraient les gens du Sud, sont pour la plupart des aigris, des malades, des individus 
névrotiques, des faibles rongés de complexe d’infériorité. Que Mezzrow aille vivre à Har-
lem et préfère systématiquement les noirs aux blancs relève de cette attitude: Wright la 
trouve néfaste, parce qu’elle tend à maintenir l’existence d’un fossé entre les noirs et les 
blancs. Les différences évidentes entre les deux castes viennent de différences de situation 
historique, économique, sociale, culturelle qui pourraient—du moins théoriquement— 
être abolies. Mais c’est là une des vérités dont les Américains blancs, même les plus bien-
veillants, n’aiment pas se laisser convaincre” (AJ 485–86).
178 “Pour nous, celui qui adore les nègres est aussi ‘malade’ que celui qui les exècre” (pnmb 6; 
bswm 2). The passage continues, “Conversely, the Black man who wants to turn his race 
white is as miserable as he who preaches hatred for the whites. In the absolute, the Black 
is no more lovable than the Czech, and really, it’s time to let the man go.” [Inversement, le 
Noir qui veut blanchir sa race est aussi malheureux que celui qui prêche la haine du 
Blanc. Dans l’absolu, le Noir n’est pas plus aimable que le Tchèque, et véritablement il 
s’agit de lâcher l’homme (pnmb 6; bswm 2, translation altered).] We should hear reso-
nances of the nursery rhyme—“if he hollers, let him go”—which Chester Himes took as 
title for his novel.
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In short, two notions of authenticity were in play in the post-war period: an 
existentialist one, and one around race. My unsurprising conclusion is that 
these were both productively and problematically interwoven, and that it 
seems to have taken Beauvoir a certain amount of time to sort them out as she 
moved toward a position of solidarity with the international anti-colonial 
movement that included both Fanon and Wright.
9 Meanwhile, Back in New York…
What Les Temps Modernes valued about Richard Wright’s analysis was however 
increasingly devalued back home. The first American writer of color to really 
be a best-seller, he quickly fell from critical favor in the United States, and for 
several decades his work, especially the writing he did after he emigrated to 
Europe, received little attention or was disparaged. Michel Fabre, Wright’s 
French biographer, was surprised, when he began his research in the early 
1960s, that many of Wright’s books, though readily available in French transla-
tion, had gone out of print in the United States, and that the American aca-
demics he met with in the course of his research were dismissive.179 The ten-
dency to see Wright as a pathetic, superseded figure whose late work was 
ruined by going to Europe and encountering a philosophy he couldn’t under-
stand, while losing touch with his “roots” and his “material” (the “folk”), per-
sisted for a long time, as both Gilroy and Simons note.180 In 1991 the Library of 
America brought out the “definitive” edition of his works, clearly intended to 
rehabilitate and honor Wright by restoring material cut by original publishers 
as too “daring”; the editor, Arnold Rampersad, also chose to include an early 
unpublished novel, Lawd Today, which is indeed stunningly good and shows 
Wright’s connection to naturalist writers of the Chicago school (including one 
Nelson Algren). But the bias against Wright as a political thinker continued: 
almost nothing was included from his European period, none of the essays and 
travel writing from his internationalist political phase, and none of his writing 
about Africa.181 This presents a seriously skewed picture and (whatever one 
179 Michel Fabre, The Unfinished Quest of Richard Wright. He discussed this surprise in the 
preface to the first (1973) edition, which appears in the second (1993) edition as xxi-xxii.
180 Perhaps this relates to a tendency to see existentialism as a set of faded and pathetic once-
trendy dogmas which “we,” having had the benefit of post-structuralism, now see beyond. 
As must be clear by now, I don’t agree with that judgment.
181 Gilroy discusses Rampersad as an advocate for the American Richard Wright and con-
nects this to a particular idea of “authenticity,” which Gilroy wants to call into question 
(The Black Atlantic, 153–57). According to Gilroy, Wright’s “Blueprint for Negro Writing” 
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thinks of Wright) it is surely irresponsible to pass over these omissions in si-
lence. Louis Menand’s New Yorker review of Rampersad’s selection magnified 
and broadcast Rampersad’s erasure of Wright’s politics by describing Wright’s 
development as “Nietzschean” and basically deploring the “protest” element of 
his work.182 I am trying not to say “It is no accident that” the Library of America 
edition does include his powerful indictment of the Communist party in Amer-
ican Hunger.183 (There’s no clearer give-away of what used to be called vulgar 
Marxism than a sentence that starts, “It is no accident that,” is there. And the 
Cold War is over. Isn’t it?) But if Wright’s non-fiction prose works, like The Color 
Curtain and Black Power, which combine “travel writing” with theory and po-
litical analysis, were until recently no better appreciated by American audi-
ences than L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 was, perhaps this was for some of the 
same reasons. Fortunately, more recent scholarly work has appeared that does 
take Wright and his ideas seriously, both politically and philosophically, and 
that sees him, and other writers about the Black experience in the United 
States, as part of Existentialism with a capital E.184
But wait a minute, you say: wasn’t Richard Wright a terrible misogynist? 
(1937) “only implies what would later become one of his favorite themes, namely that 
 differences between the groups we know as races are associated with the repression of 
differences within those races” (154); “an elaborate body of philosophically-informed re-
flection on the character of western civilization and the place of racism within it … [is] 
filtered through the mesh provided by his combination of fervent anti-communism and 
passionate anti-capitalism” (155).
182 Louis Menand, “The Hammer and The Nail.”
183 Something similar might be said about the missing Red chapter from most people’s un-
derstanding of Langston Hughes. Might there be more to the fact the best biography of 
Wright to date was written by a French man than the “Jerry Lewis problem”?
184 The silence Fabre complained of is over, and he deserves some of the credit; it was he, for 
instance, who organized the archive, and he discovered the manuscript of what became 
American Hunger and worked with Ellen Wright to get it into print. Among the excellent 
work now ongoing I’d single out the work of Abdul JanMohammed (particularly The 
Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright’s Archaeology of the Dream), and two edited collec-
tions, James B. Haile iii, Philosophical Meditations on Richard Wright and William E. Dow, 
Alice Mikal Craven, and Yoko Nakamura, Richard Wright in a Post-Racial Imaginary, for 
their attention to issues discussed here. (I was initially dubious about the latter antholo-
gy’s term “post-racial.” As used here, though, the muting of a relentlessly binary idea of 
race does not remove the critique of domination, but rather complicates it, and makes 
class and also geography more visible.) Also interesting is Alice Mikal Craven and William 
E. Dow, eds., Richard Wright: New Readings in the 21st Century. See also now Jane Anna 
Gordon and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, eds., The Politics of Richard Wright: Perspectives on 
Resistance, and Lori Marso, Politics with Beauvoir: Freedom in the Encounter, 122–147, 
which includes extensive discussion of Wright’s European and African travels, and per-
suasively puts his book 12 Million Black Voices in conversation with The Second Sex.
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The question of Wright’s “misogyny” is not one I can fully discuss here, much 
less settle. How can we balance his support of Gwendolyn Brooks with his con-
spicuous lack of support for Zora Neale Hurston? Gilroy, who is a vocal mem-
ber of the “not a misogynist” camp, notes that Wright began his speech at the 
first Présence Africaine congress by lamenting the absence of women from the 
event.185 Barbara Foley has discovered in Wright’s papers an unpublished man-
uscript from the early 1940s; one draft, for which he did research with domestic 
workers, dealt with the difficult life of a woman trafficked from South to North; 
but Foley’s description, while making it clear that this text (which explores fas-
cism’s appeal to the oppressed) does give voice to some feminist ideas, also 
makes it sound unlikely that publication of “Black Hope” would settle the “mi-
sogyny” debate one way or the other.186
But was Wright mistaken in preferring Brooks to Hurston, a complex figure 
whose contrarianism went so far as refusing to support Brown v. Board of 
Education?187 Hazel Carby, who first became well-known for a piece titled 
“White Woman Listen,” thinks Wright had a point:
In returning to and recreating the moment of her childhood, Hurston 
privileges the nostalgic and freezes it in time. Richard Wright, in his re-
view of Their Eyes Were Watching God, accused Hurston of recreating 
minstrelsy. Though this remark is dismissed out of hand by contempo-
rary critics, what it does register is Wright’s reaction to what appears to 
him to be an outmoded form of historical consciousness. Whereas Wright 
attempted to explode the discursive category of the Negro as being 
formed, historically, in the culture of minstrelsy, and as being the product 
of a society structured in dominance through concepts of race, Hurston 
wanted to preserve the concept of Negroness, to negotiate and rewrite its 
cultural meanings, and, finally, to reclaim an aesthetically purified ver-
sion of blackness. The consequences for the creation of subaltern subject 
185 Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, 176. Wright said, apparently, that “black men will not be free 
until their women are free,” and called for an “effective utilization of negro womanhood 
in the world to help us mobilize and pool our forces,” which is terrific, except for the pos-
sessive pronoun.
186 Barbara Foley, “A Dramatic Picture of Women from Feudalism to Fascism: Richard 
Wright’s Black Hope.” According to Foley’s article, the Wright estate was opposed to the 
idea of publication at that time.
187 See Glenda R. Carpio and Werner Sollors, “The Newly Complicated Zora Neale Hurston,” 
and Hazel Carby, “The Politics of Fiction, Anthropology, and the Folk: Zora Neale 
Hurston.”
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 positions in their works are dramatically different. The antagonism be-
tween them reveals Wright to be a modern, and leaves Hurston embed-
ded in the politics of Negro identity.188
Perhaps what we’re seeing isn’t “misogyny” but a genuine difference of opin-
ion. What’s at stake between them isn’t (or isn’t just) gender politics, but (also) 
a disagreement about how to value and advance Black culture, comparable to 
the different views about négritude offered by Léopold Senghor on the one 
hand and by Fanon and Césaire on the other.
The Gwendolyn Brooks poem that appeared, thanks to Wright’s mediation, 
in the very first issue of Présence Africaine turns out to be “The Ballad of Pearl 
May Lee,” an angry mock-joyful poem in which a dark-skinned Black woman 
says she is glad that her husband is being lynched, for going along with a white 
woman who seduced him and then cried rape.189 (The refrain is, “You had it 
coming surely.”) If there ever was a poem that showed why it was hasty to col-
lapse the subject positions or “standpoints” of Black women and Black men, or 
of Black women and white women, this would be it; considering that Wright 
himself was married to a white woman, his support for this (stunning) poem 
and poet speaks strongly in favor of his awareness that the issues involved were 
complex, and that the claims involved were incommensurable and perhaps fi-
nally irreconcilable.
Wright would also have been very familiar with debates within the Com-
munist Party of the United States on “the woman question.” As with race is-
sues, the cpusa was for a time more progressive about women’s issues than 
mainstream America; Kate Weigand has shown that the contribution of Old 
Left women to second-wave feminism was long understated, mainly due to 
McCarthyism.190 Barbara Foley’s archival work has also discovered that Wright 
owned Mary Inman’s “In Woman’s Defense,” an important analysis of women’s 
domestic labor which synthesized feminism and Marxism; the Party leader-
ship later attacked it (and Inman). Foley and Gilroy both point to one of the 
stories in Wright’s Eight Men, in which a man cross-dresses to get work as a 
maid and discovers that the work is physically too hard for him (shades of The 
Salt of the Earth!) and that he is vulnerable to sexual harassment. None of this 
188 Ibid., 79.
189 The poem also appears in Brooks’s A Street in Bronzeville and is reprinted in Blacks, the 
fullest available collection of her work, 60–63.
190 See Kate Weigand, Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women’s 
Liberation.
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helps us know how to read the “existential” violence against women that is 
central to much of Wright’s fiction.191 All I can do here is suggest that posing 
the question as “misogynist, yes or no” obscures more than it illuminates.
But how does it happen that “Richard Wright, Political Thinker” and “The 
American Richard Wright” seem to be two different people?
The urbanely condescending tone of Menand’s appraisal of Wright struck 
me as depressingly familiar. Though he might deny this, Menand is in many 
ways the heir of the very people who most annoyed Beauvoir on her first visit 
to New York City: a loose group literary historians refer to as “The New York 
Intellectuals,” who first gathered around the Partisan Review.192 Meeting them 
at a party, Beauvoir describes them as “the editorial team of a review that calls 
itself leftist and avant-garde, whose aggressive tone surprises me…. They hate 
Stalinism with a passion that reveals them as former Stalinists.”193 In a letter to 
Sartre, she was even franker: “They would burn the world to ashes to keep their 
stupid rag alive.”194 They first take her to task for Merleau-Ponty’s article, “Le 
yogi et le prolétaire,” which had just appeared in Les Temps Modernes:
Perhaps because we were drinking, we didn’t weigh our words very care-
fully. My remarks were judged worthy of an agent of the Soviet Secret 
Police; but it would be easy to mistake these free spirits for American 
imperialists. Halfway through the conversation the tall, insolent young 
man declared, “After all, it wasn’t the Russians who sent you food to live 
on; it’s America who created the UN Relief Agency.” If even these so-
called leftist intellectuals are so proud of the tinned milk their govern-
ment sends, how can we be surprised by the arrogance of the capitalist 
press, by the tone of condescension toward France I’ve observed pretty 
much everywhere, which is beginning to annoy me?195
191 See Jan-Mohammed, The Death-Bound-Subject, for a fuller discussion.
192 See Louis Menand, “Browbeaten: Dwight MacDonald’s War on Midcult.” I’m aware as I 
write this that the term “New York Intellectuals” may have little current resonance beyond 
the Upper West Side. But if you have seen Margarethe von Trotta’s film about Hannah 
Arendt, you have met these people.
193 “[L]’équipe d’une revue qui se dit de gauche et d’avant-garde et dont l’agressivité me sur-
prend…. Ils haïssent le stalinisme avec une passion qui me fait comprendre que ce sont 
d’anciens staliniens” (AJ 59–60). See also 45, 59–60, and 78–81, about American literature.
194 “Ils incendierait le monde pour que leur mauvais torchon vive” (Lettres à Sartre, 296).
195 “Je pense que l’alcool aidant nous mesurons mal nos paroles; il paraît que mes propos sont 
dignes d’un agent du Guépéou: mais on prendrait facilement ces esprits libres pour des 
impérialistes américains. Le grand jeune homme insolent déclare au milieu de la conver-
sation: ‘Ce ne sont quand même pas les Russes qui vous envoient de quoi manger; c’est 
l’Amérique qui a crée l’UNRA.’ Si même les intellectuels dits de gauche sont si fiers des 
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In a long discussion toward the end of L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, Beau-
voir shows her detailed understanding of the different tendencies among this 
group—for instance, around the time of her visit, Dwight Macdonald and 
Mary McCarthy had broken off to found a journal called politics, which was a 
bit further left. Not all of the New York Intellectuals would become as conser-
vative as Norman Podhoretz or Sidney Hook; the New York Review of Books, 
which the group would found in 1963, was always recognizably more open-
minded than Commentary; their direct descendants include Susan Sontag as 
well as Norman Mailer.196 But Beauvoir’s overall diagnosis of the dangers im-
plicit in their “pessimistic individualism,” as part of the “parti pris of inertia”197 
in the face of McCarthyist sabre-rattling that she saw all across the United 
States, especially on college campuses, is borne out by a reading of the sympo-
sium “Our Country and Our Culture” organized by the Partisan Review in 1952. 
As it happens, “vulgar Marxist propaganda” claims that the cia itself was be-
hind many of their institutions, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom and 
the journals Encounter, Perspectives usa, and Preuves, later turned out to be 
literally true.198
It is very difficult to explain why this group matters to anyone who doesn’t 
already think so; in retrospect, their nasty internal quarrels seem unbelievably 
boîtes de lait condensé que leur gouvernement nous dispense, comment s’étonner de 
l’arrogance de la presse capitaliste, de ce ton de condescendance que j’ai observé un peu 
partout à l’égard de la France et qui commence à m’exaspérer?” (AJ 60–1).
196 Some would see the New Yorker of the 1940s and 50s as part of this “group” and others 
would disagree. When Arendt’s husband says in von Trotta’s movie, “Hannah, das kannst 
du im New Yorker nicht sagen!” (Hannah, you can’t say that in The New Yorker!), he’s ex-
pressing a view that the mass-market magazine was somehow gentler and more “midcult” 
(Macdonald’s word) than the others. But Hannah could, and Hannah did. The New Yorker 
also dedicated a whole issue to John Hersey’s Hiroshima.
Despite their lack of unanimity on just about any question, and the sheer nastiness of 
some of their internal bickering, I can’t help agreeing with Beauvoir that the group shares 
a particular subjectivity, or self-concept, or ethos: taking principled left positions about 
certain things makes it unnecessary to examine one’s complicity with the dominant cul-
ture in other respects. Of course it’s easier to spot this in someone else than in oneself. 
“And this is hell, nor are we out of it.”
197 “Individualisme pessimiste,” “parti pris de l’inertie” (AJ 474, 472). “Parti pris” can mean a 
bias, or a prejudice, but it is also used for someone who has taken a theoretical stand. 
Beauvoir here means both, I think: like the serious man, the Americans she’s talking about 
have turned their inclination to passivity into a system of life.
198 The literature on the New York Intellectuals is vast, but see Alan Wald, The New York Intel-
lectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s, and Fran-
ces Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The cia and the World of Arts and Letters. For 
a discussion of how Cold War categories continue to shape intellectual debates, see Mi-
chael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds.
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petty, and they can’t possibly actually matter as much as they thought they did. 
But the reach of the Partisan Review was broad.199 In spite of the 1960s, which 
most of them astringently deplored, somehow such “intellectual life” as there 
is in the United States outside universities still seems marked by the terms they 
set. For me, Menand’s faintly genteel distaste for protest retains the ring of Lio-
nel Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination (1950), smug in its claim to articulate pro-
gressive values through the Great Tradition and yet equally proud of its dis-
tance from anything that looks like it might genuinely upset the applecart. 
Garcia gives a very clear account of how the New York Intellectuals used a lan-
guage of psychological “maturity” and aesthetic “complexity” to explain first 
their own turn away from the radicalism of the 1930s and later their disdain for 
the unwashed youth movements of the 1960s. For instance, despite their early 
support for James Baldwin—they particularly liked “Everybody’s Protest Nov-
el,” his attack on Richard Wright—they largely missed the boat when it came 
to Civil Rights.200 Hannah Arendt’s failure to see the forest for the trees in her 
piece on Little Rock, the frank racism of Saul Bellow’s Mr. Sammler’s Planet, 
Norman Mailer’s ghastly “White Negro” essay, are symptomatic.201 Some of 
them joined in protesting the war in Vietnam (Mary McCarthy’s hard-hitting 
reportage on what she saw there is still worth reading), but fighting racial in-
justice was not part of their agenda. Their influence on the “consensus” view 
that came to dominate the nascent field of American studies was especially 
profound.202
I’m too much of a “Tenured Radical” (as their heirs would put it) to be a 
“New York Intellectual.” Still—full disclosure here—it’s hard for me to imagine 
199 For instance, Stanley Cavell notes in his autobiography that “[t]he legacy, if I may call it 
that, of anti-Stalinist socialist aspirations living somehow with a commitment to high 
modernism, is one for which I am permanently grateful” (Little Did I Know: Excerpts from 
Memory, 231). The word “somehow” is characteristically apt.
200 They soured on Baldwin, too; by 1957, Commentary was accusing Baldwin of “an anachro-
nistic attitude toward race” (Garcia, Psychology Comes to Harlem, 163).
201 An analysis of the parallels between Mailer’s “White Negro” and Firestone’s Dialectic of 
Sex might be illuminating. It was Bellow who famously asked, “Who is the Tolstoy of the 
Zulus?” See also Barber, “Phenomenology and the Ethical Basis of Pluralism.” Barber 
makes an interesting argument that while the two different philosophical approaches 
taken by Beauvoir and Arendt “cashed out” differently in terms of their ability to read the 
immediate situation, both are ultimately necessary to a fully adequate solution of real-
world problems. See also now Gines, Arendt and The Negro Question.
202 See Geraldine Murphy, “Romancing the Center: Cold War Politics and Classic American 
Literature,” and Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds.
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life without the New Yorker and the New York Review of Books; and as time wears 
on it gets harder to extricate myself from that discourse of “maturity.” Every 
time one finds oneself saying (internally) “such and such a group has a valid 
point, of course, but they go too far” or “X is right but does she have to say it like 
that?” or “by demanding Y before the time is ripe they are hurting their own 
cause…” Or: “existentialism had its impact, certainly, but it’s not really philoso-
phy, it’s something people outgrow after their sophomore year, like Ayn Rand.” 
Or: “Bernie Sanders, now that would really be something. But he’s a throwback, 
he couldn’t possibly win.” And there’s often more than a grain of truth in these 
thoughts, isn’t there?203 But there’s also a whiff of bad faith, a nagging sense 
that perhaps these, too, are self-fulfilling prophecies. I’ll put my cards on the 
table: when Beauvoir speaks of the American “parti pris d’inertie,” I think she 
really had their number, and ours as well. The insouciance about the coming of 
war with the ussr that she saw in American college students, that Sartre found 
in his discussion with a Ford Foundation official: “But you have no common 
border, where will you fight?” “Oh, we will fight them in Europe.”204 In the end, 
they fought them in Asia. And I remember going into the bar on 9/11 and hear-
ing Don Henley’s “The End of the Innocence” and thinking well, you can call it 
innocence if you like…
Beauvoir says thousands and thousands of Americans don’t fit the picture 
she is drawing, and she has plenty of negative things to say about French intel-
lectual and public life. But I can’t help be stung by some of what she says, my-
self. Is it is the sting of non-recognition or the sting of recognition?205 bell 
hooks once visited the campus where I work, and I wrote down something she 
said in her closing remarks to the students: “You tell me that you live in a free 
country, and then you say that you can’t say what you really think because your 
friends in the fraternity and sorority won’t like you any more.”
203 “Possibly by the time you read this, the last statement will already have proven right,” I 
wrote at this point, in the summer of 2016. 2017: well, yes, no kidding. 2019: or maybe not?
204 “Au cours d’un déjeuner, le directeur des Public relations de Ford avait évoqué avec bonne 
humeur la prochaine guerre contre l’URSS. ‘Mais vous n’avez pas de frontière commune, 
où se battra-t-on?’ avait demandé une journaliste du PC. ‘En Europe,’ répondit-il avec na-
turel” (FCh 1:55).
205 Patriotism surfaces embarrassingly at odd moments. Is any version of national character 
offensive? It is bound to give offense, certainly, but that is not my question. Is this some-
thing one should ethically or politically forbid oneself? But it’s really hard, especially 
when you’re traveling. (How stupid they think us. On the other hand, how right they are.)
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10 Beauvoir Reads America, America Reads Beauvoir
In any case, the fact that the New York Intellectuals were not able to find com-
mon ground with Les Temps Modernes, and vice versa, says a great deal, not 
just about the context of Wright’s American reception, but also Beauvoir’s— 
including the American reception of The Second Sex, and its repercussions for 
second-wave American feminism, which is my reason for dwelling on it here.206
Beauvoir’s critique of the American paradox went far beyond that group. In 
New Mexico she tells us what the headlines say about what Truman is doing, 
and then notices how few people (other than some French people she happens 
to meet on the way) seem to be talking about it. She refers twice to a comment 
made to her by someone at the New York Times:
[T]he top manager leans back in his swivel chair; he looks down on me 
ironically, from the height of his own power and of American power gen-
erally. So France is amusing itself now with existentialism? Of course, he 
knows nothing about existentialism, his contempt is aimed at philosophy 
in general, and even more broadly at the sheer effrontery of an economi-
cally impoverished country claiming to think; isn’t it laughable to go on 
thinking when one hasn’t the advantage of running a major American 
newspaper, which anyhow renders thinking unnecessary? “Yes,” says 
he, “in France you pose problems, but you don’t solve them. Here, we 
don’t pose them, we resolve them.” The creaky armchair swivels back and 
forth….207
“In France, you pose problems; in America, we resolve them.” For me this 
rhymes with a throwaway comment Paul de Man made in 1986, which stuck in 
my head: “in Europe, one is of course closer to political and ideological 
206 I’ll have some more examples when I come to discuss Beauvoir’s writing about China 
below.
207 “[L]e grand manager se balance sur son fauteuil tournant; du haut de sa puissance propre 
et de la puissance américaine en général il me jette un regard ironique: ainsi la France 
s’amuse à l’Existentialisme? Bien entendu, il ne sait rien de l’Existentialisme, son mépris 
vise la philosophie en général et plus généralement encore l’outrecuidance d’un pays 
économiquement pauvre et qui prétend penser; n’est-ce pas dérisoire de vouloir penser 
quand on n’a pas l’avantage d’être une des têtes d’un grand journal américain, ce qui 
d’ailleurs dispense de penser? … ‘Oui, dit-il, en France vous posez des problèmes: mais 
vous ne les résolvez pas. Nous, nous ne les posons pas: nous les résolvons.’ Le fauteuil 
tourne et craque” (AJ 63). Ellipsis in original.
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questions, while on the contrary, in the States, one is a lot closer to professional 
questions. So the ethics of the profession are very different.”208
But the New York Intellectuals were right to see that they were a particular 
target, and they returned the favor, especially with Mary McCarthy’s very nasty 
review, “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique,” which has been picked up in the Beauvoir 
scholarship, and largely uncritically.209
What Mary McCarthy truly hated about L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 is that 
Beauvoir did what Americans since Daisy Miller had done to Europe: made the 
American reader feel like a Lilliputian by reversing the direction of the ethno-
graphic gaze. Like Françoise in L’invitée, McCarthy felt “the look of the Other 
that steals my world,” and made a valiant attempt to seize it back, through 
character assassination and mockery if not by actual murder. Accompanied by 
a mystifying ugly caricature of a seated woman who seems to be part robot 
machine and part ersatz Dogon statue, “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique” proceeds 
in McCarthy’s characteristic manner not by argument but by mockery and an 
appeal to what “everyone” knows, without overly concerning itself about what 
is meant by “everyone.”
Peering down at himself, the American discovers that he has “no sense 
of nuance,” that he is always in a good humor, that “in America the in-
dividual is nothing,” that all Americans think their native town is the 
most beautiful town in the world, that an office girl cannot go to work 
208 A comment that sounds rather chilling, now that we know what de Man did during the 
Second World War. (And we make excerpts, and assign handbooks, lest our student evalu-
ations complain: “Too Long; Didn’t Read.”) Stephano Rosso, “An Interview with Paul de 
Man,” 788.
209 McCarthy, “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique.” Elaine Marks reprinted McCarthy’s attack in the 
1987 Critical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir. See also Penelope Deutscher, Philosophy of 
Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance, 65–6, and Deirdre Bair, Simone de 
Beauvoir, 334–35, 386. Deutscher reproduces McCarthy’s points without dissent; Bair at 
times sounds positively gleeful, and seems to have sought out further snide remarks from 
those she interviewed about Beauvoir’s American visit. Her chronology of the visit is un-
reliable, and she dismisses the political side of L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 entirely, as 
something Beauvoir added in afterwards to seduce a French audience, much less interest-
ing than the unfashionableness of what the subject of her biography wore.
McCarthy’s was not the only counterattack from the partisans of the mauvais torchon, 
either: William Barrett, who would become the most influential popularizer of existen-
tialism in America (while explaining that Sartre was actually only a minor moment in its 
history, and removing all the political bite), had some choice words in his intellectual 
autobiography, The Truants. Probably the best-known result of this whole sorry map of 
misprision was Norman Mailer’s use of “existentialism” to justify rape and murder in An 
American Dream.
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in the same dress two days running, that in hotels “illicit” couples are 
made to swear that they are married, that it almost never happens here 
that a professor is also a writer, that the majority of American novelists 
have never been to college, that the middle class has no hold on the 
country’s economic life and very little influence on its political destiny, 
that the good American citizen is never sick, that racism and reaction 
grow more menacing every day, that “the appearance, even, of democ-
racy is vanishing from day to day,” and that the country is witnessing 
“the birth of fascism.”210
Each of these clauses is a malicious twist on a small observation Beauvoir 
makes, often in the context of a larger narrative of something she witnessed. 
McCarthy also flattens out the development of Beauvoir’s views, ignoring what 
Robert Bernasconi has described as her “self-correcting method.”211
Writing before the English translation appeared, McCarthy dismisses the 
well-evidenced discussion of segregation and is particularly outraged by Beau-
voir’s claim that the idea of America as a “classless society” was a “mystification.”
She has preserved enough of Marxism to be warned that the spun-sugar 
façade is a device of “the Pullman class” to mask its exploitation and cru-
elty: While the soda fountains spout, Truman and Marshall prepare an 
anti-Communist crusade that brings back memories of the Nazis, and 
Congress plots the ruin of the trade unions….212
Finally, McCarthy charges Beauvoir with entertaining a paranoid fantasy, “the 
petrifaction of a fear very common in Europe today—a fear of the future….”213
But McCarthy’s defense of America reveals precisely the blind optimism 
Beauvoir diagnosed. McCarthy even goes so far as to defend the suburbs, which 
elsewhere in her writing appear as a blight and an abomination.214 She writes:
210 McCarthy, “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique,” 34.
211 Robert Bernasconi, “The Smell of Hatred in the Air: Simone de Beauvoir’s Account of 
Anti-Black Racism in the United States.”
212 Ibid., 36.
213 Ibid., 37.
214 Indeed, her real view of the suburbs slips out later in “Mlle. Gulliver en Amérique”: “the 
American problem … is not one of inequity, as she would prefer to believe, but its oppo-
site. The problem posed by the United States is, as Tocqueville saw, the problem of equal-
ity, its consequences, and what price shall be paid for it. How is wealth to be spread with-
out the spread of uniformity? How create a cushion of plenty without stupefaction of the 
soul and the senses? It is a dilemma that glares from every picture window and whistles 
through every breezeway” (36–7).
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The society characterized by Mlle. de Beauvoir as “rigid,” “frozen,” “closed” 
is in the process of great change. The mansions are torn down and the real-
estate “development” takes their place: serried rows of ranch-type houses, 
painted in pastel colors, each with its picture window and its garden, each 
equipped with deep freeze, oil furnace, and automatic washer, spring up 
in the wilderness. Class barriers disappear or become porous; the factory 
worker is an economic aristocrat in comparison to the  middle-class clerk; 
even segregation is diminishing; consumption replaces acquisition as an 
incentive. The America invoked by Mlle. de Beauvoir as a country of vast 
inequalities and dramatic contrasts is rapidly ceasing to exist.215
Now, the G.I. Bill that built the suburbs was a very good thing (I grew up in one 
of those little boxes myself), but Black people didn’t have access to the G.I. Bill, 
and those new towns were deliberately segregated. The sharecroppers that 
Beauvoir saw, she saw. Her description of the censorship trial she attended, of 
a novel about homosexuality that had been targeted by the Society for the Sup-
pression of Vice, she didn’t make up (I checked).216 The poll tax and the literacy 
tests and the systematic intimidation that prevented southern Blacks from vot-
ing were real. Fifth Avenue existed (exists) and not everyone can afford to shop 
there (still can’t). The menace of McCarthyism was real; the people Beauvoir 
met in Hollywood, who spoke to her of the blacklist, were not lying. The atom 
bomb, too, was not a science fiction fantasy. “Class barriers disappear ….” Well, 
precisely, and who “disappeared” them? Now, I don’t enjoy thinking of myself 
as a member of “the Pullman class” either, but, well, ça n’empêche pas d’exister. 
Even Life Magazine knew that Myrdal was right! (But of course the New York 
Intellectuals looked down on Life Magazine as “midcult.”)
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 fared better in the Journal of Negro History, 
where a detailed positive review by the distinguished scholar (and future US 
215 The essay ends, “For Europeans of egalitarian sympathies, America is this dilemma, re-
lentlessly marching towards them, a future which ‘works,’ and which for that very reason 
they have no wish to face. Hence the desire, so very evident in Mlle. de Beauvoir’s impres-
sions and in much journalism of the European Left, not to know what America is really 
like, to identify it with ‘fascism’ or ‘reaction,’ not to admit, in short, that it has realized, to 
a considerable extent, the economic and social goals of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and of progressive thought in general” (ibid., 37). That McCarthy would pick up and turn 
around, apparently without irony, Lincoln Steffens’s famous (and in retrospect, embar-
rassing) line about the Soviet Union, “I have seen the future, and it works” shows how fully 
she—can I be about to say “brainwashed”?
216 The book in question was Calder Willingham’s End as a Man, based on his experiences at 
the Citadel.
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ambassador) Mercer Cook concludes: “it is less ephemeral than its title would 
suggest. Few contemporary studies offer Americans a better opportunity to see 
ourselves as others see us.”217 (He did feel that Beauvoir had understated the 
opposition to segregation among college students.)
All this is especially disappointing because Beauvoir and McCarthy had so 
much in common. To the generation of women who came of age in the 1950s 
and 1960s, both stood for the rare combination of intellectual prowess and 
sexual freedom. Each had flourished personally and professionally as the only 
woman in a very male and fairly aggressive intellectual atmosphere; scholars 
of women’s autobiography have often discussed them together, because they 
describe shuffling off the shackles of Catholic upbringing in very similar ways; 
both were seemingly fearless truth-tellers, including when they wrote about 
heterosexuality from the woman’s point of view.
And yet the antipathy between them seems to have been immediate, viscer-
al, and lasting, as Eugenia Zimmerman details (drawing on Carol Brightman’s 
biography).218 Beauvoir refers to McCarthy as “that beautifully cold novelist 
who has already gone through three husbands and several lovers in the course 
of a cleverly laid out career,”219 and McCarthy, as Zimmerman says, “returned 
the compliment … nearly thirty years after the ‘Prettiest Existentialist’ first vis-
ited New York. In 1980, six years before Beauvoir’s death, McCarthy expressed 
herself thus: ‘How dare she talk about injustice to women, and how as a wom-
an she’s been deprived when she has put herself on the map solely by attaching 
herself to Sartre, solely. Sartre et moi. He made her … She’s not utterly stupid 
… she would be a good “B” student somewhere in the intellectual world….’”220 
217 Mercer Cook, “Review of America Day By Day.” Mercer Cook (1903–87), future US ambas-
sador to Senegal and the Gambia, Professor of French and English, translator of Senghor, 
head of Romance Languages at Howard, received his teaching diploma from the Sor-
bonne in 1926. Cook also notes omissions from the translation, and takes mild issue with 
Wright’s statement (quoted by Beauvoir) that Blacks are conscious of racism “every single 
moment.” The same issue of The Journal of Negro History contains a positive review of 
Richard Wright’s The Outsider.
218 See Eugenia Zimmerman, “Simone de Beauvoir, Mary McCarthy and The ‘Woman’ Intel-
lectual,” Carol Brightman, Writing Dangerously: Mary McCarthy and Her World, and Fran-
cis Kiernan, Seeing Mary Plain: A Life of Mary McCarthy. In an interesting article, Tina 
Chanter has discussed McCarthy’s violent hatred of Beauvoir under the rubric of “abjec-
tion,” which she sees as generally characteristic of later feminist responses to Beauvoir 
(“Abjection and Ambiguity: Simone de Beauvoir’s Legacy”).
219 Brightman, Writing Dangerously, 346.
220 Ibid., 342; Brightman’s italics. McCarthy didn’t like Sartre any better, though, and Zimmer-
man quotes John Gerassi to the effect that Sartre “carefully avoided [McCarthy] because, 
he said, she was an ‘arrogant imperialist witch.’” Zimmerman comments further: “Mary 
McCarthy was part of the cultural furniture of a New York adolescence in the 1950s. 
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Writing to Sartre after she met McCarthy, Beauvoir called McCarthy “typique,” 
and of course no one likes to be “typical.”221
Brightman’s diagnosis that “McCarthy’s ‘deep ambivalence’ for the ‘new 
America’ is project[ed] onto Simone de Beauvoir” is an apt one: McCarthy’s re-
view of Beauvoir tells us more about her own confusions than about Beauvoir’s 
book.222 Like Macdonald and others of the group, she held an inconsistent— 
not to say incoherent—view of American mass culture. They liked to think of 
New York as a branch of Europe; visits from actual Europeans showed them 
they weren’t as different as they believed from the Babbitts they mocked. To 
expose the complicity of New York Intellectuals with American cold warriors 
was to challenge their sense of themselves as cosmopolitan: if Beauvoir was 
right, McCarthy’s whole stance in the world, the story she has been telling her-
self, was a lie.
The thing is, I like Mary McCarthy. She was whip-smart, and a very good 
writer, and nothing about that extraordinarily aggressive group cowed her.223 
Stories from The Company She Keeps (1942) broke open a whole host of taboos 
about sex; when The Group appeared in 1963 (the same year as The Feminine 
Mystique) it was, I’ve argued elsewhere, a contribution to the feminist argu-
ments McCarthy herself wasn’t quite willing to make.224 Like Doris Lessing, 
McCarthy laid out all the data, but balked at drawing the conclusion.225
McCarthy was a good friend to Hannah Arendt when Arendt needed one, 
and she was, herself, intellectually up to the job of translating Simone Weil’s 
“The Iliad, or the Poem of Force” and editing Arendt’s The Life of the Mind for 
posthumous publication. She was famous for her wicked tongue—“[t]orn ani-
mals were removed at sunrise from that smile,” as an Esquire profile had  it—and 
 Simone de Beauvoir offered—or appeared to offer—that same generation of bookish 
young women the image of a life in which conventional and iconoclastic choices could be 
integrated and reconciled: love and work, the emotional and the intellectual, a man and a 
career” (Zimmerman, “The ‘Woman’ Intellectual,” 113).
221 Beauvoir, Lettres à Sartre, 301.
222 Brightman, Writing Dangerously, 338.
223 Delmore Schwartz, for instance, used to refer to her writings as “Tidings from the Whore.” 
From Elizabeth Hardwick’s introduction to McCarthy’s Intellectual Memoirs (128): “An eve-
ning at the Rahvs’ was to enter a ring of bullies, each one bullying the other.” A line from 
one of Robert Lowell’s poems—“How we wish we were friends with half our friends!” nails 
the overlay of personal and literary politics rather well (“Ulysses,” in Selected Poems, 225).
224 See Altman, “Beyond Trashiness.”
225 What Beauvoir noticed at Vassar—drawing McCarthy’s ire—is quite close to what Mc-
Carthy would later satirize about her alma mater in The Group. (Perhaps Vassar really was 
like that. See also Muriel Rukeyser, “More of a Corpse Than a Woman.”)
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many of the people she bit royally deserved it. She was no friend to feminists, as 
Zimmerman explains: “McCarthy not only denounced Beauvoir per se, she also 
denounced feminism for its ‘self-pity, shrillness and greed’; ‘feminism is bad for 
women … [I]t induces a very bad emotional state.’”226 Neither, for that matter, 
was Arendt, who is known to have remarked that “Women’s Liberation just does 
not say hello to me at all,” and later, “What will we lose if we win?”227
McCarthy tends to disavow her own early radicalism as the skittishness of a 
boy-crazy misfit, presenting herself retrospectively as a kind of accidental 
Trotskyite. “It was not difficult, after all, to be the prettiest girl at a party for the 
sharecroppers.”228 At the time she met Beauvoir, the splinter group formed 
with Dwight Macdonald, Nicola Chiaramonte, and a few others were attempt-
ing more or less what Les Temps Modernes stood for, to be a non-Communist 
voice on the left. But if there wasn’t much space for that in Paris, there was 
even less in the United States. Anna Bogic tells us:
In the Nation, Patrick Mullahy wrote that The Second Sex “is in many ways 
a superb book, brilliantly written with a broad scope and keen psycho-
logical insight”; however he warned that “because of certain political 
leanings Mme. de Beauvoir has to be read with critical caution.”229
226 Brightman, Writing Dangerously, xviii, 343.
227 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 513. Bair (332) reports Ar-
endt as having told William Phillips (according to the latter) that he would have gotten on 
better with Beauvoir if he had flirted with her, as opposed to attempting a discussion. But 
a turning point, as marked in the McCarthy/Arendt correspondence, occurs when Robert 
Lowell leaves Elizabeth Hardwick, who had stuck with him for many decades despite his 
serious manic-depressive episodes, and … other difficulties. McCarthy wrote, “I feel very 
sorry for Cal and troubled about him, and yet this final piece of arrogance makes me al-
most angry. Women’s lib” (Carol Brightman, Between Friends: The Correspondence of Han-
nah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 273).
Lori Marso calls Arendt and Beauvoir “unrecognized allies” (41) in a highly illuminat-
ing comparison of Beauvoir’s 1946 account of Robert Brasillach’s treason trial, “Oeil pour 
œil” (An Eye for an Eye) to Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (Politics with Beauvoir, 41–65). 
On the level of political theory, she is convincing; but the reasons why the two didn’t “rec-
ognize” one another as “on the same side,” either personally or politically, still seem 
important.
228 Mary McCarthy, The Company She Keeps, 112. See also Hardwick’s introduction to McCar-
thy’s Intellectual Memoirs, 66. There is something so arch, so knowing about McCarthy’s 
tone, so much the opposite of the “earnestness” of the angry young man—“he’s fair and 
he’s true and he’s boring as hell,” in the words of Billy Joel. (And he is all those things.) And 
yet when an arch and knowing skeptic is actually roused to anger, as McCarthy was by 
Vietnam and Watergate, it’s a powerful weapon.
229 Bogic, “Uncovering Hidden Actors: The ‘Making’ of The Second Sex,” 175.
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Another prominent New York Intellectual was Elizabeth Hardwick, whose 
very strange review of The Second Sex in the Partisan Review could stand in for 
the initial American response.230 This reviewer hid her awareness that Beau-
voir’s book was, in the main, astute, in so much mockery and scolding that her 
piece reads like a bitter attack. Here’s how it starts:
Vassal, slave, inferior, other, thing, victim, dependent, parasite, prisoner— 
oh, bitter, raped, child-swollen flesh doomed to immanence! Sisyphean 
goddess of the dust-pile! Demeter, Xantippe, Ninon de Lenclos, Marie 
Bashkirtsev, and “a friend of mine….” Cave to café, boudoir to microscope, 
from the knitting needles to the short story, this potency of pages, this 
foreshortened and exaggerated mysterious and too clear relief, this elo-
quent lament and governessy warning, this poem and doctoral thesis—I 
suppose there is bound to be a little laughter in the wings at the mere 
thought of this madly sensible and brilliantly confused tome on women 
by Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex.231
Hardwick’s review mainly chronicles her own bewilderment and defensive-
ness: that same arch and knowing New York Intellectual tone is in full cry, but I 
find her overall argument as difficult to parse as she found The Second Sex.232 
Much later, after she’d produced a feminist novel and Seduction and Betrayal 
(1974), one of the first significant books of feminist criticism to appear in the 
United States, Hardwick was asked, “would you still stand on that?” and re-
plied, “no. No, I wouldn’t. It’s a wonderful, remarkable book. Nothing that has 
come since on the matter of women compares to it.”233 Such a décalage be-
tween first and later reading is a pretty common experience—it was, in fact, 
mine. But Hardwick’s original piece from the 1950s, like McCarthy’s, continues 
to be anthologized and cited.
The question I have is, why did Hardwick find this book opaque and con-
fused, when Lorraine Hansberry found it brilliantly clear and comprehensive?
Hansberry herself is unsparing in explaining why there had not been more 
uptake of the book: she refers to the “American myth of the already liberated 
woman of all classes,” and gives short shrift to those who provide gossip about 
230 For a fuller discussion, see Judith Coffin, “Historicizing The Second Sex,” and Jo-Ann 
 Pilardi, “The Changing Critical Fortunes of The Second Sex.”
231 Elizabeth Hardwick, “The Subjection of Women,” 321.
232 “I take up the bewildering inclusiveness of this book, because there is hardly a thing I 
would want to say contrary to her thesis that Simone de Beauvoir has not said herself” 
(ibid., 322).
233 Elizabeth Hardwick, “The Art of Fiction No. 87.”
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the writer instead of analysis.234 “Women who can’t read such a long work 
reflect their historical experience of utter intellectual impoverishment as a 
class …”; they can’t understand it “any more than I should imagine a slave prior 
to the civil war could have understood intellectually the nature of his bond-
age…. The overwhelming majority of American women (like the overwhelm-
ing majority of American men) do not read books.”235 This is true even of intel-
lectuals: “We are a people, as oft noted elsewhere, who have grown accustomed 
to thought reduced on the tabloid sheet to far below its least common 
denominator.”236 She does, however, praise the women of the left. “That so 
much of the fight against ‘male supremacy’ in the American communist move-
ment can be so negatively described is not the fault of the women.”237
But Hansberry’s understanding that The Second Sex was a political book 
was rare. As Rosie Germain has shown,238 The Second Sex was received in 
the United States primarily as a work of social science—indeed as a work of 
“sexology.”239 Partly this was because Blanche Knopf had it marketed that way 
(as she wrote to Parshley, existentialism was a “dead duck” from a commercial 
point of view).240 But also, by 1953, when The Second Sex was discussed in Time 
magazine and other widely read outlets, “women’s ‘fulfilment’ was already, and 
would continue to be, a popular topic of debate.”241 But “fulfillment” and its an-
tithesis, frustration, were being discussed in a way that entirely left out “femi-
nism,” which Germain sees to have been a truly dead duck.242
234 Hansberry, “Simone de Beauvoir and The Second Sex: An American Commentary,” 129, 
128.
235 Ibid., 129, 132.
236 Ibid., 133.
237 Ibid., 132.
238 Rosie Germain, “Reading The Second Sex in the 1950s.”
239 Ibid., 1048–1052.
240 Ibid., 1044. See also Anna Bogic, “Why Philosophy Went Missing: Understanding the Eng-
lish Version of The Second Sex,” 160.
241 Germain, 1045. As Germain shows, “[t]he reception of The Second Sex … fits awkwardly 
into the historiography of the 50s. Much of this historiography has focused on the ques-
tion of whether this should be seen as a culturally ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’ decade” 
(1046). Perhaps my analysis can contribute to an understanding that that is, in fact, the 
wrong question. For a debunking of the idea of supposedly dead time “between the 
waves,” see also Joanne Meyerowitz, Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar 
America, 1945–1960, Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War 
Era, and Wini Breines, Young, White and Miserable: Growing Up Female in the Fifties.
242 Germain notes that while British readers read exactly the same book (Parshley’s transla-
tion), there was no comparable popular interest in social science, no vogue for sexology—
most British public intellectuals were economists, who did not review the book, and Brit-
ish publisher Jonathan Cape “had, in striking contrast to Knopf, actually requested that 
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It was this term, “fulfillment,” that would carry over so powerfully into The 
Feminine Mystique, written by a woman who had trained as a psychologist dur-
ing the heyday of functionalist social science. Friedan built a feminism within 
the comfort zone of middle-class femininity, much as Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
had done a century earlier. The differences between Beauvoir and Friedan 
were well-cataloged as early as 1980 by Sandra Dijkstra, who described Friedan 
as “a translator who could boil down its ideas, and its theory, into less radical, 
more readable journalese,” making both problems and solutions more indi-
vidualistic, thus more palatable.243 Friedan did not admit Beauvoir’s influence 
on her work until 1975, and then rather grudgingly; a meeting between them 
was a dialogue of the deaf, since Beauvoir wanted to abolish the family and 
Friedan wanted to save it, through basically reformist solutions that involved 
thinking about things differently. In Dijkstra’s words, Friedan “eliminated the 
radical core”; Beauvoir’s response was that she intended “to sap this regime, 
rather than play its game.”244
Friedan describes her trip to Paris as a pilgrimage to consult a movement 
“Goddess,” seeking advice because the American movement had lost its way. 
(Some of this is quite bizarre, to be honest.) “In the last two years in America,” 
she tells Beauvoir,
some of de Beauvoir’s references to sexual intimacy be cut” (“Reading The Second Sex in 
the 1950s,” 1061). It was reviewed mainly by literary writers and was received as a feminist 
text, for instance in the suffrage journal Time and Tide, which was still publishing.
 Germain also shows that, while “The Second Sex was … to some extent, a transatlantic 
work from inception, particularly so when seen in the context of social science,” Ameri-
can reviewers, proudly invested in American ideal of “modernity,” were quick to attribute 
the parts of The Second Sex they didn’t like to national differences (1043). She quotes 
among others psychiatrist Clara Thompson: “If [Beauvoir’s] picture is true of present day 
France, then France is about fifty years behind us” (1054). Beauvoir’s portrait of American 
women as smugly certain that they are already emancipated seems to be borne out. (The 
label of “modernity” was also a pretty good way to sell kitchen appliances.) Ironically, Ju-
dith Coffin (“Historicizing The Second Sex”) found that the negative reviews in France 
tended to complain that The Second Sex was too American!
243 Sandra Dijkstra, “Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan: The Politics of Omission.” See 
Betty Friedan, “Sex, Society and The Female Dilemma.”
244 Dijkstra, “The Politics of Omission,” 298. In Tout compte fait, Beauvoir would call The Femi-
nine Mystique an “excellente livre” (an excellent book), but would deplore the lack of radi-
calism in the National Organization of Women, calling it “soon irrelevant” (bientôt dé-
passé) (618). She describes the American feminist scene with an accuracy that shows her 
to be well informed, and details her points of agreement and disagreement with various 
groups and writers.
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there has been a diffusion of energy in an internal ideological dispute. 
Women began to realize their potential power with the passage of the 
Equal Rights Amendment right before the ’72 elections and the Supreme 
Court’s decision on abortion. At that point, forces on the far right began a 
well-financed campaign to prevent ratification of era in the States and to 
overturn the abortion decision. From testimony at the Watergate hear-
ings, we suspect that agents provocateurs were also at work within the 
Women’s Movement, fomenting disruption and extremism, fanning the 
divisive note of sexual politics—“down with men, childbearing and 
motherhood!” The attempt to make a political ideology out of sexual 
preferences, out of lesbianism, has diverted energies from the political 
mainstream and hindered the political momentum of the Women’s 
Movement.245
Beauvoir replied, “well, of that, I’m not sure,” and things went rapidly downhill 
from there. Friedan asked about work, Beauvoir answered that the women in 
the Lipp factory … but that wasn’t what Friedan meant by work. Beauvoir re-
fused to endorse the idea of “wages for housework,” and so on. In the end, the 
pilgrim, disappointed at not getting the answers she wanted, turned on the 
goddess as cold, overly dependent on Sartre, etc: “And then I recognized the 
authoritarian overtones of that supposedly Maoist party line I’ve heard before 
from sophomoric, self-styled radical feminists in America….”246
Since Dijkstra wrote, it has been asserted that Betty Friedan under-reported 
the radical leftist background of her own thinking and practice. Daniel Horow-
itz’s book, Betty Friedan and the Making of  The Feminine Mystique,247 is unsat-
isfactory in a number of ways: I’m not sure he can be exonerated from the 
charge of red-baiting, though that may not have been his intention. However, 
if, as his archival work does appear to show, Friedan deliberately minimized 
class analysis, and sanitized her own history by failing to mention her commu-
nist-related activities, in order to reach a broader audience of women, she 
would hardly have been the only one.248 This actually strengthens my view of 
the importance of Cold War contexts in the separate development of Ameri-
can and European feminisms—and provides evidence of their persistence. 
Whatever Friedan’s intention or reasoning was, it seems obvious that if The 
Feminine Mystique had been more “radical” it would not have reached the 
245 Friedan, “Sex, Society and the Female Dilemma,” 14.
246 Betty Friedan, “No Gods, No Goddesses,” 17.
247 Daniel Horowitz, Betty Friedan and The Making of The Feminine Mystique.
248 See Weigand, Red Feminism.
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broad audience it did. And again, this is a self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating 
prophecy: but that doesn’t make it an inaccurate one.
Certainly Beauvoir’s contribution to feminist theory does not reduce to an 
intervention in Cold War politics. But I am arguing that the reception of her 
work can’t be well understood apart from that frame, which (to put it sche-
matically) acted on The Second Sex like a screen, or a strainer, to the point that 
when Spelman looked into the bowl there was nothing to see.
However, when American readers (hostile, friendly, or passive-aggressive) 
understood The Second Sex as a work of psychology, they were not wrong, 
exactly.
In one of the infrequent passages in Les mandarins where Anne refers to the 
book she is working on, she describes it as an attempt to reconcile Marx and 
Freud. It would be over-reaching to say that the book Anne is quietly writing 
turns out to be The Second Sex; for one thing, Anne is not primarily interested 
in understanding women. A practicing psychoanalyst who works with Holo-
caust survivors, many of them children, she is looking for a way to help heal 
trauma that would not require repudiating the real horrors of the war, a way to 
honor the victims of war without sacrificing one’s own future to survivor guilt. 
This will require working politically toward a better world; a “private solution” 
will not be enough, indeed the real pain of these others demands more than 
a “private solution.” To “cure” is, as she sees it, a mutilation; yet to understand 
the intimate injuries that result from collective injustices, to look for “tech-
niques” to heal them, strikes her as an honorable task.249 We do not hear much 
more about Anne’s book: indeed, when Scriassine asks her whether she writes, 
her response is to laugh and say, “God, no!”250 But those two projects—work 
on the self, work on the world—in tension yet indissoluble, like the “I” and 
the “we,” animate Beauvoir’s political thinking, from the Liberation onwards. 
This was something important she had in common with Richard Wright. It 
was also something they both had in common with Frantz Fanon. All three 
shared the view that oppression creates psychologically and morally defective 
249 See Les mandarins 1:73, 91–3. As Beauvoir says in her memoirs, it is a mistake to take Anne 
as a stand-in for the author; she put as much or more of herself into Henri. “He resembles 
me at least as much as Anne does, and perhaps more.” [Il me ressemble autant qu’Anne 
au moins, et peut-être davantage (FCh 1:367).] But it is also too simple to accept the sepa-
ration Beauvoir makes in those retrospective pages between Henri-the-writer-and activist 
and Anne-the-“être relatif.”
250 “Ils écrivent tous, n’est-ce pas?
—Tous.
—Vous, vous n’écrivez pas?
Je dis en riant: ‘Grand Dieu non!’” (Les mandarins, 1:49).
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forms of subjectivity, which are artifacts of situation rather than intrinsic de-
fects (though the results may look the same); oppression must thus be fought 
simultaneously on several fronts, and with a complex, sometimes contradic-
tory, set of instruments.251
11 Reading Beauvoir with Fanon
One quick way of saying what The Second Sex “is about” is that it attempts to 
demystify and liquidate the notions of femininity that cause women to be 
treated as “Other” by culture, by men, and by themselves. That urgent task of 
demystification is a major parallel with Frantz Fanon’s first book, Peau noire 
masques blancs, which appeared only three years later, and which is a powerful 
analysis of the psychological and cultural effects of racism. I first began think-
ing about this when I noticed that Fanon has a chapter called, “L’expérience 
vécue du noir” (The Lived Experience of the Black), which recalls the title of 
volume 2 of The Second Sex.252 That’s a small point in itself, but there are many 
other signs that the project of inquiry was similar. In the words of Toril Moi 
(probably the first to have commented on the resemblance), “where Beauvoir...
construct[s] a highly complex theory of female alienation under patriarchy, 
Fanon mobilizes the same thinkers to theorize Black alienation in a racist 
society.”253 Both Beauvoir and Fanon offer strongly Hegelian accounts of the 
subject’s struggle for recognition in the face of a hostile, “othering” gaze. Both 
make serious use of psychoanalysis while remaining alert to the biases that can 
251 Again, see now Lori Marso, Politics with Beauvoir (94, 97–121) for an extended comparison 
with Fanon. Marso engages (as I do not) with affect theory and with political theories of 
violence, and she concentrates most fully on Les damnés de la terre where I have empha-
sized Peau noire masques blancs, but I am substantially in agreement with her conclusions.
252 The origin of the French phrase is with Merleau-Ponty. It was unhelpfully translated by 
Charles Lam Markmann as “The Fact of Blackness,” in a parallel to Parshley’s mistransla-
tions, and with parallel unhelpful effects on Anglophone Fanon scholarship. In both cas-
es, what is lost is not simply the indebtedness to Merleau-Ponty but the intentionally 
subjective nature of the accounts given: this is the lived reality of an embodied conscious-
ness, told from the inside out. David Macey also criticizes the way in which the American 
translation of Peau noire masques blancs in 1967 dislocates Fanon from a Francophone 
context and, through mistranslation, transforms him into the archetypal Negro from the 
American deep South (Macey, “Adieu Foulard, Adieu Madras,” 17). And Nigel Gibson 
points out that Markmann obliterated the distinction Fanon makes between “Noir” and 
“nègre” (Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue). The English versions in my book are 
based on Markmann’s, but I have altered them, in some cases significantly, so the respon-
sibility for any errors should properly be mine.
253 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 204.
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infect it, to the way it can work as a tool of social coercion; both books are 
centrally concerned with sexuality as a social and cultural force, and both have 
some forthright and uncomfortable things to say about the bourgeois Europe-
an fantasy-world. Both draw examples and arguments indiscriminately from a 
range of disciplines and discourses, importantly including literary texts as well 
as personal narrative, though in Beauvoir’s case the “I” is more often veiled.254 
Both deploy a range of methodological tools and rhetorical strategies, which 
they are nonetheless willing to criticize. Max Silverman writes about Fanon 
that “[d]iscourses of liberation such as psychoanalysis, the Hegelian dialectic 
and phenomenology are adopted as useful tools for prising open the nature 
and extent of white oppression but are also exposed as false universalisms 
when confronted by the specificities of ‘the lived experience of the black 
man.’”255 If we substitute “women” for “the black man,” that sentence fits Beau-
voir. Fanon presents himself as a psychoanalyst—sort of—and Beauvoir pres-
ents herself as a philosopher—sort of—but both in fact draw on all sorts of 
evidence for their positions, and are no respecters of disciplinary purity.256
Rather obviously, both Beauvoir and Fanon had serious intellectual engage-
ments with Sartrean existentialism, and both importantly dissented from and 
struggled with aspects of his thinking, though Fanon marked his struggle with 
Sartre explicitly in his text and Beauvoir chose not to. Each also helped move 
Sartre himself past some impasses at key points in his intellectual and political 
development. Both also had important intellectual engagements with the phe-
nomenology of Merleau-Ponty, whose lectures Fanon attended in Lyon while 
studying for his medical degree.257
Both Fanon and Beauvoir are extremely critical of members of the oppressed 
group they belong to whom they see as complicit with their oppression— both 
254 Both Beauvoir and Fanon were partly writing to understand who they were by under-
standing their place in the world, but neither makes this explicit: both essays open (as 
indeed did Woolf ’s A Room of One’s Own) by stating that the writer is not angry, that the 
time for anger is past. In all three cases this opening move to conciliate or reassure the 
reader is revealed to be a lie, but not in a manipulative fashion: it is as if the writer discov-
ered her or his own anger through the process of writing the book.
255 Max Silverman, “Introduction,” in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks: New Interdisci-
plinary Essays, 3.
256 See David Macey, “The Recall of the Real: Frantz Fanon and Psychoanalysis.” Lewis Gor-
don notes that it is “not written in a way that one could readily identify what kind of work 
it is,” and cites Jane Anna Gordon, who calls this way of writing “creolized” (Lewis Gordon, 
What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought, 73). Gordon sees 
“methodological fetishism and disciplinary decadence” as having impeded a clear under-
standing of Fanon’s work (ibid., 74).
257 Ibid., 13.
Chapter 4322
texts foreground criticism of complicity and of inadequate self-justification, 
including through sarcasm and mockery. And both call, in very explicit terms, 
for the subjects of history to reinvent themselves, as Beauvoir’s “independent 
woman”—“the free woman is just being born”—or the fully decolonized “new 
man” of whom Fanon says, “il faut faire peau neuve.”258 This may be why both 
were and continue to be inspiring, energizing books for all sorts of readers, 
even though the picture they paint is a bleak one, and even though neither is 
what you’d call an easy read.
Writing in 1994, Moi rightly noted that the influence of Beauvoir on Fanon 
had been underacknowledged—beginning, it must be said, by Fanon himself.
Fanon himself makes absolutely no reference to The Second Sex. Nor does 
he seem even remotely interested in the question of women’s liberation. 
Writing his essay as a medical student in Lyons, Fanon was influenced by 
existentialism, and—judging by his footnotes—clearly an assiduous 
reader of Les Temps Modernes. In 1948 and 1949 the existentialist journal 
published many excerpts from The Second Sex, yet Fanon fails to mention 
any of them. Nor does he refer to the full-length book, although he could 
hardly have been unaware of its publication and the outraged response it 
provoked in France in 1949 and 1950. Unfortunately, Fanon’s explicit invo-
cation of Sartre and his total neglect of Beauvoir exemplify the usual re-
sponse of male intellectuals to existentialism [and] … it would seem that 
present-day colonial and post-colonial critics have done nothing to 
change this unhappy state of affairs.259
Fortunately, the last point is no longer true. Among others, Lewis Gordon’s 2015 
book What Fanon Said forthrightly explores Beauvoir’s “presence at the level of 
ideas but exclusion at that of citation” which he calls “a form of epistemic sex-
ism” and finds he “cannot excuse.”260 Gordon begins by noting
258 Literally, “make a new skin,” usually translated by “turn over a new leaf” (Fanon, Les dam-
nés de la terre, 305).
259 Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 204.
260 Gordon, What Fanon Said, 32. Perhaps another parallel is that despite all the books on 
Fanon already in existence, a book with that title was still badly needed. Gordon’s first 
chapter is devoted to the ways Fanon has been reduced to his biography, or read as a tis-
sue of influences, which flow in one direction: why is Fanon seen as Sartrean when Sartre 
is not seen as Senghorian or Wrightian? And Gordon’s discussion of how Peau noire 
masques blancs has been read through various disciplinary agendas leads him to an impa-
tience much like my own about The Second Sex: could people please just read the book? 
See also Henry Louis Gates: “Frantz Fanon, not to put too fine a point on it, is a Rorschach 
blot with legs” (“Critical Fanonism,” 252).
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the insight, which Fanon erroneously attributes to Nietzsche, that (in 
Fanon’s paraphrasing) “Man’s misery (le Malheur) is that he was once a 
child.”261 The actual source was Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambi-
guity (1947), a text that, along with The Second Sex (1949), as Matthieu 
Renault informs us, reveals affinities between Beauvoir and Fanon … Al-
though at first an observation on the human condition, Beauvoir subse-
quently brought it to bear on specific modes of embodiment, identities, 
and the longing human beings may have for times before such ways of 
being were realized. Her observation in The Second Sex of not being born 
but instead becoming a woman is premised on this insight and clearly 
prefigures Fanon’s thesis of the black as a white construction, that blacks 
are made or constructed. As Beauvoir scholarship reveals Jean-Paul Sar-
tre’s indebtedness to her for crucial concepts such as the Look and dis-
cussions of concrete relations with others in Being and Nothingness, it is 
clear that Fanon, too, is influenced by her thought on at least the philo-
sophical anthropology of human development, the limitations of Hege-
lian dialectics of recognition, and the importance of psychoanalysis in 
his inaugural work.262
Amey Victoria Adkins has argued similarly that “a close reading of Fanon’s 
groundbreaking analysis in Black Skin, White Masks reveals a pattern of analy-
sis uncannily similar to Beauvoir’s The Second Sex.”263 She takes Fanon to task 
for his “erasure” and “silencing” of his debt to Beauvoir, connecting this to his 
“use of the universal masculine” and negative portrayals of women.264 Her 
comparison starts from an eloquent reading of Fanon’s famous confrontation 
with the white child: “Look! A Negro!”—“the shattering shared experience 
of  blackness and black being in a white world” which catalyses a “crucial, 
 crucifying perspectival shift.” She compares this to Beauvoir’s equally  harrowing 
But of course we are all reading the same books, really. Maybe the distinction I’ve been 
trying to draw is between a clever reading, which seizes on some arcane and little-noticed 
aspect of a familiar text as an occasion for display of the critic’s own brilliance, political 
acumen, or whatever, versus a sound reading, which foregrounds an attempt to account 
for the thought of the textual other in a full and responsible way.
261 pnmb 8. Beauvoir herself attributes the idea, not to Nietzsche, but to Descartes.
262 Gordon, What Fanon Said, 31. The article Gordon references (Matthieu Renault, “Le genre 
de la race: Fanon lecteur de Beauvoir”) is truly excellent: only my determination to keep 
issues about “readings of Hegel” from taking over my project prevents me from engaging 
with it further here. Renault confirms that Fanon owned (at least) the first volume of The 
Second Sex, and annotated it.
263 Amey Victoria Adkins, “Black/Feminist Futures: Reading Beauvoir in Black Skin, White 
Masks,” 698.
264 Ibid., 698, 700.
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analysis of what it is to be “taken to be a woman,” interpellated at birth (now, 
even before birth) by the announcement, “it’s a girl!” and indoctrinated, from 
one’s earliest moments, into the shame of being “seen” that results in a simi-
larly crippling self-alienation.265
To bring these two insights together is a powerful move. But what stays with 
me is not so much the question of who the insight originates with, or belongs 
to, as the power of the insight itself. The texts resonate and live because their 
description of this moment of being “Other” describes an experience that very 
many women, and very many people of color, have actually had—and that is a 
truth about the world we live in that no writer, no person, “owns.” Here’s an 
understated version, called “Incident,” published in 1925, from Harlem Renais-
sance poet Countee Cullen:
Once riding in old Baltimore,
Heart-filled, head-filled with glee,
I saw a Baltimorean
Keep looking straight at me.
Now I was eight and very small,
And he was no whit bigger,
And so I smiled, but he poked out
His tongue, and called me, ‘Nigger.’
I saw the whole of Baltimore
From May until December;
Of all the things that happened there
That’s all that I remember.
265 The example Adkins gives in illustration comes from Beauvoir’s “Formation” section; as 
she observes, it is one among (very) many. “‘A man, sniggering, made a comment about 
my fat calves. The next day, my mother made me wear stockings and lengthen my skirt, 
but I will never forget the shock I suddenly felt in seeing myself seen.’ The little girl feels 
that her body is escaping her, that it is no longer the clear expression of her individuality; 
it becomes foreign to her; and at the same moment, she is grasped by others as a thing: on 
the street, eyes follow her, her body is subject to comments; she would like to become in-
visible; she is afraid of becoming flesh and afraid to show her flesh.” [“Un homme a fait en 
ricanant une réflexion sur mes gros mollets. Le lendemain, maman m’a fait porter des bas 
et allonger ma jupe: mais je n’oublierai jamais le choc ressenti soudain à me voir vue.” La 
fillette sent que son corps lui échappe, il n’est plus la claire expression de son individuali-
té; il lui devient étranger; et, au même moment, elle est saisie par autrui comme une 
chose: dans la rue, on la suit des yeux, on commente son anatomie; elle voudrait se rendre 
invisible; elle a peur de devenir chair et peur de montrer sa chair (DS 2:65, quoted in Ad-
kins, “Black/Feminist Futures,” 703–4).]
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Examples (for people of color, and for women of all races) might be mul-
tiplied almost indefinitely, drop by drop, until they become a seething sea of 
pain and outrage.266 Some such encounters are immediately deadly (see also 
under, Baltimore), some are damaging in more insidious ways…. Did Fanon 
read Countee Cullen? He could have. Did Countee Cullen read Hegel? In a way, 
who cares?267 The next time I am in my office with a first-year student to whom 
that exact thing has happened that very day, shall I act like Mariah in the Ja-
maica Kincaid story and say to her, “oh, here’s a book that analyses what just 
happened to you”? (And which book shall I offer?) And will I be surprised if the 
student looks at the book, and looks back at me as though I am, literally, crazy?
Sorry. The politics of citation is important, and not just for those with ca-
reers to make: writers who are not given credit for their ideas fall out of view, 
and their thinking is lost to us; intellectual history then seems whiter and mal-
er than it actually was, which can be unnecessarily daunting to those not white 
and male who seek to enter it; and then there’s the question of scholarly eth-
ics.268 But if the task is actually to engage with the world, and not just texts, we 
need to keep before our eyes that the politics of citation is not the only politics 
that there is. When I ask myself why scholars (including myself) have been 
more concerned with protecting Beauvoir’s intellectual property rights than 
she ever was herself, I remember that an over-obsessiveness about whether 
people cite one’s own work is the mark of the Serious Man (and we’ve all met 
him, if only as “reviewer number two”). Perhaps Beauvoir thought of her intel-
lectual and political work less as a product, and more as a project, which would 
mean an endeavor that is valuable only insofar as it is shared.269 That could be 
a good idea to try.
266 See Coates, Between the World and Me; see Baldwin, No Name in the Street; see … the news-
paper …
267 He easily could have: he went to Harvard … his father-in-law was a prominent American 
Hegelian named W. E. B. DuBois… But he certainly hadn’t read Hegel before the age of 
eight.
268 Nobody’s footnotes are perfect, though. Adkins’s discussion of Richard Wright doesn’t 
credit Margaret Simons’ work, and her citation of Buck-Morss’s Hegel and Haiti is mis-
leading: that book, wonderful as it is, does not mention Beauvoir on page 20, or anywhere 
else. And I’m sure I have not eliminated all such errors from this book, either.
Maybe there’s a bigger picture, though. I suggested in chapter 1 that the most powerful 
influences on Beauvoir’s thought were the ones she cites least: perhaps that is also true of 
influences on Fanon? Perhaps it is true more generally? Suleiman (“Breton ou la poésie”) 
makes a similar point about Beauvoir’s influence on feminist literary criticism, including 
her own.
269 Beauvoir’s history with Les Temps Modernes makes clear that she cared less about getting 
her name on the masthead than about making sure the work of speaking truth to power 
actually got done. One could contrast this with what she had to say about the Partisan 
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Gordon’s discussion of Fanon’s relationship to Beauvoir makes a lot of sense 
to me. While noting that the catalogue of Fanon’s library shows he owned two 
of Beauvoir’s books,270 Gordon also underlines the importance of Richard 
Wright to both Beauvoir and Sartre, and the importance of Wright and Sartre 
to both Beauvoir and Fanon.
This circle of thought reveals an evolving community of ideas in which 
each influences the other, through which to draw on the resources of one 
is to evoke the other. There is, in other words, a fundamental relationality 
of ideas through which speaking of race in terms of gender reveals a sym-
biosis of each. Acknowledging Beauvoir means, in other words, also evok-
ing Wright, and reading through Fanon should, then, bring forth Beauvoir 
and the many exemplars of existential critical work on oppression.271
Whether a certain idea passed from Wright to Beauvoir to Fanon, or from 
Wright to Fanon directly, and what role was played in all of that by Sartre’s 
ideas about Jews, matters less than the ideas themselves.272 And worrying 
about who “invented” the social construction of the oppressed consciousness 
seems liable to distract us from the force of that insight in all their work: we are 
free to change. Why haven’t we? Are we going to? How? If not now, when?
Why I started down this road is that reading Fanon and Beauvoir together 
brought some things about each of them into clearer view.273 One has to do 
with the history and uses of psychoanalysis: like Beauvoir, Fanon brings to bear 
Review group’s approach to their mauvais torchon. There’s also the rule of thumb that one 
can get a great deal done provided one does not care about getting credit for it.
270 Gordon doesn’t say which two: Fanon’s reference (pnmb 148, bswm 141) to Beauvoir walk-
ing with Wright in New York City (and being harassed by a white passerby) tells us he read 
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, at least, though he gives no footnote. Large sections of that 
book, and of The Second Sex, were serialized in Les Temps Modernes.
271 Gordon, What Fanon Said, 33.
272 An exemplary reading along these lines is Annabelle Golay, “Féminisme et postcolonialis-
me: Beauvoir, Fanon, et la guerre d’Algérie.” Golay situates the face-to-face encounter be-
tween the two in Rome in 1961, as recounted by Beauvoir in La force des choses, in the light 
of carefully contextualized readings of Fanon’s late texts about the veil and Beauvoir’s 
writing about the case of Djamila Boupacha. I’ll engage with this further in chapter 5.
273 And I suppose I also hoped to show that if the methods and insights that were useful to 
her were also useful to such a person as Fanon, she cannot be as bankrupt from the point 
of view of race and class analysis as some commentators believe. I can spot the excluded 
middle in that reasoning, really. But it is curious that the routine denunciation of Beau-
voir as “Hegelian” is not matched by comparable criticisms of Fanon: that the latter starts 
from, and then revises, the “master-slave” trope is taken as a matter of course.
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certain strands of psychoanalytic thinking, certain psychoanalytically-based 
arguments, that are unpopular today. Like Beauvoir, he does so in order to use 
psychoanalytic tools of description and analysis, while refusing the teleology 
that would keep every problem on an individual level, as the unfolding of an 
individual story.
The task Fanon set himself was, as I said, one of demystification:
White civilization and European culture have imposed on the Black an 
existential deviation. We shall demonstrate elsewhere that often what 
people call the Black soul is a white construction.274
We here indict both those who have been swindled and those who 
swindled them … [There are] a certain number of realities to whose liq-
uidation we wish here to contribute.275
Unlike many of his day, he does not plan to do this by making a case for the 
value of Black culture or the full humanity of people of color.
Oh yes, as we see, by appealing to humanity, to a sense of human dignity, 
to love, to charity, it would be easy for us to prove, or to win the admis-
sion, that the Black is the equal of the white. But our goal is quite differ-
ent: to help the Black man to free himself of the arsenal of complexes 
that has sprouted up from the colonial situation.276
But as Gwen Bergner cogently puts it, “[t]he difficulty is to recognize the psy-
chic damage caused by racism without representing oppressed minority sub-
ject positions as essentially compromised.”277 Fanon thus describes his project 
274 “La civilisation blanche, la culture européenne ont imposé au Noir une déviation existen-
tielle. Nous montrerons ailleurs que souvent ce qu’on appelle l’âme noire est une cons-
truction du Blanc” (pnmb 11; bswm 6, translation altered).
275 “Nous faisons ici le procès des mystifiés et des mystificateurs” … “un certain nombre de 
réalités à la liquidation desquelles nous voulons ici contribuer” (pnmb 25; bswm 19–20, 
translation altered).
276 “Oui, comme on le voit, en faisant appel à l’humanité, au sentiment de la dignité, à 
l’amour, à la charité, il nous serait facile de prouver ou de faire admettre que le Noir est 
l’égal du Blanc. Mais notre but est tout autre: c’est aider le Noir à se libérer de l’arsenal 
complexuel qui a germé au sein de la situation coloniale” (pnmb 24; bswm 19, translation 
altered).
277 Gwen Bergner, “Politics and Pathologies: On the Subject of Race in Psychoanalysis,” 223. 
Fanon is clear in his disdain for the sort of psychoanalysis that concludes by proving to 
man “that he is nothing”; the problem will have to be proposed carefully, and differently 
(pnmb 17–18, bswm 12).
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both as a “procès” (a case at law, an indictment) and as a “sociodiagnostique.” 
Psychology does not unfold in a vacuum.
Before the trial opens, we must insist on a few points. The analysis we 
undertake is psychological. It remains nonetheless evident that for us the 
true disalienation of the Black implies an abrupt bringing-to-conscious-
ness of social and economic realities. If there is an inferiority complex, it 
is the outcome of a double process:
—first, economic;
— subsequently by interiorization or, to say it better,  epidermalization, 
 of this inferiority.
Reacting against the constitutionalist school of the late nineteenth 
century, Freud, through psychoanalysis, insisted that the individual fac-
tor be taken into account. He substituted an ontogenetic perspective for 
the phylogenetic theory. As we shall see, the Black man’s alienation is not 
an individual question. As well as phylogeny and ontogeny, there is 
sociogeny.278
Fanon’s terms—“sociogénie,” “sociodiagnostic”—seem reasonable descriptors 
also for the project of The Second Sex, with its ultimate refusal to choose be-
tween (a modified version of) Marx and (a modified version of) Freud.
The concept of a Black “inferiority complex,” which Fanon uses as a jump-
ing off point, is drawn from the work of “Professor Westerman”279 and espe-
cially from Octave Mannoni; his chapter 4, “Du prétendu complexe de dépen-
dance du colonisé” (On the So-Called Dependency Complex of Colonized 
Peoples) is an epic takedown of Mannoni’s study of Madagascar, Psychologie de 
la colonisation. Where Mannoni thought he saw a Black “inferiority complex” 
278 “Avant d’ouvrir le procès, nous tenons à dire certaines choses. L’analyse que nous entre-
prenons est psychologique. Il demeure toutefois évident que pour nous la véritable dé-
saliénation du Noir implique une prise de conscience abrupte des réalités économiques 
et sociales. S’il y a complexe d’infériorité, c’est à la suite d’un double processus:
—économique d’abord;
—par intériorisation ou, mieux, épidermisation de cette infériorité, ensuite.
Réagissant contre la tendance constitutionnaliste de la fin du xixe siècle, Freud, par la 
psychanalyse, demanda qu’on tînt compte du facteur individuel. À une thèse phylogéné-
tique, il substituait la perspective ontogénétique. On verra que l’aliénation du Noir n’est 
pas une question individuelle. À côté de la phylogénie et de l’ontogénie, il y a sociogénie” 
(pnmb 8; bswm 4, translation altered).
279 pnmb 19; bswm 14.
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that supposedly predated colonialism, Fanon saw the psychic effects of the 
colonial situation itself: “[i]t is the racist who creates his inferior.”280
[W]hy does [Mannoni] try to make the inferiority complex something 
that existed before colonization? We recognize here the explanatory 
mechanism that, in psychiatry, would yield: there are latent forms of psy-
chosis that manifest following a trauma. Or, in surgery: the appearance of 
varicose veins in a certain individual does not arise from his being com-
pelled to spend ten hours a day standing up, but really from a constitu-
tional weakness in the walls of his veins; his working conditions are only 
a facilitating factor. And the insurance compensation expert to whom the 
case is submitted will find the responsibility of the employer extremely 
limited.281
Fanon makes short work of Mannoni’s apologetics, and his claim that French 
colonialism was somehow “less racist” than other countries; he reanalyses 
Mannoni’s data (including the dreams of children) in the light of the real mas-
sacres that conditioned the fear Mannoni described.
What must be done is to restore this dream to its proper time, and this 
time is the period during which eighty thousand natives were killed—
that is to say, one of every fifty persons in the population; and to its proper 
place …282
The Senegalese soldier’s rifle is not a penis but in truth a model 1969 Leb-
el rifle.283
280 “[C]’est le raciste qui crée l’infériorisé” (pnmb 75, bswm 69).
281 “[P]ourquoi veut-il faire du complexe d’infériorité quelque chose de préexistant à la colo-
nisation? Nous reconnaissons là le mécanisme d’explication qui, en psychiatrie, don-
nerait: il y a des formes latentes de la psychose qui deviennent manifestes à la suite d’un 
traumatisme. Et en chirurgie: l’apparition de varices chez un individu ne provient pas de 
l’obligation pour lui de rester dix heures debout, mais bien d’une fragilité constitution-
nelle de la paroi veineuse; le mode de travail n’est qu’une condition favorisante, et le sur-
expert requis décrète très limitée la responsabilité de l’employeur” (pnmb 68–9; bswm 
62–3, translation altered).
282 “Il s’agit de replacer ce rêve en son temps, et ce temps c’est la période pendant laquelle 
quatre-vingt mille indigènes ont été tués, c’est-à-dire un habitant sur cinquante; et dans 
son lieu” (pnmb 84, bswm 70).
283 “Le fusil du tirailleur sénégalais n’est pas un pénis, mais véritablement un fusil Lebel 1916” 
(pnmb 86; bswm 79, translation altered.)
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Fanon then juxtaposes to Mannoni’s dream accounts a long and devastating 
excerpt from a trial document, detailing torture at Tananarive. (Note his use, 
like Beauvoir’s, of long quotations from original material; summary cannot do 
justice to the effect this is meant to have, and does have, on the reader. No, we 
will not be permitted to look away from this, from the real.)284
I see Fanon’s de-Freudianized Freud as a darker version of Beauvoir’s insis-
tence that what little girls “envy” is not the penis, but the whole sphere of hu-
man activity that is denied to them because they don’t have one. Like her, he 
rejects psychoanalytic “explanations” when real explanations will do. Just as 
it’s useless to wonder why a woman “imagines” that birds are attacking her 
when birds really are attacking her, why women fear rape when the threat of 
rape is all around them, one need not wonder why a Black man would dream 
of becoming white in a culture that ceaselessly affirms to him that white cul-
ture is superior and that he can achieve nothing. The purchase of this on to-
day’s problems should be clear: it makes no more sense to blame students of 
color for their lack of “resilience” than to blame their elders for their high blood 
pressure.285 The same is true for the trauma of rape, and of the constant threat 
of rape that hangs in the air, and of the existential hatred directed at non-ideal 
female bodies (which is to say, at female bodies tout court).286 Nonetheless, the 
damage done is manifest, and it is urgent not to pretend it away, but to seek or 
invent a therapeutic, one component of which must somehow involve an ac-
tivist awareness that goes beyond the individual.287
Another parallel to Beauvoir: Fanon’s appropriation of psychoanalysis is 
eclectic, and some of the authorities he cites are not household names. Peo-
ple tend to notice his occasional mentions of Lacan. But the Lacan cited by 
both Beauvoir and Fanon was not yet Lacan with a capital L: both the power 
plays by which he and his followers would come to dominate the institutions 
284 See Nigel Gibson, “Losing Sight of the Real: Recasting Merleau-Ponty in Fanon’s Critique 
of Mannoni.”
285 And yet both are done, explicitly or implicitly, a tradition going back to Moynihan and 
well beyond.
286 See Fiona Vera-Gray, Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment. And of course some people 
experience both simultaneously and synergistically, as Tamara Beauboeuf-Lafontant has 
shown.
287 “What emerges then is the need for a combined action, on the individual and on the 
group. As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to conscientize his unconscious, to 
stop seeking a hallucinatory lactification, but rather to take action toward changing the 
social structures.” [Ce qui apparaît alors, c’est la nécessité d’une action couplée sur 
l’individu et sur le groupe. En tant que psychanalyste, je dois aider mon client à conscien-
tiser son inconscient, à ne plus tenter une lactification hallucinatoire, mais bien à agir 
dans le sens d’un changement des structures sociales (pnmb 80; bswm 74, translation 
altered).]
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of French psychoanalysis, and the uptake by Americans that would make him 
the darling of (Anglo-American) “French theory,” lay in the future.288 Lacan 
appears in both their texts as one among many authorities, and not the most 
interesting. Rather, we encounter names no one knows today, but whose work 
is indeed more appropriate, or at least more productive and open for appro-
priation. In Fanon’s text, one is the Swiss Charles Odier:
Man’s tragedy, Nietzsche said, is that he was once a child. None the less, 
we cannot afford to forget that, as Charles Odier has shown us, the neu-
rotic’s fate remains in his own hands.289
Another is Germaine Guex, whose work he cites copiously in the analysis of 
the neurotic Jean Veneuse (the hero of a novel by René Maran), which consti-
tutes the second part of his chapter “L’homme de couleur et la blanche” (The 
Man of Color and the White Woman).290
Who was Germaine Guex?
Germaine Guex was a Swiss psychoanalyst who rose briefly to prominence 
with a 1950 book called La névrose d’abandon, later reissued as Le syndrome 
d’abandon. She wrote it in isolation, during the war; she was married to Odier, 
and worked as a research assistant to Jean Piaget. The book describes a neuro-
sis that differs from, has been absent from, classical Freudian accounts because 
it does not derive from the repression that arises from the Oedipus complex; 
rather, it stems from a pre-Oedipal lived “vécu” involving abandonment (real 
or imagined), a “vécu” which has not been worked through (and thus contin-
ues to recur), but has also not been repressed. The memories are thus con-
sciously available to the patient, not just as memories, but as if they were hap-
pening now, with disastrous consequences for the patient’s conduct of his or 
her present life.291
288 See Élisabeth Roudinesco, Histoire de la psychanalyse en France, and David Macey, Lacan 
in Contexts.
289 “Le malheur de l’homme, disait Nietzsche, est d’avoir été enfant. Toutefois, nous ne sau-
rions oublier, comme le laisse entendre Charles Odier, que le destin du névrosé demeure 
entre ses mains” (pnmb 8; bswm 4).
290 Another way Fanon follows Beauvoir is in his seamless uptake of literary example as if it 
were “clinical evidence”—though of course Freud did this too.
291 “We will use the term ‘abandonnique’ to refer to the neurotic who sees everything and 
everyone, beginning with himself, from the point of view of the abandonment he experi-
enced, or dreads.” [Abandonnique signifiera le névrosé qui envisage tout et tous, à com-
mencer par lui-même, du point de vue de l’abandon vécu ou redouté (Germaine Guex, Le 
syndrome d’abandon, 19).]
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Guex seems to have been concerned less with theoretical innovation than 
with compassionate and effective treatment for those whom a more conven-
tional treatment had failed to help; there is some similarity between her ideas 
and those of Donald Winnicott, Jeanne Lampl de Groot, perhaps Melanie 
Klein; but (apart from her use by Fanon) the book was, from the point of view 
of intellectual history, a dead end.292 However, when the book came out it 
was a bestseller; it would appear that many people recognized themselves in 
this portrait, including many who had already undergone a traditional psy-
choanalysis, even become analysts themselves, but were still unhappy. I am 
tempted to compare it to Alice Miller’s book, The Drama of the Gifted Child, 
which was similarly popular with a lay audience, and which also calls for a 
more compassionate psychoanalytic practice, as from one human being to an-
other.293 Perhaps one reason Guex’s book had so little lasting impact was that 
Jacques Lacan disliked it very much. He commented to a seminar in 1958:
The tremendous popularity of the “névrose d’abandon” has been not so 
much due to the young analysts as to certain sick people, who use it to 
prop up their neurotic-delusional claims.294
Part of what was a lightbulb for some and a professional red flag for others was 
Guex’s view that there was no point in seeking the source of neurosis in uncon-
scious repression of experiences—the patient was aware of them already: in-
deed, ceaselessly ruminating on his childhood abandonment is a key symp-
tom, along with a complete “lack of self-esteem,” crippling anxiety, “a sharp sense 
of catastrophe,” and an affective “avidity” and “aggression” that stem from a 
292 Or almost: Reiner Stach mobilizes Guex’s description of the “abandonnique” quite con-
vincingly in his recent biography, Kafka: The Early Years (71–4).
293 While ordinary readers found both books helpful in understanding their own histories 
and conditions, neither book was written to be “used” in that way: they are addressed very 
much to the practitioner.
294 “Le grand succès de la névrose d’abandon n’est pas tellement auprès des jeunes analystes 
que chez certains malades qui y trouvent un support pour leur revendication névrotico-
délirante” (Lacan, “Interventions sur l’exposé de J. Favez-Boutonnier: Abandon et névrose, 
Société Française de Psychanalyse,” 3). René Henny, writing the introduction to the 1973 
edition, was almost as hostile: “How many patients have been led to psychotherapy by a 
naïve reading of this book? And, indeed, it does not leave one unmoved.” [Combien de 
patients n’ont-ils pas été conduits à la consultation psychothérapique par la lecture naïve 
de ce livre? Il ne laisse en effet pas indifférent” (9).] He notes that it was a “great success 
in the bookstores, which is probably why the publishers have insisted on a new edition in 
spite of the author’s reticence.” [[U]n succès de librairie, d’où probablement l’insistance 
de l’éditeur à une nouvelle édition, en contrepoint de la réticence de l’auteur (9).]
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chronic state of fear.295 The patient’s inability to trust anyone results in conduct 
that alienates others, “proving” that he was right all along. Therefore the neuro-
sis must be treated, as she puts it, “dans le vrai” (in the real), by careful atten-
tion to “le vécu,” what is lived: a classically abstinent analysis, where the doctor 
shows no emotional connection with the patient, will be counterproductive. 
As she says, the task is delicate, and if following Fanon one adds politics to this 
it becomes even more delicate: not to deny the real roots of historical and on-
going trauma (what really happened, really did happen) but yet to move for-
ward, without imposing a new set of ideological mystifications … not to dis-
miss the manifestations of trauma as (individual) “neurosis” and yet, to find a 
way forward for those who are in pain … to undertake the urgent work of repair 
without promising a cure that it is not in the power of therapists or teachers 
to give … to find a way that does not require not listening to what people actu-
ally say, or assuming that one knows them better than they know themselves. 
(David Macey cites Fanon’s later mentor François Tosquelles: “Useless to offer 
 psychotherapy to a dead man, it’s too late. Useless also to interpret his oral fixa-
tion to someone who is hungry, or his castration complex to a man with a 
wooden leg.”296) This is very much related to the problem Anne Dubreuilh 
295 “[N]on-valorisation de soi,” “un sens aigu de la catastrophe,” “état chronique de peur” 
(Guex, Le syndrome d’abandon, 47). “Affective non-valorization always leads the abandon-
nique to an extremely painful and obsessive feeling of exclusion, of being at home 
nowhere and unwanted everywhere, affectively speaking. The need to belong, a primary 
deep need of every human being, has remained unsatisfied since infancy, because the 
subject did not feel strongly connected to someone, a mother or father whose love was 
lacking, nor really integrated to the family milieu. Since then, the subject has generally 
stood apart from any real affective tie or milieu, believing himself excluded by others, but 
in truth excluding himself, whether from a feeling of unworthiness, or on account of his 
many fears. Mistrust, aggressiveness, and passivity combine with lack of self-esteem to 
impose on the abandonnique a severely restricted reserve.” [La non-valorisation affective 
amène toujours l’abandonnique à un sentiment extrêmement pénible et obsédant 
d’exclusion, de n’avoir nulle part sa place, d’être de trop partout, affectivement parlant. Le 
besoin d’appartenance, besoin primaire et profond chez tout être humain, est demeuré 
insatisfait dès l’enfance, du fait que le sujet ne s’est pas senti fortement lié à tel être, mère 
ou père, dont l’amour lui à fait défaut, ni réellement intégré au milieu familial. Dès lors, le 
sujet est généralement resté en dehors de tout lien ou de tout milieu réellement affectif, 
se croyant exclu par les autres, mais en fait s’excluant lui-même, tant par sentiment 
d’indignité, que sous l’effet de peurs multiples. Méfiance, agressivité et passivité se 
joignent à la non-valorisation pour interdire à l’abandonnique de sortir d’un quant-à-soi 
sévèrement protégé (ibid., 45).]
296 “Inutile de faire de la psychothérapie à un mort, c’est trop tard. Inutile aussi d’interpréter 
son oralité à quelqu’un qui a faim, ou son complexe de castration à l’homme qui a une 
jambe de bois” (Macey, “Adieu Foulard,” 25.)
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 confronts in her therapeutic practice at the start of Les mandarins, and it 
emerged from the same experiences of wartime displacements, dislocations, 
real-world tragedies.
I think it must be the insistence on “le vécu,” on addressing the neurotic’s 
problems in the here and now, that appealed to Fanon in Guex’s work; she 
herself is not concerned in the least with racial politics, or any other kind,297 
but Fanon seems to have found the combination of Guex and Maran useful for 
thinking through his own subject position and that of the Black man in a white 
world more generally.298 Guex believes in what she calls a “constitutional” fac-
tor in neurosis, which leads her to caution against blaming parents. (This 
seems to be a big reason why the mainstream of psychoanalysis set her work 
aside.)299 But Fanon found it a productive view.
There can be no argument: in the domain of psychoanalysis as in that of 
philosophy, the organic, or constitutional, is a myth only for him who can 
go beyond it [celui qui la dépasse]. If from a heuristic point of view one 
must totally deny the existence of the organic constitution, the fact re-
mains, and we can do nothing about it, that some individuals insist on 
belonging to pre-established categories. Or, no, actually we can do some-
thing about it.300
297 Some of Guex’s descriptive analyses are reminiscent of Beauvoir’s, as when she remarks 
that apparent devotion to someone else may become a form of tyranny, or when she says 
that “one could write a whole book about the relationship between mistresses and their 
maid.” [Il y aurait une volume à écrire sur les relations des maîtresses de maison avec leur 
bonne (Guex, Le syndrome d’abandon, 55).] But according to Guex the névrose d’abandon 
affects women and men alike, in quite similar ways.
298 Insofar as I can tell, Guex and Odier’s work seems refreshingly free of Lacan’s smug nor-
mative assumptions about the inevitability of heterosexuality and a specific content for 
“femininity” that remains tied to woman’s maternal function (and I use the word “func-
tion” advisedly). See Judith Butler, “Lacan, Rivière, and the Strategies of Masquerade” 
(“Lacanian theory must be understood as a kind of slave morality,” 76), and Eribon, Réfle-
xions sur la question gay. But there is no indication that Fanon cared about any of that.
299 Lacan phrased his substantive objection as follows: “It is dangerous to foreground the real 
distinction—this critique of object relations implies the notion of a missing object for a 
being who lives in the symbolic and the real.” [À mettre au premier plan la distinction 
réelle—cette critique de la relation à l’objet implique la notion de manque d’objet chez 
un être qui vit dans le symbolique et le réel—cela est dangereux.] Anglo-American prac-
titioners like D. W. Winnicott and Melanie Klein would also do that, but their work led 
toward, rather than away from, the policing of maternal affect and behavior still visible 
today in the school of “attachment parenting.” It’s hard not to think this has something to 
do with the continuing visibility of their names when Guex has faded into oblivion.
300 “Il faut en convenir: sur le plan de la psychanalyse comme sur celui de la philosophie, la 
constitution n’est mythe que pour celui qui la dépasse. Si d’un point de vue heuristique on 
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We referred earlier to Jacques Lacan; it was not at random. In his the-
sis, presented in 1932, he made a violent critique of the idea of organic 
constitution. Obviously, we are departing from his conclusions, but our 
dissent will be understood when one recalls that for the idea of the con-
stitutional as it was understood by the French school we are substituting 
that of structure, “embracing unconscious psychic life, as we are able to 
know it in part, especially in the form of repression and inhibition, inso-
far as these elements take an active part in the organization peculiar to 
each psychic individuality.” [He’s quoting Guex’s definition here.] … The 
neurotic structure of an individual is simply the elaboration, the forma-
tion, the eruption within the ego, of conflictual clusters arising in part out 
of the environment and in part out of the purely personal way in which 
that individual reacts to these influences.301
I must admit it is not entirely clear to me why a political psychoanalysis would 
want to hang on to the idea of a pre-given (individual) “constitution,” and I am 
not entirely sure whether Markmann is right to interpret the term “constitu-
tion” as referring to an underlying organic substrate. But either way, the idea of 
“structure” here seems to be doing similar work to Beauvoir’s idea of “situa-
tion,” which includes both the body and the individual’s social history. Fanon 
concludes that Veneuse/Maran’s problems are not reducible to questions of 
race, whatever Veneuse himself may think. And thus his “fate” (as he sees it) is 
not in fact fateful or inevitable.
Where does this analysis lead us? To nothing short of proving to Jean Ve-
neuse that in fact he is not like the rest. Making people ashamed of their 
existence, said Jean-Paul Sartre. Yes: teaching them to become aware of 
doit dénier toute existence à la constitution, il demeure, nous n’y pouvons rien, que des 
individus s’efforcent d’entrer dans des cadres préétablis. Ou du moins, si: nous y pouvons 
quelque chose” (pnmb, 64–5; bswm 58, translation altered).
301 “Nous parlions tout à l’heure de Jacques Lacan: ce n’était pas un hasard. En 1932, il a, dans 
sa thèse, fait une critique violente de la notion de constitution. Apparemment, nous nous 
écartons de ses conclusions, mais l’on comprendra notre dissidence quand on se rappelle-
ra qu’à la notion de constitution au sens où l’entendait l’école française, nous substituons 
celle de structure, ‘englobant la vie psychique inconsciente telle que nous pouvons par-
tiellement la connaître, en particulier sous la forme de refoulé et de refoulant, en tant que 
ces éléments participent activement à l’organisation propre de chaque individualité psy-
chique.’ … La structure névrotique d’un individu sera justement l’élaboration, la forma-
tion, l’éclosion dans le moi de nœuds conflictuels provenant d’une part du milieu, d’autre 
part de la façon toute personnelle dont cet individu réagit à ces influences” (pnmb 65; 
bswm 58–9, translation altered).
Chapter 4336
the potentials they have forbidden themselves, of the passivity they have 
displayed in just those situations where what is needed is to act like a 
splinter aimed at the heart of the world, to interrupt, when necessary, the 
heartbeat of the world, to shift the ruling system when it must be shifted, 
but in any case, and most assuredly, to stand up to the world.302
Another solution is possible, as we shall see. It implies a restructuring 
of the world.303
How to bring this about, Fanon does not (yet) say. But in the meantime, “those 
who recognize themselves will have taken a step forward.”304
There is one important limit to the parallel I have been drawing between 
Beauvoir and Fanon: the solution Fanon later advocated, of violent collective 
struggle for liberation, is not available to women as a group acting on our own 
behalf. We may be glad about this, or we may be sorry, but this is, as Beauvoir 
saw and said in The Second Sex, the place where analogies between the oppres-
sion of women and all the other oppressions she puts it in parallel with break 
down.305 So we are left with the problem of how to structure a healthy self in 
an unhealthy world. I can’t answer this question, either, but Gordon reads 
Fanon as saying that “the basic problem … is to restore the humanity of each 
degraded person.”306
302 “À quoi tend cette analyse? À rien de moins qu’à démontrer à Jean Veneuse qu’effectivement 
il n’est pas pareil aux autres. Faire honte aux gens de leur existence, disait Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Oui: les amener à prendre conscience des possibilités qu’ils se sont interdites, de la pas-
sivité dont ils ont fait montre dans des situations où justement il fallait, telle une écharde, 
s’agripper au cœur du monde, forcer s’il le fallait le rythme du cœur du monde, déplacer 
s’il le fallait le système de commande, mais en tout cas, mais certainement, faire face au 
monde” (pnmb 63; bswm 57, translation altered, emphasis in original).
303 “Nous verrons qu’une autre solution est possible. Elle implique une restructuration du 
monde” (pnmb 66; bswm 60, translation altered).
304 pnmb, 10; bswm 5. “Ceux qui s’y reconnaîtront auront, je crois, avancé d’un pas.”
305 Some of the reasons she gives for this might (at least in theory) be overcome by subse-
quent historical developments. That the “apprenticeship” girls receive conditions them to 
regard their bodies as passive rather than active instruments, that they are educated to be 
the victims rather than the agents of violence, perhaps might be addressed by providing 
different sorts of training; women’s participation in athletics may already have made 
some difference here (see Vera-Gray, Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment). The neces-
sity of heterosexual intercourse to perpetuate the race is no longer as fully a feature of 
“the real” as it was in 1949. But the argument I’ve been calling “intersectional”—that wom-
en’s interests (real and perceived) often lie in greater solidarity with the men of their 
group, rather than with women as a transnational, transracial, transeconomic class for 
itself—seems likely to stand. This is a structural feature of the human world, not a mysti-
fication that can be overcome by thinking about it differently.
306 Gordon, What Fanon Said, 45.
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12 Unflattering Portraits, New Ways to Live
But wait a minute, you say: wasn’t Frantz Fanon a terrible misogynist? 
As with Wright, views (vehemently) differ. Amey Victoria Adkins is among 
those who think so. She connects Fanon’s failure to acknowledge Beauvoir’s 
intellectual contribution to what she calls “the categorically negative assess-
ment of women in Black Skin, White Masks”: his “acerbic rendering” of Mayotte 
Capécia’s novel and her life in his chapter 2, “La femme de couleur et le Blanc” 
(The Woman of Color and the White Man), and in general the way he treats the 
bodies of women, white and Black, in describing the development of Black 
male subjectivity under conditions of racism.307
Many, many scholars have taken up this question, and a full consideration is 
impossible here.308 But putting Fanon into parallel with Beauvoir, as Adkins 
suggests we do, can help us see that these two chapters in Peau noire masques 
blancs—“La femme de couleur et le Blanc” and “L’homme de couleur et la 
Blanche”—are meant to be phenomenological accounts, and accounts of neu-
rosis, of the way relations between men and women and between Blacks and 
whites are deformed and twisted by racism, and by the tendency for the colo-
nized to accept the values of the colonizer. Considering that the book is an at-
tack on racism, a surprisingly large number of pages are consumed in unflat-
tering portraits of people of color, both female and male; many readers also 
had trouble seeing The Second Sex as a feminist book because so many of the 
women portrayed there are frankly so horrible. But that is precisely the point: 
for Beauvoir, as I wrote above, the harmed person could not be good; for 
Fanon—perhaps for both of them?—the harmed person could not be well.
Fanon denounces Mayotte Capécia for her complicity with whites in a way 
that strikingly recalls Wright’s unhappiness with Zora Neale Hurston. And 
T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting makes a point similar to what Hazel Carby said 
about Hurston: we should ask why Capécia’s (otherwise unacclaimed) novel Je 
suis martiniquaise was awarded the Grand Prix littéraire des Antilles in 1949 by 
a jury composed of thirteen white Frenchmen, and why Euro-American “lit crit 
feminists” (as she describes them) have leapt to her defense.309
307 Adkins, “Black/Feminist Futures,” 701, 699.
308 See Gwen Bergner, Taboo Subjects: Race, Sex, and Psychoanalysis, T. Denean Sharpley-
Whiting, Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms, and Françoise Vergès, “Chains of Mad-
ness, Chains of Colonialism: Fanon and Freedom.”
309 Sharpley-Whiting, Frantz Fanon, 36.
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To reconstruct Capécia’s story as an example of Black feminism in prac-
tice because she is a Black woman and was taken to task by Fanon is, to 
say the least, a dangerous feminist politics. One has to ask equally what is 
invigorating about Capécia’s representations and for whom are they 
invigorating?310
Sharpley-Whiting suggests that “many Euro-American lit crit feminists have 
not read Capécia’s novels, but only one another’s writing on Fanon and 
Capécia.”311 I am not sure whether this is fair, but it is certainly the case that 
Fanon’s “attack” on Capécia, like Wright’s “attack” on Hurston, have passed 
into, and been passed around in, the secondary literature almost as a decontex-
tualized “topos” with little or no connection to what either writer actually said. 
(Perhaps this is a parallel to what I called above the “Spelman moment” in 
feminist reception of Beauvoir.)
Mayotte’s story is only one of the strands in “La femme de couleur et le 
Blanc.” Fanon is equally scathing about Nini, the heroine of a novel by Abou-
laye Sadji, a male Senegalese writer. He also weaves in real-world examples 
from everyday life in Martinique, and in Paris, such as a young woman student 
of color (she will one day be a teacher in the Antilles), who finds Césaire’s ac-
tivism distasteful and could not imagine marrying a “nègre.”312 The issue for 
Fanon is not so much that Capécia’s and Sadji’s heroines, and their real-life 
counterparts, are women, but that they are sell-outs, that the social sickness of 
colonialism has had its way with them. This is visible in Mayotte’s desire to be 
white, in her desire to marry a white man in order to “magically whiten” her-
self. Mayotte’s story—or at least, the story she tells in her books—enables 
Fanon to explain lucidly how “métissage” in Martinique is not one phenome-
non but two, depending on whether it is the father or the mother who is 
white.313
Gordon remarks, “it is unclear to me how Fanon is expected to have written 
on the two main accounts of women of color, Capécia’s and A. Sadji’s, with-
out the criticisms he has offered as part of his ongoing argument.”314And he 
continues:
310 Ibid., 49. Fanon: “the enthusiastic reception that greeted this book in certain circles forces 
us to analyze it.” [L’accueil enthousiaste qui a été réservé à cet ouvrage dans certains mi-
lieux nous fait un devoir de l’analyser (pnmb 34, bswm 29).]
311 Sharpley-Whiting, Frantz Fanon, 19.
312 pnmb 38, bswm 33.
313 pnmb 37, bswm 32.
314 Gordon, What Fanon Said, 29.
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Fanon announced that he was examining pathological cases, those of the 
phobic and the failure…. I do not see Black (especially Martinican) men 
faring especially well who return to the Antilles to be “deified,” deluded 
foragers of civilization in a pair of “white breasts,” pathetic slaves in 
search of whiteness through, if not white women, at least mulattas who 
condescendingly offer a bit of whiteness, and so on.315
Gordon’s defense of Fanon on Capécia is plausible to me—Fanon is describing 
a case of bad faith, of pathological narcissism. This is not the only possible 
reading of Je suis martiniquaise, but it is a credible one.
“One day a woman named Mayotte Capécia, obeying a motivation whose 
elements are difficult to detect, sat down to write two hundred and two pages— 
her life—in which the most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random.”316 Fanon’s 
is certainly a negative review (though perhaps not unusually nasty, by French 
standards). However, having read the book, I do not find Fanon’s description 
unfair: Je suis martiniquaise is a simple, straightforward narrative of what the 
main character (who is given the same name as the author) experienced, and 
how she felt about it at the time, with no reflection of any sort, and it is in-
deed “difficult to detect” why it was written or what its author may have been, 
as the students put it, “trying to say.” What Capécia does say, in an entirely 
straightforward manner, is that Black men and women are ugly, that white 
men and women are superior objects of desire, that she wants to be whiter 
and marry a white man, and that she can’t. Reading it made Fanon angry. It 
might make us sad instead, as Sharpley-Whiting suggests.317 But he doesn’t 
misrepresent it. Similarly, in Capécia’s La négresse blanche, it is clear that the 
heroine fears and is disgusted by Blackness, in herself and others. One can 
think of some twentieth-century texts by Black women that riff on the re-
ceived trope of the “tragic mulatto” in fascinating and productive ways—Nella 
Larsen’s Quicksand, for example. But Capécia simply recites that old story, 
without comment or complexity.
Fanon’s reading of Capécia is certainly no further off the mark than his read-
ing of René Maran, whose novel is mined in “L’homme de couleur et la Blanche” 
315 Ibid., 30.
316 “Un jour, une femme du nom de Mayotte Capécia, obéissant à un motif dont nous aper-
cevons mal les tenants, a écrit deux cent deux pages—sa vie—où se multipliaient à loisir 
les propositions les plus absurdes” (pnmb 34, bswm 29).
317 Sharpley-Whiting, Frantz Fanon, 41.
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for the portrait of a perfectly neurotic man, unable to love.318 Moreover, liter-
ary criticism as such was not Fanon’s aim. He also wasn’t interested in proving 
that writers of color were good writers; in fact, the project of showing whites 
the excellence of Black achievements seemed to him a flawed project in itself. 
If the criticism is that Peau noire masques blancs is largely an investigation of 
colonized masculinity, well, yes it is.319 But the story it tells is not a happy one. 
The late section called “The Negro and Recognition” (Le Nègre et la reconnais-
sance) shows us men who are constantly comparing themselves to others, pre-
occupied with “autovalorisation,” putting others down. The point of the sec-
tion is to disprove Alfred Adler’s “inferiority complex” theory by showing that 
this behavior is not related to an individual ego “goal,” but is socially condi-
tioned. Still, it’s an unflattering portrait, and it’s easy to see why Fanon says 
318 See Sharpley-Whiting: “Fanon spreads his critical analysis of blackphobia rather evenly 
among male and female colonized subjects” (ibid., 11). “What ‘sympathetic’ tenor rings 
out in Fanon’s observation that ‘Jean Veneuse … is a beggar. He looks for appeasement, for 
permission, in the white man’s eyes’; or ‘Un homme pareil aux autres is a sham, an attempt 
to make the relations between two races dependent on an organic unhealthiness’; and 
better still, in embarking upon uncovering Veneuse’s complex neurosis, Fanon offers: ‘Ve-
neuse is the lamb to be slaughtered. Let us make the effort’?” (ibid., 48, quoting pnmb 76, 
80, 66).
I might add that one feature of Veneuse’s illness Fanon denounces is that he asks per-
mission of a white male friend before approaching a white woman, who has shown con-
siderable agency already in expressing her interest in him. Does this not at least sketch a 
proto-feminist critique of the exchange of women between men?
319 See Traci West, “Extending Black Feminist Sisterhood in the Face of Violence: Fanon, 
White Women, and Veiled Muslim Women.” I agree with those who have written that the 
passages about the breasts of the white woman as source of the Black man’s ego- salvation, 
which may owe something to Beauvoir’s description of what men seek when they see 
woman as the Absolute Other, are hard to take, as is his depiction of the white woman 
who half incites the rape she fears. But whether they are hard (for me) to take is beside the 
point: making me (or anybody) comfortable is not Fanon’s aim. As for the white woman 
who “cries rape,” this is a topos common to a great deal of anti-racist writing, from Chester 
Himes’s If He Hollers Let Him Go to Gwendolyn Brooks’s “The Ballad of Pearl Mae Lee,” and 
the primal scene of a rape accusation is clearly central to the psychology of Black mascu-
linity in the twentieth century, at least as it is expressed in literature. (I am thinking of the 
scene in Ellison’s Invisible Man [141–42] where the protagonist, newly arrived in the North, 
finds himself standing in the subway, and holds desperately on to his lapels to avoid inad-
vertently touching any of the white women he sees around him.) Two early Alice Walker 
essay/stories, “Coming Apart” and “Advancing Luna—and Ida B Wells,” explore this dy-
namic beautifully: the narrator of “Advancing Luna” may partly be responding to Fanon 
and Wright when she says to herself, enraged, “Who know what the Black woman thinks 
of rape? Who has asked her? Who cares?” (93). Sharpley-Whiting: “We are here speaking 
of white women whose psychosexualities have been corroded, abnormalized, which in 
turn incite the cultural mythology of the Black male rapist, the sexually voracious Black 
brute” (Frantz Fanon, 13).
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several times that many of his compatriots would not recognize themselves. 
But he also says that those who did recognize themselves would have taken a 
step forward.320 I find myself thinking of Alice Schwarzer’s comment that 
Beauvoir “gave women an explanation, but never an excuse.”321
Fanon’s phenomenological account of inter-racial relationships is not meant 
to imply that the behavior he describes is universal or inevitable, still less that 
he endorses the “male” version he describes in “L’homme de couleur et la 
Blanche.”
Just as there was a touch of fraud in trying to deduce from the behavior of 
Nini and Mayotte Capécia a general law of the behavior of the Black 
woman with the white man, there would be, we maintain, a breach of 
objectivity in expanding the attitude of Veneuse to the man of color as 
such.322
This feels very similar to what Beauvoir was doing in her discussion of “myths,” 
and it has been misunderstood in parallel ways. The ultimate goal is demystifi-
cation, to stop believing lies, lying to oneself, lying to others. But to get there, 
Fanon, like Beauvoir, passes through an exploration of how powerful these 
myths are and how they are powerful. It’s not an argument that they are inevi-
table, much less that they are desirable. To say that a desire is not desirable is 
not to stop desiring it. But it’s a step.323
I wrote above about readers of Beauvoir experiencing a shock of recogni-
tion, and sometimes a shock of non-recognition. But suppose sometimes those 
shocks are simultaneous, or nearly? “I am not that … I do not want to be that … 
I am that … I do not want to be that any more.” In early 1970s consciousness-
raising groups, this last stage was called, “starting to stop.”324
320 pnmb 10, bswm 5.
321 “Notre propos étant la désaliénation des noirs” (pnmb 30, bswm 25).
322 “De même qu’il y avait une tentative de mystification à vouloir inférer du comportement 
de Nini et de Mayotte Capécia une loi générale du comportement de la Noire vis-à-vis du 
Blanc, il y aurait, affirmons-nous, manquement à l’objectivité dans l’extension de l’attitude 
de Veneuse à l’homme de couleur en tant que tel” (pnmb 65; bswm 59, translation 
altered).
323 Sandra Bartky’s early essays (reprinted in Femininity and Domination) work this through 
in ways I find illuminating.
324 Where Fanon says, “notre propos est la désaliénation des Noirs,” could one describe Beau-
voir’s “propos” as “la désalienation des femmes”? She does not say so. In fact, she never 
says what her political project is, I think because she was discovering it along the way. The 
parallel I am describing here is between his intention and her effect.
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But there is another possibility: I am not that; thank God I am not like those 
women; yes, she really has their number; thank God there are other ways than 
that to be a woman. And in that respect both books are written from (and for) 
the subject position of the évolué, the colonized subject who has a greater un-
derstanding of the colonial situation than most of his brothers and sisters (so 
to speak); his or her first impulse will be to escape, and Fanon devotes a great 
deal of derisive energy to showing that this is impossible. (His mockery of the 
Martiniquais who returns from France with his nose in the air has its counter-
part in Suzanne Césaire’s contempt for the “vanilla” poets who stand in need of 
surrealist cure: in “Malaise d’une civilisation” she compared the évolué who is 
bent on assimilating to a “hysteric who does not know he is merely imitating a 
sickness, but the doctor does know.”)325 The évolué’s first task as a political be-
ing must be to awaken his compatriots to a consciousness of the degradation 
in which they live but which they themselves do not “speak,” even in their 
hearts. He or she begins by distinguishing him/herself from the character to 
which most of those who share his oppression have been reduced by their situ-
ation, including their intellectual and moral condition, and there is an inevi-
table moment of alienation for him or her, partly because his or her “evolution” 
has been enabled by his or her own colonization, through education directed 
from and by the metropole. Then too, he must resist racist assumptions that 
Blacks who are more “similar” to whites (either because they are educated, be-
cause they are more light-skinned, or both) are somehow more “evolved” in the 
sense of biologically superior: it is for this reason that Fanon sometimes puts 
“évolué” in quotation marks. (But sometimes he does not.)
White civilization and European culture have imposed on the Black an 
existential deviation. We shall demonstrate elsewhere that what people 
call the Black Soul is a white construction.
The évolué Black, slave of the spontaneous and cosmic Negro myth, 
feels at a given stage that his race no longer understands him.
Or that he no longer understands it.326
325 Suzanne Césaire, “Malaise d’une civilisation,” 122.
326 “La civilisation blanche, la culture européenne ont imposé au Noir une déviation existen-
tielle. Nous montrerons ailleurs que souvent ce qu’on appelle l’âme noire est une cons-
truction du Blanc.
Le Noir évolué, esclave du mythe nègre, spontané, cosmique, sent à un moment donné 
que sa race ne le comprend plus.
Ou qu’il ne la comprend plus” (pnmb 11; bswm 7, translation altered).
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And yet, if escape is impossible, nostalgia is worse. One cannot go back-
wards. The passage continues:
Then he congratulates himself on this, and enlarging the difference, the 
incomprehension, the disharmony, he finds in them the meaning of his 
real humanity. Or more rarely he wants to belong to his people. And it is 
with rage on his lips and vertigo in his heart that he buries himself in the 
vast Black abyss. We shall see that this attitude, so absolute and beautiful, 
renounces the present and the future in the name of a mystical past.327
Throughout Peau noire masques blancs, Fanon carries on a debate with other 
Black intellectuals (the most prominent being the poet Léopold Senghor), who 
were advocating a sort of Afrocentric celebration of Blackness, a re- valorization 
of what white culture had devalued, leaning on cultural difference as a spring-
board to liberation, under the banner of “négritude.” I think Max Silverman is 
right to say that “Fanon’s position oscillates between intellectual critique and 
emotional empathy,” but ultimately, he is just not with them.328 For one thing, 
he is very aware of cultural differences between groups that would all be con-
sidered “Black,” and of racist tensions between, for example, the Antillais and 
the Sénégalais—tensions for which the white colonizers are ultimately re-
sponsible, and which they exploit shamelessly, but which are nonetheless 
 real.329 While his desire for solidarity across national boundaries comes 
327 “Alors il s’en félicite et, développant cette différence, cette incompréhension, cette déshar-
monie, il y trouve le sens de sa véritable humanité. Ou plus rarement il veut être à son 
peuple. Et c’est la rage aux lèvres, le vertige au cœur, qu’il s’enfonce dans le grand trou noir. 
Nous verrons que cette attitude si absolument belle rejette l’actualité et le futur au nom 
d’un passé mystique” (pnmb 11; bswm 7, translation altered).
328 Silverman, New Interdisciplinary Essays, 3.
329 “One has had friends—and unfortunately one still does—who were born in Dahomey or 
the Congo but pretend to be natives of the Antilles; one has known, and one still knows, 
Antilleans who become annoyed when they are suspected of being Senegalese. This is 
because the Antillean is more ‘civilized’ than the Black African, in other words he is closer 
to the White; and this difference prevails not only in the street and on the boulevards but 
also in public service, in the army. Any Antillean who performed his military service in a 
regiment of sharpshooters is familiar with this disturbing situation: on one side he has the 
European, whether born in his own country or in France, and on the other he has the 
Senegalese marksmen. A day comes back to me when, in the midst of combat, it was a 
question of wiping out a nest of machine-guns. Three times the Senegalese were launched 
on attack, three times they were forced back. Then one of them asked, why don’t the tou-
babs go? At such times, one ends up unsure which one is, toubab or indigène.”
(Markmann has a translator’s note about toubab: “Literally, this dialect word means 
European; by extension it was applied to any officer.”)
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through in the text (and would become clearer in his later writing, and the 
commitments of his life), it is not a solidarity based on a clear, real, unambigu-
ous identity.
This strikes me as yet another parallel to Beauvoir. Fanon is struggling here 
with Sartre’s view that what Sartre calls an “anti-racist racism” will be a nec-
essary stage of self-affirmation in moving toward an ultimately post-racialist 
future. Toril Moi describes him as brilliantly “manag[ing] at once to signal 
his distance from and endorsement of Sartre’s positions,” which perhaps 
entails an acceptance of the need for what would later be called “strategic 
essentialism.”330 Moi sees it as a “the deepest political flaw in The Second Sex” 
that Beauvoir did not make the corresponding move of affirming an “anti- 
sexist sexism,”331 but I can’t quite agree: for one thing, Beauvoir’s refusal to do 
so is what enables what I’ve been calling her intersectionality.
Fanon saw the négritude movement as invoking a concept of Blackness that 
was not just inaccurately monolithic, but too static, too closed, too unwilling to 
admit the dimensions of time and change: in short, insufficiently existentialist. 
He is scathing about what he later labels “folklore,”332 and about what he sees 
as pathetic attempts to convince Europeans that Africans, too, have a signifi-
cant though “different” culture. In the case of Mannoni, he is clear that the idea 
of a Malagasy “culture” is a dangerous mystification:
After having locked up the Malagasy in his customs, after having carried out 
a unilateral analysis of his way of seeing the world, after having described 
the Malagasy within a closed circle, after having noted that the Malagasy 
maintains relationships of dependency with his ancestors—eminently 
tribal characteristics—M. Mannoni, in defiance of all  objectivity, then 
[Nous avons connu, et malheureusement nous connaissons encore, des camarades 
originaires du Dahomey ou du Congo qui se disent Antillais; nous avons connu et nous 
connaissons encore des Antillais qui se vexent quand on les soupçonne d’être Sénégalais. 
C’est que l’Antillais est plus “évolué” que le Noir d’Afrique; entendez qu’il est plus près du 
Blanc; et cette différence existe non seulement dans la rue et sur les boulevards, mais 
aussi dans les administrations, dans l’armée. Tout Antillais ayant fait son service militaire 
dans un régiment de tirailleurs connaît cette bouleversante situation: d’un côté les Euro-
péens, vieilles colonies ou originaires, de l’autre les tirailleurs. Il nous souvient de certain 
jour où, en pleine action, la question se trouva posée d’anéantir un nid de mitrailleuses. 
Par trois fois les Sénégalais furent lancés, par trois fois ils furent rejetés. Alors, l’un des 
leurs demanda pourquoi les toubabs n’y allaient pas. Dans ces moments-là, on arrive à ne 
plus savoir qui l’on est, toubab ou indigène (pnmb 20; bswm 15, translation altered).]
330 Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, 206.
331 Ibid., 211.
332 See “Sur la culture nationale” in Les damnés de la terre (195–224).
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 applies his conclusions to the understanding between two groups—delib-
erately ignoring the fact that, since Galliéni, the Malagasy has ceased to 
exist.333
(This is more or less Leiris’s critique of colonialist anthropology, most fully laid 
out in the 1950 lecture I discussed earlier, but already sketched in the essays 
Fanon cites in Peau noire masques blancs.) Fanon is equally critical, though, of 
Black writers like Alioune Diop who were advancing the idea of an alternative 
African metaphysics:
What use are reflections on Bantu ontology when one reads elsewhere: 
“When 75,000 Black miners went on strike in 1946, the state police forced 
them back to work by firing on them with rifles and charging with fixed 
bayonets. Twenty-five were killed and thousands were wounded.”334
We know that Bantu society no longer exists. And there is nothing on-
tological about segregation. Enough of this rubbish.335
In a 1956 talk, he would describe the “zombification of culture”: an effort to 
“freeze time” that was equally misguided whether undertaken as a strategy of 
colonization or a strategy of resistance. And his analysis that a woman wearing 
a veil can mean many different things, not just either “feudal” dependency or 
resistance to colonialism, his (unfortunately prescient) awareness of the limi-
tations of Algerian nationalism, is rooted in this same dynamism of the évolué, 
who understands culture itself as dynamic.336
333 “Après avoir enfermé le Malgache dans ses coutumes, après avoir réalisé une analyse uni-
latérale de sa vision du monde, après avoir décrit le Malgache en cercle fermé, après avoir 
dit que le Malgache entretient des relations de dépendance avec les ancêtres, caractéris-
tiques hautement tribales, l’auteur, au mépris de toute objectivité, applique ses conclu-
sions à une compréhension bilatérale—ignorant volontairement que depuis Galliéni le 
Malgache n’existe plus” (pnmb 76; bswm 69–70, translation altered). A note by Mark-
mann explains that Galliéni, “the hero of the Marne,” was appointed resident-general of 
Madagascar when it became a French colony in 1896, and later became governor-general. 
Markmann quotes the Encyclopedia Britannica: Galliéni “completed the subjugation of 
the island.”
334 “Que signifient les méditations sur l’ontologie bantoue, quand on lit par ailleurs: ‘Lorsque 
soixante-quinze mille mineurs noirs se sont mis en grève en 1946, la police d’État les a 
contraints à coups de fusil et à coups de baïonnette à reprendre le travail. Il y a eu vingt-
cinq morts, des milliers de blessés’” (pnmb 148–49, bswm 142).
335 “[N]ous savons que la société bantoue n’existe plus. Et la ségrégation n’a rien d’ontologique. 
Assez de ce scandale” (pnmb 150, bswm 143).
336 Fanon, “Racisme et culture”; “Mésaventures de la conscience nationale”; “L’Algérie se 
dévoile.”
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In a situation where structural inequalities manifest themselves as social 
and cultural hegemonies, attempts to free oneself by understanding one’s op-
pression often, maybe always? take place against the background of others 
who share the oppression but do not seem to have the same drive to under-
stand and fight it. This is an important component of Richard Wright’s Black 
Boy, of the Aimé Césaire poem from which Peau noire masques blancs draws so 
much of its energy and imagery, of the essays by Suzanne Césaire and others in 
Tropiques and Légitime défense. Wright finds Hurston’s approach misguided; 
later, Baldwin will feel the same about Wright…
I see the same dynamic in Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée and The Second 
Sex—the issue is not explicitly posed in The Second Sex, where Beauvoir is, as I 
have said, really not concerned with “identity” as such at all: but there is the 
same struggle to free the idea of “women” from what women and girls are told, 
often by women, they must or should be like, and from the reality of what 
many women around one are like. It is interesting that when Beauvoir did 
come to speak as a feminist, she was asked about this question of “we,” and she 
described a kind of split subject—“when I say we I mean we feminists, not we 
women.”337
The legacy of this structure for feminism has been something of a poisoned 
chalice, really. One consequence has been generational warfare; another has 
been a struggle around the term “feminist,” both struggles to possess it (as in 
the sex wars, or the des femmes debacle), and struggles to disavow or/and rela-
bel it (“power feminism,” “womanism,” etc.). None of these struggles have “suc-
ceeded,” exactly, in the sense that no new label has “won” and feminism is 
owned by no one. But it does not seem entirely right, either, to describe these 
as unfortunate, divisive “splits in the movement.” From the point of view of 
dialectics, the splits in the movement are the movement.
337 “A. S.—Avant l’existence du Mouvement, vous disiez ‘elles’ en parlant des femmes. Main-
tenant vous dites ‘nous.’ S. B.—Pour moi, cela ne signifie pas ‘nous les femmes,’ mais nous 
les féministes” (Schwarzer, Simone de Beauvoir aujourd’hui, 124).
Chapter 5
The East Is Real: Orientalism and Its Enemies
Without failure, there can be no ethics.
Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.1
Without investigation there is no right to speak.
Chairman Mao2
The wise man changes his mind; the fool never does.
Greek Proverb
1 Algeria without Apology
When Fanon and Beauvoir met in 1961, they didn’t, as far we know, discuss 
whether there should have been footnotes to The Second Sex in the book he’d 
published nine years earlier. Did they talk at all about the “position of women” 
in France’s colonies, or in the Algerian revolution, or more generally? Beauvoir 
does not record any such conversation, either, in the vivid and moving pages of 
La force des choses she devoted to Fanon’s meeting with Sartre, Claude Lanz­
mann, and herself.3 Nor, apparently, did they pursue, as Sabine Broeck would 
have wished, “a philosophical questioning of the white premises of the En­
lightenment”: Broeck is correct that “a concerted epistemically programmatic 
critique did not emerge.”4
There were other things to talk about in 1961. Colonialism in Algeria and 
throughout Africa was taking a long and bloody time to die, and the prospects 
for what would follow it were not encouraging. Lanzmann (who met Fanon 
first) reported him as devastated by the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, 
and also by the mounting evidence of fractures and fault lines to African unity, 
1 “[S]ans échec, pas de morale” (Pour une morale de l’Ambiguïté [hereinafter pma], 14, Ethics of 
Ambiguity [hereinafter EA], 10).
2 Mao Zedong, “Reform Our Study,” 23.
3 La Force des Choses (hereinafter FCh), 2:420–27, 439–41; Force of Circumstance (hereinafter 
FCirc), 605–611, 620–21.
4 Sabine Broeck, “Re­reading de Beauvoir After Race,” 170. See chapter 3 above.
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his most urgent commitment.5 When the four came together in Rome, Fanon 
was worried that France was about to invade Tunisia, and watching his own 
back vigilantly: assassins had already made at least one attempt to take his life. 
The metropole too seemed on the brink of civil war. Sartre’s apartment had 
just been bombed, for the second time, in reprisal for his support of the Alge­
rian revolution and his denunciation of torture by French forces there. Fanon 
himself was dying of leukemia. It can hardly have seemed like the moment for 
querying the episteme.
Interestingly, the conflict over Algeria brought together intellectuals whose 
epistemological commitments were quite diverse. The 1960 Manifesto of the 
121 against the Algerian war (“Déclaration sur le droit à l’insoumission dans la 
guerre d’Algérie”), signed by Beauvoir and Sartre and many others (but not by 
Camus), was originally drafted by Maurice Blanchot, who might reasonably be 
considered the grandfather of deconstruction. As Gisèle Sapiro showed for the 
question of collaboration with Vichy, epistemological commitments are poor 
predictors of political ones.6
What Beauvoir and Fanon did talk about included Fanon’s formation as a 
revolutionary leader. She gives a very compelling and nuanced account of how 
his experiences of racism in France and in Algeria moved him from assimila­
tionist optimism to militant advocacy of direct action. Everything he wrote 
against intellectuals he wrote against himself, she says, explaining how his 
lived experience of racism as a student had called into question the humanist 
abstractions with which he, like Sartre and herself, had been raised as a French 
subject.7 And they talked about the future, about the difficulties facing pan­
Africanism given the cultural differences and divisions between and among 
peoples of color, which were confirming the complex account of Black identity 
Fanon gave in Peau noire masques blancs.
But in the end, what Beauvoir and Fanon most had in common was a war. 
Both were passionately engaged in a real­world struggle for third­world 
5 FCh 2:408, FCirc 597. Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the 
Congo, was assassinated on January 17, 1961, apparently with the complicity of the cia: Cold 
War machinations were deeply entangled with post­independence infighting between Con­
golese factions. In May, Les Temps Modernes had published a long section from what became 
Les damnés de la terre, for which Sartre would write the famous preface; extracts from L’an V 
de la révolution algérienne (usually translated as A Dying Colonialism) had appeared there in 
May­June 1959.
6 Sapiro, La guerre des écrivains.
7 FCh 2:424, FCirc 609. Unlike some later commentators, Beauvoir does not seem to see a sharp 
break between Peau noire masques blancs and Les damnés de la terre, between the philoso­
pher­psychologist and the professional revolutionary responsible for training troops.
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liberation, each on the basis, not of a theoretical critique or a fantasized iden­
tification, but of a lucid understanding of their actual, and very different, so­
cial locations in a concrete world: a world that, to steal Yeats’s phrase, was 
changing minute by minute.
Or perhaps there was an epistemic critique, in a way, in the basic sense of an 
acknowledgement that what you see and know is conditioned by where you 
are placed to see it. Throughout La force des choses Beauvoir very much situates 
herself as French, and as French at that moment of danger, rather than assum­
ing the “view from nowhere” of ahistorical universalist humanism; she speaks 
of the shame of being French in terms very similar to those of L’Amérique au 
jour le jour 1947, when her color “burned her.” And as in the earlier book, she 
gives a detailed and devastating account of her reasons.
The sky was so blue that as I sat facing my open window I wanted to write 
just for the sake of writing, as I would have sung just to sing, if I’d had any 
voice. “I’ve got some things to show you,” Lanzmann said one evening. He 
took me to dinner outside Paris, in a sleepy fragrant country village, and 
suddenly, hell was back on earth. Marie­Claude Radziewski had given 
him a file which contained accounts of the treatment inflicted by the har-
kis, in the cellars of the Goutte d’Or, on Moslems handed over to them by 
the dst: electrodes, burning, impaling on bottles, hangings, stranglings. 
The tortures were psychological as well as physical. Lanzmann wrote an 
article on the subject for Les Temps Modernes and published the dossier 
of charges. A student told me that she had been in the street near the 
Goutte d’Or and seen bleeding men dragged house to house by the harkis. 
Every night the neighbors heard their screams. “Why? Why? Why?” The 
unendingly repeated cry of a fifteen­year­old Algerian boy who had 
watched his whole family being tortured ripped at my eardrums and my 
throat. Oh, how mild they had been in comparison, those abstract storms 
of revolt I had once felt against the human condition and the idea of 
death! … [A]t least then my horror had been directed at something out­
side myself. Now I had become an object of horror in my own eyes.8
8 The Goutte d’Or quarter of Paris was and is home to African migrants and their working­class 
descendants; dst stands for “Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire,” an arm of the police 
force responsible for domestic surveillance and counter­espionage. Analogous to the cia in 
the United States, it behaved comparably during this period, including arming a group re­
sponsible for “false flag” attacks and other delightful behavior. See Jim House, “Colonial and 
Post­Colonial Dimensions of Algerian Migration to France.”
“Le ciel était si bleu que, face à la fenêtre ouverte, j’avais envie d’écrire, pour ne rien dire, 
comme j’aurais chanté si j’avais eu de la voix. ‘J’ai des choses à te montrer,’ me dit Lanzmann
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At an early stage, she notes, “It seemed to us that the [French] Left had noth­
ing to teach the Algerians, and that El Moudjahid was quite right to put them in 
their place”9—an echo of Leiris’s point: Africa does not need me. But the tor­
tures described above took place in Paris. And “France” itself was becoming 
unrecognizable.10 By the time of the meeting with Fanon, to be “French” meant 
to be inescapably responsible for violence undertaken “in one’s name,” vio­
lence one is helpless to prevent, but in which one is nonetheless implicated.
In a fine article, Annabelle Golay has done a very thorough job of putting 
Fanon’s later writing (L’an V de la révolution algérienne and Les damnés de 
la terre) in dialogue with Beauvoir’s activism as described, over hundreds of 
 pages, in the second volume of La force des choses, which Golay shows as very 
much part of the same project.11 Golay doesn’t use the word “activism,” which 
seems to have no exact French equivalent. What do I mean by it? nothing espe­
cially glamorous: meetings, mostly. Now and again a demonstration. Writing 
editorials and pieces for Les Temps Modernes, soliciting and editing articles 
from others. Taking public stands in the hope of changing minds; when she 
can’t, continuing the work of testimony and documentation.
 un soir. Il m’emmena dîner aux environs de Paris, dans un village endormi qui sentait la 
campagne; et soudain, l’enfer remonta sur la terre. Marie­Claude Radziewski lui avait 
communiqué un dossier sur les traitements infligés par les harkis, dans les caves de la 
Goutte­d’Or, à des Musulmans que leur livrait la dst: gégène, brûlures, empalements sur 
des bouteilles, pendaisons, étranglements. Les tortures étaient entrecoupées d’actions 
psychologiques. Lanzmann écrivit là­dessus un article pour Les Temps Modernes et publia 
le dossier des plaintes. Une étudiante me raconta qu’elle avait vu de ses yeux, rue de la 
Goutte­d’Or, des hommes en sang que des harkis traînaient d’une maison à une autre. Les 
gens du quartier entendaient toutes les nuits des hurlements. ‘Pourquoi? Pourquoi? Pour­
quoi?’: ce cri indéfiniment répété d’un petit Algérien de quinze ans qui avait vu torturer 
toute sa famille me déchirait les tympans et la gorge. Qu’elles étaient bénignes les révoltes 
où me jetaient jadis la condition humaine et l’idée abstraite de la mort! … Et du moins le 
scandale demeurait hors de moi. Aujourd’hui j’étais devenue scandale à mes propres 
yeux” (FCh 2:409–10, FCirc 598).
9 “Nous trouvions que la gauche n’avait pas de leçon à donner aux Algériens et qu’El Moud-
jahid avait bien fait de le remettre à sa place” (FCh 2:127, FCirc 381). The articles in El 
Moudjahid to which she refers were probably largely authored by Fanon himself.
10 “[P]ointing to the flowering apple orchards, Lanzmann said in a desolate voice: ‘Even the 
grass won’t be the same color any more.’ What devastated us was to suddenly discover the 
face of France as it had become, little by little, depoliticized, inert, ready to give itself over 
to the men who wanted to continue the war to the point of atrocity.” [Me montrant les 
clos fleuris de pommiers, il me dit d’une voix désolée: “Même l’herbe n’aura plus la même 
couleur.” Ce qui nous accablait c’était de découvrir soudain le visage qu’avait pris peu à 
peu la France: dépolitisée, inerte, prête à s’abandonner aux hommes qui voulaient pour­
suivre à outrance la guerre (FCh 2:152; FCirc 404, translation altered).]
11 Annabelle Golay, “Feminisme et postcolonialisme: Beauvoir, Fanon, et la guerre d’Algérie.”
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Should I be calling this activism? Beauvoir herself does not. In La force des 
choses and elsewhere, she contrasts herself to her friend Francis Jeanson, who 
put his life on the line by helping to deliver weapons to the fln, and her for­
mer student Jacqueline Guerroudj, who participated in the Battle of Algiers 
and was condemned to the guillotine for her militant activities. Beauvoir told 
Madeleine Gobeil: “I felt and thought about things in a political way, but I nev­
er engaged in political action.”12 La force des choses:
Since the Left had completely failed in its attempt to carry on the struggle 
within the limits of legality, if one wanted to remain faithful to one’s anti­
colonialist convictions and free oneself of all complicity with this war, 
then underground action remained the only course. I admired those who 
took part in such action. But to do so demanded total commitment, and 
it would have been cheating to pretend I am capable of such a thing. I am 
not a woman of action; my reason for living is writing; to sacrifice that I 
would have to believe myself indispensable in some other field. Such was 
not by any means the case. I contented myself with giving what help I 
could when I was asked for it; certain of my friends did more.13
Whatever we want to call it, Beauvoir’s testimony on behalf of Jacqueline 
Guerroudj is often credited as decisive in winning her reprieve. Beauvoir and 
12 “The Art of Fiction No. 35,” interview with Madeleine Gobeil, 35. Sonia Kruks comments 
on this point: “As a well­known public figure, who by this time could not sit in a café with­
out being recognized, [Beauvoir] was not practically speaking a good bet for underground 
activity. She was far too visible easily to shelter fln militants, to transport money or ma­
terials for them, as the ‘Jeanson network’ and others were doing…. In fact, Beauvoir did at 
times offer practical support to the network: she lent members her car and allowed her 
apartment to be used. On at least one occasion, she helped to find a secure hiding place 
for a fugitive” (Kruks, “Politics of Privilege,” 202). Kruks cites Hervé Hamon and Patrick 
Rotman, Les porteurs de valises, 158 and 283. She also notes that “under the emergency 
powers of the time,” actions such as signing manifestos and attending banned demonstra­
tions were “acts of illegality,” and that after the publication of Djamila Boupacha (which 
Beauvoir co­signed with Gisèle Halimi) a death threat was telephoned to Beauvoir’s 
apartment.
13 “La gauche ayant échoué à mener dans la légalité un combat efficace, si on voulait rester 
fidèle à ses convictions anticolonialistes et briser toute complicité avec cette guerre, il ne 
restait d’autre issue que l’action clandestine. J’admirais ceux qui la menaient. Seulement 
elle exigeait un engagement total et ç’aurait été tricher que de m’en prétendre capable: je 
ne suis pas une femme d’action; ma raison de vivre, c’est d’écrire; pour la sacrifier, il aurait 
fallu me croire ailleurs indispensable. Ce n’était pas du tout le cas. Je me contentai de 
rendre, quand on me le demanda, des services; certains de mes amis firent d’avantage” 
(FCh 2:245–56, FCirc 472).
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Sartre had signed the Manifesto of the 121, the “Déclaration sur le droit à 
l’insoumission dans la guerre d’Algérie.” Les Temps Modernes had vigorously 
sponsored Henri Alleg’s book, La question, which described his torture by 
French troops (and was banned by the French government); a letter of defiant 
support from Sartre had been read out at the trial of Jeanson’s underground 
network. As a result, it had been unsafe, for a time, for Sartre and Beauvoir to 
be in France. Even after they returned, Paris felt to Beauvoir like an occupied 
city. Her own government’s support of torture and massacre, police brutality 
and censorship, the casual racism of the people in the streets, the deceitful lies 
of the government and the mainstream press poisoned everyday life and satu­
rated her with shame. “I had been called an enemy of France: I became one.”
This hypocrisy, this indifference, this country, my own self, were no lon­
ger bearable to me. All those people in the streets, in open agreement or 
battered into a stupid submission—they were all murderers, all guilty. 
Myself as well. “I’m French.” The words scalded my throat like an admis­
sion of hideous deformity. For millions of men and women, old men and 
children, I was one of the people who were torturing them, burning them, 
machine­gunning them, slashing their throats, starving them; I deserved 
their hatred because I could still sleep, write, enjoy a walk or a book…. I 
felt that I was suffering from one of those diseases whose most serious 
symptom was the absence of pain.14
Other commentators on Beauvoir’s work at this period have highlighted her 
work on behalf of Djamila Boupacha, whose shameful treatment—falsely ac­
cused of setting a bomb, she was raped and tortured by French forces, with the 
complicity of higher­ups—Beauvoir denounced in Le Monde; Beauvoir headed 
up the committee of support, and accompanied Gisèle Halimi in interviewing 
French officials, whose disgraceful statements and behavior they detailed in a 
14 “Je ne supportais plus cette hypocrisie, cette indifférence, ce pays, ma propre peau. Ces 
gens dans les rues, consentants ou étourdis, c’étaient des bourreaux d’Arabes: tous coup­
ables. Et moi aussi. ‘Je suis française.’ Ces mots m’écorchaient la gorge comme l’aveu d’une 
tare. Pour des millions d’hommes et de femmes, de vieillards et d’enfants, j’étais la sœur 
des tortionnaires, des incendiaires, des ratisseurs, des égorgeurs, des affameurs; je méri­
tais leur haine puisque je pouvais dormir, écrire, profiter d’une promenade ou d’un livre: 
les seuls moments où je n’avais pas honte, c’étaient ceux où je ne le pouvais pas…. Il me 
semblait traîner une de ces maladies où le symptôme le plus grave, c’est l’absence de dou­
leur” (FCh 2:145, FCirc 396–97).
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book.15 Dramatic as this was, I see it not as an isolated incident, but rather as 
embedded in the day in day out of resistance, resistance as a way of life.
As usual, I feel that summary can’t do justice to the texture of Beauvoir’s 
narration, which catches us up in the alternations of hope and despair. Per­
haps her most important activism was this work of testimony, as the period 
documented in La force des choses catches up to its own moment of writing.16 
She documents it all, in detail, move by move: massacres, tortures and disap­
pearances, Muslims rounded up in the Vel’ d’Hiv where the Jews had been held, 
systematic rapes in detention camps. Listening to the radio with Michel and 
Zette Leiris, just as she and Sartre had done during the Second World War.17 At 
one point she turns to reproducing pages from her diary, as she’d done in the 
part of La force de l’âge that covers the worst days of the Occupation; what hor­
rible thing did we just learn about, how did other people react…. As the rules 
of human rights are suspended not just in Algeria but in France itself (censor­
ship, bans, firings, deportations), she draws parallels with the Nazis, with the 
massacre at Oradour and the rounding­up of French Jews.18 She describes also 
a progression of her awareness and shame about being French, how she walks 
around gritting her teeth as French people say stupider and stupider things 
and show unconcern in the face of casual brutality against Algerians and then 
against demonstrators.19 La force des choses also records travel—Cuba, Brazil, 
15 FCh 2:298–306, 402, 436, 449; FCirc 513–18, 591–92, 618, 628. While most of Djamila Boupa-
cha was written by Halimi, Beauvoir’s name was given as author so that she could take 
responsibility if a prosecution resulted, which seemed quite likely. See also Kruks, “Poli­
tics of Privilege,” Mary Caputi, “Simone de Beauvoir and the Case of Djamila Boupacha,” 
Karen Shelby, “Beauvoir and Ethical Responsibility,” and Julien Murphy, “Beauvoir and the 
Algerian War: Toward a Postcolonial Ethics.” See now also Lori Marso, “Politics with Beau­
voir,” 94–120.
16 See also Ursula Tidd, Gender and Testimony, especially chapter 6.
17 FCh 2:256, FCirc 404.
18 “Ten thousand Algerians have been herded into the Vel’ d’Hiv, like the Jews at Drancy once 
before. Again I loathed it all—this country, myself, the whole world.” [Dix mille Algériens 
étaient parqués au Vel’ d’Hiv, comme autrefois les Juifs à Drancy (FCh 2:431, FCirc 614).]
19 For instance: “Yes, the poor Germans—one realizes now it wasn’t their fault.” [Oui, pau­
vres Allemands: on se rend compte maintenant que ce n’était pas de leur faute (FCh 2:455, 
FCirc 633).] Beauvoir says that “[f]rom then on, having a coffee at the bar or going to the 
boulangerie was a trial. You heard people say that ‘the whole thing was the Americans 
wanting our oil,’ or, ‘why are we waiting? One good blow will finish it.’ … I had liked 
crowds. Now even the streets were hostile, and I felt as dispossessed as in the first days of 
the occupation.” [Désormais, boire un café à un zinc, entrer dans une boulangerie, ce fut 
une épreuve. On entendait: “Tout ça, c’est les Américains qui veulent notre pétrole.” Ou 
bien: “Qu’est­ce qu’on attend pour en mettre un bon coup et en finir?” … J’avais aimé les 
foules: maintenant même les rues m’étaient hostiles, je me sentais aussi dépossédée 
qu’aux premiers temps de l’occupation (FCh 2:125, FCirc 381).]
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China (more on this below), Africa, the Soviet Union—which took place with­
in the context of support for revolutionary movements, respites of optimism 
against a backdrop of dread. Going to a demonstration, being moved by a sense 
of solidarity, and yet coming home to futility and rage: if only there had been 
more of us, if only the unions had come out earlier, if only the Communists 
hadn’t bailed on us (again)…. And she talks about a “tetanus of the imagina­
tion” resulting from wave after wave of bad news, atrocities, massacres, torture 
and rapes, suspensions of the rule of law. The worst thing, she says, “is that you 
get used to it.”20
Working through this in the first year of Donald Trump’s administration, 
what resonated most for me was her description of walking that difficult 
line. How to avoid defeatism (“demonstrations never change anything”) with­
out grandstanding, without exaggerating the importance of what one says or 
does; how to mark one’s own visceral responses without narcissism or self­ 
complacency.21 I remember Anne in Les mandarins, finding it hard to answer 
Scriassine’s questions about life in Paris under the Occupation: “the truly awful 
20 “Today, in this grim December of 1961, like most of my fellow­creatures I suppose, I am 
suffering from a sort of tetanus of the imagination. [Here she quotes details of torture from 
trial testimony.] I read this and move on to another article. That, perhaps, is the final stage 
of demoralization for a nation: one get used to it.” [Aujourd’hui, en ce sinistre mois de 
décembre 1961, comme beaucoup de mes semblables, je suppose, je souffre d’une sorte de 
tétanos de l’imagination…. C’est peut­être ça le fond de la démoralisation pour une nation: 
on s’habitue (FCh 2:122, FCirc 379).] Very similar language occurs in “Pour Djamila Boupa­
cha,” which appeared in Le Monde, and in the introduction to Djamila Boupacha.
21 One is entitled to one’s very own despair and self­loathing; one is not entitled to infect 
others with it under the guise of political analysis, much less “theory.” And one must live 
through these things in one’s own skin, without mistaking one’s inner theatre of war for 
the actual ongoing struggle. “When one lives in an unjust world there is no use hoping by 
some means to purify oneself of that injustice; the only solution would be to change the 
world, and I don’t have that power. To suffer from these contradictions serves no good 
purpose; to blind oneself to them is mere self­deception. [Quand on habite un monde 
injuste, inutile d’espérer, par aucun procédé, se purifier de l’injustice; ce qu’il faudrait, 
c’est changer le monde et je n’en ai pas le pouvoir. Souffrir de ces contradictions, ça ne sert 
à rien; les oublier, c’est se mentir (FCh 2:501, FCirc 668–69).]
But see also Ursula Tidd, Gender and Testimony (1999): “Although presence is some­
times all that is possible in our relationship with the Other, Beauvoir represents her proj­
ect of testimonial autobiography as a means of reaching these others whose testimonies 
are silenced in order to break down our common existential isolation. Living with others 
in ‘the real,’ resisting the Disneyland hyperreality parodied by Beauvoir in the mid­sixties 
in Les belles images, may seem an increasingly remote option at the end of the second 
millennium. Before we learn to live with the ‘loss of the real’ [the reference is to Baudril­
lard, Simulacres et simulations], Beauvoir’s testimonial autobiographical project alerts us 
to the continuing importance of being there and bearing witness” (154).
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things, it wasn’t me they happened to; and yet they haunted my life.”22 Later 
Beauvoir would say to Madeleine Gobeil, “everyone has forgotten about 
Algeria”;23 she’d go on to dramatize this French amnesia in Les belles images 
(1966). At our own moment in particular, it seems important not to reproduce 
that amnesia in scholarship on Beauvoir, not to act as if “nothing happened” 
between The Second Sex and the 1970s.
Golay also points out that the solidarity between Beauvoir and Fanon at the 
time of their meeting did not come out of nowhere.
The story of their meeting, as told in La force des choses (1963), makes it 
possible to think about the common stakes for oppressed nations and 
oppressed individuals, women and colonized peoples, and to establish 
the unifying link between French feminism and the call for decolonial­
ization. Woman’s alterity with respect to man is comparable to that of 
the colonized with respect to the colonizer. Beauvoir highlights this par­
allel from the first pages of The Second Sex. The essay should be reread, 
22 “[L]es vrais malheurs ce n’est pas à moi qu’ils étaient arrivés, et pourtant ils avaient hanté 
ma vie” (Les mandarins, 1:111).
23 “De Beauvoir: I felt and thought about things in a political way, but I never engaged in 
political action. The entire last part of Force of Circumstance deals with the war. And it 
seems anachronistic in a France which is no longer concerned with that war.
Interviewer: Did you realize that people were bound to forget about it?
De Beauvoir: I deleted lots of pages from that section. I therefore realized that it would 
be anachronistic. On the other hand, I absolutely wanted to talk about it, and I’m amazed 
that people have forgotten it to such a degree. Have you seen the film La Belle Vie, by the 
young director Robert Enrico? People are stupefied because the film shows the Algerian 
war. Claude Mauriac wrote in Le Figaro littéraire: ‘Why is it that we’re shown parachute 
troopers on public squares. It’s not true to life.’ But it is true to life. I used to see them every 
day from Sartre’s window at Saint­Germain­des­Prés. People have forgotten. They wanted 
to forget. They wanted to forget their memories. That’s the reason why, contrary to what I 
expected, I wasn’t attacked for what I said about the Algerian war but for what I said about 
old age and death. As regards the Algerian war, all Frenchmen are now convinced that it 
never took place, that nobody was tortured, that insofar as there was torture they were 
always against torture” (“The Art of Fiction No. 35,” interview with Madeleine Gobeil, 
35–6).
In the 1986 interview with Hélène Wenzel for Yale French Studies, Beauvoir indicated 
at the outset that she had written about “other things,” not just feminism: “As a result, I’d 
prefer that a focus on my writing and my work not be absolutely limited … to the woman 
question” (Wenzel, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir,” 6). But she was unsuccessful in 
getting Wenzel to discuss those “other things,” and the articles in the issue (an important 
breakthrough for Beauvoir scholarship in the United States) focused entirely on feminist 
questions.
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in this respect, starting from the situation of its writing and the colonial 
context.24
That last sentence describes what I’ve been trying to do right along. I’d add 
that, while La force des choses describes her relationship to France and French­
ness as changing during the Algerian conflict, her disgust, and her awareness 
of linkage between social conservatism and the war machine, had been well­
prepared by her previous intellectual commitments: remember the refusal of 
knee­jerk nationalism at the heart of her conception of the One and the Other, 
and her uptake of the surrealist response to Claudel’s smug patriotism.25 As is 
true for Fanon, there is more ethical and political continuity throughout the 
development of her work than may at first appear.
I agree with Golay, too, in not seeing any contradiction between drawing a 
parallel between two sorts of oppressions, and being deeply committed to end­
ing both of them, whether together or separately. (As I write that, I am asking 
myself, why would anybody think that would be a contradiction? Was I fighting 
a straw person, for all those pages?) Golay goes so far as to say that for Beauvoir, 
the struggle against racist colonialism took precedence over the lutte des 
femmes during the years chronicled in La force des choses, and I think she’s 
right.
It’s not that Beauvoir forgets about women during the second volume of La 
force des choses. She notes casual points of interest, for instance, that Castro’s 
guerilla army included some women, “a fact which caused a good many snig­
gers among the French bourgeoisie”;26 that “six women prisoners in the La 
Roquette prison escaped; a pretty feat, well­organized, and one that should 
24 “Le récit de leur rencontre dans La force des choses (1963), permet de penser les enjeux 
communs aux nations et aux individus opprimés, femmes et colonisés, et d’établir le lien 
qui unit le féminisme français et les revendications de la décolonisation. L’altérité de la 
femme par rapport à l’homme est comparable à celle du colonisé par rapport au colon. 
Beauvoir met en lumière ce parallèle dès les premières pages du Deuxième sexe (1949). 
L’essai doit être relu, à cet égard, à partir de sa situation d’écriture et du contexte colonial” 
(Golay, “Féminisme et postcolonialisme,” 408).
25 In the course of one demonstration, in 1957, we run into our old friend Adamov: “There 
were cries of ‘Down with de Gaulle,’ shouted out syllable by syllable as though we were at 
a sporting event, and Adamov said angrily, ‘It’s all too gay, this isn’t how we should be be­
having.’” [On a crié “À bas de Gaulle” au rythme des monômes d’étudiants et Adamov a dit 
avec irritation: “C’est trop gai, ça ne convient pas” (FCh 2:217, FCirc 451).] He’s still criticiz­
ing style, but (throughout La force des choses) he’s still by their side, along with Leiris and 
a number of other veterans of surrealism (Tzara, Masson…).
26 “Dans la petite armée qui tenait le maquis avec lui, il y avait des femmes, ce qui suscitait 
chez les bourgeois français des rires égrillards” (FCh 2:137–38, FCirc 391).
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have been a help to all women in getting rid of their inferiority complexes.”27 
She also makes brief mentions here and there of what would later be labelled 
“sexism.” For instance, when describing her disappointment with the increas­
ing conservatism of Dos Passos and with Faulkner’s failure to disavow his racist 
Southern heritage, she also rethinks her admiration for Hemingway, noting the 
anti­Semitic tinge of The Sun Also Rises: “Aryan, male, endowed with wealth 
and leisure—[Hemingway] speaks as one seigneur to the other.”28 She express­
es admiration for younger women she meets: the mixed­race Chinese writer 
Han Suyin;29 the Algerian lawyer Gisèle Halimi, who enlisted her support for 
Djamila Boupacha;30 the young working­class novelist Christiane Rochefort.31 
She is gratified by the reception of The Second Sex in America, its “success 
27 “Six détenues de la Roquette s’évadèrent; un joli exploit, bien machiné et qui aurait dû 
aider les femmes à se nettoyer de leurs complexes d’infériorité” (FCh 2:409, FCirc 
597–98).
28 “D’ailleurs, les complicités que nous propose Hemingway à tous les tournants de ses récits 
impliquent que nous avons conscience d’être, comme lui, aryens, mâles, dotés de fortune 
et de loisirs, n’ayant jamais éprouvé notre corps que sous la figure du sexe et de la mort. 
Un seigneur s’adresse à des seigneurs. La bonhomie du style peut tromper, mais ce n’est 
pas un hasard si la droite lui a tressé de luxuriantes couronnes: il a peint et exalté le 
monde des privilégiés” (FCh 2:132, FCirc 386–87).
See also “The Art of Fiction No. 35,” interview with Madeleine Gobeil, 34, where they 
discuss Hemingway as a paradigmatic uncommitted writer.
29 FCh 2:231, FCirc 461–62.
30 FCh 2:225, FCirc 457.
31 “[Rochefort’s Les petits enfants du siècle] had caused less of a scandal than her first [book], 
but she’d had another cartload of self­righteous filth emptied on top of her all the same. 
‘It’s happened to me too,’ I told her. ‘It must have been worse for you, though,’ she said 
sympathetically, ‘because I’m a tramp anyway, you know.’ And indeed, I was always con­
scious of my middle­class origins when I was with her; she was a real working­class girl, 
and there wasn’t much she hadn’t seen: I envied her daring, her fire, her inner freedom. 
For the time being, she wasn’t writing. ‘I can’t get interested in my piddling little stories, 
not at the moment!’
I understood how she felt. The assassination of Lumumba, the last pictures of him, the 
photographs of his wife leading his mourners, head shaved, breast bare—what novel 
could compete with that?”
[Ce livre avait moins scandalisé que le premier, mais tout de même on l’avait à nou­
veau aspergé de vertueuse merde. “J’ai connu ça, lui dis­je. —Ça a dû être plus gênant 
pour vous, m’a­t­elle dit avec sympathie, parce que moi, je suis une truande.” Près d’elle 
en  effet, j’avais conscience de mes origines bourgeoises; c’était une fille du peuple et 
elle en avait vu de toutes les couleurs; elle avait des audaces, une verve, une liberté que je 
lui enviais. Pour l’instant, elle n’écrivait pas: “Je ne peux pas m’intéresser à mes petites 
histoires, en ce moment!”
Je la comprenais. L’assassinat de Lumumba, les dernières images qu’on vit de lui, les 
photographies de sa femme menant le deuil tête rasée, seins nu, à côté de ça quel roman 
pouvait tenir le coup? (FCh 2:407, FCirc 596).]
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unspoiled by any salacious comment,”32 and also gratified by those who write 
to thank her for it, and to provide more evidence that “[i]t’s terrible to be a 
woman”; their letters, she says, would make a moving document. “I wasn’t 
wrong when I wrote The Second Sex, in fact I was even more right than I knew 
at the time.”33 As she reads page proofs for Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, 
she says she hopes it will help younger women;34 and she even gives several 
feminist talks.
But her heart does not seem to be in it. “At the university [of Rio de Janeiro] 
I spoke—not because I wanted to, but because I had been asked—on the posi­
tion of women.”35 Describing another such talk in São Paolo she says,
Once more I found myself talking about women in a large flower­decked 
and scented hall, addressing a lot of bedizened ladies who were thinking 
exactly the opposite of what I was saying; but a young woman lawyer 
thanked me on behalf of women who work.36
Most of these women seem to have all too much in common with the French 
“society women who listen in ecstasy” to the sickeningly patriotic and 
32 “Le deuxième sexe parut en Amérique avec un succès que ne salit aucune chiennerie. J’y 
tenais à ce livre et j’ai été contente de vérifier—chaque fois qu’on l’a publié à l’étranger—
qu’il avait fait scandale en France par la faute de mes lecteurs, non par la mienne” (FCh 
2:19, FCirc 298).
33 “Que de correspondantes me répètent: ‘C’est terrible d’être une femme!’ Non, je ne me 
trompais pas en écrivant Le deuxième sexe, j’avais même encore plus raison que je ne le 
pensais. Avec des extraits de lettres reçues depuis ce livre, on aurait un document navrant” 
(FCh 2:188, FCirc 429).
34 “[F]or once, one of my books is giving me pleasure to reread. Unless I am mistaken, it 
should be a success with young girls who are having problems with their family and reli­
gion and who do not yet dare to dare.” [Hier après­midi, j’ai corrigé un énorme paquet 
d’épreuves envoyées par Festy: pour une fois un livre que j’ai écrit me fait plaisir à relire. Si 
je ne me trompe, il devrait avoir du succès auprès des jeunes filles, en mal de famille et de 
religion et qui n’osent pas encore oser. D’autre part, j’ai pris mon élan, je crois, pour mon 
nouveau livre (FCh 2:189, FCirc 429–30, translation altered).]
35 “À l’Université je parlai—non par goût, mais parce qu’on me l’avait demandé—de la con­
dition de la femme” (FCh 2:349, FCirc 552). In their public appearances, both she and Sar­
tre were mainly concerned to gather support for the Cuban revolution, advancing the 
ideas he’d just articulated in “Ouragan sur le sucre” (Hurricane Over the Sugar).
36 “De nouveau, je parlai des femmes dans une grande salle fleurie et parfumée, devant des 
dames harnachées qui pensaient le contraire de ce que je disais; mais une jeune avocate 
me remercia au nom des femmes qui travaillent” (FCh 353, FCirc 555, translation 
altered).
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self­aggrandizing speeches of de Gaulle.37 Even the success of the first two vol­
umes of her memoirs creates mixed emotions.
People would come up to me with beaming smiles and say, “I don’t agree 
with you politically; but I liked your book so much.” “Let’s hope you don’t 
like the next one,” I said to one of them. It is true that in La force de l’âge I 
had taken a very objective attitude toward my past beliefs; all the same, I 
did make it perfectly clear how distasteful I find bourgeois institutions 
and ideologies; I shouldn’t have been receiving the approval of people 
who were attached to them.38
I’m reminded of Richard Wright’s determination that his second book, Native 
Son, would make less room than his earlier writings for what is now called 
“white tears,” and of Beauvoir’s later “dialogue of the deaf” with Betty Friedan. 
At one point she describes her support for a Doctor Weill­Hallé’s crusade for 
birth control, noting the shockingly conservative attitude of the French com­
munist party; she is asked to, and does, write prefaces for two short books, Le 
planning familial and La grande peur d’aimer. But she describes the press con­
ference for the second book as depressing.
There were about a hundred people there: psychoanalysts, doctors, vari­
ous more or less qualified specialists in the human heart. Mme.  Weill­ Hallé 
in a white dress, blonde, virginal­looking, expounded in her musical voice 
on the advantages of the pessary; some fifty­year­olds asked uneasily if the 
use of such things was not harmful to the romantic side of love. The vo­
cabulary employed was edifying in the extreme. They talked, not about 
birth control but about the joys of maternity, not about contraception but 
about orthogenesis. At the word abortion, faces were turned away; as for 
sex, that wasn’t allowed in the room at all.39
37 “Tout en réclamant pour son investiture une procédure exceptionnelle, de Gaulle avait 
fait savoir qu’il voulait être légalement appelé par le pays. Des dames du monde 
écoutaient, en extase; Mauriac se pâmait” (FCh 2:151, FCirc 401).
38 “Les gens me disaient avec d’éclatants sourires: ‘Je ne suis pas d’accord avec vous, poli­
tiquement; mais votre livre m’a tellement plu!—J’espère que le prochain déplaira,’ dis­je à 
l’un d’eux. Il est vrai que dans La force de l’âge je prenais certaines distances par rapport à 
mes attitudes passées; tout de même j’y disais clairement mon dégoût des institutions et 
des idéologies bourgeoises; je n’aurais pas dû obtenir les suffrages de ceux qui leur étaient 
attachés” (FCh 2:404, FCirc 593). See also FCh 2:497, FCirc 665.
39 “Il y avait une centaine de personnes: des psychanalystes, des médecins, des spécialistes 
plus ou moins autorisés du cœur humain. Mme. Weill­Hallé en robe blanche, blonde, fraîche, 
virginale, exposa d’une voix musicale les avantages du pessaire; des  quinquagénaires 
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It would not be until 1970 that she would be contacted by the younger gen­
eration of militants from the mlf (Mouvement de libération des femmes), 
with whom she’d have more in common. For now, she quickly turns back to the 
urgency of defending Jeanson and Alleg. As she observes (in a different con­
text): “The war in Algeria was mobilizing all my emotions. I had none left over 
for anything else.”40
I think Golay is also right when she defends that priority, using Beauvoir’s 
own language from Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté:
Because oppression has more than one face, if in the historical context of 
the late ’50s and early ’60s Beauvoir’s feminist engagement seems to have 
been subordinated to the struggle for decolonization, it’s on the one hand 
because the urgency of the situation demanded it, and on the other be­
cause the liberation of colonized nations would serve the struggle for 
women’s liberation (as Fanon argues in “L’Algérie se dévoile”): “First 
things first,” one might say, taking Kirsten Holst Petersen’s formulation.41
By 1972, Beauvoir would acknowledge that the second part of that reasoning 
had been over­optimistic, writing in Tout compte fait: “Fanon was profoundly 
mistaken when he foretold that the Algerian women would escape from male 
oppression because of the part they had played in the war.”42 But as Beauvoir 
also says in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, one makes choices about this kind 
of thing without being able to know in advance whether one will be right: we’re 
 demandèrent avec inquiétude si l’usage n’en était pas nuisible au romantisme amoureux. 
Le vocabulaire employé était des plus édifiants. On parlait non de ‘birth­control’ mais de 
maternité heureuse, non de contraception, mais d’orthogenèse. Au mot avortement, on se 
voilait la face; quant au sexe, il n’était nulle part” (FCh 2:297–98, FCirc 512–13).
40 She has met an old friend who is devastated by a different injustice, the execution of Caryl 
Chessman in the US: “La guerre d’Algérie mobilisait mes émotions, je n’en avais plus de 
reste, mais je la comprenais” (FCh 2:306–7, FCirc 519).
41 “L’oppression ayant plus d’un visage, si dans le contexte historique de la fin des années 50 
et du début des années 60, l’engagement féministe de Beauvoir semble subordonné à la 
lutte pour la décolonisation, c’est d’une part que l’urgence de la situation l’exigeait, et 
d’autre part, que la libération des nations colonisées servait la lutte de libération des 
femmes (ce que défend Fanon dans ‘L’Algérie se dévoile’): ‘First things first,’ pourrait­on 
dire en reprenant la formule­titre de Kirsten Holst Petersen” (Golay, “Féminisme et post­
colonialisme,” 423). Golay is referencing pma 14, EA 10; see chapter 3 above. See also Pe­
tersen, “First Things First.”
42 “Fanon s’est bien trompé quand il prédisait que grâce au rôle qu’elles ont joué pendant la 
guerre les femmes algériennes échapperaient à l’oppression masculine (Tout compte fait 
[hereinafter tcf], 562; All Said and Done [hereinafter asd], 443). I’ll return below to the 
wider context for this passage.
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not in the world of trolley problems now. And perhaps, looking back later, one 
would still feel one’s choice had been the right one, much as she’d said no one 
had the right to judge Richard Wright’s view that, for American Blacks in the 
1940s, the war effort was less urgent than their own liberation.
But where Golay, honoring an important strand of postcolonial critique, 
says “first things first,” Beauvoir’s own formulation, both in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté and here, seems a little different: I expressed it (with reference to 
Anna Julia Cooper) as one thing at a time. If we wait for the perfectly intersec­
tional action, we will wait forever; plus, in the real world, certain desiderata are 
genuinely incompatible, and nothing is gained by pretending otherwise. (This 
is also, I think, one important takeaway from Kimberlé Crenshaw’s original 
article.)43 Perhaps here is as good a place as any to remind my reader (and my­
self) that what is an issue is not whether Beauvoir was “a good person.”44 Of 
course, after all these pages (and all these decades) I can’t help but hope so; but 
she herself would have regarded that issue as pretty much irrelevant, and as a 
bit of a trap.45 The question I began with was a different one: how can her 
thinking­in­situation (including the thinking she did in her autobiographical 
writing), from her situation, be of use to us in ours.46
In retrospect, only one of the two justifications Golay saw Beauvoir as offer­
ing for prioritizing the anti­colonial struggle (and de­centering more obviously 
“feminist” concerns) would hold water. But the most we can ask is that people 
make a good faith judgement based on what was available to them at the time. 
With respect to Algeria, as always, Beauvoir documents her response, both in­
timate and collective,47 to facts on the ground as they appear to her; and does 
not hesitate to say, later, when she turns out to have been wrong.
43 See Qrescent Mali Mason, “Intersectional Ambiguity and the Phenomenology of 
#BlackGirlJoy.”
44 Whatever we mean by that. And what do we mean by that? For women especially, there’s 
a depressing amount of overlap between “a good person” and “a nice person.” Perhaps this 
is another situation where policing a boundary is not an especially good use of one’s en­
ergy, even (especially?) when one is thinking about oneself.
45 See for example her discussion of “dévouement” and of the “dame de charité” in The Sec-
ond Sex, but also in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, where it is formulated in a more gender­ 
neutral way.
46 I follow Ursula Tidd (Gender and Testimony) and Karen Vintges (Philosophy as Passion) in 
taking Beauvoir’s autobiographical works as a key aspect of her theory, and of her theory’s 
impact on women and the women’s movement internationally.
47 “Writing the self and writing history are woven into one and the same gesture of writing.” 
[L’écriture de soi et l’écriture de l’histoire se tissent ici en un seul et même geste d’écriture 
(Golay, “Féminisme et postcolonialisme,” 415).]
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It may be worth underlining this. Beauvoir is a remarkably consistent think­
er and writer, when compared to, say, Gide or Malraux, or even Sartre; it is strik­
ing, for instance, that the same views and even the same examples recur in 
writing of very different periods and genres. But in their search for “Beauvoir,” 
commentators often miss the way she undertakes to document the uncertain­
ties and evolutions in her thinking,48 and the way many of her texts, as Golay 
says of this one, look forward to their own “dépassement.”49 One should not 
ignore the warning at the beginning of La force des choses:
Like its predecessor, this book asks the reader for his collaboration. I pres­
ent, in order, each moment of my development, and the reader must have 
the patience not to close the accounts before the end. He is not entitled, 
for instance, to conclude, as one critic has done, that Sartre likes Guido 
Reni because he liked him when he was nineteen. Indeed, only malice 
dictates such blunders, and against malice I do not intend to be on my 
guard. On the contrary, this book contains everything likely to provoke it, 
and I should be disappointed if it failed to displease someone. I should 
also be disappointed if it pleased no one, and that is why I suggest that its 
truth is not expressed in any one of its pages but only in their totality.50
48 As I discussed above, Mary McCarthy could only see the different views in L’Amérique au 
jour le jour 1947 as an incoherent mess; others have followed her lead in picking out and 
attacking isolated points, identifying those as “Beauvoir.” What is often missing (whether 
through bad faith or “déformation professionnelle”) is the habit of reading dialectically.
49 “The text of La force des choses, which looks forward to its own dépassement, this tense 
and straining text, has an even more forceful effect on the reader because Beauvoir gives 
us the whole story of the road she took, with a constant concern for the truth, making no 
attempt to disguise her own contradictions, but rather forcing herself to take hold of 
them in the very gesture of writing.” [Le texte de La force des choses, qui vise son propre 
dépassement, ce texte tendu, peut être reçu par le lecteur avec d’autant plus de force que 
Beauvoir y livre son cheminement dans son ensemble avec un souci constant de vérité, ne 
cherchant en rien à masquer ses propres contradictions, mais s’efforçant au contraire de 
les saisir dans le geste même de l’écriture (Golay, “Féminisme et postcolonialisme,” 419).]
50 “Comme le précédent, ce livre demande au lecteur sa collaboration: je présente, en ordre, 
chaque moment de mon évolution et il faut avoir la patience de ne pas arrêter les comptes 
avant la fin. On n’a pas le droit par exemple, comme l’a fait un critique, de conclure que 
Sartre aime Guido Reni parce qu’il l’aima à dix­neuf ans. En fait, seule la malveillance 
dicte ces étourderies et contre elle je n’entends pas me prémunir: au contraire, ce livre a 
tout ce qu’il faut pour la susciter et je serais déçue s’il ne déplaisait pas. Je serais déçue 
aussi s’il ne plaisait à personne et c’est pourquoi j’avertis que sa vérité ne s’exprime pas 
dans aucune de ses pages mais seulement dans leur totalité” (FCh 1:10, FCirc 7).
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La force des choses ends with a kind of balance sheet, where she responds in 
firm feminist tones to those who have criticized her relationship with Sartre, or 
insinuated that he writes her books for her,51 or painted a wounding picture of 
her personality, describing her as a madwoman, an eccentric, dissolute, a 
schoolmistress, a conformist: any number of incompatible slurs.52 But she 
then moves into an assessment of her objective situation:
I know that I am a profiteer, and that I am one primarily because of the 
education I received and the possibilities it opened up for me …. [T]he 
people who buy my books are all beneficiaries of an economy founded 
upon exploitation. I am an accomplice of the privileged classes and com­
promised by this connection; that is the reason why living through the 
Algerian war was like experiencing a personal tragedy.53
The primary commitment is to decolonization, to anti­racism, to the Third 
World. “For now I know the truth of the human condition: two­thirds of 
51 See FCh 2:490, FCirc 660.
52 “In France, if you are a writer, to be a woman is simply to provide a stick to be beaten with 
… I am of the Left, I had things I was trying to say; among others, that women are not just 
a tribe of moral cripples from birth.” [En France, si vous écrivez, être femme c’est donner 
des verges pour vous battre …. Je suis de gauche, j’ai essayé de dire des choses, entre au­
tres, que les femmes ne sont pas des éclopées de naissance [FCh 2:492, FCirc 661).]
53 “Je sais que je suis une profiteuse, et d’abord par la culture que j’ai reçue et les possibilités 
qu’elle m’a fournies …. [L]es gens qui achètent mes livres sont tous les bénéficiaires d’une 
économie fondée sur l’exploitation. Je suis complice des privilégiés et compromise par 
eux: c’est pourquoi j’ai vécu la guerre d’Algérie comme un drame personnel” (FCh 2:501, 
FCirc 668–69).
She returns also to the contradiction about her readership I mentioned above: “My 
relationship to the public has become ambiguous because the horror my class inspires in 
me has been brought to white heat by the Algerian war…. I feel ill at ease if the middle 
class as a whole gives me a good reception. There were too many women who read The 
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter because they enjoyed the accuracy with which I had de­
picted a milieu they recognized, but without being at all interested in the effort I had 
made to escape from it. As for The Prime of Life, many’s the time I’ve stood gritting my 
teeth as people congratulated me: ‘It’s bracing, it’s dynamic, it’s optimistic,’ when I was so 
sickened by everything that I would rather have been dead than alive.” [Mon rapport au 
public est devenu très ambigu parce que la guerre d’Algérie a porté au rouge l’horreur que 
m’inspire ma classe…. [J]’éprouve un malaise si la bourgeoisie dans son ensemble 
m’accueille bien. Trop de lectrices ont apprécié dans les Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée 
la peinture d’un milieu qu’elles reconnaissaient, sans s’intéresser à l’effort que j’avais fait 
pour m’en évader. Quant à La force de l’âge, j’ai souvent grincé des dents quand on me fé­
licitait: “C’est tonique, c’est dynamique, c’est optimiste,” à un moment où tel était mon 
dégoût que j’aurais mieux aimé être morte que vive (FCh 2:497, FCirc 665).]
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mankind are hungry.”54 France is where she is, she is in it and of it, and she does 
not pretend or fantasize otherwise: like Pierre in L’invitée, she cannot imagine 
writing from a position of exile. But France is not the world, or the center of the 
world.
2 A Response to “Occidental Dreams”
But wait a minute, you say. Didn’t I read somewhere that Beauvoir was a terrible 
orientalist?
Sigh. Yes, you did.
As I mentioned above, Sally Markowitz’s article, “Occidental Dreams: Ori­
entalism and History in The Second Sex,” takes Beauvoir to task for being em­
bedded in some problematic discourses about “the oriental,” and scolds Beau­
voir scholars for having ignored this. In Markowitz’s view, The Second Sex is 
rendered less than useful for present­day feminists by traces of an outdated 
rhetoric of ethnic difference in Beauvoir’s account of the “progress” East and 
West have made toward gender equality. Markowitz sees Beauvoir as closer to 
Havelock Ellis “whom Beauvoir cites respectfully in The Second Sex,” and to 
the integral racism of Hegel’s theory of historical progress, than to “us today”; 
it would be a caricature to say that Beauvoir gets raked over the coals for not 
having read Edward Said, but that is the general drift. Markowitz assimilates 
Beauvoir to a whole history of white women’s imposition of exclusionary the­
ory on peoples of color, and on that basis claims that her work is outdated and 
irrelevant.55
Markowitz’s article is a polemic, rather than a work of textual scholarship: 
her claim that The Second Sex associates gender and oriental “race” in an em­
barrassingly retrograde way rests on two short quotations—four sentences in 
all—from that eight­hundred­page book. One occurs in a footnote, at the end 
of part 2 of the five­part “Histoire” section. Beauvoir has been pointing forward 
to a discussion of the ambiguity of modern man’s “Othering” of women: no 
longer satisfied with nakedly dominating her as a pure object, his “problem” 
54 “Car je connais à présent la vérité de la condition humaine: les deux tiers de l’humanité 
ont faim” (FCh 2:503, FCirc 670).
55 “The Second Sex, for all its brilliance, reflects a time increasingly remote from our own and 
thus inevitably marked by ways of thinking we would rather forget. Indeed, there is rea­
son to regard Beauvoir as a figure in some respects as close in spirit to, say, the early twen­
tieth­century sexologist Havelock Ellis (whom Beauvoir cites respectfully in The Second 
Sex) as to the feminists she would provoke and inspire in the 1970s and beyond” (Markow­
itz, “Occidental Dreams,” 271).
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will become how to make her his “companion” while still maintaining her sub­
servient status.56 Then the footnote explains that she’ll be describing this mod­
ern development in the West, since that is where it has occurred: “the history 
of women in the East, in India, in China, has been in effect the history of a long 
and unchanging slavery.”57 The second passage Markowitz cites, which occurs 
in Beauvoir’s chapter on “myths,” is indeed a stereotyped generalization, some­
thing that (to borrow Nancy Bauer’s phrase) “hurts my ears,”58 as I’ll discuss 
fully below: Beauvoir contrasts an “Oriental” man who views women as objects 
of pleasure to a modern Western man who dreams of embracing “another free 
being.”59 But Markowitz pulls these two passages out of context, and she 
doesn’t engage with any of the other, more substantive things Beauvoir says in 
The Second Sex about China, India, and the Arab world. The “oriental other,” 
Markowitz says, “haunts the margins” of The Second Sex;60 but she seems un­
able or unwilling to cite further examples of his actual presence in Beauvoir’s 
actual text. Nonetheless, her description of Beauvoir as an “orientalist” has be­
come a routine, dismissive gesture in the general feminist literature, taking its 
place alongside older accusations that Beauvoir is a “liberal feminist” in the 
model of Betty Friedan, and that she writes only from the viewpoint of her own 
race and class and has “nothing to say” about, or to, anyone else.
Why do I find it so hard to be charitable to this article? It does not add any­
thing to our understanding of Simone de Beauvoir—but then, that was not the 
writer’s intention. We are expected to simply accept on faith Markowitz’s claim 
that her two brief quotations “cast a long shadow” over Beauvoir’s work and 
her career, without supporting argumentation.61 Markowitz barely talks about 
any more of The Second Sex than Lucy did.62 Instead, most of her article 
56 DS 1:135–36.
57 “Nous examinerons cette évolution en Occident. L’histoire de la femme en Orient, aux 
Indes, en Chine a été en effet celle d’un long et immuable esclavage. Du Moyen Âge à nos 
jours nous centrerons cette étude sur la France dont le cas est typique” (DS 1:136).
58 Nancy Bauer, “On the Limits of Philosophizing,” 2.
59 DS 1:237.
60 Sally Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams: Orientalism and History in The Second Sex,” 286.
61 Why did a major, well­respected academic feminist journal fail to pick up on this elemen­
tary methodological point? Perhaps the view is taken that racism in feminism is such an 
emergency that other matters must take a back seat. Or perhaps it is Spelman who casts a 
long shadow here, even though, as Markowitz rightly says, her own arguments are differ­
ent ones.
62 She’s also not quite right when she announces herself triumphantly as the first to have 
taken notice of the passages she discusses: Margaret Simons noted that Beauvoir “con­
signs the majority of the world’s women to a footnote” in an article, “Sexism and the Philo­
sophical Canon: On Reading Beauvoir’s The Second Sex,” first published in 1990 and 
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expands on what is wrong with the “discourse” in which Beauvoir allegedly 
participates: Markowitz rehearses a grand narrative about the racialization of 
the sex/gender difference in the grand narrative of the West, using as her ex­
amples other writers, including some who may have been unknown to Beau­
voir. (For example, she adduces the shortcomings of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 
without showing any relationship between Gilman and Beauvoir—and I don’t 
believe there was one: Gilman’s work was pretty well forgotten in the United 
States by the time Beauvoir traveled there, and remained little­known until 
feminists rediscovered her work in the 1970s.) Markowitz explains what she is 
criticizing as follows:
By the racialization of sex/gender difference, I mean that constellation of 
views, prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that 
correlated greater “racial advancement” with greater sex/gender differ­
ence between the men and women of a particular race: the more “ad­
vanced” the race—so the story went—the greater the differences be­
tween men and women of that race.63
But in fact, even the most painful passages Markowitz pulls out from The Sec-
ond Sex do not talk about differences between men and women, or between 
masculinity and femininity: they are talking about how different groups of 
men relate sexually to women, which is not the same thing at all.64 Tina Chant­
er says something in another connection that I find apposite here:
Of course, anything anyone says about anyone anywhere is fair game, once 
it is out there in the world…. But I do have a question about the ethics and 
politics of readings which focus on strategic alignments and produce a 
homogenizing string of feminist authors, all of whom are represented as 
 reprinted in her 1999 collection, which Markowitz lists in her references. But she may well 
be the first to have made such a meal of it.
63 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams,” 274.
64 In what follows below, I will analyze all the other passages that relate to Arabs, Islam, 
harems, the “Orient” and or the “East.” While there are indeed strange things to see, I can­
not find a discussion of progress toward greater gender differentiation anywhere. By ex­
trapolating, in fact, one might deduce the opposite: it is the average modern Occidental 
man who sees his wife (at least some of the time) as his “semblable.” Beauvoir does find 
this preferable—Markowitz is right that, pace Bergoffen, Beauvoir favors what Thomas 
Laqueur named the “one­sex model”—or, as she might have called it, humanism. I myself 
know some women who would agree with her. (This is not the place to explore how fully 
Laqueur’s own historical scheme has been cast into doubt by other scholars.)
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saying more or less the same thing, despite the fact that their political and 
ethical sensibilities might be entirely divergent.65
However, in another way, Markowitz’s two passages are very well chosen, in 
that they are guaranteed to make “the woman of today”—that is to say, the 
 academic feminist of today—wince, blush, and desperately wish herself 
elsewhere.
One may interpret this passage [the footnote] generously, overlooking 
Beauvoir’s easy generalizations about non­Western cultures, but later in 
the book one encounters this troubling explanation of what makes gen­
der relations in the modern West so special: “The more the male becomes 
individualized and lays claim to his individuality, the more certainly he 
will recognize also in his companion an individual and a free being. The 
Oriental, careless of his own fate, is content with a female [femelle] who 
is for him [an object of pleasure]; but the dream of the Occidental, once 
he rises to consciousness of his own uniqueness, is to be taken cogni­
zance of by another free being, at once strange and docile.”66
This seems quite obtuse, by the standards of any age. So what is it doing here? 
What might Beauvoir have intended?
One thing to notice is that the passage occurs in the section on “Mythes.” 
This section follows the “Histoire” section; Beauvoir explains that she intends 
to supplement her earlier discussion of women’s concrete economic and judi­
cial subjugation to men with a discussion of the latter’s “ontological and moral 
pretentions.”67 Here Beauvoir reports on quite a few crazy ideas, the over­
whelming majority of which are Western and Christian. In a sense, the entire 
chapter needs to be put within scare quotes: it is a compilation of things that 
65 Tina Chanter, “The Trouble We (Feminists) Have Reasoning With Our Mothers,” 492. 
Chanter was responding to Penelope Deutscher’s use of Chanter’s own work in Yielding 
Gender.
Having argued that Beauvoir received Hegel, not directly, but via Marx, Markowitz 
also spends several pages exploring whether or not Marx was an “orientalist,” in a way 
which is significantly more respectful of the nuances of that question: but if Marx is an 
important enough thinker that one or two quotations from his work should not condemn 
him out of hand, why not extend that same contextualizing courtesy to Beauvoir?
66 The French, which Markowitz does not give, reads as follows: “L’Oriental insouciant de 
son propre destin se contente d’une femelle qui est pour lui un objet de jouissance; mais 
le rêve de l’Occidental, quand il s’est élevé à la conscience de la singularité de son être, 
c’est d’être reconnu par une liberté étrangère et docile” (DS 1:281).
67 “[P]rétentions ontologiques et morales” (DS 1:237).
Chapter 5368
are not true, but that have nonetheless been powerful. Remember that the 
overall title of volume 1 is “Les mythes et les faits,” myths and facts, and that it 
is shaped by a dialectic relationship between what women “are seen as,” and 
what they are, or could be. “If woman did not exist, men would have invented 
her. They did invent her. But she also exists.”68 So to take any isolated sentence 
from the myth section as “Beauvoir” would be, at best, naïve: Beauvoir investi­
gates myth in order to demystify. As Fanon said, “Nous faisons ici le procès des 
mystifiés et des mystificateurs.”69 Both those who make myths, and those who 
fall for them, are on trial.
Like the rest of The Second Sex, the myth chapters are a patchwork quilt of 
strange and contradictory things which nonetheless add up to an argument, if 
one has the patience to wait for it. Markowitz sees her chosen passage as “a 
troubling explanation of what makes gender relations in the modern West so 
special”; to my mind, it forms part of a lengthy indictment of how modern 
Western men behave, even as they pat themselves on the back for their greater 
enlightenment. We might remember what short work Beauvoir made, in Pour 
une morale de l’ambiguïté, of le colon’s supposed arguments for his own 
superiority.
Beauvoir has a fair amount to say, in The Second Sex, about India, China, the 
Arab world, and various ethnographically­documented “peoples”; her study of 
the “non­Western” was far from a cursory afterthought. For instance, quite ear­
ly in the Introduction, and central to her development of the primordial cate­
gory of Otherness (prior to its sexual differentiation), we find a reference to 
Granet’s works on “Chinese Thought” and Dumézil’s scholarship on India and 
Rome.70 What led Markowitz to single out the particular tidbit she cites? Even 
if she’d wanted to stick to the realm of desire, she could have chosen the fol­
lowing one, from the chapter on “Initiation sexuelle”:
68 DS 1:303. I discuss this passage above in connection with Richard Wright.
69 Peau noire masques blancs [hereinafter pnmb], 25; Black Skin White Masks [hereinafter 
bswm] 17, translation altered.
70 “The category of the Other is as primeval as consciousness itself. In the most primitive 
societies, the most ancient mythologies, there is always a duality of Same and Other; this 
division at first was not placed under the sign of the division of the sexes, it was not based 
on any empirical given: this emerges from the research of Granet on Chinese thought, 
from Dumézil’s work on Rome and India, among others.” [La catégorie de l’Autre est aussi 
originelle que la conscience elle­même. Dans les sociétés les plus primitives, dans les my­
thologies les plus antiques on trouve toujours une dualité qui est celle du Même et de 
l’Autre; cette division n’a pas d’abord été placée sous le signe de la division des sexes, elle 
ne dépend d’aucune donnée empirique: c’est ce qui ressort entre autres des travaux de 
Granet sur la pensée chinoise, de ceux de Dumézil sur les Indes et Rome (DS 1:16).]
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It appears that in India the husband, while fulfilling his conjugal duty, 
happily smokes a pipe to distract himself from his own pleasure, so that 
his wife’s pleasure can last longer; in the West, in contrast, a Casanova 
will brag about the number of his “coups,” and his greatest pride is to 
make his partner beg for mercy; according to the tradition of erotica, that 
is a rare exploit…71
“Gender relations in the West” are hardly being shown here as “special”: surely 
one would rather be in bed with this considerate Indian fellow than with any 
of the sadistic Parisian and Viennese husbands, casual rapists, and self­ centered 
premature ejaculators catalogued in that chapter?72 Except that “the Indian 
husband” is undoubtedly imaginary, a hasty over­generalization from (maybe) 
the Kama Sutra, just as Markowitz’s insouciant oriental was a hasty over­gen­
eralization from the Thousand and One Nights, or some such. Really both are 
deployed as illustrations, or foils, rather than argument or evidence. The tactic 
is similar to Foucault’s contrast, in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, 
between an Eastern “ars amatoria” and a Western “scientia sexualis,” and it is 
deployed for a quite similar purpose: to problematize (and, subliminally, to 
criticize) the habitual practices and discourses of sexuality in the West, by 
showing that another approach is possible. And yes, the use of non­Western 
examples purely for contrast is a familiar orientalist habit; and the failure to 
locate non­Westerners as distinct agents in real historical time is another. But I 
see no argumentation that would lead me to believe that the careless oriental 
of Markowitz’s passage “casts a long[er] shadow” than the thoughtful Indian 
husband, or indeed that either has any importance beyond the page on which 
he appears.
In some ways this is the same question of method I discussed above: when 
a reader balks at something in a text, how is she to decide whether that “some­
thing” is, to put it crudely, a dealbreaker, or merely a regrettable lapse in an 
71 “Il paraît qu’aux Indes l’époux, tout en remplissant ses devoirs conjugaux, fume volontiers 
la pipe afin de se distraire de son propre plaisir et de faire durer celui de son épouse; en 
Occident, c’est plutôt du nombre de ses ‘coups’ que se vante un Casanova; et sa suprême 
fierté, c’est d’obtenir que sa partenaire crie merci” (DS 2:180). This illustration follows up 
on statistical information, drawn from Kinsey, about the difference in time men and 
women require to reach orgasm.
72 Perhaps my reader will remember (from chapter 1) Dr. Grémillon, the war hero Beauvoir 
quoted (DS 2:237) in her discussion of orgasm: “The modern woman wants to be made to 
vibrate. We reply: Madam, we haven’t got the time, and hygiene forbids it!” Actually, in this 
context, Markowitz’s own quotation might look somewhat less critical of the “Oriental” 
than she thinks—the “insouciant Oriental” seems more interested in sexual pleasure, pe-
riod, than in the use of sexual pleasure as a tool of domination.
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otherwise valuable work?73 Are Markowitz’s two passages about “the Orient” 
on the level of Beauvoir’s usage of “he,” where we might wish she’d said “he or 
she”—a surface irritant, which one can describe as “of its time”—or do they 
betray a deeper obtuseness against which readers must be warned? Perhaps 
the latter case can be made, but no one has taken the trouble to actually make 
it. What’s frustrating to me is that, while Markowitz does a fine job of explain­
ing the ideology she is taking issue with (the subject of her own earlier book), 
she does not do the textual work of connecting what she is against to Beau-
voir’s work, and she fails to see The Second Sex as a whole.
Instead, she makes Beauvoir responsible for all the faults of everyone she 
cites. But “cites respectfully” is not the right way to understand how Beauvoir 
uses Havelock Ellis, or sources generally, as I hope I’ve explained fully in chap­
ter 1. For instance, one place Beauvoir cites Ellis is a long footnote in the “Initia­
tion sexuelle” chapter listing a variety of objects that doctors have removed 
from women’s vaginas. Beauvoir’s point here is that, despite what Kinsey says 
about the lack of nerve endings in the vagina, women do, apparently, find 
enough sensation present there that some among them find it worthwhile to 
masturbate, using, um, a range of items.74 Maybe you didn’t want to know this; 
but I can’t find anything wrong with Beauvoir’s logic, her conclusion appears 
reasonable, and her “methodology” appears to value plain old empirical evi­
dence. If that is “outdated,” I don’t know what to say.
Actually, since the Kindle makes this so easy now, why not finish the job? 
The list of dildoids is one of nine references to Havelock Ellis in The Second Sex. 
All are very brief. In four, all she is interested in is the first person narrative he 
has collected;75 in three others, she uses his statistics;76 the last one refers very 
73 This question cuts both ways: as I discussed above regarding Debra Bergoffen’s work, is it 
fair to pull out a few passages one likes and agrees with, and develop them into an inter­
pretation one then labels as “Beauvoir”?
74 DS 2:149.
75 She quotes a patient he calls Zenia to the effect that the noise of a jet of water was sexually 
exciting (DS 2:22); one of the cases Stekel analyses (Florrie) was originally Ellis’s case 
(2:23); at 2:198, there is a reference to “the homosexuals’ confessions collected by Ellis and 
Stekel” [les confessions d’inverties … qu’ont recueillies Havelock Ellis et Stekel]—from 
both, she uses only the first­person quotation; at 2:206, one of the stories Havelock Ellis 
recounts concerns “a subject … who detested her mother throughout her childhood” [Un 
des sujets dont Havelock Ellis raconte l’histoire et qui avait détesté sa mère pendant toute 
son enfance] and how this influenced the girl’s first lesbian experience.
76 At DS 2:50, his results show that more girls want to be boys than boys want to be girls, and 
this is followed up with a corroborating result from a more qualitative study done by 
someone else. At 2:68 she discusses a survey he cites that “out of 125 American high school 
students thirty­six at the time of their first period knew absolutely nothing of the ques­
tion, and thirty­nine had vague ideas…. Ellis cites the case of a young girl who threw 
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briefly to a concept he called “undinism,” a term that, indeed, one rarely hears 
nowadays (it never caught on), but all it means is “urinary eroticism,” which 
still exists, from what I read on the internet.77 Furthermore, Ellis’s legacy to 
sexology and gay liberation is a mixed one, as Markowitz herself notes: he had 
some dumb ideas, and also some better ones (and his ideas about “inversion” 
look different, and better, in the age of “trans” than they did twenty years ago). 
But it hardly seems worth dwelling on that here, since Beauvoir’s “use” of Ellis 
is actually quite cursory. As with Stekel, she seems to have mined him for infor­
mation rather than taken him as a mentor or guide. The only thing she quotes 
from him that might rise to the status of an actual idea is the statement that 
there is more rape inside marriage than outside of it:78 this has nothing to do 
with an evolutionary view of race, or with race at all.
And what does “cites respectfully” mean, exactly? If all of us were to blame for 
all the faults of everyone whose work we cited, who among us would ’scape 
whipping? Following out Penelope Deutscher’s nice metaphor of Beauvoir’s 
eclectic assemblage of theorists as a dinner party where the guests don’t get 
along:79 suppose I invite Heidegger to my party (or, suppose my boyfriend asks if 
he can bring him along and I say, oh well, ok). Am I then personally responsible 
herself into the Seine in Saint­Ouen because she thought she had an ‘unknown disease’” 
[D’après une enquête rapportée en 1896 par Havelock Ellis, sur 125 élèves d’une “high­
school” américaine, 36 au moment de leurs premières règles ne savent absolument rien 
sur la question, 39 avaient de vagues connaissances…. H. Ellis cite le cas d’une jeune fille 
qui s’est jetée dans la Seine à Saint­Ouen parce qu’elle se croyait atteinte d’une “maladie 
inconnue.”] (Others cited on this point include Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein, and a 
memoir by Beauvoir’s friend Colette Audry). At 2:248, he is quoted as saying that there are 
more rapes inside than outside of marriage [“Il y a certainement plus de viols commis 
dans le mariage que hors du mariage,” dit Havelock Ellis], and lower down the page he is 
cited as objective support for the misery of women’s sexual initiation: “In England, Ellis 
reports, a woman asked six intelligent, married, middle­class women about their reac­
tions on their wedding night: for all of them, intercourse was a shock.” [En Angleterre, 
rapporte Havelock Ellis, une dame demanda à six femmes mariées de la classe moyenne, 
intelligentes, leur réaction pendant la nuit de noces: pour toutes le coït était survenu 
comme un choc; deux d’entre elles ignoraient tout; les autres croyaient savoir mais n’en 
furent pas moins psychiquement blessées.]
77 This occurs in the chapter on narcissism: another footnote says a case of Dalbiez “con­
firms Havelock Ellis’s ideas of the relation between narcissism and what he calls ‘un­
dinism,’ that is, a certain urinary eroticism” [ce qui confirme les idées d’Havelock Ellis sur 
le rapport entre le narcissisme et ce qu’il nomme “ondinisme,” c’est­à­dire un certain éro­
tisme urinaire (DS 2:526)]. “As we now know,” Ellis was drawing on the authority of per­
sonal experience here. See Phyllis Grosskurth, Havelock Ellis: A Biography, 365–66.
78 DS 2:248.
79 Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance, 
11–13.
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for everything he says at the table? Everything he says at my table, maybe that’s 
fair, unless I say something back to him about it at the time.80 But everything else 
he ever said ever?81 And his friends? And with respect to her use of Hegel: is there 
any twentieth­century critical theorist who wasn’t, on some level, friends with 
Hegel?82 Do we have to throw out all of standpoint theory, too?83
So Beauvoir should not have used Ellis and Hegel; Second Wave feminists 
should not have used Beauvoir; I should not use those Second Wave feminists; 
students now, presumably, should not use me. What a relief: the reading list is 
now much, much shorter! No, this can’t be right. This can’t be what Markowitz 
means.
But what is to be feared if these things are not pointed out? That the young­
er generation will be corrupted by tainted discourses? It still does not seem 
possible to treat Simone de Beauvoir as a thinker, rather than as a mother who 
80 Beauvoir is very clear that many of Hegel’s ideas were repugnant to her, in The Second Sex, 
in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, in her memoirs…. Markowitz does not engage with this, 
or with the considerable secondary scholarship on the question.
81 I’m channeling the flap occasioned in continental philosophy circles by the publication 
of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks. A prominent Heideggerian resigns, and people go, why 
resign only now? We knew that. The issue is how thoroughgoing was Heidegger’s anti­
Semitism. Some people privilege the private texts in deciding that; others feel just the 
opposite; some even feel that what Heidegger did personally during the war actually mat­
ters, too. See Sarah Bakewell, At The Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cock-
tails with Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jas-
pers, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Others.
82 See for instance Susan Buck­Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, 15: “[W]e need to 
consider not only Hegel’s Haiti, but Haiti’s Hegel, that is, the Afro­Caribbean reception of 
Hegel that claims him as their own. [Nick] Nesbitt has traced this legacy through the work 
of Aimé Césaire, whose influential conception of négritude, referring to the African dias­
pora’s self­understanding based on ‘a common experience of subjugation and enslave­
ment,’ considers the slave’s self­liberation in the Haitian revolution as ‘emblematic.’ Cé­
saire recalled to Nesbitt personally his youthful excitement in discovering Hippolyte’s 
new translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology (1941). ‘When the French translation of the 
Phenomenology came out, I showed it to Senghor, and said to him “Listen to what Hegel 
says, Léopold: to arrive at the Universal, one must immerse oneself in the particular!”’ 
Césaire understood that the truly productive, ‘universal’ experience of reading Hegel is 
not through a summary of the total and totalizing system, but through the liberation that 
one’s own imagination can achieve by encountering dialectical thinking in its most con­
crete exemplification.” Buck­Morss’s citation is to Nesbitt, Voicing Memory: History and 
Subjectivity in French Caribbean Literature, 120.
83 Actually, much as I like it, the dinner party analogy is a bit misleading: it wasn’t people 
Beauvoir invited to dinner, it was ideas. And most powerful ideas (good and bad) have 
more than one parent: Markowitz and many others derive the racism in philosophy from 
Hegel, a recent Aeon article derives it just as convincingly from Kant (Bryan Van Norden, 
“Why the Western Philosophical Canon is Xenophobic and Racist”).
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is required to be either perfect or terrible. What accounts for this lack of gener­
osity, I think, is the belief that policing the purity of others will guarantee our 
own. But that is magical thinking. Markowitz announces rather smugly that 
Beauvoir seems “all but unaware of her own orientalism.”84 Like Freud or 
Stekel: “I brought her to admit…” Aha! A racist moment! Is the project simply 
to catch people out? Wasn’t there a different project? Is it comprehensible to 
speak of collaborating with writers of the past? Of working in coalition with 
them?
But there I go again using the dated language of the shared “project.” Mar­
kowitz seems really to be against the whole idea of “progress,” the underlying 
optimism of The Second Sex that things for women are getting better, that we’re 
almost there. She’s quite snide about this, as though we all agree it was a stupid 
idea. I really don’t know what to say about this. Would a feminism that didn’t 
think things for women were once worse, had gotten better, were getting bet­
ter, would get better, could get better, really be feminism? I must be missing 
something.
Anyhow, I almost want to ask Markowitz the question I asked Spelman: who 
do you think “we” are? The fact is, there is no reason to regard a view of “the 
East” or “the Orient” as somehow behind or belated or defective or lesser as 
“dated.” There are plenty of people who believe it now. (Many of them have 
guns.) So what is actually happening is that Markowitz is asserting the exis­
tence of a feminist vanguard, or rather, asserting that she is a member of it, that 
Beauvoir is not, and that I am not. Presumably that’s what’s bugging me, sorry, 
that’s really dopey. Isn’t there also something kind of silly, though, about criti­
cizing Beauvoir for being embedded in a Hegelian teleology of human progress 
which we have “gotten beyond,” since that statement is itself couched in a rath­
er Hegelian and teleological way….85 And now I’m being meta­silly, since that 
kind of “you’re doing what you accuse X of” is easy and boring. Of course what 
Markowitz means to do is to condemn the specifics of that part of Hegel’s ac­
count which are racist, and the triumphalist progress narrative which those 
specifics are mobilized to justify. I condemn those too. But so did Beauvoir.
Now, I am very far from the first to notice about the term “orientalism” that 
the more different kinds of work it is mobilized to do, the less it can actually 
accomplish. As Said himself pointed out in an earlier essay, “Traveling Theory,” 
84 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams,” 278.
85 The locus classicus for this kind of thing is Julia Kristeva’s “Women’s Time,” which … now 
looks terribly … dated … OK, I can’t help it, either.
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“a breakthrough can become a trap.”86 When Markowitz says that a “postcolo­
nial” reading of Beauvoir is in tension with a more “philosophical” reading, I 
think she means (and this is a fair criticism) that philosophical readings have 
attended insufficiently to the political history of concepts. But her own reading 
also fails to do so. The power of Edward Said’s analysis was that he linked a 
system of ideas, beliefs, ways of seeing and thinking—“orientalism”—to an 
economic and political system, colonialism/imperialism, which involved the 
violent extraction of resources from whole sets of people, the institution of 
regimes of terror, etc., for which a set of ideas about “civilization,” “barbarism,” 
“progress,” and so on served as an excuse. (This is Fanon’s point, too: colonial­
ism is not a thinking­machine.)87 Of course the two are connected: otherwise 
there would be no point in intervening on the level of ideas at all. But an ap­
proach like Markowitz’s here abandons the material for the discursive, and 
then polices the discursive at the level of language. Beauvoir’s explicit and 
principled analysis of and opposition to the practices of colonialism become 
irrelevant, compared to her failure to cleanse herself from certain unpleasant 
Hegelian turns of phrase, employed in the course of speaking about something 
else. This is not, I don’t think, what Said had in mind.88
86 Said, “Traveling Theory,” 56. It was something of a surprise to me to realize that this essay, 
whose title phrase has had such resonance in post­colonial studies, actually (if you look) 
deals with French and British responses to the work of Georg Lukács … and the follow­up 
piece, “Traveling Theory Reconsidered,” explores Lukács’s possible and salutary impact 
on the thinking of Frantz Fanon. A similarly nuanced uptake of Foucault’s underlying 
point is visible in Said’s work on Conrad.
87 Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, 66. One might say that the distinction I’m making between 
orientalism as a set of enabling tropes and colonialism as an economic and political sys­
tem is parallel to the distinction between individual racism and institutional racism, 
which according to Alison Jaggar was first made by Stokely Carmichael and Michael Ham­
ilton in Black Power in 1967. (Jaggar, “Philosophical Challenges of Gender Justice,” 5.)
88 To criticize a writer for “participating in a discourse” that one finds problematic is also a 
fundamental misapplication of what Foucault meant by “discourse.” Ursula Tidd (Gender 
and Testimony, 154) gives, at greater length, the quotation from the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality I’ve referenced several times already: “[W]e must not imagine a world 
of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between 
the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive ele­
ments that can come into play in various strategies…. Discourses are not once and for all 
subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make 
allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an in­
strument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling­block, a point of re­
sistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces 
power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it” (Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume One, an Introduction, 100–
101). [Il ne faut pas imaginer un monde de discours partagé entre le discours reçu et le 
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In my discussion of “the Spelman moment,” above, I argued that it was un­
fair then to set Simone de Beauvoir up as a scapegoat for second wave occlu­
sions of race. I think it’s just as unfair now to set her up as a scapegoat for oc­
clusions of colonialism.
OK, but what about the harem? What about the harem? What about the 
harem?
3 Harem Trouble
While Markowitz’s two isolated quotations were clearly chosen for their shock 
value, a better starting point for this discussion is probably Beauvoir’s use of 
the figure of the “harem woman” as a counterpoint to “the Western woman of 
today.” I’ve already said, in my discussion of Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, 
that Beauvoir’s emphasis there was more on “enfermée” (locked up) than on 
“harem.” But as I promised, I want to return and trace the development of this 
figure through Beauvoir’s work.89 Markowitz’s article takes us back to a famil­
iar story from La force de l’âge, which happened during the Second World War, 
while Sartre was on leave from the army:
Gallimard had just brought out [Sartre’s] The Imaginary. There Sartre in­
dicated the theory of néantisation which he was working to deepen. In 
the moleskin notebooks where he took notes on his day to day life along 
with a heap of reflections upon himself and his past, he was sketching a 
philosophy; he expounded the main points to me one evening as we were 
walking around near the Gare du Nord; the streets were bare and humid 
and I had a sense of irremediable desolation; I had too greatly desired the 
discours exclu ou entre le discours dominant et celui qui est dominé; mais comme une 
multiplicité d’éléments discursifs qui peuvent jouer dans des stratégies diverses …. Les 
discours, pas plus que les silences, ne sont une fois pour toutes soumis au pouvoir ou 
dressés contre lui. Il faut admettre un jeu complexe et instable où le discours peut être à 
la fois instrument et effet de pouvoir, mais aussi obstacle, butée, point de résistance et 
départ pour une stratégie opposée. Le discours véhicule et produit du pouvoir; il le ren­
force mais aussi le mine, l’expose, le rend fragile et permet de le barrer (La volonté de 
savoir: histoire de la sexualité volume 1, 133).]
89 Again, I must apologize for long quotations, which are necessary since I’m arguing that 
points were taken out of context; and I also apologize for going over ground that has been 
very well addressed by Patricia Moynagh (“Beauvoir on Lived Reality, Exemplary Validity, 
and a Method for Political Thought,” 16–17), by Sonia Kruks (Retrieving Experience: Subjec-
tivity and Recogition in Feminist Politics, 35), and by others. Markowitz quotes only the last 
five sentences of this passage, in Kruks’ translation, which differs slightly from mine.
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absolute and suffered from its absence not to recognize in myself that 
useless project toward Being which Being and Nothingness describes. But 
what a sad deception, this endlessly vain seeking, begun over and over 
without end, where existence consumes itself! In the days that followed 
we discussed some particular problems, especially the relation between 
situation and freedom. I maintained that, from the point of view of free­
dom as Sartre defined it—not a stoical resignation but an active dépasse-
ment of the given—situations are not equivalent. What dépassement is 
possible for the woman shut up in a harem? Even this imprisonment, 
there are different ways of living it, Sartre said to me. I dug in my heels for 
quite a while and only gave in half­heartedly. At bottom, I was right; but 
to defend my position, I would have needed to abandon the terrain of 
individualist, idealist morality.90
This paragraph is justly famous among Beauvoir scholars, partly because it 
seems to be one of the earliest sketches of feminist argument Beauvoir attri­
butes to her younger self, partly because many commentators have seen it as a 
sign of how much better of a social and political thinker she was than Sartre, 
and how her idea of situation, which would be central to The Second Sex, in 
some ways preceded his interest in political engagement after the war. Beau­
voir’s use of “the woman in a harem” is a way of arguing that all situations are 
not alike and that not all subjects are practically free, even though theoretical 
freedom may be the heart of what it means to be human. Without the under­
standing that situations are different, and that situations matter, no under­
standing of oppression, indeed no politics at all, is possible; without this shift, 
90 “L’imaginaire venait enfin de paraître chez Gallimard. Sartre y indiquait la théorie de la 
‘néantisation’ qu’il était en train d’approfondir. Sur les carnets de moleskine où il notait sa 
vie au jour le jour, ainsi qu’un tas de réflexions sur lui­même et sur son passé, il ébauchait 
une philosophie; il m’en exposa les grandes lignes, un soir où nous rodions du côté de la 
Gare du Nord; les rues étaient noires et humides et j’eus une impression d’irrémédiable 
désolation; j’avais trop souhaité l’absolu et souffert de son absence pour ne pas reconnaî­
tre en moi cet inutile projet vers l’être que décrit L’être et le néant; mais quelle triste du­
perie, cette recherche indéfiniment vaine, indéfiniment recommencée où se consume 
l’existence! Les jours suivants, nous discutâmes certains problèmes particuliers et surtout 
le rapport de la situation et de la liberté. Je soutenais que, du point de vue de la liberté, 
telle que Sartre la définissait—non pas résignation stoïcienne mais dépassement actif du 
donné—les situations ne sont pas équivalentes: quel dépassement est possible à la 
femme enfermée dans un harem? Même cette claustration, il y a différentes manières de 
la vivre, me disait Sartre. Je m’obstinai longtemps et je ne cédai que du bout des lèvres. Au 
fond, j’avais raison. Mais pour défendre ma position, il m’aurait fallu abandonner le ter­
rain de la morale individualiste, donc idéaliste, sur lequel nous nous placions” (La force de 
l’âge, hereinafter FA, 498–99).
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none of Beauvoir’s social and political analysis (or Sartre’s) could have 
happened.
But why did she need to situate the oppression of women elsewhere, bring­
ing up the figure of the Other woman, in order for it to become visible? Here’s 
what Markowitz says about the appearance of this figure in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté:
So the child, the slave, the “Mohammedan woman enclosed in a harem” 
can be said to be free in only the most attenuated of senses, while the 
Western woman of today, whose changed situation is accompanied by a 
new awareness and new possibilities, consents to her unfreedom in a way 
the others do not. Although The Second Sex, written soon after, may 
equivocate somewhat on the matter, it suggests that the “Western women 
of today” and “the Mohammedan woman enclosed in a harem” have 
something important in common after all: both have female bodies, and 
so both are viewed as the other by the men of their group. But Beauvoir 
also insists on a crucial difference between them. Even as she comes to 
embody the ideal of feminine difference, the bourgeois Western woman 
has a correspondingly more developed idea of what it means to be a free, 
autonomous subject.91
Now, I may be being obtuse here, but it is very hard for me to see what Mar­
kowitz wishes Beauvoir had done. To Spelman’s complaint that Beauvoir only 
discusses women of her own race, nationality and class and generalizes from 
that about “Woman,” Markowitz adds the complaint that when she does dis­
cuss women of color, she describes their situation as different from her own. 
But it was.
She could hardly have turned to Sartre and said, “you’re wrong because you 
are more free than I am.” It would not have been true, and she knew it. She was, 
at that young point in their individual histories, at least as free, and probably 
more so—as she later explains, he was more tied than she to expectations of 
91 There’s a slippage in Markowitz’s paraphrase from what Beauvoir actually said—“what 
freedom is possible”—a difference in the actual, material situation—to how the two 
women thought about their different situations. Markowitz continues: “The Second Sex, 
moreover, suggests that this idea and the material conditions that make it possible have 
developed through the evolution of man—that is, of Western man, who increasingly re­
quires his companion to be not merely an object of pleasure, but another free being, a 
version of himself if not quite his equal.” She references the same passage she quoted 
above, without further support or analysis.
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bourgeois masculine adulthood that he experienced as constraining.92 Plus, he 
was actually in the army, in time of war.93 What freedom was available to a 
Catholic girl from an haut­bourgeois family, who had fought her way out, and 
was earning her own living and enjoying her sexuality just as she liked? Actu­
ally, quite a bit. When Beauvoir implied that women in other parts of the world 
were less free than she was, that was an accurate statement, and also, in so far 
as it showed awareness of her own privilege, it was a politically progressive 
thing to say. The issue is not race or nationality, but the fact that some people 
(including some people who happen to be women) have more agency than 
others, and thus (since ought implies can) more ethical responsibility.94 The 
passage from Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté draws attention to differences 
among women, rather than papering them over.95 (As I discussed when I anal­
ysed this passage at the end of chapter 3, those differences are not reducible to 
simple identity categories: some modern European women are not free, some 
Muslim women may be free, although which Muslim women these are, and 
how we can tell, remains unclear.)
92 “On this point, there was a big difference between Sartre and myself. It seemed to me 
miraculous to have pulled away from my past, to be self­sufficient, making my own deci­
sions; I had won my autonomy once and for all; nothing could take that away. As for Sar­
tre, he was simply reaching the stage of a man’s existence that he had long foreseen with 
disgust; he had lost the irresponsibility of early youth and was entering the detestable 
universe of the adults. His independence was in danger. First, he would be constrained for 
eighteen months to a soldier’s life; then the professoriate lay in wait.” [Sur ce point, il y 
avait une grande différence entre Sartre et moi. Il me semblait miraculeux de m’être ar­
rachée à mon passé, de me suffire, de décider de moi; j’avais conquis une fois pour toutes 
mon autonomie: rien ne me l’ôterait. Sartre, lui, ne faisait qu’accéder à un stade de son 
existence d’homme qu’il avait depuis longtemps prévu, avec dégoût; il venait de perdre 
l’irresponsabilité de la première jeunesse; il entrait dans l’univers, détestable, des adultes. 
Son indépendance était menacée. D’abord, il allait être astreint à dix­huit mois de vie 
militaire; ensuite le professorat le guettait (FA 29–30).] Beauvoir would also explain his 
later episode of hallucinatory depression along the same lines (FA 243–45).
93 As we know from Three Guineas, there are ways full citizenship can be constraining, espe­
cially in wartime, ways from which women (because they are not full citizens) are ironi­
cally free.
94 So, at the founding moment of “situation,” we find, not “Woman,” but an intersectional 
account. What has been taken as an “orientalist” perception of “differences” results from 
not wanting to generalize her own position.
95 One could understand Beauvoir’s initial hesitation to write a book about women in the 
same light: with respect to her own situation, being a woman did not seem all that 
interesting—it hadn’t made much of a difference to her own life chances; but the situ­
ation of women in the world, yes, she could write about that. See FCh 1:135–36 and 
Kruks, “Living on Rails.”
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Without some way of distinguishing between the different situations of dif­
ferent women, Beauvoir would have been trapped within an early Sartrean po­
sition of voluntarism, which could only have led to blanket victim­blaming 
and/or the rather, I want to say American, individual solution: I did it, what’s 
the matter with you? (Why don’t you lean in?) By deploying the figure of the 
“harem woman,” Beauvoir is able to avoid blaming all women for not having 
practically emancipated themselves in the way she herself has done. Far from 
being a carefree and unconscious expression of European bourgeois superior­
ity, it is an admission of privilege, and a refusal to let her own situation stand 
for the situation of all women, let alone all people. It is as if she were saying to 
Sartre, “sure, you and I can do it—but that doesn’t mean everyone can, and a 
purely theoretical abstract freedom is actually not much use to people who are 
actually suffering.”96
Markowitz says, “Although The Second Sex, written soon after, may equivo­
cate somewhat on the matter,” and then proceeds to take the Pour une morale 
de l’ambiguïté passage as “Beauvoir.” But as we saw, Beauvoir professed herself 
very dissatisfied with Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, by reason of its abstrac­
tion: “It was absurd to pretend one could define an ethics independent of so­
cial context.”97 And it does seem fair to grant theorists the right to evolve in 
their thinking. Let’s see if she did any better in The Second Sex.
The most familiar reference to the “harem” in The Second Sex occurs in the 
introduction, in a phrase that recalls the conversation she had with Sartre dur­
ing his leave; it comes in the discussion about the difference between happi­
ness and freedom.
But we do not confuse the idea of private interest with that of happiness. 
That is another point of view one often comes up against: aren’t women 
of the harem happier than a woman voter? Isn’t the housewife happier 
than the woman worker? It is not easy to know what the word “happy” 
really means, still less what authentic values might be behind it. There is 
no way to measure the happiness of others, and it is always easy to call 
“happy” the situation one wishes to impose on them….98
96 See Moynagh, “Beauvoir on Lived Reality,” 16–17; Kruks, “Living on Rails.”
97 “Il était aberrant de prétendre définir une morale en dehors d’un contexte social” (FCh 
1:99, FCirc 76, translation altered).
98 “Mais nous ne confondons pas non plus l’idée de l’intérêt privé avec celle de bonheur: c’est 
là un autre point de vue qu’on rencontre fréquemment; les femmes de harem ne sont­
elles pas plus heureuses qu’une électrice? La ménagère n’est­elle pas plus heureuse que 
l’ouvrière? On ne sait trop ce que le mot bonheur signifie et encore moins quelles valeurs 
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If you diagram this in your head, the harem woman is being set up as a par­
allel to the housewife (two examples of immanence), the woman voter to the 
working woman (two examples of transcendence). This has remarkably little 
to do with the oriental way of life as different from or opposite to “our” way. The 
contrast, rather, is between two mystifications about women as happy in their 
subjection, and two examples of women as subjects, as who they are in and for 
themselves, or at least, could be. And please note that, unlike in Pour une mo-
rale de l’ambiguïté, the comment about women in harems is attributed speech, 
and it is speech attributed to an interlocutor with whom she does not agree.
Notice also another change. In the misty conversation with Sartre, the ques­
tion was whether the harem woman is as free as the abstract human individu­
al. By the introduction to The Second Sex, the abstract human individual has 
been abandoned—as she said in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, he exists nulle 
part, nowhere.99 So the question is whether the harem woman or the house­
wife is happier than une électrice—a brand­new coinage, by the way100—and 
the answer is, that’s so abstract I won’t answer it. In fact, sir, your bad faith in 
posing this question is so palpable that I will not lower myself to discuss it 
further.
It is interesting that Markowitz quotes the rather muddy distinction drawn 
in an early work with which Beauvoir professed herself dissatisfied, rather 
than this one which (at least to my eyes) is clearer, from a work Beauvoir was 
willing to stand by until the end of her life. Who exactly is “equivocating” here?
But this is not the end of Arab women in The Second Sex.
Probably only the most obsessive readers will recall a related passage from 
chapter three of the history section, where the condition of “the Muslim wom­
an, veiled and shut in,” is contrasted to the freer life of the “bédouine.” This 
occurs in the course of Beauvoir’s unfolding argument about the relationship 
between the history of women and the history of property. In between the 
Greeks and the Jews, we find the following:
When family and private patrimonial property remain the uncontested 
bases of society, women also remain totally alienated. This is what 
authentiques il recouvre; il n’y a aucune possibilité de mesurer le bonheur d’autrui et il est 
toujours facile de déclarer heureuse la situation qu’on veut lui imposer” (DS 1:30–1).
99 “[U]niversal, absolute Man exists nowhere” [l’Homme universel, absolu, n’existe nulle 
part (pma 162, EA 112)]. One reason why the Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté passage, as 
Nancy Bauer and I agree, is really a bit of a mess, is that she could not fully follow through 
on this insight: she was still wrestling with Hegel’s ghost.
100 French women voted for the first time in 1945. Recall the controversy over votes for wom­
en, and for “les indigènes,” in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.
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occurred in the Muslim world. Its structure is feudal, which is to say that 
there has never emerged a state strong enough to subdue and unite the 
different tribes; no power holds in check that of the patriarchal chieftain. 
The religion that emerged when the Arab people were warriors and con­
querors displayed the most extreme scorn for woman. “Men rule over 
women by virtue of the qualities through which God has endowed them 
with pre­eminence, and because they give women dowries,” says the Ko­
ran; she has never enjoyed either actual power or mystical prestige. The 
Bedouin woman does hard labor, she handles the plow and bears heavy 
loads: in this way she establishes a bond of reciprocal dependence with 
her husband; she circulates freely with uncovered face. The veiled and 
confined Muslim woman is still today, at most levels of society, a kind of 
slave. I recall in a village of cavedwellers in Tunisia an underground hol­
low where four women were squatting on their haunches: the old wife, 
one­eyed and toothless, her face horribly ravaged, was cooking some 
cakes on a small brazier, surrounded by acrid smoke; two other wives, 
slightly younger but almost as disfigured, were rocking babies in their 
arms, one of them breastfeeding; a young idol, magnificently decked out 
with silk, gold and silver, was seated at the loom, knotting strands of wool. 
As I was leaving this melancholy cavern—the realm of immanence, both 
womb and tomb—I crossed paths, in the tunnel that led back up to the 
light, with the Male, dressed in shining white, smiling and sunny. Return­
ing from the market, where he had discussed the business of the world 
with the other men, he would spend a few hours in this retreat, which 
was his at the heart of a vast universe to which he belonged, from which 
it did not separate him. For the old withered women, for the young bride 
doomed to the same decline, there was no universe apart from the smoky 
cave from which they only emerge only at night, silent and veiled.101
101 “Quand la famille et le patrimoine privé demeurent sans contestation les bases de la so­
ciété, la femme demeure aussi totalement aliénée. C’est ce qui s’est produit dans le monde 
musulman. La structure en est féodale, c’est­à­dire qu’il n’est pas apparu d’État assez fort 
pour unifier et soumettre les différentes tribus: aucun pouvoir ne tient en échec celui du 
chef patriarcal. La religion qui s’est créée au moment où le peuple arabe était guerrier et 
conquérant a affiché pour la femme le plus total mépris. ‘Les hommes sont supérieurs aux 
femmes à cause des qualités par lesquelles Dieu leur a donné la prééminence et aussi 
parce qu’ils dotent les femmes,’ dit le Koran; elle n’a jamais détenu ni pouvoir réel ni pres­
tige mystique. La Bédouine travaille durement, elle manie la charrue et porte des fardeaux: 
par là elle établit avec son époux un lien de dépendance réciproque; elle sort librement, à 
visage découvert. La Musulmane voilée et enfermée est encore aujourd’hui dans la plu­
part des couches de la société une sorte d’esclave. Je me rappelle dans un village troglo­
dyte de Tunisie une caverne souterraine où quatre femmes étaient accroupies: la vieille 
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Now, some may wish to debate Beauvoir’s reading of the Koran, just as some 
would balk at her readings of the Old and New Testament, which are just as 
negative if not more so.102 The description of strong tribes and weak states 
probably makes more sense for some places and times than for others. And for 
the twentieth century, there is now available a wide variety of emic accounts of 
Muslim women’s seclusion, which present a variety of opinions: many of them 
don’t mesh with this one, though some do, in whole or part.103 But given that 
épouse borgne, édentée, au visage horriblement ravagé, faisait cuire des pâtes sur un petit 
brasier au milieu d’une âcre fumée; deux épouses un peu plus jeunes mais presque aussi 
défigurées berçaient des enfants dans leurs bras: l’une d’elles allaitait; assise devant un 
métier à tisser une jeune idole merveilleusement parée de soie, d’or et d’argent nouait 
des brins de laine. En quittant cet antre sombre—royaume de l’immanence, matrice et 
tombeau— j’ai croisé dans le corridor qui montait vers la lumière le mâle vêtu de blanc, 
éclatant de propreté, souriant, solaire. Il revenait du marché où il avait causé avec d’autres 
hommes des affaires du monde; il passerait quelques heures dans cette retraite qui était 
sienne au cœur du vaste univers auquel il appartenait, dont il n’était pas séparé. Pour les 
vieillardes flétries, pour la jeune mariée vouée à la même rapide déchéance, il n’y avait 
pas d’autre univers que la cave enfumée d’où elles ne sortaient qu’à la nuit, silencieuses et 
voilées” (DS 1:139–40).
102 The Koran is briefly mentioned three times; the New and Old Testament are discussed 
voluminously, in many sections. The same proportion holds for Islam generally. For in­
stance, when making a general argument that the transcendence offered to women by 
religion is a mystification, she notes that “[a]mong others, for Jews, Muslims, and Chris­
tians, man is the master by divine right” [Entre autres chez les Juifs, les mahométans, les 
chrétiens, l’homme est le maître par le droit divin (DS 2:514)]. But in the page of condem­
nation that follows to illustrate the point, her examples are all drawn from Catholicism. 
Should we complain about the negative attitude toward Islam, since there are versions of 
Islam that would not support this view? but there are also more woman­friendly forms of 
Judaism and Christianity than Beauvoir ever acknowledges. Or, should we object that the 
treatment of the three traditions is uneven, and demand “equal time” for other traditions? 
That might make sense, if one disregarded how unrelentingly negative the discussions of 
the Western traditions are. Christianity is described as promising women greater freedom 
in theory, but then instantly taking it away and making things worse for women (and ev­
eryone) by its antagonism to sexuality and to the body. As I said above about the attention 
paid to bourgeois women: It is, I agree, important what people talk about more and what 
they talk about less, or don’t talk about, but not to the point where we should ignore what 
they say.
103 See Andrea Duranti, “Becoming ‘Woman’ in the Muslim World: Echoes of Simone de 
Beauvoir’s Thinking.” Duranti references the work of Assia Djebar, Fatima Mernissi, Leila 
Marouane, Malika Mokeddem, Azar Nafisi, and Shirin Ebadi; his strongest example, to my 
mind, is Nawal El­Saadawi, whose Woman at Point Zero is a paradigmatic existentialist 
novel, and whose account of the transition to Islam in the book that was translated as The 
Hidden Face of Eve parallels Beauvoir’s account. I would add Marnia Lazreg to his list (see 
discussion below).
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Beauvoir’s account was written in the 1940s, and that her sources appear to 
have been limited, I want to draw attention to several points.
First, the Arab world is not handled differently from other traditions or parts 
of the world. It is offered as an example, among others, of her general point 
that women’s status tracks with questions of private property. What follows 
this passage also tracks a similarity rather than a difference: “The Jews of Bibli­
cal times had more or less the same customs as the Arabs. The patriarchs were 
polygamous.”104 A bit later, speaking of fourth­century Athens—the cradle of 
Western philosophy—she says that “there was no great difference between the 
gynaeceum and a harem,” and details the iniquities of the Athenian system of 
inheritance—“the epikleros was not a female heir but only a machine to pro­
create a male heir.”105
The customs of the Greeks are very similar to Oriental ones; however, 
they do not practice polygamy. No one knows exactly why…. [T]he reality 
was that the Greek citizen still enjoyed all the comforts of polygamy, 
since he could find ways to satisfy his appetites with the prostitutes of the 
city or the women servants of the gynaeceum itself. “We have hetairas for 
spiritual pleasures,” says Demosthenes, “pallakes for sensual pleasure, 
and wives to give us sons.”106
Second, she speaks to differences between Arab women, based on different rela­
tions to labor and property—the distinction between the “bédouine” and the 
shut­in woman is strikingly similar to the distinction between the French peas­
ant and the French bourgeoise as I discussed it earlier. The “hole” in which the 
Muslim women live is the “realm of immanence,” a term that in the second vol­
ume will be mainly associated with the bourgeois apartment inhabited by the 
miserable “femme d’intérieur.”107 Moreover, Beauvoir’s is a realist, materialist 
104 “Les juifs de l’époque biblique ont à peu près les mêmes mœurs que les Arabes. Les patri­
arches sont polygames” (DS 1:140).
105 “[L]’épiclère n’était pas héritière mais seulement une machine à procréer un héritier” 
(DS 1:145).
106 “Les mœurs des Grecs demeurent très proches des mœurs orientales; cependant ils ne 
pratiquent pas la polygamie. On ne sait pas exactement pourquoi…. [E]n vérité, le citoyen 
grec demeurait agréablement polygame puisqu’il pouvait trouver chez les prostituées de 
la ville et chez les servantes du gynécée l’assouvissement de ses désirs. ‘Nous avons des 
hétaïres pour les plaisirs de l’esprit, dit Démosthène, des pallages pour le plaisir des sens, 
et des épouses pour nous donner des fils’” (DS 1:143–44).
107 Beauvoir’s use of the word “troglodyte” at first gave me pause (I’ve heard it used as an in­
sult for an uneducated or overly conservative person). But the French word turns out to 
mean simply, “dwelling in caves”: “Troglodyte: n.m. (du gr. trôglê, trou, et duein, entrer). 
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account and not eroticized, glamourized, or sensationalized. I mention this be­
cause the eighteenth­century orientalist discourses to which Markowitz (draw­
ing on the work of Alain Grosrichard) wants to assimilate The Second Sex were 
primarily erotic texts, written by and for Western men. The materialist account 
may, for all I know, be quite inaccurate (it’s hard to know what Beauvoir’s source 
would have been). But Arab treatment of women is explained, not by some in­
trinsic “oriental” difference, but by the persistence of a feudal structure of soci­
ety. This is not about racializing gender difference. It isn’t about race at all.
And there’s another way it’s not an abstraction: she connects her view to 
something she saw—not in “the Orient,” but in Tunisia—and she is upfront 
about this. Like the discussion in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté of the serious 
man’s chillingly callous joking about bad­smelling Arab midwives, the appear­
ance in that text of the “Musulmane enfermée au fond d’un harem” was related 
to something that happened while she was writing it, in the course of a solo 
trip she took to the Mahgreb. One advance of The Second Sex over Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté might seem to be that in the later work she comes out 
and says so, and just tells the story, abandoning the “empty maxims”108 of his­
torical or philosophical summary which were responsible for the muddled 
contortions around the figure of the harem woman in the earlier essay.
She gives an even clearer account of the incident in La force des choses. She’d 
been traveling in Tunisia, to do some lecturing sponsored by the Alliance Fran­
çaise, but mostly because she wanted to explore, as a tourist, a region she’d 
only glimpsed on previous trips, particularly the Sahara Desert and its oases.
At Médenine, the promised truck was waiting for me. I was the only pas­
senger. The driver must have known the Matmata road before it was dam­
aged in the war. In two or three places bridges had been blown up, but he 
managed to ford the wadis and brought me to that strange village where 
ten thousand people live under the ground. The market­place was a 
seething mass; nothing but men, draped in snowy burnouses, cheerfully 
chatting and gossiping; the dark, blue­eyed women, some young and 
beautiful, but dull­looking, were scattered at the bottom of the shafts 
which led to the caves; I visited one of these dens. Down the dark, smoky 
caverns I saw a horde of half­naked children, a toothless old woman, two 
Habitant des cavernes. // Nom que donnaient les géographes de l’Antiquité à un peuple 
qui se plaçaient au sud­est de l’Eygpte. //Oiseau passereau insectivore, nichant dans les 
trous des murs et des arbres, dans les buissons. (Long. 10 cm).” Petit Larousse, 1080.
108 “[J]’ai pris beaucoup de peine pour poser de travers une question à laquelle j’ai donné une 
réponse aussi creuse que les maximes kantiennes” (FCh 1:99, FCirc 76).
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neglected­looking women neither old nor young, and a pretty girl cov­
ered with jewelry who was weaving a carpet. As I came back up into the 
light, I passed the master of the house returning from the market, daz­
zling in his white burnous and gleaming with health. I pitied my sex.109
Now, in the memoir this clearly marks what we could call a moment of 
 solidarity—“J’ai plaint mon sexe”: plaindre can mean to pity, or it can mean, to 
sympathize. It’s not that she thinks she is the same as they are—she’s clearly 
not—but that there’s a point of connection. (There are many differences, but 
nonetheless some similarities.) The moment of solidarity does not explicitly 
appear, however, in either Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté passage or the pas­
sage in The Second Sex, though some readers seem to see it there.
Myself, I don’t see this quick moment of imaginative sympathy as sufficient 
to demonstrate either that Beauvoir saw with “Western eyes,” or that she didn’t. 
But it’s interesting that in the wider context of La force des choses, the encoun­
ter is surrounded by a distaste (as yet only mild) for the behavior of the French 
in the Maghreb.110 She met some quite odious “colons,” and also some who 
were more critical of the French presence, including her Alliance Française 
hosts, “M. and Mme. E.”; she also met some “modernized” Tunisian women.
The E.s regarded French policy in Tunisia as clumsy; they were in favor of 
a rapprochement between the French and Moslem middle classes. At 
their house I met Tunisian women dressed, made up, groomed and scent­
ed just like Parisiennes; they no longer wore veils except in the morning, 
to go to market; they were thirsty for freedom. Among the men, the young 
ones were in agreement with them; they resented having their fathers 
impose wives on them who were ignorant and unenlightened. No one 
109 “A Médenine, le camion promis m’attendait. J’étais l’unique passagère. Le chauffeur devait 
reconnaître la route des Matmata endommagée par la guerre. En deux ou trois endroits 
des ponts avaient sauté, mais il réussit à franchir les oueds et m’amena jusqu’au singulier 
village où dix mille personnes habitent sous terre. La place du marché grouillait; rien que 
des hommes, drapés dans des burnous neigeux, bavards et joyeux; les femmes, brunes, 
aux yeux bleus, parfois jeunes et belles, mais l’air morne, étaient disséminées au fond des 
puits sur lesquels donnaient des grottes; j’ai visité un de ces antres: dans de sombres ca­
vernes enfumées, j’ai vu une marmaille demi­nue, une vieille édentée, deux femmes entre 
deux âges, mal soignées, et une jolie fille couverte de bijoux qui tissait un tapis. En remon­
tant vers la lumière, j’ai croisé le maître du logis qui revenait du marché, resplendissant de 
blancheur et de santé. J’ai plaint mon sexe” (FCh 1:86, FCirc 66, translation altered).
110 For the whole account of that trip, see FCh 1:81–9, FCirc 62–8.
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had anything to tell me about the Franco­Tunisian situation in general, 
and I did not question them too closely.111
Perhaps the encounter with these “évoluées” accounts for the phrase “at most 
levels of society” in the sentence I quoted above: “The veiled and confined 
Muslim woman is still today, at most levels of society, a kind of slave.” The wom­
en confined to the cave do not necessarily stand in her mind for “the Arab 
world,” or at least, they do not stand alone in that. But as she describes that 
particular trip in the passage from La force des choses, any nascent social cri­
tique is still subordinated to the adventure of discovering a foreign land. It is 
not until the next trip that she will declare the old sort of tourism no longer 
possible.112
111 “Les E. trouvaient maladroite la politique de la France en Tunisie; ils souhaitaient un rap­
prochement entre les bourgeoisies française et musulmane. Je rencontrai chez eux des Tu­
nisiennes habillées, maquillées, coiffées et parfumées à la parisienne; elles ne portaient plus 
le voile que le matin, pour aller au marché; elles avaient soif de la liberté. Parmi les hom­
mes, les jeunes étaient d’accord avec elles; ils souffraient de se voir imposer par leur père 
des épouses ignorantes et mal éveillées. Sur l’ensemble de la question franco­ tunisienne, 
personne ne me renseigna et je n’insistai guère.” (FCh 1:83–4, FCirc 64).
Writing after her prise de conscience of the Algerian crisis, Beauvoir undoubtedly saw 
the problem of French rule more clearly in hindsight, but that is precisely her point: how 
could I not have noticed this? The overall arc of La force des choses documents the path 
toward greater awareness.
112 “At last I set out with Sartre for Algeria; we wanted sun, we loved the Mediterranean; it was 
a vacation, a pleasure trip; we would go touring, write, talk. One day Camus had said: ‘hap­
piness exists, and it’s important; why refuse it? You don’t make other people’s unhappi­
ness any worse by accepting it; it even helps you to fight for them. Yes,’ he had concluded, 
‘I find it sad the way everyone seems to feel ashamed of feeling happy nowadays.’ I agreed 
with him completely and the first morning I looked out of my room in the Hôtel Saint­
Georges at the blue sea with a light heart. But that afternoon we walked around the Cas­
bah, and I realized that tourism, as we had practiced it in the old days, was dead and 
buried; what had been picturesque before no longer seemed so: what we encountered 
now in these streets was misery and bitterness….
But Camus, now that I thought it over, had put the question badly; we weren’t refusing 
to feel happy, we just couldn’t.” [Enfin, je m’embarquai avec Sartre pour l’Algérie; nous 
souhaitions du soleil, nous aimions la Méditerranée; c’était des vacances, un voyage 
d’agrément: nous nous promènerions, nous écririons, nous causerions. Un jour, Camus 
nous avait dit: “Le bonheur, ça existe, ça compte; pourquoi le refuser? En l’acceptant, on 
n’aggrave pas le malheur des autres; et même, ça aide à lutter pour eux. Oui, avait­il con­
clu, je trouve regrettable cette honte qu’on éprouve aujourd’hui à se sentir heureux.” 
J’étais bien d’accord, et de ma chambre de l’hôtel Saint­Georges, le premier matin, je re­
gardai gaiement le bleu de la mer. Mais l’après­midi nous nous promenâmes dans la Cas­
bah et je compris que le tourisme, tel qu’autrefois nous l’avions pratiqué, était enterré; le 
pittoresque s’était décomposé: ce que nous rencontrions dans ces ruelles, c’était la misère 
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4 Theories and Histories
But in The Second Sex, the concreteness and presentness of the cave example 
also raises a problem: what is it doing in the history chapter? What century are 
we in? Are we talking about time or about place?
In fact this is part of a larger problem, which is partly (though only partly) 
due to Beauvoir’s (inconsistent) use of the “historical present” tense to narrate 
events which are clearly long past, such as Persian and Babylonian laws of in­
heritance and the behavior of Old Testament patriarchs and fourth­century 
Athenians.113 The problem begins in the sections on “prehistory,” and contin­
ues as she struggles to account for the transition to patriarchy, not from “matri­
archy” (she knows quite well and says that, pace Engels and the “élucubrations” 
of Bachofen, there was never any such thing), but from … well, from whatever 
human life was like before a settled relationship to property cemented men’s 
power over women and children, as part of consolidating their power over 
other sorts of objects and dominating the natural world.
What gets tricky is that some of this “before” is documented by reference to 
the life of “tribes” who persisted in that “earlier” way of life long enough for 
anthropologists to study them in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and 
for Lévi­Strauss to synthesize those findings into a general structuralist ac­
count of How Culture Works. An excellent piece by Françoise Héritier, teasing 
out the strands in these early “Histoire” chapters, establishes the difficulties 
Beauvoir had in fitting together what she had learned from Lévi­Strauss with a 
prior strain of thought Héritier describes as “évolutionniste,” a term which de­
scribes most of what Beauvoir would have found in the Bibliothèque nationale 
and in the library of the Musée de l’homme.114 Or rather, the piece establishes 
et la rancœur…. Mais Camus, réflexion faite, avait mal posé la question; nous ne refusions 
pas de nous sentir heureux, nous ne le pouvions pas (FCh 1:228, FCirc 173).]
113 Beauvoir’s use of tenses is inconsistent, to the point where I’ve given up the attempt to 
analyze it fully. What I can say is that some of what is most troubling in the history chap­
ters in terms of orientalism or evolutionism does involves tense shifts which makes it 
unclear—Beauvoir makes it unclear (let me be clear)—whether the ethnic descriptions 
do or don’t continue to apply.
The same tension can be found in Hegel’s Phenomenology: see Robert Pippin, “You 
Can’t Get There From Here: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.” In­
deed, that dislocating alternation between historical narrative and cultural description is 
traceable back as far as Herodotus, the inventor of the “ethnographic present,” on whom 
both Hegel and Beauvoir herself were drawing. But to explore that will require a separate 
paper.
114 Françoise Héritier, “Les communautés agricoles primitives,” in Galster, Le deuxième sexe: 
Le livre fondateur du féminisme moderne en situation. Another helpful feature of Héritier’s 
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the difficulties Beauvoir should have had, because as Héritier says, this major 
contradiction, so clear to us, Beauvoir simply seems not to see.115 It may be 
helpful to realize that Beauvoir was writing at the very moment of a paradigm 
shift (reading The Elementary Structures of Kinship right before it was pub­
lished). Also, as I noted above in my discussion of Leiris, the absence of ques­
tions of historical development from the structuralist account is both the 
greatest strength of that approach, and its blind spot.116
chapter is that, while noting that one cannot blame Beauvoir for not knowing what was 
not known (“Il va de soi qu’on ne saurait reprocher à Simone de Beauvoir de ne pas con­
naître ce qui était inconnu” [104]), it provides a short account of what is now known, 
which could be useful in teaching. One must tell the students what is wrong, so it is help­
ful to tell them also what is right: for instance, that most scholars now acknowledge the 
role of women in the discovery of agriculture; that Malinowski was wrong to assert that 
“primitive” societies were unaware of the male role in procreation.
The preceding chapter, by Nicole­Claude Mathieu, on “les hordes primitives,” is also 
excellent. And overall, Galster’s collection is a major contribution, both substantively and 
methodologically, and I regret that it has not been translated. As she explains in her 
“Présentation,” “The Second Sex is undoubtedly the most quoted book in modern femi­
nism. Still, have the 958 tightly­packed pages that make up the two volumes in the Collec­
tion Blanche edition always been carefully read? Fifty years after its first publication, it 
has seemed useful to set in motion a radical return to the text. To create the conditions for 
a precise and searching reading, we have submitted each chapter of this wide­ranging 
work—interdisciplinary before there was such a thing—to a researcher particularly well­
trained to investigate it.” [Le deuxième sexe est sans doute le livre le plus cité du féminisme 
moderne, mais a­t­on pour autant toujours bien lu les 958 pages serrées qui constituent 
les deux tomes dans la collection blanche? Cinquante ans après sa première publication, 
il a paru utile d’opérer un retour radical sur le texte. Pour créer les conditions d’une lec­
ture précise et pénétrante, on a soumis chaque chapitre de cette œuvre abondante et 
pluridisciplinaire avant la lettre à une chercheuse ou un chercheur particulièrement bien 
armé pour s’en occuper (11).]
115 Héritier, “Les communautés agricoles primitives,” 107.
116 Héritier concludes her discussion of the chapter Galster assigned her: “Certainly, Simone 
de Beauvoir’s argumentation is full of errors. Certainly she writes in this chapter a ‘grand 
narrative’ which is not true. Certainly, she loses the trail, blinded as she was (as we all are) 
by images [représentations], in philosophy as much as everyday life, which were (and still 
are) current and function as though they were certainties. And nonetheless, at the end of 
the day, there stands a stubborn and illuminating truth. And this is the paradox for us, to 
say both that the roads she took in this chapter are undoubtedly not the most appropriate 
ones, but that the picture she paints is nonetheless, in itself, appropriate and fair.” [Certes, 
l’argumentation de Simone de Beauvoir est erronée. Certes elle écrit dans ce chapitre un 
“grand récit” qui n’est pas véridique. Certes, elle omet des pistes, aveuglée qu’elle fut, com­
me nous le sommes tous, par des représentations tant philosophiques qu’usuelles qui 
avaient (ou ont toujours) cours et qui fonctionnent comme des certitudes. Et pourtant, au 
bout du compte, une vérité est là, éclairante, obstinément posée. Et c’est notre paradoxe 
à nous, de dire à la fois que les chemins qu’elle a suivis dans ce chapitre n’étaient pas sans 
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But to return to the narrower question about how Beauvoir’s “Histoire” sec­
tion approaches people and parts of the world that might be considered “non­
Western”: almost all of what she includes (and there’s a fair amount) is seam­
lessly intermingled with what might be considered “Western,” in a syncretic, 
not to say agglutinative, way. For instance, when she tries to clarify the devel­
opment of agriculture and private property, we find New World Indian, Austra­
lian, and Polynesian tribes side by side with Babylonians, Indians from India, 
Arabs, ancient Celts, and ancient Greeks. Or see her discussion of the so­called 
Great Mother.117
doute les plus appropriés, mais que le tableau qu’elle dresse est cependant, lui, approprié 
et juste (ibid., 117).]
On the other hand, the criticism of later history sections made by Claudia Opitz 
(“Moyen Âge et Ancien Régime,” 144) that Beauvoir wrongly concluded history had been 
made exclusively by men, because she uncritically accepted that view from her (male) 
historical sources—from Michelet to the early work of the Annales school—must simply 
be marked, objection sustained. See also Karin Hausen, “De la révolution française aux 
années 1940,” 160–61: “Beauvoir mostly builds up … an image of the longue durée that is 
almost outside time. She thus, I think, reinforces representations of the patriarchal or­
der’s inertia, its sedimentary force, in ways that work against her political intentions.” 
[Beauvoir ébauche plutôt … une image de la longue durée presque intemporelle. Elle ren­
force ainsi, je pense, contre son intention politique, les représentations de la force 
d’inertie sédimentaire de l’ordre patriarcal.]
117 Beauvoir knows that Bachofen (and therefore Engels) are wrong about the “great histori­
cal defeat of the feminine sex”: “In truth, this Golden Age of Woman is no more than a 
myth … ‘Public, or even social, authority always belongs to men,’ Lévi­Strauss affirms in 
the conclusion of his study of primitive societies” [en vérité cet âge d’or de la Femme n’est 
qu’un mythe … “L’autorité publique ou simplement sociale appartient toujours aux hom­
mes,” affirme Lévi­Strauss au terme de son étude sur les sociétés primitives (DS 1:122)]. She 
also knows that goddess­worship, or the fact that women in matrilineal (or other) groups 
hold apparently high positions, as priestesses or queens, tells us nothing about the actual 
condition of most women: “It can happen that in a matrilineal society [woman] occupies 
a high situation, but one must still be aware that the presence of a woman chief, or a 
queen, at the head of a tribe absolutely does not mean that women there hold power: 
Catherine the Great’s accession to the throne did not in the least alter the lot of Russian 
peasant women.” [Il arrive qu’en régime matrilinéaire elle occupe une situation très 
haute: encore faut­il prendre garde que la présence d’une femme chef, d’une reine, à la 
tête d’un tribu ne signifie absolument pas que les femmes y sont souveraines: l’avènement 
d’une Catherine de Russie n’a en rien modifié le sort des paysannes russes; et il n’est pas 
moins fréquent qu’elle vive dans l’abjection (DS 1:123).]
Perhaps here she was also informed by Virginia Woolf ’s insight (in 1929) that the high 
status granted women by prized cultural forms such as literature provides no information 
about women’s actual status or life: “[Women] have burnt like beacons in all the works of 
the poets from the beginning of time…. Indeed, if woman had no existence save in the 
fiction written by men, one would imagine her a person of the utmost importance; very 
various; heroic and mean; splendid and sordid; infinitely beautiful and hideous in the 
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Capricious, lustful, as cruel as Nature, benevolent but terrifying, [the 
Great Mother] reigns over the whole Aegean region, over Phrygia, Anato­
lia, and all Western Asia. She is called Ishtar in Babylon, Astarte by Se­
mitic peoples, and by the Greeks Gaea, Rhea, or Cybele; we find her in the 
features of Isis in Egypt; the male gods are below her. A lofty idol in the 
distant realms of heaven or hell, woman on earth is surrounded by ta­
boos, like all sacred beings—she is herself taboo; because of the powers 
she holds, she is seen as a sorceress or a witch; prayers are offered to her, 
she sometimes becomes a priestess like the ancient Celtic druidesses; 
sometimes she takes part in governing the tribe or even governs alone. 
These remote ages have left us no literature. But the great patriarchal eras 
preserve in their mythology, monuments, and traditions the memory of a 
time when women’s position was a very high one. From the point of view 
of women, the Brahman period is a regression from that of the Rig­Veda, 
and the latter is a regression from the primitive stage that preceded it. 
Pre­Islamic Bedouin women had much higher status than the Koran ac­
corded them. The great figures of Niobe and Medea evoke a time when 
mothers took pride in children as in their own property. And in the Ho­
meric poems, Andromache and Hecuba have an importance that classi­
cal Greece no longer granted to women hidden in the shadows of the 
gynaeceum.118
extreme; as great as a man, some think even greater. But this is woman in fiction. In fact, 
as Professor Trevelyan points out, she was locked up, beaten, and flung about the room” 
(A Room of One’s Own, 50–1).
118 “Capricieuse, luxurieuse, cruelle comme la Nature, à la fois propice et redoutable, elle 
règne sur toute l’Égéide, sur la Phrygie, la Syrie, l’Anatolie, sur toute l’Asie occidentale. Elle 
s’appelle Ishtar à Babylone, Astarté chez les peuples sémitiques et chez les Grecs Géa, 
Rhéa où Cybèle; on la retrouve en Égypte sous les traits d’Isis; les divinités mâles lui sont 
subordonnées. Suprême idole dans les régions lointaines du ciel et des enfers, la femme 
est sur terre entourée de tabous comme tous les êtres sacrés, elle est elle­même tabou; à 
cause des pouvoirs qu’elle détient on la regarde comme magicienne, sorcière; on l’associe 
aux prières, elle devient parfois prêtresse telles les druidesses chez les anciens Celtes; en 
certains cas elle participe au gouvernement de la tribu, il arrive même qu’elle l’exerce 
seule. Ces âges reculés ne nous ont légué aucune littérature. Mais les grandes époques 
patriarcales conservent dans leur mythologie, leurs monuments, leurs traditions, le sou­
venir d’un temps où les femmes occupaient une situation très haute. Du point de vue 
féminin, l’époque brahmanique est une régression sur celle du Rig­Véda, et celle­ci sur le 
stade primitif qui l’a précédée. Les Bédouines de l’époque pré­islamique avaient un statut 
bien supérieur à celui que leur assigne le Koran. Les grandes figures de Niobé, de Médée, 
évoquent une ère où les mères considérant leurs enfants comme leur bien propre 
s’enorgueillissaient. Et dans les poèmes homériques, Andromaque, Hécube ont une 
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Soon thereafter, in a similar passage that precedes the infamous footnote by 
several paragraphs, she speaks in one (long) breath of Aristotle, of Adam and 
Eve, of Pythagoras, the “laws of Manu” (Wikipedia informs me that this is “a 
sacred Hindu verse text, a legal code based on the Veda, dating from the second 
century ce”), Leviticus, the code of Solon, Christian Canon Law, and then the 
Koran:
Lawgivers, when they organize the oppression of woman, are afraid of 
her. Of the polyvalent attributes she once enjoyed, what mostly remains 
is the dangerous side: at one time sacred, she now becomes unclean. Eve, 
given to Adam as his companion, brought down the whole human race; 
the pagan gods when they wished to punish mankind invented woman 
and the first female creature, Pandora, unleashed all the evils that plague 
humanity. The Other is passivity against activity, diversity destroying uni­
ty, matter opposing form, disorder resisting order. Woman is thus doomed 
to Evil. “There is a good principle which created order, light, and man, 
and an evil principle that created chaos, darkness, and woman,” says Py­
thagoras. The Laws of Manu define her as a vile being who should be held 
in slavery. Leviticus puts her in the same category with the beasts of bur­
den owned by the patriarch. Solon’s laws confer not a single right upon 
her. The Roman code puts her in guardianship and proclaims her “imbe­
cility.” Canon law considers her “the devil’s gateway.” The Koran treats her 
with the most absolute contempt.119
importance que la Grèce classique ne reconnaît plus aux femmes cachées dans l’ombre 
du gynécée” (DS 1:121).
119 “Organisant l’oppression de la femme, les législateurs ont peur d’elle. Des vertus ambiva­
lentes dont elle était revêtue on retient surtout l’aspect néfaste: de sacrée elle devient 
impure. Ève donnée à Adam pour être sa compagne a perdu le genre humain; quand ils 
veulent se venger des hommes, les dieux païens inventent la femme et c’est la première­
née de ces créatures femelles, Pandore, qui déchaîne tous les maux dont souffre 
l’humanité. L’Autre, c’est la passivité en face de l’activité, la diversité qui brise l’unité, la 
matière opposé à la forme, le désordre qui résiste à l’ordre. La femme est ainsi vouée au 
Mal. ‘Il y a un principe bon qui a créé l’ordre, la lumière et l’homme; et un principe mau­
vais qui a créé le chaos, les ténèbres et la femme,’ dit Pythagore. Les lois de Manou la dé­
finissent comme un être vil qu’il convient de tenir en esclavage. Le Lévitique l’assimile aux 
bêtes de somme possédées par le patriarche. Les lois de Solon ne lui confèrent aucun 
droit. Le code romain la met en tutelle et proclame son ‘imbécillité.’ Le droit canon la 
considère comme ‘la porte du Diable.’ Le Koran la traite avec le plus absolu mépris” (DS 
1:134–35).
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The picture is certainly a sweeping one, but it is hardly the particular grand 
narrative that underwrites a colonialist triumph of the West. Its very grand­
ness makes the opposite point, holding all cultures in equivalence, rather than 
making a hierarchy or a sequence. (Perhaps it is more of a grand landscape 
than a grand narrative?) Beauvoir’s account differs significantly, not just from 
Hegel’s, but also from what she would have encountered in her own study of 
Ancient Greece and Rome as an undergraduate, and in preparing for the agré-
gation. For most of the twentieth century, the opposition between the Ancient 
Greece and its barbarian Others (Persians, etc.) was routinely and nakedly 
couched in terms of the politics of nineteenth­ and twentieth­century empire; 
the way she was taught about Ancient Greece would have been part of this at­
tempt to distinguish the font of Western wisdom from the “primitive,” or bar­
barous, parts of the world, in preparing the youth of Europe to take up the 
“white man’s burden” of colonial administration.120 Beauvoir does not do this.
Another excellent essay in Galster’s collection, by Pauline Schmitt Pantel 
and Beate Wagner­Hasel, has uncovered the influence of a book by German 
feminist Lily Braun on Beauvoir’s negative view of the Athenians, whom she 
had been raised to revere as part of her own cultural birthright.121 (We’ve al­
ready seen Beauvoir’s use of Braun’s book in her discussion of prostitution.)122 
According to Pantel and Wagner­Hasel, Braun repudiates the idea of matriar­
chy, and also says: “We are in the habit of considering the Greeks, when com­
pared with the Orientals, as representatives of a remarkably higher civiliza­
tion. However if one takes the condition of woman as the criterion, one would 
judge quite differently, for one would find scant progress and even a rather 
discouraging movement backwards”123—a formulation very similar to Beau­
voir’s own.
120 The literature on this aspect of “classical reception” is voluminous, but I would single out 
Christopher Stray, Classics Transformed, as exemplary.
121 Pauline Pantel Schmitt and Beate Wagner­Hasel, “L’antiquité”; Lily Braun, Die 
Frauenfrage.
122 It’s worth noting that this wonderful book, which Beauvoir credits, seems lost in the mist 
(or amnesia) that chronically occludes feminist intellectual history, especially when it 
does not fall neatly into “waves” or national traditions. Many articles exist about Beauvoir 
and Merleau­Ponty, Beauvoir and Heidegger, a growing number on Beauvoir and Arendt 
(who was not a feminist, and who hated Beauvoir), but few or none on the relationship of 
her thought to that of Lily Braun, Colette Audry, Françoise d’Eaubonne, Wollstonecraft, 
Woolf…
123 “Nous avons l’habitude de considérer les Grecs, par rapport aux Orientaux, comme les 
représentants d’une civilisation remarquablement plus élevée. Si cependant on prenait la 
condition de la femme comme critère, on jugerait tout différemment, car on trouverait à 
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So is Beauvoir writing a progress narrative or isn’t she? Well, if by “progress 
narrative” we mean the Hegelian story of unbroken progress from darkness to 
light and from East to West, no.124 For instance, at the same time—the fourth 
century bce—Sparta was better for women and Athens was worse, because 
the laws of property, and the relation between the family and the State, were 
different. The “Brahmans” are found wanting in comparison with the Vedas, 
not in comparison to what was happening in “the West” (or the proto­West) in 
the same era. And, as we saw above, things “in the West” can stagnate, or go 
backwards, or leave some women better off and other women worse off.125 But 
peine quelques progrès et même un mouvement de recul assez pénible” (Pantel and Wag­
ner­Hasel, “L’antiquité,” 128).
As Pantel and Wagner­Hasel note, one sign of the prominence of Greek and Roman 
classics in her education was that at the oral examination for the agrégation she would 
have been given an untranslated Greek text to comment on. (This according to Maurice 
Gandillac, who took the same exam.) They also point to a rare footnote in The Second Sex, 
in Beauvoir’s rather Herodotean account of Persia and Egypt: “This account is taken from 
Clément Huart, La Perse antique et la civilisation iranienne.” Pantel and Wagner­Hasel note 
that this book was part of a series called “l’évolution de l’humanité,” which they discov­
ered was kept in the general reference section in the reading room of the Bibliothèque 
nationale.
Further discussion of this topic must wait. But it would be valuable also to attend to 
the literary side of Beauvoir’s education in the “classical tradition,” to the remarkably 
quick progress she made in overcoming the deficiencies of her preparation at the Greek­
less Cours Desir, and to her use, as another source for The Second Sex, of an English 
book, James Donaldson’s Woman: Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome, 
and Among the Early Christians (1907). We are indebted to Constance Borde and Sheila 
Malovany­Chevallier for having identified (on p. 61 of their translation) this book, 
which Beauvoir alludes to rather cryptically at DS 1:95. For a detailed reading of Beau­
voir’s education and its historical context, see Moi, Making of an Intellectual Woman, 
part 1, chapter 2.
124 If it is permissible to speak of arguments that “haunt” a text, but are not actually in the 
text, this whole section is haunted by the awareness that if we bring women into the pic­
ture, Hegel’s view of history cannot be right. But I don’t think it’s permissible to speak of 
such things, I think it’s slightly mad, actually. And in any case, she had already found and 
stated many other good reasons not to agree with Hegel’s theory of history as the progres­
sive triumph of Geist.
125 In the more modern parts of the history, we could say her point was largely to prove the 
nearly “unbroken subjection” of women in the West also: despite some complexity, and 
even some dissenters, the codes of chivalry didn’t “break” it, neither did the French Revo­
lution, the Enlightenment, or the rise of the bourgeoisie; it was not until the industrial 
revolution put women to work that they gained a measure of control over their own des­
tinies, and even then, as we have seen, the condition of women workers was lamentable. 
The “progress” Beauvoir documents does show up in legal reform toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, and then in her history of suffrage movements. As she reaches the 
present time of writing, she notes that, with the resolutions passed by the UN  Commission 
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insofar as Beauvoir judges that some cultures, at some eras, are better for wom­
en and others are worse, one must say yes, “progress” is very much at issue 
here,126 even though her overall thesis is that the progress has often been more 
illusory than real, that the promise has not been fulfilled. At the end of the his­
tory section: “The fact that controls women’s condition today is the stubborn 
survival of the most antiquated traditions in the new civilization that is begin­
ning to take shape.”127
How then do we interpret that “long, unbroken subjection” footnote, which 
does not jibe particularly well with anything that is before or after it? Well, 
here’s my imaginative reconstruction: “I’ve done the best I possibly can to in­
clude everything that’s in the library: if I don’t find a way to leave something 
out, I’m never going to finish this book.”
Or maybe I’m just projecting.
5 The Myth Itself, and Not the Thing
So much for Beauvoir’s “history.” But the second passage on which Markowitz 
rests her claim occurs in the myth section, and actually, most of what hurts 
our ears about “the Orient” occurs there. As I’ve already said, everything in the 
three chapters of the myth section must be understood as imaginary, powerful 
but/because imaginary: the point is to investigate what we can tell about 
people— about men, really—from how they imagine Woman. As I said above, 
it’s important not to be misled by Beauvoir’s long ironic paraphrases in style 
indirect libre. Lori Marso puts this very nicely when she speaks of Beauvoir’s 
“mimicking of male voices,” which can make it hard to be sure what she is or 
isn’t “endorsing.”128 Beauvoir sometimes talks about Scheherazade as though 
Scheherazade really existed. But she talks in the same way about Eve, and 
Pandora, and Stendhal’s character Mlle. de la Mole. Like so much else in The 
on the Status of Women, “[i]t would seem that the game has been won” [[i]l semble donc 
que la partie soit gagnée (DS 1:220)]. And yet abstract rights do not guarantee real equality 
(“les droits abstraits, nous venons de le dire, n’ont jamais suffi à assurer à la femme une 
prise concrète sur le monde: entre les deux sexes, il n’y a pas aujourd’hui encore de véri­
table égalité,” DS 1:228).
126 Hausen (“De la révolution française aux années 1940,” 164) points out Beauvoir’s belief, 
following Engels and Marx, in the “march of history” advanced, as if inevitably, by means 
of the “evolution of techniques” in the industrial revolution—in spite of what she shows 
about the immiseration of women workers in factories.
127 “Le fait qui commande la condition actuelle de la femme, c’est la survivance têtue dans la 
civilisation neuve qui est en train de s’ébaucher des traditions les plus antiques” (DS 1:231).
128 Lori Marso, Politics With Beauvoir: Freedom in the Encounter, 27.
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Second Sex, the images of the East are for the most part literary rather than 
“factual,” and Beauvoir knows this. When she writes that “only the sultan of 
the Thousand and One Nights has the power to behead mistresses when dawn 
takes them from his bed,”129 she is describing a male fantasy of sexual con­
quest, and a Western one at that.
Where the history section shifted awkwardly between static synchronic 
comparison and diachronic narrative, the method of the myth chapters is de­
liberately ahistorical, structured by topic and theme. Josette Pacaly calls it a 
“light­hearted journey,” full of “oscillations” and “meanderings.” “Beauvoir in­
vites us on a vast­ranging tour of the world.”130 The discussion travels as easily 
in time as in space, bringing data from very different cultures and eras into 
non­hierarchical parallel, mingling information about “primitive societies” 
from Lévi­Strauss, Malinowksi, etc. with rural and urban western customs, po­
etry and other “high” literature, and “I heard a man say one day.” Speckled amid 
this profusion of examples are some references to “les Indes” and to Islam, 
which are in no way labelled as worse and sometimes come off better. Discus­
sion of women in the “Orient” is always embedded in long paragraphs that 
discuss the oppression of women not in the Orient. This intermingling makes 
precisely the opposite point from what is claimed to be orientalism, a stark op­
position between two worlds. (Indeed, in all this welter of detail it is hard to 
keep track of what “the Orient” could really mean: there are many more parts 
of Beauvoir’s world than just two.)131
129 “[S]eul le sultan des Mille et une nuits a le pouvoir de trancher la tête de ses maîtresses dès 
que l’aube les retire de son lit” (DS 1:271).
130 “[U]n parcours allègre, plein d’allers et retours; on pense à la dialectique que Pascal dé­
finissait comme un perpétuel renversement du pour au contre, où à la méthode progres­
sive­régressive de Sartre; chemin faisant Beauvoir parle d’ ‘oscillations,’ de ‘méandres 
compliqués’…. Beauvoir … nous invite … à un immense périple à travers le monde…” (Pa­
caly, “La femme et les mythes,” 172–73). Pacaly quotes DS 1:242: “It is always difficult to 
describe a myth: it won’t let itself be grasped or defined, it haunts consciousnesses with­
out ever being posed in front of them like a fixed object. [The myth of Woman] is so 
changeable, so contradictory, that it takes a while to see it as a unified whole: Dalila and 
Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora and Athena, woman is at the same time Eve and the 
Virgin Mary.” [Il est toujours difficile de décrire un mythe; il ne se laisse pas saisir ni cern­
er, il hante les consciences sans jamais être posé en face d’elles comme un objet figé. Ce­
lui­ci est si ondoyant, si contradictoire qu’on n’en décèle pas d’abord l’unité: Dalila et Ju­
dith, Aspasie et Lucrèce, Pandore et Athéné, la femme est à la fois Ève et la Vierge 
Marie.]
131 One might ask oneself whether, in the 1940s, the Jews of the Old Testament counted as 
Orientals or not; right­wing French (and, for that matter, British) writers continued to 
describe modern Jews as “Asiatic,” and they didn’t mean this as a compliment. But draw­
ing such distinctions do not seem to interest Beauvoir.
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For instance, in talking about how the worship of nature as female survives 
long after the Great Mother has been “dethroned,” Beauvoir refers in one swoop 
to Goethe’s second Faust, William Blake (“the matron Clay”), “un prophète in­
dien” who tells his disciples not to plow the Earth because this would harm 
their “mother”; this last is also true, she says, of “les Baija” who live “en Inde 
centrale.” In the next sentence, we have Aeschylus and Sophocles; “the beloved 
of an Egyptian song declares, ‘I am the Earth!’”;132 “in the Islamic texts woman 
is called ‘a field … the grape­bearing vine’”;133 then we hear about St. Francis of 
Assisi … then Michelet….134 She shows a similar eclecticism when it comes to 
taboos and fears about menstruation: in the list of customs that isolate girls at 
menarche (sometimes she is forbidden to touch her own body, sometimes she 
is forbidden to touch food, etc.) it is hard to tell exactly when Beauvoir slides 
from Lévi­Strauss to Leviticus, which, she says, views the “impurity” of men­
struation in the same way it views the impurity of gonorrhea.135 Among those 
who are cited as thinking the presence of a menstruating woman might spoil 
food or drink or other products, we find Pliny, “un vieux poète anglais,”136 the 
British Medical Association Journal in 1878 (meat), the sugar refineries of the 
North (?) at the beginning of the century,137 and this: “In Saigon, women are 
132 “La bien­aimée d’une chanson égyptienne déclare: ‘Je suis la terre!’” (DS 1:245).
133 “Dans les textes islamiques la femme est appelée ‘champ … vigne aux raisins’” (DS 1:245).
134 DS 1:245.
135 Menstruation taboos can be ambivalent, and power can heal as well as harm: “still today 
some Indians” protect their boats with “a wad of fibers soaked in menstrual blood,” 
young girls in ancient Greece dedicated their stained linen to Astarte, and so on 
(DS 1:250).
136 “An old English poet” (DS 1:251). I and several friends spent a pleasurably procrastinatory 
morning attempting to identify the source of the lines she (mis)quotes as “Oh! menstruat­
ing woman, thou’st [sic] a fiend / From whom all nature should be screened.” He may have 
been the seventeenth century Abraham Cowley, who lived through the English Civil War 
and died shortly after the Restoration, but we couldn’t quite verify this. See Lesel Dawson, 
“Menstruation, Misogyny, and the Cure for Love.” It seems very likely that Beauvoir en­
countered these lines in Ellis, Studies in The Psychology of Sex, Volume 1: The Evolution of 
Modesty, The Phenomena of Sexual Periodicity, Autoeroticism (1926), where they appear on 
page 331, also without the poet’s name. Ellis’s volume is itself a dizzyingly syncretic and 
bizarrely comprehensive compendium of received ideas on the topics in the subtitle, 
drawn indiscriminately from science, ethnography, literature, and commonplace. Unlike 
Beauvoir, Ellis seems not to have known that what he was compiling was a book of myths, 
but his style may have had some influence on hers.
137 “These beliefs have continued quite forcefully right until today. In 1878, a member of the 
British Medical Association sent in to the British Medical Journal as article in which he 
declared: ‘It is an unquestionable fact that meat becomes rotten when it is touched by 
menstruating women’; he claimed to be personally acquainted with two instances where 
hams had been spoiled under those circumstances. At the beginning of this century, in 
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not employed in opium factories: because of their periods, the opium goes bad 
and becomes bitter. These beliefs survive in many areas of the French 
countryside.”138 And apparently they also survive in French scientific writing, 
as a hilarious footnote describes.139 (Pacaly calls this a “sottisier réjouissant!,” 
a  delightful compendium of stupidities.)140 There follows a long quotation 
the refineries of the North, a regulation forbade women from entering the factory when 
they were suffering from what the Anglo­Saxons call ‘the curse,’ because the sugar would 
turn black.” [Ces croyances se sont perpétuées jusqu’à nos jours avec beaucoup de force. 
En 1878, un membre de l’Association médicale britannique a fait une communication au 
British Medical Journal où il déclarait que: “C’est un fait indubitable que la viande se cor­
rompt quand elle est touchée par des femmes ayant leurs règles”; il dit connaître person­
nellement deux cas où les jambons ont été gâtés en de telles circonstances. Au début de 
ce siècle, dans les raffineries du Nord, un règlement défendait aux femmes d’entrer dans 
la fabrique quand elles étaient atteintes par ce que les Anglo­Saxons appellent le “curse,” 
la “malédiction”: car alors le sucre noircissait (DS 1:251).]
138 “Et à Saigon, on n’emploie pas de femmes dans les fabriques d’opium: par l’effet de leurs 
règles, l’opium tourne et devient amer. Ces croyances survivent dans beaucoup de cam­
pagnes françaises.” The passage continues:
“Every cook knows it is impossible to make a successful mayonnaise if she or anyone 
near her is ‘indisposed.’ Recently in Anjou an old gardener, after storing the year’s cider 
harvest in a cellar, wrote to his master, ‘you must ask the young ladies of the household 
and female guests not to enter the cellar on certain days of the month, they would keep 
the cider from fermenting.’ The cook, when told of this letter, merely shrugged: that never 
kept the cider from fermenting, says she, it’s only bad for making lard.” [Toute cuisinière 
sait qu’il lui est impossible de réussir une mayonnaise si elle est indisposée ou simple­
ment en présence d’une femme indisposée. En Anjou, récemment, un vieux jardinier, 
ayant emmagasiné dans un cellier la récolte de cidre de l’année, écrivait au maître de la 
maison: “Il faut demander aux jeunes dames du logis et aux invitées de ne pas traverser le 
cellier à certains jours du mois: elles empêcheraient le cidre de fermenter.” Mise au cou­
rant de cette lettre, la cuisinière haussa les épaules: “Ça n’a jamais empêché le cidre de 
fermenter, dit­elle, c’est pour le lard seulement que c’est mauvais…” (DS 1:251–52).]
139 “The question of whether these prejudices have any basis in fact is still discussed today. 
The only fact adduced in its favor by Dr. Binet is an observation by Schink (cited by Vi­
gnes). Schink supposedly saw flowers wilt in the hands of a servant who had her period; 
some yeast cakes prepared by that woman supposedly only rose three centimeters in­
stead of the five centimeters they normally reached. At any rate this data is quite meagre 
and sketchy when one compares the universal scope of such beliefs, whose origin is 
clearly mystical.” [On discute encore aujourd’hui la question de savoir s’il y a quelque 
fondement à ces préjugés. Le seul fait que rapporte en leur faveur le docteur Binet est une 
observation de Schink (citée par Vignes). Schink aurait vu des fleurs se faner entre les 
mains d’une servante indisposée; les gâteaux à la levure fabriqués par cette femme 
n’auraient monté que de trois centimètres au lieu des cinq centimètres qu’ils atteignaient 
normalement. De toute façon ces faits sont bien pauvres et bien vaguement établis si on 
considère l’importance et l’universalité des croyances dont l’origine est évidemment mys­
tique (DS 1:252).]
140 Josette Pacaly, “La femme et les mythes,” 173.
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about menstrual taboos among the Chago, cited by Lévi­Strauss, supported by 
a parallel among “the Aleutians”; again Leviticus; then the French romantic 
poet Alfred de Vigny, whom Beauvoir, like every French child, would have stud­
ied at school. A page later, Leviticus is once more given equal weight with the 
laws of Manu, and the discussion ends with the Oedipus complex.141
Women can help the community maintain a connection with the mysteri­
ous powers of the natural world: “still today, among the Bedouins, among the 
Iroquois, [woman] assures the fertility of the fields,” and in Ancient Greece she 
was Pythia and prophetess.142 Beauvoir has a great deal to say about myths of 
Virginity, whose power unites dread and desire: here we find Venus emerging 
from the water (“sortie toute neuve de l’eau”), Genesis, and the laws of Manu, 
in the same paragraph as a drawing by André Masson, further illuminated by a 
footnote to Rabelais.143 Nor is it purely a case of “Western eyes” looking at 
“Eastern” matters.
Marco Polo asserted about the Tibetans that “none of them wanted to 
take a virgin girl as wife.” A rational explanation has sometimes been 
given for this refusal: the man does not want a wife who has not yet 
aroused masculine desires. El­Bekri, the Arab geographer, speaking of the 
Slavic peoples, notes that “if a man gets married and finds that his wife is 
a virgin, he says, ‘If you were worth something, men would have loved you 
and one of them would have taken your virginity.’”144
I have not succeeded in figuring out who El­Bekri (or Al­Bekri) might have 
been, but his appearance certainly reverses the ethnographic lens. Beauvoir’s 
141 DS 1:254.
142 “Elle assure encore aujourd’hui chez les Bédouins, chez les Iroquois, la fécondité des 
champs; dans la Grèce antique, elle entend les voix souterraines” (DS 1:255).
143 “‘Woman is like the field in which man sows the seed,’ say the Laws of Manu. A drawing by 
André Masson shows a man, hoe in hand, cultivating the garden of the female genitals.” 
[“La femme est comme le champ et l’homme comme la semence,” disent les Lois de Ma­
nou. Dans un dessin d’André Masson on voit un homme, une pelle à la main, qui bêche le 
jardin d’un sexe féminin (DS 1:256).]
144 “Selon que l’homme se sent écrasé par les puissances qui le cernent, ou qu’il se croit 
orgueilleusement capable de les annexer, il refuse ou réclame que son épouse lui soit 
livrée vierge…. Marco Polo affirmait des Tibétains ‘qu’aucun d’eux ne voudrait prendre 
pour femme une fille qui serait vierge.’ On a parfois expliqué ce refus d’une manière ra­
tionnelle: l’homme ne veut pas d’une épouse qui n’a pas déjà suscité des désirs masculins. 
Le géographe arabe El Bekri, parlant des Slaves, rapporte que ‘si un homme se marie et 
trouve que sa femme est vierge, il lui dit: ‘Si tu valais quelque chose, des hommes 
t’auraient aimée et il y en aurait un qui t’aurait pris ta virginité.’ Puis il la chasse et la ré­
pudie” (DS 1:256–57).
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discussion of virginity myths concludes with mentions of the Valkyries, Joan of 
Arc, wedding night customs of the “indigènes described by Malinowski,” the 
Brahmans of the Malabar coast, the Ancient Romans, and the Samoans. And 
“there are still villages in France where the bloody sheet is displayed.”145
Now, this syncretic or synoptic mode of inquiry was not Beauvoir’s inven­
tion, obviously. References make it clear that she has been reading Jung and 
Bachelard, whose method in such works as L’eau et les rêves may have been in­
fluential.146 She refers frequently also to the sociologist and sinologist Marcel 
Granet, and to Georges Dumézil (1898–1986), the founding figure of the disci­
pline of “comparative mythology,” who was in many ways a precursor of struc­
turalism. Dumézil studied parallels between Greek, Roman, Indian, and an­
cient Iranian traditions, and derived what he believed to be a common 
ideological structure dividing both mythological narratives and social institu­
tions into three “functions”: that particular homology has been called into 
question, but the influence of his method continues to be felt in the cross­
cultural study of myth. He also apparently supported and influenced both Lé­
vi­Strauss and then Foucault. Beauvoir never mentions the “three functions,” 
but her frequent references to Dumézil’s work Mitra-Varuna, and indeed to the 
“laws of Manu,” show that he was an important influence on her thought as 
well.
What we are dealing with here is not the popularizing universalism of a Jo­
seph Campbell, which strips away cultural particularities and turns every story 
into the same story. Rather, it is a nuanced and (at least in Beauvoir’s hands) 
somewhat torturous inquiry into both similarities and differences across cul­
tures. Dumézil himself can be criticized for the way he “slices up the world”—
the phrase is Keith Nightenhelser’s147—in that he defended the existence of 
something called “Indo­European culture” and described patterns that (he 
thought) were found there and not found elsewhere. (And he has been blamed 
for the rather awful uses to which the idea of “Indo­European culture” was put 
by the Third Reich, though Didier Eribon and others make strong arguments 
that this was unfair.)148 Beauvoir, however, did not “slice up the world” in that 
145 “Il y a encore en France des villages où, le matin des noces, on exhibe devant parents et 
amis le drap ensanglanté” (DS 1:259).
146 Bachelard’s comment in prefacing his own work—“People might be surprised to see a 
rationalist philosopher devoting such attention to illusions and errors”—could apply to 
Beauvoir as well. Gaston Bachelard, L’eau et les rêves, 18: “On a pu s’étonner qu’un philo­
sophe rationaliste donne une si longue attention à des illusions et à des erreurs.”
147 Personal communication.
148 Didier Eribon, Faut-il brûler Dumézil? See also David Frauenfelder’s review of García 
Quintela, Dumézil: An Introduction, and Hugo Freund’s review of C. Scott Littleton, The 
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way, or indeed in any way at all: just putting the “laws of Manu” in parallel with 
Leviticus, as she does repeatedly, shows she’s not drawing a distinction be­
tween Semitic and Indo­European worlds. Her copious use of Dumézil’s ex­
amples, detached from the over­arching theory he was using them to support, 
is yet another example of the “unhooking” we saw with Stekel, Ellis, etc.
Some of what Beauvoir draws from Dumézil, Granet, and other sources for 
these chapters may be right and some of it is undoubtedly quite wrong. But 
none of it was even visible to Markowitz because it does not look like what she 
was combing for: that is to say, it was not part of that orientalizing discourse we 
are trained to look for and object to. Beauvoir does not speak of “the Orient” 
when referring to the work of Granet and Dumézil, but rather of other cul­
tures, understood as systems of thought in their own right. There’s no distinc­
tion drawn between “myth” (them) and “religion” (us): the myths of the Chago 
and the Greeks are put in parallel with the myths of Christianity, and indeed 
with the myths created by supposedly “rationalist” thinkers from Pythagoras to 
Aquinas to the British Medical Association and the man next door. (Perhaps 
we have forgotten that calling Christianity a “myth,” and examining it on the 
same level as other stories, was once a very radical thing to do.)
Interestingly, the rather awful lines Markowitz quoted about the “insouciant 
Oriental” are embedded in just such a characteristically syncretic (and tortu­
ous) discussion of the shift toward companionate understandings of marriage, 
drawing again on Dumézil, where non­Western (as well as Western) examples 
weigh on the “after” side as well as the before.
In the patriarchal family, feminine magic was deeply domesticated. 
Woman makes it possible for society to integrate into itself the cosmic 
forces. Dumézil indicates in his study Mitra-Varuna that, in India as in 
Rome, there are two ways for male power to affirm itself: in Varuna and 
Romulus, in the Gandharvas and the Luperques, it is aggression, abduc­
tion, disorder, hubris; then woman appears as a being who must be vio­
lently assaulted and raped; the abducted Sabine women were sterile, they 
were whipped with goatskin thongs, dealing violently with violence. But 
Mitra, Numa, the Brahmans and the flamines, on the contrary, ensured 
the order and the reasonable equilibrium of society; then the wife is 
bonded with the husband by a complicated ritual of marriage and, col­
laborating with him, she assures for him the domination of all the female 
forces of nature; in Rome, if the flamina dies, the flamen dialis resigns his 
New Comparative Mythology: An Anthropological Assessment of the Theories of Georges 
Dumézil.
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office. It is thus that in Egypt Isis, having lost the supreme power of the 
Goddess Mother, nonetheless remains generous, smiling, welcoming and 
kind, the magnificent spouse of Osiris. But when woman appears thus as 
the associate of man, his complement, his other half, she of necessity 
possesses a conscience, a soul; he could not depend so intimately on a 
being who did not participate in the human essence. We have already 
seen that the laws of Manu promised to the legitimate wife the same par­
adise as her husband. The more the male becomes individualized and 
lays claim to his individuality, the more certainly he will recognize also in 
his companion an individual and a free being. The Oriental careless of his 
own fate is content with a female [femelle] who is for him an object of 
pleasure [jouissance]; but the dream of the Occidental, once he rises to 
consciousness of his own uniqueness, is to be taken cognizance of by an­
other free being, at once strange and docile.149
What follows deals with the difference between Greece and Rome, then gets to 
the main enemy, Christianity, which paradoxically proclaims women’s “equal­
ity” and then traps her in the duality of Virgin and Whore.
I am not, by any means, arguing that this account is a correct one, or even 
that it makes sense: the confusion of tenses alone is dizzying. What is the 
149 “La magie féminine a été profondément domestiquée dans la famille patriarcale. La 
femme permet à la société d’intégrer en elle les forces cosmiques. Dans son ouvrage, 
Mitra-Varuna, Dumézil signale qu’aux Indes comme à Rome, il y a deux manières pour le 
pouvoir viril de s’affirmer: en Varouna et Romulus, dans les Gandharvas et les Luperques, 
il est agression, rapt, désordre, hybris; alors la femme apparaît comme un être qu’il faut 
ravir, violenter; les Sabines ravies se montrent stériles, on les fouette avec des lanières en 
peau de bouc, compensant par la violence un excès de violence. Mais Mitra, Numa, les 
Brahmanes et les Flamines assurent au contraire l’ordre et l’équilibre raisonnable de la 
cité: alors la femme est liée au mari par un mariage aux rites compliqués et, collaborant 
avec lui, elle lui assure la domination de toutes les forces femelles de la nature; à Rome, 
si la flamina meurt, le flamen dialis se démet de ses fonctions. C’est ainsi qu’en Égypte, 
Isis, ayant perdu sa puissance suprême de déesse mère, demeure cependant généreuse, 
souriante, bienveillante et sage, la magnifique épouse d’Osiris. Mais quand la femme ap­
paraît ainsi l’associée de l’homme, son complément, sa moitié, elle est nécessairement 
douée d’une conscience, d’une âme; il ne saurait si intimement dépendre d’un être qui 
ne participerait pas à l’essence humaine. On a vu déjà que les Lois de Manou promet­
taient à l’épouse légitime le même paradis qu’à son époux. Plus le mâle s’individualise et 
revendique son individualité, plus aussi il reconnaîtra en sa compagne un individu et 
une liberté. L’Oriental insouciant de son propre destin se contente d’une femelle qui est 
pour lui un objet de jouissance; mais le rêve de l’Occidental, quand il s’est élevé à la con­
science de la singularité de son être, c’est d’être reconnu par une liberté étrangère et 
docile” (DS 1:280–81).
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relationship between what the laws of Manu already “promised” (in the im­
perfect tense), and the Oriental who is seemingly stuck in the ethnographic 
present? Once again, the problem Héritier identified with the history chapter 
rears its head. My point is merely that quoting the last two sentences out of 
context oversimplifies what Beauvoir was doing. As I said above, there is in 
these chapters no discussion of “the Orient” that is not attached to discus­
sions of the not­Orient; sometimes it is the latter that comes off worse,150 but 
usually questions of comparative judgment vanish in a welter of concrete 
particulars. The overall point is not about a binary difference, and the effect 
is the opposite of cultural triumphalism.
Another example: Beauvoir takes a similarly syncretic approach to the ques­
tion of female beauty:
All the poets of the East and the West [d’Orient et d’Occident] have trans­
formed woman’s body into flowers, fruits, birds…. Here too, one would 
have to cite an entire weighty anthology.151
Her citations are drawn from the Song of Songs, Breton, Steinbeck, Colette, 
“Samivel cited by Bachelard,” and the poet Léopold Senghor (1906–2001), négri-
tude’s greatest champion, who would later serve as the first president of Sene­
gal. Around this time, Senghor’s work was appearing in Présence Africaine 
(which Les Temps Modernes was strongly supporting); his Anthologie de la nou-
velle poésie nègre et malgache came out in 1948, with a preface by Sartre, “Or­
phée noir” (Black Orpheus). Beauvoir quotes Senghor’s lines (beginning “Na­
ked woman, dusky woman! / Ripe and firm­fleshed fruit” [Femme nue, femme 
obscure! / Fruit mûr à la chair ferme]) in absolute parallel to the others, much 
as the work of Richard Wright and other theorists of Black experience was ap­
pearing alongside her own theoretical work in Les Temps Modernes.
Different cultures, it is true, have different ideals of beauty—and different 
ideal objects of desire. In her desire to leave nothing out, Beauvoir goes on to 
say some things that, taken in isolation, are bizarre. In the end, she’s going to 
say, the beauty myth amounts to the same thing, a male fantasy and a mystifi­
cation, wherever and whenever it is found. But as with other “sandwiches” I’ve 
discussed, the road to this conclusion is mined with some troubling bits. So, a 
150 For instance, at DS 1:282 we find “la Grande Mère asiatique” contrasted to the Virgin Mary, 
to the detriment of the latter.
151 “Tous les poètes d’Orient et d’Occident ont métamorphosé le corps de la femme en fleurs, 
en fruits, en oiseaux. Ici encore, à travers l’Antiquité, le Moyen Âge et l’époque moderne, 
c’est toute une épaisse anthologie qu’il faudrait citer” (DS 1:261).
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few pages later she embarks on a general discussion of what we would call 
“objectification”:
when woman is handed over to the male as his possession, what the latter 
demands is that, in her, the flesh be present in pure facticity. Her body is 
grasped, not as the radiance of a subjectivity, but as a thing, heavy with 
immanence; this body does not refer to the rest of the world, it must 
promise nothing but itself: it must be the ending point of his desire.152
So far, so good. But then:
The most naïve form of this demand is the Hottentot ideal of the Steato­
pygian Venus, since the buttocks are the part of the body least supplied 
with nerves, the part where flesh appears as a given without a destina­
tion. The preference of Orientals for fat women is of the same sort; they 
love the absurd luxury of this adipose proliferation, which no project ani­
mates, which has no meaning except to be there.153
Wait, what?
So, there is a footnote, which quotes from “Luquet, Journal de Psychologie, 
1934, Les Vénus des cavernes,”154 and here is what her footnote quotes:
The Hottentots, among whom steatopygy is neither as fully developed or 
as constant as among bushwomen, consider this conformation as aes­
thetically valuable and massage the buttocks of their daughters to de­
velop them. In the same way the artificial fattening of women, a real 
152 “[Q]uand la femme est livrée au mâle comme son bien, ce que celui­ci réclame, c’est que 
chez elle la chair soit présente dans sa pure facticité. Son corps n’est pas saisi comme le 
rayonnement d’une subjectivité, mais comme une chose empâtée dans son immanence; 
il ne faut pas que ce corps renvoie au reste du monde, il ne doit pas être promesse d’autre 
chose que de lui­même: il lui faut arrêter le désir” (DS 1:264).
153 “La forme la plus naïve de cette exigence, c’est l’idéal hottentot de la Vénus stéatopyge, les 
fesses étant la partie du corps la moins innervé, celle où la chair apparaît comme un don­
né sans destination. Le goût des Orientaux pour les femmes grasses est de la même es­
pèce; ils aiment le luxe absurde de cette prolifération adipeuse que n’anime aucun projet, 
qui n’a d’autre sens que d’être là” (DS 1:264).
154 I haven’t entirely succeeded in tracing this; it would appear to be Luquet, “Les Vénus 
paléolithiques,” but this article is, for some reason, unobtainable. Luquet seems to have 
been a scholar of paleolithic art: Gunter Berghaus, in New Perspectives on Prehistoric Art, 
refers to his book “L’art et la religion des hommes fossiles” (1926) and to a 1910 article 
comparing paleolithic figures to graffiti.
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force­feeding whose two essential methods are immobilization and the 
copious ingestion of particular foods, chiefly milk, can be found in vari­
ous parts of Africa. It is still practiced by well­to­do Arab and Jewish city­
dwellers of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.155
This sounds unlikely, doesn’t it? But if someone made it up, that someone was 
not Beauvoir. And what is she doing with this “example”? Her paragraph 
continues:
Even in civilizations with more subtle sensibility, where notions of form 
and harmony come into play, a woman’s breasts and buttocks continue to 
be prized because they blossom out and develop in a gratuitous, contin­
gent way. Customs and fashions often work to sever the female body from 
its transcendence: the Chinese woman with bound feet can scarcely walk; 
the polished claws of the Hollywood star deprive her of the use of her 
hands; high heels, corsets, bustles, farthingales, crinolines are intended not 
just to exaggerate the curves of the female body, but to render it useless.156
Once again, she’s not saying it’s worse, she’s not saying it’s better, and she’s not 
using the Eastern example as an allegory for the others. She’s piling up all the 
examples she can find, to make a general point that is, I feel, still relevant:
Weighed down by fat, or too slender and delicate to exercise any effort, 
paralyzed by awkward clothes and by the rituals of propriety, [her body] 
thus appears to man as his thing.157
155 “Les Hottentotes chez qui la stéatopygie n’est ni aussi développée ni aussi constante que 
chez les femmes bushman considèrent cette conformation comme esthétique et mala­
xent les fesses de leurs filles dès l’enfance pour les développer. De même l’engraissement 
artificiel des femmes, véritable gavage dont les deux procédés essentiels sont l’immobilité 
et l’ingestion abondante d’aliments appropriés, en particulier du lait, se rencontre dans 
diverses régions de l’Afrique. Il est encore pratiqué par les citadins aisés arabes et israé­
lites d’Algérie, de Tunisie, et du Maroc” (DS 1:264).
156 “Même dans les civilisations d’une sensibilité plus subtile où interviennent des notions de 
forme et d’harmonie, les seins et les fesses demeurent des objets privilégiés à cause de la 
gratuité, de la contingence de leur épanouissement. Les coutumes, les modes se sont sou­
vent appliquées à couper le corps féminin de sa transcendance: la Chinoise aux pieds 
bandés peut à peine marcher, les griffes vernies de la star d’Hollywood la privent de ses 
mains, les haut talons, les corsets, les paniers, les vertugadins, les crinolines étaient desti­
nés moins à accentuer la cambrure du corps féminin qu’à en augmenter l’impotence” 
(DS 1:264–65).
157 “Alourdi de graisse, ou au contraire si diaphane que tout effort lui est interdit, paralysé par 
des vêtements incommodes et par les rites de la bienséance, c’est alors qu’il apparaît à 
l’homme comme sa chose” (DS 1:265).
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Some like us fat, some like us thin, but either way—well, beauty is a trap. 
And so is the pursuit of beauty, because men are funny about what they want 
in a woman: “Nature,” or the opposite of nature, or some impossible combina­
tion. (Pacaly comments, “splendide double­bind!”)158
Among primitive peoples, the idea men seek simply perfects the com­
mon type: a race with thick lips and flat noses creates a thick­lipped, flat­
nosed Venus; later a more complicated canon of beauty applies. But in 
any case, the more a woman’s form and features seem deliberately craft­
ed, the more she gladdens the heart of man by appearing to avoid the fate 
of all natural things. A strange paradox ensues: wanting to take hold of 
nature, but nature transfigured, man dooms woman to artifice. She is not 
merely physis, but equally antiphysis, and this is true not only in the civi­
lization of electrically permed hair, leg­waxing, and latex girdles, but also 
where African women wear plates in their lips, and in China, and every­
where on Earth.159
Something similar happens in a discussion of the social function played by 
wives:
A man boasts of his wife as he boasts of his house, his lands, his flocks, or 
his riches, and sometimes more so; through her, he displays his power in 
the eyes of the world, she is his earthly portion, his worth. In the Orient, 
the wife must be fat; visibly well­fed, she brings honor to her master. [A 
footnote refers to the earlier citation from Luquet.] A Muslim gains con­
sequence from the number of wives and their flourishing appearance. In 
bourgeois society, one role that falls to the wife is to represent: her beauty, 
her charm, her intelligence, her elegance are the outward signs of her 
husband’s wealth, like the make and model of his car.160
158 Pacaly, “La femme et les mythes,” 174.
159 “Chez les peuples primitifs, l’idée est seulement celle de la perfection du type populaire: 
une race aux lèvres épaisses, aux nez plats forge une Vénus aux lèvres épaisses, au nez 
plat; plus tard on applique aux femmes les canons d’une esthétique plus complexe. Mais 
en tout cas, plus les traits et les proportions d’une femme paraissent concertés, plus elle 
réjouit le cœur de l’homme parce qu’elle semble échapper aux avatars des choses naturel­
les. On aboutit donc à cet étrange paradoxe que, souhaitant saisir dans la femme la na­
ture, mais transfigurée, l’homme voue la femme à l’artifice. Elle n’est pas physis seulement 
mais tout autant antiphysis; et cela non seulement dans la civilisation des permanentes 
électriques, de l’épilation à la cire, des guêpières de latex, mais aussi au pays des négresses 
à plateaux, en Chine et partout sur la terre” (DS 1:266).
160 “[L’homme] s’enorgueillit de sa femme comme de sa maison, ses terres, ses troupeaux, ses 
richesses, et parfois même davantage; c’est à travers elle qu’il manifeste aux yeux du 
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East or West, zaftig or svelte, a wife is just one more luxury item. Beauvoir 
closes this discussion with the example of Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew, 
where Petruchio calls on all his neighbors to marvel at the docile paragon 
Katharine has become.161
A bit later, cross­cultural examples will again support Beauvoir’s explana­
tion that adultery, and men’s fear of adultery, is an inevitable result of mar­
riage, and why: marriage involves a mystification, since by claiming to socialize 
the erotic, it only succeeds in killing it.162
Thus [woman] is doomed to infidelity: it is the only face her freedom can 
wear. She is unfaithful quite aside from her own desires, thoughts, con­
sciousness; regarded as an object, she is offered up to any subjectivity 
that chooses to seize upon her; shut up in a harem, hidden beneath veils, 
she may still awaken someone’s desire; to awaken a stranger’s desire is 
already to have sinned against one’s husband and society. Then too, she is 
often complicit with this fate; only through deceit and adultery can she 
disprove men’s pretension and show that she belongs to no one. Thus 
male jealousy is quickly aroused; legends tell us that a woman can be 
suspected without any reason, then condemned on the barest suspicion, 
like Geneviève de Brabant and Desdemona; Griselidis is subjected to the 
harshest of trials even before any suspicion of her can arise; this story 
would be absurd if woman was not suspect in advance; he does not have 
to prove her crimes, it is up to her to prove her innocence. That is also 
why jealousy can be insatiable; we’ve already shown that possession can 
never be positively realized; one does not own the spring from which one 
drinks, even if one forbids others to draw water there, as the jealous man 
knows very well…. Across all literatures, in the Thousand and One Nights 
as in the Decameron, women’s ruses are seen to triumph over the pru­
dence of men.163
monde sa puissance: elle est sa mesure, et sa part sur terre. Chez les Orientaux la femme 
se doit d’être grasse: on voit qu’elle est largement nourrie et elle fait honneur à son maître. 
Un musulman est d’autant plus considéré qu’il possède un plus grand nombre de femmes 
et qu’elles sont d’apparence plus florissante. Dans la société bourgeoise, un des rôles dévo­
lus à la femme, c’est de représenter: sa beauté, son charme, son intelligence, son élégance 
sont les signes extérieurs de la fortune du mari au même titre que la carrosserie de son 
automobile” (DS 1:288–89).
161 “[L]e héros de La mégère apprivoisée convoque tous ses voisins pour leur montrer avec 
quelle autorité il a su dompter sa femme” (DS 1:289).
162 “[I]l y a dans le mariage une mystification puisque prétendant socialiser l’érotisme, il n’a 
réussi qu’à le tuer” (DS 1:305).
163 “La voilà donc vouée à l’infidélité: c’est le seul visage concret que puisse revêtir sa liberté. 
Elle est infidèle par­delà même ses désirs, ses pensées, sa conscience; du fait qu’on la re­
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The mythic patrimony (so to speak) is here being treated as a kind of grab­
bag or anthology: neither a set of binary contrasts nor a universal same in 
which differences are flattened out. Beauvoir’s examples may appear to have 
been chosen almost at random, but they appear side by side rather than in 
separate boxes, much less in a hierarchical arrangement; the veiled lady whose 
seclusion fails, here, to truly contain her has precisely the same status as Shake­
speare’s Desdemona, Bocaccio’s Griselda, and the legendary Frenchwoman 
Geneviève de Brabant. And when Beauvoir says “[t]here is, however, no femi­
nine figure—virgin, mother, wife, sister, servant, lover, fierce virtue, smiling 
odalisque—capable of encapsulating the inconstant yearnings of man,” she is 
telling us that all these images of Woman are equally imaginary—and none 
the less powerful and damaging.164
6 Anti-orientalism in The Second Sex: Plus Jamais Claudel
Markowitz professes to find it “curious” that Beauvoir “seems to be all but un­
aware of her own Orientalism,” especially in the light of Beauvoir’s strong 
critique of “the Jewish personality and the black soul.”165 In fact, while the rit­
ual gestures of white feminist self­abasement are indeed absent, the myth 
chapters of The Second Sex do contain some rather biting critiques of Europe­
an male fantasies of an exotic “other,” fantasies Beauvoir links to nationalism 
and colonialism. (Markowitz may not have seen this because it is advanced by 
garde comme un objet, elle est offerte à toute subjectivité qui choisit de s’emparer d’elle; 
enfermée dans le harem, cachée sous des voiles, on n’est encore pas sûr qu’elle n’inspire à 
personne du désir: inspirer du désir à un étranger, c’est déjà manquer à son époux et à la 
société. Mais, en outre, elle se fait souvent complice de cette fatalité; c’est seulement par 
le mensonge et l’adultère qu’elle peut prouver qu’elle n’est la chose de personne et qu’elle 
dément les prétentions du mâle. C’est pourquoi la jalousie de l’homme est si prompte à 
s’éveiller; on voit dans les légendes que la femme peut être soupçonnée sans raison, 
condamnée sur le moindre soupçon, telles Geneviève de Brabant et Desdémone; avant 
même tout soupçon, Grisélidis est soumise aux plus dures épreuves; ce conte serait ab­
surde si la femme n’était pas d’avance suspecte; il n’y a pas à démontrer ses fautes: c’est à 
elle de prouver son innocence. C’est pourquoi aussi la jalousie peut être insatiable; on a 
dit déjà que la possession ne peut jamais être positivement réalisée; même si on interdit 
à tout autre d’y puiser, on ne possède pas la source à laquelle on s’abreuve: le jaloux le sait 
bien…. À travers toutes les littératures, dans Les mille et une nuits comme dans le Déca-
méron, on voit les ruses de la femme triompher de la prudence de l’homme” (DS 
1:307–308).
164 “[I]l n’est aucune figure féminine: vierge, mère, épouse, soeur, servante, amante, farouche 
vertu, souriante odalisque qui ne soit susceptible de résumer ainsi les ondoyantes aspira­
tions des hommes” (DS 1:315).
165 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams,” 278.
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means of literary example, and because many of the writers discussed are un­
familiar today outside France.) One strong instance occurs within Beauvoir’s 
discussion of how the figure of Woman comes to serve as an abstraction “as­
similated” to cities, regions, nations:166 “This assimilation is not only allegori­
cal; it is realized on the level of feeling [affectivement] by many men.” A foot­
note adds:
It is allegorical in the shameful poem Claudel has recently committed, 
where he calls Indochina “that yellow woman”; on the other hand, it is 
emotional [affective] in the verse of the Black poet:
The soul of the black land where the old ones sleep
lives and speaks
tonight
in the trembling strength along your hollow thighs167
There is nothing accidental in this juxtaposition, I would submit. My readers 
may remember Beauvoir’s use of Claudel as a target in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté, where he figured as an example of the “serious man”: as well as 
supporting Franco and defending Pétain, Claudel was literally “le Colon,” the 
colonial administrator, whose patriotic pride figured in his attack, in 1925, on 
the decadence of Surrealism. The “poète noir” to whom Beauvoir contrasts him 
was Guy Tirolien (1917–88), a close friend and collaborator of Senghor’s; the 
poem she quotes from, “Black Beauty,” is addressed to a particular (though 
unnamed) woman who reminds the speaker of Africa in her face and way of 
walking (démarche), and in her voice, as well as her body. It is hard not to see 
this quotation, from a poet of color who was associated with the resistance to 
166 She begins by citing Jung on this point, but her examples soon exceed the point he was 
making.
167 “Cette assimilation n’est pas seulement allégorique: elle est affectivement réalisée par 
quantité d’hommes. [Note: Elle est allégorique dans le honteux poème que Claudel vient 
récemment de commettre et où il appelle l’Indochine “C’te femme jaune”; elle est affec­
tive au contraire dans les vers du poète noir:
L’âme du noir pays où dorment les anciens
vit et parle
ce soir
en la force inquiète le long de tes reins creux]” (DS 1:292).
I am indebted to Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany­Chevallier for identifying the 
poet.
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colonialism both in literature and in life,168 as a rebuke to Claudel’s (literally) 
imperialist pretensions, which linked a traditionalist nostalgia for “family val­
ues” with a vision of the Mission of France Beauvoir found nauseating.169
But I wish she had quoted from Claudel’s poem, too. It was called “Saint Mi­
chel­l’archange, patron des parachutistes du corps expéditionnaire d’Indochine” 
(Saint Michael the Archangel, Patron Saint of Paratroopers in the Indochina 
Expeditionary Corps). Dated July 16, 1948, it was written to celebrate France’s 
effort to regain its former colonies after World War ii. I found some of it in 
Claude Roy’s autobiography, Moi je, in the course of a discussion of what vari­
ous writers did during the German occupation of France. Roy refers to Clau­
del’s well­known 1915 ode to Pétain—Tant que vous voudrez, mon général!— 
and to his call for bloody reprisals against Republican Spain, describes him as 
beating a deaf man’s drum to which other collaborators danced in tune, and 
notes that “He had time, before he died, to consecrate a last ballad to the para­
chutists of Indochina,” from which Roy quotes:
Hail, champion of Ocean!
Hail, policeman of God!
Breton saint! Brutal saint! Colonel, Soldier of a kind,
Help me from above to make her understand, that yellow woman, that 
this land where we are gaining ground is our land, for which we 
have paid dear.
168 Born in Guadeloupe, Tirolien studied in France, met Senghor in the Stalag where both 
were German prisoners, was among the founders of Présence Africaine and held a number 
of official posts in French African countries, both before and after independence. I wish I 
knew more about him.
169 In May 1968, observing among the wall slogans “PLUS JAMAIS CLAUDEL” (Never Again 
Claudel), Leiris would burst out: “In other words: to hell with this elephantine gymnast of 
the word, bulwark of the bourgeois status quo, sometimes wearing the mask of a very 
mandarin, very colonial exoticism, and sometimes that of a bookish mystic. (That’s how I 
see things, at least, and I’ve no reason to think there were different motives behind the 
rejection so clearly expressed at Nanterre.)” [Autrement dit: foin de ce gymnaste mam­
mouthéen du verbe, ferme appui du statu quo bourgeois, sous le masque tantôt d’un exo­
tisme très mandarin colonial, tantôt d’une mystique de fort­en­thème. (C’est, du moins, 
comme cela que je vois la chose et je n’ai aucune raison de penser que ce rejet, si caté­
goriquement exprimé à Nanterre, n’était pas ainsi motivé.)] Other slogans included “Intel­
lectuels apprenez à ne plus l’être” (intellectuals, learn not to be), “la vie vite” (live fast) and 
“soyez réaliste demandez l’impossible” (be realistic, demand the impossible). Leiris, Frêle 
Bruit, 167.
Chapter 5410
And I hear the clarion call to the clarion down there which answers 
across the ricefield…170
(My attempt at literal translation is clumsy, but so is the original poem: it’s 
“honteux,” shameful, on more than one level.) I found a bit more of it on the 
blog of one Michel Volkovitch, under the title “Andouille en parachute”:
The Will of God suddenly vertical and severe
Which seizes you by the shoulders, plucks you out and throws you 
back like a stone,
170 Roy, Moi Je, 221: “Et un autre très grand poète, Paul Claudel, ponctue des roulements d’un 
tambour de sourd les marches et contremarches des autres. Entre deux vagues du ly­
risme le plus ample qu’exhale une poitrine vivante, il va jouer pendant trente ans le 
Colonel Scrongneugneu de l’intelligentsia. Tant que vous voudrez, mon général! Tant qu’il 
y en aura un seul! Tant qu’il y en aura un seul de vivant, les vivants et les morts tous à la 
fois, mâchonnait­il déjà en 1915. En 1937, devant l’Espagne en sang, il récidive: ‘Le temps 
de l’amputation pour l’arbre a fini et c’est le temps des représailles.’ Sa pensée politique 
sera un éternel Tant que vous voudrez! Tant que vous voudrez, mon général Franco! Tant 
que vous voudrez, monsieur le maréchal Pétain! Tant que vous voudrez, mon général de 
Gaulle! Il aura le temps, avant de mourir, de consacrer une dernière ballade aux para­
chutistes d’Indochine:
Salut, champion de l’Océan!
Salut, gendarme de Dieu!
Saint breton! Saint brutal! espèce de colonel et de militaire
Aide­moi lui faire comprendre, elle aussi, c’te femme jaune, par là­dessus
que cette terre où nous prenons pied, c’est la nôtre que nous avons payée cher
Et j’entends le clairon au clairon là­bas qui répond à travers la rizière…”
Tant que vous voudrez, mon général!, the refrain from Claudel’s poem of the First World 
War, is usually translated as, “As many as you wish, my general!” (“as many” meaning, as 
many men, young men for cannon fodder, “until there will only be one left”…); but some­
times it is translated to mean “as far as you wish!” (a simple gesture of blind obedience to 
authority). In his repetition of the phrase, Roy also alludes to Claudel’s bloody­minded 
and self­righteous early support for Franco, and to his (brief, and later retracted) support 
for Pétain as leader of the Vichy government. (Roy incidentally displays an unflattering 
view of General de Gaulle that parallels Beauvoir’s view of that General’s authoritarian 
response to the Algerian crisis.) Interestingly, this all comes at the end of a chapter where 
Roy is attempting to explain why many intellectuals (including himself) moved from 
right­wing commitments in the 1930s to become resistance fighters, and later militants 
for the French communist party; by the time he wrote this, he (and many others) had 
moved away from Communism as well, in response to the evolution of the Soviet Union, 
the revelation of the labor camps, and other factors. Claudel, in contrast, never seems to 
have learned anything. (Roy also mocks him as “le Colonel Scrongneugneu de 
l’intelligentsia”: using a phrase, first attested in an 1884 novel, for “un vieux militaire bou­
gon,” a grumpy old military man; “Scrongneugneu” is a blasphemy­avoiding substitute for 
“sacré nom de Dieu.” [See Alice Develey, “Mais d’où vient le mot ‘scrongneugneu’?”] No, 
you didn’t need to know that, sorry.)
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So that thundering, unexpected, amid the bulrushes and the unknown,
You continue (since I was made for this) the combat of France against 
the Dragon.
All this to testify to people, one more time, about this Good Thing 
coming out of the sky
(This Good Thing, with all its weight, to which one’s harness is 
attached)
And may the Dragon be proved wrong once more when he tries to ar­
gue with Saint Michael!
Hail, champion of the Ocean! hail, policeman of God!
Representative of everything, in sky, on earth, that tries to understand 
what it can
Of all the universal which is right against the particular
Of all the spiritual which is right against the secular
Of all that is upright against that which is twisted!
Hail, warrior full of peace and confident of this Father,
Who since there is no other way, tries to make himself understood in 
bolts of thunder!, etc.171
171 “La volonté de Dieu tout à coup verticale et sévère
Qui vous saisit par les épaules, vous arrache et qui vous lâche comme une pierre,
Afin que foudroyant, inopiné, à travers l’inconnu et le jonc,
On continue, puisque je suis fait pour ça, le combat de la France contre le Dragon.
Tout ça est pour attester aux gens une fois de plus cette bonne chose qui vient du ciel
(Cette bonne chose de tout le poids qu’on est à quoi l’on est attaché avec des 
bretelles),
Et que le Dragon n’a pas raison une fois de plus quand il essaye de discuter avec Saint 
Michel!
Salut, champion de l’Océan! salut, gendarme de Dieu!
Représentant de tout ce qui là­haut dans le ciel, sur la terre, essaye de se faire com­
prendre comme il peut,
De tout cela universel qui a raison contre le particulier,
De tout cela spirituel qui a raison contre le séculier,
De tout cela rectiligne qui a raison contre l’entortillé!
Salut, guerrier plein de paix et confident de ce Père,
Puisqu’il n’y a pas moyen autrement, qui essaye de se faire comprendre à coups de 
tonnerre!” etc.
(Quoted by Volkovitch, “Andouille en parachute.”)
Volkovitch fills in the picture and replies with an angry poem of his own, noting that 
the “clarion call” would be answered by the 1954 defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu.
St. Michael appears to have been officially claimed as patron saint by French para­
troopers as early as World War I; one can buy, on the internet, vintage military medals 
depicting him, a reminder of the near­total fusion of Church and State Beauvoir describes 
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Shameful indeed. One could certainly label this language “orientalizing,” but 
the problem here is of a different order, if I may say.172 As Fanon put it in 1952, 
the Indochinese rose up against the French, not because they had discovered 
the value of their own culture, but because it was simply becoming impossible 
for them to breathe.173
On a happier note, my search for this piece of garbage (I can’t call it a poem) 
led me to Thi Tuyet Trinh Nguyen’s dissertation, L’imaginaire colonial français 
de l’Indochine 1890–1935, from which I also learned something about one of the 
few women writers Beauvoir mentions with unmitigated approval in The Sec-
ond Sex: Andrée Viollis, whose 1935 book, Indochine sos, was a courageous 
piece of reportage on behalf of the immiserated indigènes and a denunciation 
of French practices there.174 Beauvoir’s autobiography mentions reading Viol­
lis’s other book, L’Inde contre les Anglais, when it appeared in 1930.175 India 
against the English. 1930. Hmm.
in Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée. This is the France for which Claudel, and Beauvoir’s 
bourgeois readers, were nostalgic.
Wikipedia, however, informs me that those who carried out France’s colonial war “in­
cluded colonial troops from the whole former empire (Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, 
Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese ethnic minorities), French professional troops and 
units of the French Foreign Legion. The use of metropolitan recruits was forbidden by the 
government to prevent the war from becoming even more unpopular at home. It was 
called the ‘dirty war’ (la sale guerre) by leftists in France.”
172 One can see why W.H. Auden mentions Claudel in the same breath as Kipling in the qua­
train from his Yeats elegy that constitutes the only time many Anglophones are likely to 
have heard his name: Claudel is the French version of the “white man’s burden.” One does 
not, however, see why Auden thought that Time would pardon Paul Claudel “for writing 
well.” However, I did find some surprising literary­critical éloges of Claudel’s later poems, 
which reflect his “love” of the East by translating from languages he never seems to have 
learned (despite his long sojourn as a diplomat in China and Japan). “And yet, this appar­
ent lack of knowledge might also be considered an advantage (as Roland Barthes later 
stated about his own inability to speak Japanese); the poet came to learn of these cultures 
through his own direct experiences” (Pamela Genova, “Knowledge of the East? Paul Clau­
del and the Equivocal Nature of Cultural Exchange,” 105). Despite the title, there is no 
mention here of such post­Saidian sins as “cultural appropriation.” Sometimes scholar­
ship seems to take place in sealed compartments.
173 “Ce n’est pas parce que l’Indochinois a découvert une culture propre qu’il s’est révolté. 
C’est parce que, ‘tout simplement’ il lui devenait, à plus d’un titre, impossible de respirer” 
(pnmb 183, bswm 176).
174 See Thi Tuyet Trinh Nguyen, L’imaginaire colonial français de l’Indochine 1890–1935. Beau­
voir says, simply, that “no male journalist has outdone Andrée Viollis’s accounts of Indo­
china and India” [aucun journaliste masculin n’a surclassé les témoignages d’Andrée Viol­
lis sur l’Indochine et sur les Indes (DS 2:635)].
175 FA 58.
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Perhaps Beauvoir’s invocation of these telling names feel like asides, and 
perhaps they are. But insofar as Beauvoir’s anti­imperialist commitments 
merely “haunt the margins” here (in contrast to the way they are foregrounded 
in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, and especially 
La force des choses), it seems to me this was in part because she expected her 
readers to easily follow such sideways references as “the shameful poem Clau­
del recently committed.” (Fellow intellectual Claude Roy, for instance, seems to 
have quoted it from memory in a book he wrote twenty years later.) It is un­
likely that readers outside France would have picked up on these particular 
references, even at the time; but I think Beauvoir’s political point resonates 
through the paragraph that follows her discussion of Tirolien and Claudel. She 
is listing various instances where women figure as stand­ins for what is differ­
ent or Other about a land across a border.
It often happens that the traveler asks woman to provide the key to lands 
he visits: holding in his arms an Italian or Spanish woman, he thinks he 
possesses the delicious essence of Italy or Spain. “When I arrive in a new 
city, I always go first to the brothel,” a journalist has said. If a cup of hot 
chocolate spiced with cinnamon can reveal all of Spain to Gide, how 
much more strongly the kisses from an exotic mouth render up to the 
lover a country’s flora and fauna, its traditions, its culture. Woman does 
not sum up its political institutions nor its economics; but she embodies 
at the same time the marrow of its flesh and its mystical mana. From La­
martine’s Graziella to the novels of Loti and the stories of Morand, it is 
through women that we see the foreigner trying to appropriate for him­
self the soul of a region. Mignon, Sylvie, Mireille, Columba, Carmen un­
veil the most intimate truth of Italy, the Valais region, Provence, Corsica, 
Andalusia. When Goethe made the Alsatian Frédérique his lover, it 
seemed to the Germans a symbol of the annexation of Germany; recipro­
cally, when Colette Baudoche refused to marry a German, that was for 
Barrès Alsace refusing itself to Germany.176
176 “Il est fréquent que le voyageur demande à la femme la clef des contrées qu’il visite: 
quand il tient une Italienne, une Espagnole dans ses bras, il lui semble posséder l’essence 
savoureuse d’Italie, de l’Espagne. ‘Quand j’arrive dans une nouvelle ville, je commence 
toujours par aller au bordel,’ disait un journaliste. Si un chocolat à la cannelle peut dé­
couvrir à Gide toute l’Espagne, à plus forte raison les baisers d’une bouche exotique li­
vreront à l’amant un pays avec sa flore, sa faune, ses traditions, sa culture. La femme n’en 
résume pas les institutions politiques ni les richesses économiques; mais elle en incarne 
à la fois la pulpe charnelle et le mana mystique. De Graziella de Lamartine aux romans 
de Loti et aux nouvelles de Morand, c’est à travers les femmes qu’on voit l’étranger tenter 
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Here is some of the same generalized touristic exoticism/eroticism that we 
saw in L’invitée. But the cure “in the real” that I described at the end of that 
book seems to have happened more fully by the time of The Second Sex. Or at 
least, this is a more overt diagnosis. Remember (again) that the discussion is 
embedded in a lengthy recital of male fantasies and why they matter. The Ger­
man/French examples, at least, show clearly her awareness of the wider politi­
cal stakes of what Lévi­Strauss called the “exchange of women,” and not just 
among the Yanomami or the Sabines but de nos jours. At the infamous 1925 
banquet, when Soupault swung from the chandelier and Leiris was arrested 
for  shouting “Vive l’Allemagne!” the Surrealists were protesting exactly this 
sickly blend of patriotism expressed across women’s bodies, attacking the sym­
bolist writer Rachilde for the same sentiments expressed in Maurice Barrès’s 
novel Colette Baudoche. Like the Surrealists, Beauvoir connected this to anti­ 
colonialist critique. It is not a coincidence that several of the writers she men­
tions here—Loti, Morand, Barrès—were right­wing writers, deplorers of “deca­
dence,” apologists for empire, and racists of the non­subtle sort. Morand, for 
instance, directly collaborated with and served the Vichy government, and 
while Barrès did not live long enough to do so, he certainly prepared the ground 
with novels such as Les déracinés.177 Loti, Claudel, Morand all served in colonial 
armies and/or as bureaucrats (you will recall the pride Claudel took in this when 
rebuking the Surrealists).
I said earlier, near the discussion of L’invitée, that it was not a simple matter 
to disentangle Beauvoir’s relationship to some of the orientalizing and eroti­
cizing discourses about race that she found in her social and intellectual circle, 
and that is true also here. But I want to ask which orientalism we are really 
dealing with. Just saying “orientalism” as an ahistorical moniker is not espe­
cially helpful if (and I guess that’s a big if) we’re trying to actually understand 
the thing. National traditions differ. The eighteenth century and the twentieth 
century differ. And, as Emily Apter explains in an important article, even then 
there’s a lot to know.
An immediate problem in addressing these concerns lies in the fact that 
French colonial literature is made up of a nasty tissue of Orientalist 
de s’approprier l’âme d’une région. Mignon, Sylvie, Mireille, Columba, Carmen dévoilent 
la plus intime vérité de l’Italie, du Valais, de la Provence, de la Corse, de l’Andalousie. Que 
Goethe se soit fait aimer de l’Alsacienne Frédérique est apparu aux Allemands comme 
un symbole de l’annexion de l’Allemagne; réciproquement, quand Colette Baudoche re­
fuse d’épouser un Allemand, c’est aux yeux de Barrès l’Alsace qui se refuse à l’Allemagne” 
(DS 1:292).
177 See Renee Winegarten, “Who Was Paul Morand?”
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clichés; romantic physiognomical and characterological typologies, rac­
ist sexual fantasies, and frozen, “postcarded” images of native subjects 
indiscriminately shuffled between black, brown, métis, Asiatic, Arab, 
Kabylian, Moorish, Ottoman, Bedouin, Islamic, and Byzantine cultural 
frames. The reader risks reinforcing these stereotypes even in endeavour­
ing to undo them. Equally complicated is the historiographical task of 
constituting a textual canon. A motley assortment of authors falls under 
this rubric, including Parisian literati interested in updating realist exoti­
cism, modernist Orientalists seduced by the spectacular stage­setting of 
the East, North African writers writing in French, amateur ethnographers 
with a taste for the tourist sublime, colonial civil servants proselytizing 
for la mission civilisatrice, cross­dressing journalists, female voyeurs, and 
ex­harem wives.178
Markowitz speculates that Beauvoir’s “orientalism” might have come to her 
from Hegel via Marx; she also refers to the work of Alain Grosrichard, a psycho­
analytic reading of “the Western imagination” starting from the eighteenth 
century and Montesquieu. But Beauvoir knew Hegel directly, and we can tell 
that the orientalism with which The Second Sex overtly engages comes not 
from philosophy but from storybooks.
Beauvoir’s association of “the East” with a different, and a forbidden, sexual­
ity does in fact run very deep: she tells us so herself in Mémoires d’une jeune fille 
rangée. At a very young age (the First World War had not yet ended), she de­
scribes the masochism that her pious upbringing inspired;179 in the absence of 
any precise information about sexuality, she identified in fantasy with Mary 
Magdalene wiping the feet of Christ with her long hair, with saints and martyrs 
(including Geneviève de Brabant) who suffered nobly at the hands of men, and 
with Bluebeard’s wives.
Certain of my fantasies would not bear the light of day; I had to indulge 
them in secret. I was always extraordinarily moved by the fate of that cap­
tive king whom an Oriental tyrant used as a mounting­block; from time 
to time, trembling, half­naked, I would substitute myself for the royal 
slave and feel the tyrant’s sharp spurs riding down my spine.180
178 Emily Apter, “Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem,” 207–8.
179 “Ma piété me disposait au masochisme” (Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, hereinafter 
mjfr, 80).
180 “Certains de mes phantasmes ne supportaient pas la lumière; je ne les évoquais qu’en 
 secret. Je fus extraordinairement émue par le sort de ce roi captif qu’un tyran oriental 
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I haven’t identified exactly what Beauvoir was reading, but her account 
seems like a fitting synecdoche for the process by which Christian Europe, 
ashamed of and yet fascinated by sexual desire, denied the importance of the 
body (to the extent of refusing to educate children about it), connected eroti­
cism to the mortification of the flesh, and then simply outsourced the whole 
subject to “the East.” Throughout her adolescence, Beauvoir had a significant 
encounter with a rather steamy (and seamy) turn of the century literature that 
was indeed connected with Empire, in that it was written by many of the same 
people responsible for carrying out the Empire’s actual work. Gide, Loti, Mo­
rand, and Barrès all exoticized and eroticized the mysterious East, and they 
were all writers the young Beauvoir had liked and valued (as for that matter 
was Claudel, one of her best friend Zaza’s particular favorites). We’ve seen al­
ready what an important influence Gide was: in fact, when she and Sartre first 
crossed the Spanish border, almost the first thing they did, following his in­
structions, was to order a cup of bitter hot chocolate and religiously inhale it in 
order to “drink in all of Spain.”181 By the time she wrote the memoir, she was 
telling this as a funny story, amused at the credulity of her younger self; but the 
fact is that, in their later travels through the Maghreb, they were explicitly fol­
lowing Gide’s traces and his instructions that there was something important 
to see there, something that could not be found in France.182 Even on the solo 
trip where she saw the women living in the cave, she notes signs that Gide had 
been there before her (his signature in a hotel register in Nefta, and carved into 
a public bench in El Oued).183 However, she also recounts her discomfort on a 
train whose conductor, after cursing and cuffing the Arab passengers, tells her 
that because she is a European she does not have to pay.
utilisait comme marchepied quand il montait à cheval; il m’arrivait de me substituer 
tremblante, demi­nue, à l’esclave dont un dur éperon écorchait l’échine” (mjfr 81).
181 FA 97–8.
182 And there was, though it may not have been what Gide meant them to see. The case of 
Gide is more complicated than that of his old arch­adversary Claudel, and of the other 
writers discussed here; I can’t really go into it fully now. Gide’s profound and perfectly old­
fashioned, erotically­inflected orientalism may keep us from fully enjoying L’immoraliste: 
sexual freedom, bien ok, but for whom? (What freedom exists for the boy? For the woman 
in the harem—and here I mean Gide’s own harem.) However, his orientalism didn’t keep 
him from speaking out against the abuses he saw on his trip to the Congo, and throwing 
his considerable cultural weight behind this; and his leftist sympathies didn’t prevent him 
from saying what he saw in Retour de l’URSS. Perhaps his embrace of Whitman’s sublime 
insouciance about contradicting oneself was productive? Lives are more complex than 
labels.
183 FCh 1:87–8, FCirc 66–67.
417The East Is Real: Orientalism And Its Enemies
Given this context, the paragraph I quoted above about women and cities 
has the flavor of an exorcism. When you’re young, you read what’s put in front 
of you, you read what the people around you are reading, you look for what you 
need in all the wrong places. But then you grow up. Beauvoir’s mature work 
mentions these orientalist writers, I think, largely for the same reason the story 
of the captive king figures in Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée: because she 
outgrew them.
An even more obscure example of this “self­cleansing” in The Second Sex 
relates to Jean­Richard Bloch’s 1925 novel, La nuit kurde. After describing the 
inextricable mixture of love and hate that characterizes men’s sexual myth of 
Woman (lover and mother, representative of their own fleshly contingence 
and thus their own finitude), Beauvoir says, introducing a very long quotation: 
“A revealing text where we will find a synthesis of almost all these myths is the 
scene where Jean­Richard Bloch in La nuit kurde describes young Saad’s sexual 
encounter with a woman older than himself, but still beautiful, in the course of 
the sack of a city.”184 Now, in her memoirs, Beauvoir describes her mother dis­
covering La nuit kurde among her adolescent reading, leafing through it, and 
turning pale.185 And Mme. de Beauvoir was right, for once: the book is vile. It 
is a lyrical but lurid fantasy involving a variety of racial mythologies: a half­ 
Kurdish, half­Christian hero, somewhere in Asia Minor (?), carries out rape, 
pillage, and cannibalism against the Greek Christian village where his beloved 
lives. The narrative is prefaced by a declaration of extreme French nationalism 
on the part of the author, and concludes with a breathless “farewell to Asia,” 
making the geographical “outsourcing” of sexual fantasy absolutely explicit. It 
is easy enough to see what made Maman feel faint, and also easy to see why 
this would, during Beauvoir’s period of imaginative revolt against the stifling 
atmosphere of her home and the Cours Desir, have seemed like a point in its 
favor.186
184 “Un texte significatif où nous allons trouver une synthèse de presque tous ces mythes, 
c’est celui où Jean­Richard Bloch dans La nuit kurde décrit les étreintes du jeune Saad avec 
une femme plus âgée que lui, mais encore belle, au cours du sac d’une ville” (DS 1:274).
185 mjfr 313.
186 “I was in exactly the same position as these disoriented young men from good families; I 
wanted to separate myself from the class I belonged to, but where, then, was there to go? 
… I vowed allegiance to the cult of Disquiet [l’Inquiétude]…. I was just as quick to em­
brace Immoralism. Of course, I did not approve of people stealing out of self­interest or 
jumping into bed just for pleasure; but I was unflinchingly prepared to accept all kinds of 
vices, rapes, assassinations, as long as they were gratuitous acts, acts of desperation and 
revolt—and, needless to say, imaginary. Doing evil, that was the most radical way to re­
pudiate any complicity with respectable people.” [J’étais exactement dans la même situ­
ation que ces fils de famille désaxés; je me séparais de la classe à laquelle j’appartenais: 
Chapter 5418
It is harder to understand why the grown­up Beauvoir would have found 
this bizarre fantasy of enduring interest, even as a source of “myths,” powerful 
(wrong) visions of women. From the very few critics who have taken an inter­
est in Bloch, I have learned that his early work deals with questions of anti­
Semitism and Jewish assimilation in bourgeois France, and that he became a 
passionate Zionist, and later a communist writer, praised by Aragon.187 None 
of which sheds much light on La nuit kurde, and in particular on what I must 
simply call racism of a disturbingly sexualized sort.188 The book is the fantasy 
product of an identity crisis on the part of its author, who had seen no more of 
the Arab world than Boris Vian saw of America, but who nonetheless (over and 
over and over) attributes what someone says or does, down to the most minute 
physical detail or trembling nuance of feeling, directly (and explicitly) to that 
person’s racial heritage.
However, apart from the book’s title, there’s nothing in Beauvoir’s quotation 
that situates what it describes anywhere on Earth—and the entwined, vibrat­
ing bodies involved are not racialized in any way. What we see is pretty simply 
a sex­murder, and Beauvoir quotes not with tweezers but with scissors, a habit 
of hers with which we are by now familiar. I think we are simply meant to be 
fascinated and appalled by the extent to which lust and woman­hating can 
fuse into a single impulse.
Parshley seems to have had the same response to La nuit kurde as Beauvoir’s 
mother did: he simply left the whole thing out, and for once it’s hard to blame 
him. In fact, I must confess that Bloch’s book is so repellent that I have been 
unable to read it through from cover to cover. Every page drips with sexual 
où aller? … Je me vouai à l’Inquiétude…. Je ne mis pas moins d’empressement à em­
brasser l’immoralisme. Certes, je n’approuvai pas qu’on volât par intérêt ni qu’on s’ébattît 
dans un lit pour le plaisir; mais s’ils étaient gratuits, désespérés, révoltés—et bien en­
tendu imaginaires—j’encaissais sans broncher tous les vices, les viols et les assassinats. 
Faire le mal, c’était la manière la plus radicale de répudier toute complicité avec les gens 
de bien (mjfr 270).]
187 See Jean Albertini, “Jean­Richard Bloch, de l’affaire [Dreyfus] à La nuit kurde,” and Michel 
Trebitsch, “‘De la situation faite à l’écrivain juif dans le monde moderne’: Jean­Richard 
Bloch, entre identité littérature et engagement.” These scholars have convinced me that 
Bloch was, in fact, a complex and interesting writer, and a sincerely engaged man of the 
left (much as might be argued for Boris Vian). But neither scholar has much good to say 
for La nuit kurde, which the always cogent and insightful Trebitsch compares to an “ovni,” 
a ufo. At best it can be situated, and explained, as a partial allegory for the uniquely tor­
turous position occupied at that period by “assimilated” Jewish writers in a virulently an­
ti­Semitic culture. An explanation, but not an excuse.
188 He also published a récit de voyage called Première journée à Rufisque, which apparently 
takes up homosexual questions described by Paul Renard as “épineuses et choquantes,” 
thorny and disturbing (Paul Renard, “Jean­Richard Bloch,” 47).
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feeling, and scenes proceed at a glacial pace in order to emphasize this. It is 
very much a young man’s book.189 In this case, the young man happens to be a 
kind of “tragic mulatto,” since his mother was a Christian, and (stereotype piled 
on stereotype) racial currents are fighting themselves out within the hero, as 
well as between the nomadic group to which he (uneasily) belongs and the 
Nestorian Christians in the town where his beloved lives.190 I cannot really give 
an account of “what the book is trying to say.” Like Vian’s, it was cobbled to­
gether from other books, rather than informed by actual knowledge.191 As 
such, it reveals a great deal about what fantasies were received as “authentic” 
at a certain time—or at least authentic enough to sell. But I do not think it tells 
us anything much about Beauvoir, who simply seems to have unzipped it from 
the cultural context and used it to illustrate something else: the close approach, 
in the structure of male fantasy, between sex and death. The reason it is quoted 
at such length is—excuse my French—to show how fucked up this is. And if the 
response is, “but, Madame, this is typique,” her response would be: “right, my 
point exactly.”
But one is always more influenced than one thinks. On the very next page 
she returns to cultural comparison, with the same confusing mixture of syn­
chrony and diachrony we saw in the history section, some of the same points, 
and some of the same problems.
Many different attitudes are available for the man, as he may emphasize 
one aspect or another of the carnal drama. If a man does not have the 
idea that his life is unique, if he is not concerned with his singular destiny, 
he does not fear death and accepts his animal nature with joy. Among 
Muslims, woman is reduced to a lowly condition because the feudal 
structure of society permits no recourse to the State against the family, on 
account of religion which, expressing the warrior ideal of this civiliza­
tion, has dedicated man directly to death and deprives woman of her 
magic: what need he fear, who is ready to plunge from one moment to the 
next into the voluptuous orgies of the Mohammedan paradise? The man 
can thus calmly enjoy woman with no need of defense, either against 
189 Young Saad has an awful lot in common with such French juvenile heroes as Marcel Ar­
land’s Étienne or even Benjamin Constant’s Adolphe: the case could be made that this is, 
in fact, a book about France, and that Beauvoir was right to disregard the setting.
190 Those who wish to claim Bloch as an important and neglected twentieth­century writer 
tend to understand this as a tortured reflection on the situation of the Jewish writer in 
France.
191 Albertini (“Jean­Richard Bloch, de l’affaire à La nuit kurde,” 251) says it was built around a 
fait divers (“human interest story”) Bloch read by chance in the newspapers in 1920.
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himself or against her. The stories of the Thousand and One Nights regard 
her as a source of creamy delight in the same way as fruits, preserves, 
opulent cakes, perfumed oils. Today the same kindly sensuality can be 
found among many Mediterranean peoples…192
The examples which follow are from a modern Italian novel, but I think it is 
possible that what makes least sense in this paragraph bleeds over from the 
confused imaginary of La nuit kurde. However, this is merely the opening salvo 
in a paragraph that runs for no fewer than five solid pages without drawing 
breath. I simply cannot quote it, but after this brief introduction to Oriental 
“bienveillance” toward women, the “on the other hand” part—everything that 
is vile about the Christian view of women (quotes from Tertullian, etc.)—takes 
up fully four of those pages. The point is the paradox. Eastern and Southern 
peoples subjugate women socially and politically, but treat them with appre­
ciation as sexual partners; Christianity pretends to elevate woman to the status 
of a human being, but this is a dirty trick: she is still reduced to a debased and 
hateful Other by her association with the corruptions of the flesh. This is equal­
ly true of all that follows in Christianity’s wake, for instance, psychoanalysis.
Facing [the woman], man feels the strongest conviction of his own flesh­
ly passivity. Woman is a vampire, a slut, an eater and drinker of men; her 
sex organ feeds gluttonously upon his. Certain psychoanalysts have tried 
to give a scientific basis to these fantasies: supposedly all the pleasure 
woman derives from intercourse would come from symbolically castrat­
ing the male and appropriating his penis. But it seems that these theories 
themselves call out to be psychoanalyzed, and that the doctors who in­
vented them have projected their own ancestral terrors.193
192 “Beaucoup d’attitudes sont ici possibles à l’homme, selon qu’il met l’accent sur tel ou tel 
aspect du drame charnel. Si un homme n’a pas l’idée que la vie est unique, s’il n’a pas le 
souci de sa destinée singulière, s’il ne redoute pas la mort, il acceptera joyeusement son 
animalité. Chez les musulmans, la femme est réduite à un état d’abjection à cause de la 
structure féodale de la société qui ne permet pas le recours à l’État contre la famille, à 
cause de la religion qui, exprimant l’idéal guerrier de cette civilisation, a voué directe­
ment l’homme à la Mort et a dépouillé la femme de sa magie: que craindrait sur terre celui 
qui est prêt à se plonger d’une seconde à l’autre dans les voluptueuses orgies du paradis 
mahométan? L’homme peut donc tranquillement jouir de la femme sans avoir à se défen­
dre contre soi­même, ni contre elle. Les contes des Mille et une nuits la regardent comme 
une source d’onctueuses délices aux même titre que les fruits, les confitures, les gâteaux 
opulents, les huiles parfumées. On retrouve aujourd’hui cette bienveillance sensuelle 
chez beaucoup de peuples méditerranéens” (DS 1:276).
193 “C’est en face d’elle que l’homme éprouve avec le plus d’évidence la passivité de sa propre 
chair. La femme est vampire, gouge, mangeuse, buveuse; son sexe se nourrit  gloutonnement 
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Yes, evidently. You know, it’s really tough for me to see this as a progress nar­
rative. There hasn’t been any progress.
7 Pour en finir avec Montherlant
The “Oriental” sexual appreciation of women makes a final appearance in 
Beauvoir’s discussion of Henri de Montherlant, a deservedly forgotten Fascist 
writer,194 whose attitude toward women was as violent and domineering as his 
racism was glaring. Montherlant gets his own chapter in the part of the myth 
section given over to “myths of women in five authors.” As I said in my discus­
sion of Surrealism, these chapters often feel skippable, but they are important 
because they show that “myths” are still with us in the modern age, and be­
cause by close­reading male writers who are usually viewed as representing 
divergent, even opposite, literary “schools,” and nonethless drawing remark­
ably similar conclusions, Beauvoir creates an implicit category of, well, mascu­
linist writing. Entering the arena of combat about what literature should be, 
and do, she attacks her living compatriots, and condemns them out of their 
own mouths. As Susan Suleiman showed for the chapter on André Breton, 
Beauvoir’s method is “death by citation”—actually taking seriously what men 
say their ideas about women are, actually listening to them, could be enough to 
bring on a rousing cry of “goodbye to all that.” (In the words of a recent meme: 
“When someone tells you who they are, believe them.”) Margaret Zimmerman 
sees this chapter in particular as a “mise à mort” or execution which harks back 
to Christine de Pizan and the querelle des femmes and looks forward to the 
feminist critiques of the 1970s.195 Montherlant’s vision of women as monstrous 
destroyers of all that is virile and valuable is exposed and mocked as a self­ 
aggrandizing fantasy: the emperor has no clothes, and his despisal of the femi­
nine is revealed as a fear of confronting his equals, a fear of the real.
In this chapter it becomes even clearer that when Beauvoir speaks of “the 
Oriental attitude” toward women, she is speaking of a Western fantasy. The 
“Oriental male” here is not simply a foil for any Westerner, he is specifically a 
du sexe mâle. Certains psychanalystes ont voulu donner des bases scientifiques à ces 
imaginations: tout le plaisir que la femme tire du coït viendrait de ce qu’elle châtre sym­
boliquement le mâle et s’approprie son sexe. Mais il semble que ces théories elles­mêmes 
demandent à être psychanalysées et que les médecins qui les inventèrent y aient projeté 
des terreurs ancestrales” (DS 1:279–80).
194 For some good background on French fascism in the realm of letters, see Richard Golsan, 
French Writers and the Politics of Complicity: Crises of Democracy in the 1940s and 1990s.
195 Margarete Zimmerman, “Le mythe de la femme et les écrivains: Montherlant ou le pain 
du dégoût,” in Galster, Simone de Beauvoir, 192.
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foil to Montherlant, who believes (wrongly) that he has inserted himself into 
the tradition of the Thousand and One Nights.
Women’s appropriate role, according to Montherlant, is to be purely 
flesh. He approves of the Oriental attitude: as an object of pleasure, the 
weaker sex has a place on Earth, a humble place it is true, and yet a worth­
while one, justified by the pleasure the male derives from her and by that 
pleasure alone. The ideal woman is perfectly stupid and perfectly sub­
missive; she is always ready to receive the man, asking nothing in return. 
Such a one is Douce, who Alban [the hero of Montherlant’s Le songe], 
appreciates when it suits him, “Douce, admirably foolish and more desir­
able the more foolish she is; when not making love she is useless, and 
then he gently but firmly avoids her.” Such a one also is the little Arab 
Radidja, a peaceful love­beast who docilely accepts pleasure, and money. 
Such, we imagine, was that “female animal” he came across on a Spanish 
railway train: “She seemed so brutish [abruti] that I began to desire her.” 
The author explains, “what is so annoying about women is their claim to 
reason; when they concentrate on their animality, they begin to be 
superhuman.”196
But Montherlant’s disgust for women’s bodies, and for the fear of his own flesh 
he experiences in their presence, reveal a more modern (and more Christian) 
attitude.
However, Montherlant is not in the least an Oriental Sultan: to start with, 
he has no sensuality. He is far from delighting without a backward glance 
in “female animals”: they are “sick, diseased, never entirely clean.” The 
Oriental partakes voluptuously of woman and thus a carnal reciprocity is 
established between lovers: that is what we see in the ardent invocations 
196 “Ce qui convient à la femme, c’est d’être purement chair. Montherlant approuve l’attitude 
orientale: en tant qu’objet de jouissance, le sexe faible a sur terre une place, humble sans 
doute, mais valable; il trouve une justification dans le plaisir qu’en tire le mâle et dans ce 
plaisir seul. La femme idéale est parfaitement stupide et parfaitement soumise; elle est 
toujours prête à accueillir l’homme, et ne lui demande jamais rien. Telle est Douce, 
qu’Alban apprécie à ses heures, ‘Douce, admirablement sotte et toujours plus convoitée à 
mesure que plus sotte … inutile en dehors de l’amour et qu’il évite alors avec une douceur 
ferme.’ Telle est la petite Arabe Radidja, tranquille bête d’amour qui accepte docilement 
plaisir et argent. Telle peut­on imaginer cette ‘bête féminine’ rencontrée dans un train 
espagnol: ‘Elle avait l’air si abruti que je me suis mis à la désirer.’ L’auteur explique: ‘Ce qui 
est agaçant chez les femmes, c’est leur prétention à la raison; qu’elles exagèrent leur ani­
malité, elles ébauchent le surhumain’” (DS 1: 325–26).
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of the Song of Songs, the tales of the Thousand and One Nights, and so 
many Arab poems to the glory of the beloved; some women are bad, of 
course; but others are delightful, and in their arms the sensual man aban­
dons himself confidently, feeling no humiliation. Montherlant’s hero, on 
the contrary, is always on the defensive: “To take without being taken, 
that is the only acceptable motto for the superior man’s relation to 
woman.”197
I cannot recognize, here, Markowitz’s “generalized Oriental male, who cannot 
or will not rouse himself from his lethargic sensuality,” and certainly Monther­
lant’s modern misreading of the Thousand and One Nights is no improvement 
on the original: Beauvoir is arguing just the opposite.
The discussion also fails to confirm Markowitz’s claim that “Beauvoir, a tren­
chant critic of the notions of the ‘Jewish personality’ and the ‘black soul,’ has 
nothing more to say about” this “Oriental male,” nor do I see any purchase for 
the rather condescending concession with which she follows up: “After all, 
mainstream Western feminist discourse, even when questioning itself about 
race, has until recently lacked the sort of theoretical framework that could 
bring these remarks into sharp relief and suggest how to understand them.”198
In fact, Beauvoir did have such a framework, as we saw in her discussion of 
the bad faith of le colon in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté; its main points are 
reprised here. In the last chapter of the myth section, which pulls together her 
previous arguments, she investigates the myth of woman’s supposed “Mystery.” 
She describes this as providing men with “an alibi which flatters both their lazi­
ness and their vanity,”199 and as entirely oppressive to those who are seen as 
“mysterious” rather than as fully human. True, their status of dominated Other 
can lead women to play along with the game:
197 “Cependant Montherlant n’est en rien un Sultan oriental: il lui manque d’abord la sensu­
alité. Il est loin de se délecter sans arrière­pensée des ‘bêtes féminines’; elles sont ‘malades, 
malsaines, jamais tout à fait nettes.’ … L’Oriental goûte voluptueusement la femme et par 
là s’établit entre amants une réciprocité charnelle; c’est ce que manifestent les ardentes 
invocations du Cantique des cantiques, les contes des Mille et Une Nuits, et tant de poé­
sies arabes à la gloire de la bien­aimée; certes, il y a de mauvaises femmes; mais il en est 
aussi de savoureuses, et l’homme sensuel s’abandonne à leurs bras avec confiance, sans 
s’en trouver humilié. Tandis que le héros de Montherlant est toujours sur la défensive: 
‘Prendre sans être pris, seule formule acceptable entre l’homme supérieur et la femme’” 
(DS 1:326).
198 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams,” 273.
199 “[U]n alibi qui flatte à la fois la paresse et la vanité” (DS 1:399).
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Sometimes, like all oppressed people, she deliberately conceals her real 
face: the slave, the servant, the indigène, all those who depend on the ca­
prices of a master have learned to meet him with a changeless smile or an 
enigmatic impassivity, carefully hiding their real feelings and their real 
activities. Woman too is taught from adolescence to lie to men, to be cun­
ning, to sidestep the issue.200
But the question is deeper. “Quite apart from any secrecy that comes from dis­
simulation, there is a mystery of the Black, the Yellow [Jaune], insofar as they 
are considered absolutely as the inessential Other.”201
I suppose Markowitz can be forgiven for not noticing the word “Jaune” amid 
so many densely argued pages. But the idea that Beauvoir “lacked” the right 
“sort of theoretical framework” to understand her own remarks…? It might be 
better simply to accept that, as Toril Moi has shown for other matters, Beau­
voir’s questions were not ours. Her framework was not missing, but different. 
What was it? Beauvoir notes that not all cultural differences are seen as 
mysterious:
Note that the American citizen, whom the average European finds deeply 
disconcerting, is nonetheless not considered “mysterious”; we say, more 
modestly, that we just don’t understand him. Thus, while women don’t 
always “understand” men, there is no “masculine mystery.” Rich America, 
and the male, are on the side of the Master, and Mystery is a property of 
the slave.202
It is a question of relative social power—as she says a bit earlier, there is “an 
infrastructure of feminine mystery which is of an economic order”203—and 
she provides a class analysis which cuts across cultural boundaries:
200 “[I]l arrive que, comme tous les opprimés, elle dissimule délibérément sa figure objective; 
l’esclave, le serviteur, l’indigène, tous ceux qui dépendent des caprices d’un maître ont 
appris à lui opposer un immuable sourire ou une énigmatique impassibilité; leurs vrais 
sentiments, leurs vraies conduites ils les cachent soigneusement. À la femme aussi on 
apprend depuis l’adolescence à mentir aux hommes, à ruser, à biaiser” (DS 1:402).
201 “[I]l y a, par­delà le secret que crée leur dissimulation, un mystère du Noir, du Jaune, en 
tant qu’ils sont considérés absolument comme l’Autre inessentiel” (DS 1:403).
202 “Il faut remarquer que le citoyen américain qui déconcerte profondément l’Européen 
moyen n’est cependant pas considéré comme ‘mystérieux’: plus modestement on assure 
qu’on ne le comprend pas; ainsi la femme ne ‘comprend’ pas toujours l’homme, mais il n’y 
a pas de mystère masculin; c’est que la riche Amérique, le mâle, sont du côté du Maître et 
que le Mystère est propriété de l’esclave” (DS 1:403).
203 “[U]ne infrastructure du mystère féminin qui est d’ordre économique” (DS 1:401).
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Thus we see that myth is mostly explained by the use men make of it. The 
myth of woman is a luxury. It can only appear if man escapes the urgent 
grip of his needs; when relationships are more concretely lived, they are 
less idealized. The fellah of ancient Egypt, the rural Bedouin, the medi­
eval artisan, the workingman today has, through the rigors of work and 
poverty, too specific a relationship with the particular woman who is his 
companion to gild her with magical powers to help or harm. It is the eras, 
and the classes, which have sufficient leisure to dream that have built the 
dark and the gleaming statues of femininity. But luxury too has its uses; 
these dreams are imperiously driven by vested interests.204
This sort of analysis should by now feel familiar.
Where Beauvoir’s hatchet job on Montherlant was tending was towards her 
general theory of domination, which applied to the question of men and wom­
en but did not stop there (and as we have seen did not originate there). Mon­
therlant’s heroes first render women abject and then despise them; this is also 
the attitude of the author himself, not just toward women but toward the 
“weak” generally, as can be seen in his denunciations of the vanquished French, 
his collaboration with Vichy, his worship of Force, and his contempt for those 
who have been defeated simply because they have lost. As she says, he sums up 
this attitude himself, in Solstice de juin, where he describes pissing on a nest of 
caterpillars, choosing with a lordly power to save some from the fire—those 
who show some “fight”—and to let the rest perish. (As with the Claudel poem 
I discussed above, Beauvoir expects her readers to be familiar with this infa­
mous passage and does not quote or really explain it.) The scene, she says, ex­
presses the same capricious domination Montherlant’s heroes show for wom­
en, having first reduced them to the status of animals; it is the same contempt 
the whites of Georgia and Alabama show to the Blacks, the same “avilissement” 
and dehumanization the Nazis practiced in concentration camps. And “there 
is nothing accidental,” she says, about this parallel: “Montherlant’s admiration 
204 “Ainsi nous voyons que le mythe s’explique en grande partie par l’usage que l’homme en 
fait. Le mythe de la femme est un luxe. Il ne peut apparaître que si l’homme échappe à 
l’urgente emprise de ses besoins; plus des rapports sont concrètement vécus, moins ils 
sont idéalisés. Le fellah de l’ancienne Égypte, le paysan bédouin, l’artisan du Moyen Age, 
l’ouvrier contemporain ont dans les nécessités du travail et de la pauvreté des rapports 
trop définis avec la femme singulière qui est leur compagne pour la parer d’une aura faste 
ou néfaste. Ce sont les époques et les classes à qui étaient accordés les loisirs de rêver qui 
ont dressé les statues noires et blanches de la féminité. Mais le luxe a aussi une utilité; ces 
rêves étaient impérieusement dirigés par des intérêts” (DS 1:404).
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for the Nazis is well known.”205 The rest of the chapter goes on to document 
this, to call out his hypocrisy and mock him for seeing his own abasement be­
fore the victors as implying that he partakes of their superior force, rather than 
revealing his own cowardice.
Margaret Zimmerman notes that Beauvoir moves from Montherlant’s atti­
tude toward insects and women to the Southern racists and the Nazis with a 
simple “ainsi” (thus)—“an argument that today seems a little ‘facile.’”206 But it 
would not have seemed facile to readers for whom French collaboration with 
the occupiers was still a gaping wound, who remembered that the journal Je 
suis partout—to which Montherlant contributed—had called for the murder 
of Jews, and pointed out their hiding­places.207
8 But We Know So Much More about This Now
What Markowitz means by the “theoretical framework” which Beauvoir lacked 
but which we, luckily, have, is perhaps exemplified by Emily Apter’s  well­known 
205 “La clé de cette attitude, c’est l’apologue des chenilles qui nous la fournit: quelle qu’en ait 
été l’intention cachée, il est par soi­même assez significatif. Compissant des chenilles, 
Montherlant s’amuse à en épargner certaines, à en exterminer d’autres; il accorde une 
pitié rieuse à celles qui s’acharnent à vivre et les laisse généreusement courir leur chance; 
ce jeu l’enchante. Sans les chenilles, le jet urinaire n’eût été qu’une excrétion; il devient 
instrument de vie et de mort; en face de l’insecte rampant, l’homme qui soulage sa vessie 
connaît la solitude despotique de Dieu; sans être menacé de réciprocité. Ainsi devant les 
bêtes féminines, le mâle, du haut de son piédestal, tantôt cruel, tantôt tendre, juste et 
capricieux tour à tour, donne, reprend, comble, s’apitoie, s’irrite; il n’obéit qu’à son bon 
plaisir; il est souverain, libre, unique. Mais il faut que ces bêtes ne soient que des bêtes; on 
les choisira à dessein, on flattera leurs faiblesses, on les traitera en bêtes avec tant 
d’acharnement qu’elles finiront bien par accepter leur condition. Ainsi les Blancs de Loui­
siane et de Géorgie s’enchantent des menus larcins et des mensonges des Noirs: ils se 
sentent confirmés dans la supériorité que leur confère la couleur de leur peau; et si l’un de 
ces nègres s’entête à être honnête, on l’en maltraitera davantage. Ainsi se pratiquait systé­
matiquement dans les camps de concentration l’avilissement de l’homme: la race des 
Seigneurs trouvait dans cette abjection la preuve qu’elle était d’essence surhumaine.
Cette rencontre n’a rien d’un hasard. On sait assez que Montherlant admire l’idéologie 
nazie” (DS 1:333–34).
206 “[U]ne argumentation qui paraît aujourd’hui quelque peu ‘facile’” (Zimmerman, “Le 
mythe de la femme,” 191).
207 Montherlant still has his literary defenders, but the guilt Beauvoir alludes to is document­
ed in enormous and convincing detail in Golsan, French Writers and the Politics of Com-
plicity. On Je Suis Partout, see also Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution 
of Robert Brassilach, especially 32–4. Similar parallels between Fascism and misogyny had 
been drawn by Woolf in Three Guineas, written “with the sound of guns in [our] ears” (2).
427The East Is Real: Orientalism And Its Enemies
article, “Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem,” to which I referred earlier. Ap­
ter opens with two epigraphs. The first is from The Second Sex:
He takes great pride in his sexuality only in so far as it is a means of ap­
propriating the Other—and this dream other is abolished as such, it is 
consumed and destroyed: only the Sultan in The Arabian Nights has the 
power to cut off each mistress’s head when dawn has come to take her 
from his couch.
The other is from Hélène Cixous’ 1975 “Sorties,” from La jeune née.
It is in writing, from woman and toward woman, and in accepting the 
challenge of the discourse controlled by the phallus, that woman will af­
firm woman somewhere other than in silence, the place reserved for her 
in and through the Symbolic. May she get out of booby­trapped silence! 
And not have the margin or the harem foisted on her as her domain!
After the epigraphs, Apter’s article proper opens as follows.
In attempting to interpret Western projections of an “other” eroticism in 
French colonial fiction between 1870 and 1955, one becomes increasingly 
aware of the uneasy relationship between postcolonial theory and femi­
nist psychoanalysis. Western feminists from Simone de Beauvoir and Hé­
lène Cixous to Gayle Rubin and Sandra Lee Bartky have drawn on the 
language of apartheid, racism, and colonization to dramatize the world­
historical situation of women. Economically and socially “enslaved,” sex­
ually conquered as “other,” placed under the dominion of a despotic Su­
per­phallus identified with the Orientalist sultan, their bodies “trafficked,” 
their voices quelled by the “silence of the harem,” feminist critics have 
qualified their subordination to a phallic regime through the language of 
colonialism.
There are of course some obvious problems that come with this ap­
propriation of Third World discourse for First World universalizing 
ends…208
Now, given Cixous’s deliberate self­positioning as the antidote to Beauvoir (a 
favor Beauvoir returned), the choice of epigraphs could be seen as what Tina 
Chanter was complaining about, the lumping together of writers of disparate 
208 Apter, “Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem,” 205.
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views to create a seamless feminist genealogy. And I’m not sure that the quota­
tion from Beauvoir means what Apter wants it to mean, since in context, Beau­
voir is showing the problem with a (Western) male fantasy.209 But both quota­
tions do use Eastern images (the sultan, the harem) to describe woman’s 
unfreedom, and I guess that is close enough: Apter’s opening section makes 
lucid sense, and cogently quotes the relevant authority, Gayatri Spivak, whose 
“French Feminism in an International Frame” “alerts us to the ‘misfiring’ of 
theoretical signifiers in an internationalist context, particularly when those 
terms blind the reader to cultural and class difference even as they open up to 
view the history of phallocentric injustice.” “This all seems obvious to us now,” 
Apter says, and indeed it does.210
209 See my discussion above. Beauvoir is explaining that an authentic sexual encounter poses 
risks for men, as well as for women, and that fantasies of “possession” are doomed to fail, 
by the very nature of the sexual act. “Now he will experience the strongest evidence for 
the ambiguity of his fleshly condition. He can only assume his sexuality with pride insofar 
as it is a means to appropriate the Other, and this dream of possession only ends in failure. 
In an authentic possession, the other as such is obliterated, it is consumed and destroyed; 
but only the Sultan of the Thousand and One Nights has the power to cut off the head of 
his mistresses as soon as dawn takes them from his bed; woman survives man’s embraces, 
and thus she escapes him; as soon as he re­opens his arms, his prey once again becomes a 
stranger to him; there she is, new, intact, ready to be possessed by a new lover, in the same 
ephemeral manner.” [Mais c’est alors qu’il va expérimenter avec la plus grande évidence 
l’ambiguïté de sa condition charnelle. Il n’assume orgueilleusement sa sexualité qu’en 
tant qu’elle est un mode d’appropriation de l’Autre: et ce rêve de possession n’aboutit qu’à 
un échec. Dans une authentique possession, l’autre s’abolit comme tel, il est consommé et 
détruit: seul le sultan des Mille et une nuits a le pouvoir de trancher la tête de ses maî­
tresses dès que l’aube les retire de son lit; la femme survit aux étreintes de l’homme et par 
là même elle lui échappe; dès qu’il a ouvert les bras, sa proie lui redevient étrangère; la 
voilà neuve, intacte, toute prête à être possédée par un nouvel amant d’une manière aussi 
éphémère (DS 1:271).]
210 For the record, the main target of Spivak’s polemic was Julia Kristeva and other post­
structuralist French feminists whose work entered the Anglophone world with the 1980 
anthology,  New French Feminisms, edited by Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron. 
Spivak mentions Beauvoir only once: to note (giving credit to Michèle le Dœuff ’s “Simone 
de Beauvoir and Existentialism”) that the “new French feminists” were making a deliber­
ate break with Beauvoir, just as Althusser and Derrida were writing in opposition to 
Sartre.
In 1981, when Spivak’s article appeared, I was a young graduate student, intimidated 
by “Theory”; finding it largely incomprehensible, I set the article aside, with the thought 
that I might return to it when I was older and smarter. Well, I’m older … and I must admit 
that parts of it remain opaque to me, for reasons that are probably not the author’s fault. 
However, I find myself in hearty agreement with the parts of it that I do understand, no­
tably Spivak’s “dissatisfaction with the presupposition of the necessarily revolutionary 
potential of the avant­garde, literary or philosophical” (169), and with her long excoria­
tion of Kristeva’s Des Chinoises as incoherent, speculative, nostalgic, and condescending. 
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What seems odd to me, though, is that Apter never returns to the questions 
about “appropriation of Third World discourse for First World universalizing 
ends” with which she began. Her article’s real concern is to argue, against Alain 
Grosrichard, that “the sexual fantasies codified in harem texts may be used to 
construe an antiphallic, gynarchic model of ‘what a woman wants’ mediated 
by cultural difference.” She calls for a rethinking of psychoanalysis in the light 
of these fantasies, and a recuperation of women writers like Isabelle Eberhardt 
and Myriam Harry as feminist orientalizing writers, who appropriated harem 
themes “in a feminocentric fashion.” She describes this as “subversive”—and 
the article ends with a discussion of “jouissance” under the sign of Irigaray, 
Montrelay, and the “new Italian feminism” described by Teresa de Lauretis. 
This is certainly extremely interesting and may well be quite right (having not 
read the authors in question, I’m in no position to know). My question is this: 
how do the two parts of the article fit together? They are joined by a disclaimer, 
of sorts:
While I do not pretend to have escaped in my own theoretical fram­
ings some of the very methodological pitfalls that I have outlined here, 
I hope at the very least to have introduced a measure of critical self­ 
consciousness into the discussion of post­colonial interpretation.211
This is obviously better than the prophylactic “footnote one” many writers at 
the “Spelman moment” hastily applied to almost­finished books that had only 
discussed white women—“more research would be needed to demonstrate 
whether my conclusions apply across,” etc., etc. And both parts of Apter’s arti­
cle are usefully thought­provoking. But I am still having trouble harmonizing 
the two parts of the argument, absent any synthesizing return at the end. If 
writers like Eberhardt and Harry can be forgiven for their (quite overt) orien­
talism, what exactly remains unforgiveable about Beauvoir?
Apter’s is a fine article, and I have learned a great deal from her work. My 
question is what these ritual opening gestures (and they are very familiar ones) 
really amount to. Does the signifier “Spivak” function as a kind of “open sesa­
me” which gives permission for her argument that some of the texts she is in­
terested in are actually not all that bad, or at least, that the “harem” can be read 
in more than one way and was sometimes a source of pleasure (if not of 
Indeed, now that I have read Des Chinoises (and not simply the rather anodyne excerpts 
that appeared in Marks and de Courtivron and in The Kristeva Reader), Spivak seems if 
anything to have understated her case.
211 Apter, “Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem,” 206.
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freedom)? (A similar “open sesame” would now require other names: Anzaldúa, 
Mohanty, Lugones, and so on.) There’s nothing at all unreasonable in this. It 
just seems unfair to blame Beauvoir for not making those ritual gestures, espe­
cially since it’s not her fault that the gestures she does make (such as body­
slamming Claudel and Montherlant) are inaudible to us now.
But since the door to the harem is now, so to speak, open, let me return to 
the question of how “Oriental” the harem, by the middle of the twentieth cen­
tury, even was. I don’t want to make too much of the fact that the Collins Rob­
ert dictionary now translates the phrase “entouré d’un veritable harem” as “sur­
rounded by a bevy of girls”:212 that it has become a “dead metaphor” doesn’t 
mean it’s not objectionable. However, for what it’s worth, it’s possible to collect 
instances of the word “harem” in Beauvoir’s work that don’t reference the East 
at all directly. In the “Woman in Love” chapter of The Second Sex, the term is 
applied in the middle of a long discussion of Victor Hugo and Juliette Drouet—
he confined her to a small room and forbade her to go out.213 In Les mandarins, 
Paule uses the term to make a joke about Claudie Belzunce and her group of 
male lovers, including Scriassine.214 In L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, the ha­
rem crops up in the course of a discussion of whether American women really 
are freer than French women, or only think they are; she concludes that the 
“demanding and defiant attitude” (attitude de revendication et de défi) she ob­
serves in American bourgeoises is simply another mask for their weakness.
Whether she is docile or demanding, man remains the king; he is the es­
sential and woman the inessential; the praying mantis is the antithesis of 
the submissive harem servant, but both depend on the male. The dialec­
tic of master and slave proves true in this domain as well: the woman who 
sets herself up as an idol is, in reality, enslaved to her worshippers.215
212 Collins Robert French Dictionary, 439.
213 “Despite her efforts to be of service to her idol, the hours were too empty; the seventeen 
thousand letters she wrote to Hugo, at a pace of three or four hundred each year, testify to 
that. Between the master’s visits she could only kill time. The worst horror, in the condi­
tion of the harem woman, is that her days are deserts of boredom; when the male makes 
no use of the object she is for him, she is nothing.” [Malgré ses efforts pour rendre service 
à l’idole, les heures étaient trop vides: les dix­sept mille lettres qu’elle écrivit à Hugo au 
rythme de trois cents à quatre cents chaque année en témoignent. Entre les visites du 
maître, elle ne pouvait que tuer le temps. La pire horreur, dans la condition de la femme 
de harem, c’est que ses jours sont des déserts d’ennui: quand le mâle n’use pas de cet objet 
qu’elle est pour lui, elle n’est absolument plus rien (DS 2:572).]
214 Les mandarins, 1:300.
215 “[À] travers la docilité ou l’exigence, l’homme demeure roi; c’est lui l’essentiel, et la femme 
l’inessentiel; la mante religieuse est l’antithèse de la servante soumise du harem: tous 
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Here she describes the French women, who smile and put up with the moods 
of their men (toujours prêtes à sourire à leurs mâles et à supporter leurs hu-
meurs), as submitting to the harem; the supposed “praying mantises” are, um, 
us, or at least us as we were at mid­century. And finally, in Faut-il brûler Sade? 
Beauvoir uses the term to describe the situation of Justine and her compan­
ions.216 (The issue here is complex, and I don’t want to get off track; but once 
again the issue seems to be, not “harem” so much as “enfermée.”) Surely if a 
harem can be imposed, not just on French women, but on French women by 
Christian monks, we could declare the term free of an automatic taint of orien­
talism, which would release us to listen to what Beauvoir is actually saying.
The fact is, we are hypersensitive now to that one word, “harem.” We are no 
longer in the place where Lorraine Hansberry could extend particular approval 
to Beauvoir’s description of the Tunisian women in the cavelike darkness, or 
indeed where Beverly Guy­Sheftall could allude to the fact that Anna Julia Coo­
per “mentioned Muslim harems and the Chinese practice of footbinding on 
the first page of The Voice of the South” as a sign that Cooper, and other early 
Black feminists, were “aware of the differential experiences of women” and 
aiming toward “a broad feminist movement to end all kinds of domination.” 
Guy­Sheftall reads this as a sign of Cooper’s internationalism, which I agree 
with her it was;217 I’d be tempted to make the same argument for Hansberry, 
though the passage feels unfinished to me.218 Could we get back to a place 
where a gesture of … well, cosmopolitanism (?) would feel refreshing rather 
than setting off alarm bells? (Are there alternatives to the hermeneutics of 
finger­pointing?)
deux dépendent du mâle. La dialectique hégélienne du maître et de l’esclave se vérifie 
aussi dans ce domaine: la femme qui se veut idole est en vérité asservie à ses adorateurs” 
(AJ 454). See Ruhe, “Femmes, juifs, noirs,” 88, for further discussion of this passage.
216 “Faut­il brûler Sade?,” Privilèges (1955), 72.
217 “Introduction,” Words of Fire, 10. Guy­Sheftall also mentions the Pan­African Congress, 
organized in Paris in 1919 by W.E.B. DuBois, at which Cooper spoke, and traces other 
 Pan­Africanist strands within the Black women’s club movement.
218 Hansberry writes that “when one speaks comparatively of anything, the compared is lia­
ble to assume whatever dimensions its opposite does not possess. As long as an observer 
is able to report passages like the following speaking of our own times, it becomes clearer 
on what rests the celebrated ‘equality’ allegedly enjoyed by the American woman….” (And 
here she quotes, from Parshley, Beauvoir’s recollection of the cave­dwellers, “silent and 
veiled.”) Hansberry continues: “Not to even become involved in the variants on the place 
of women which the world’s religions may or may not alter to one degree or another as is 
the case with Islam, or Christianity, Catholicism or Protestantism, etc., we may still sup­
pose that woman condemned to stay indoors through the hours of light would have been 
of little use in helping to clear the American fields or sowing grain” (“Simone de Beauvoir 
and The Second Sex: An American Commentary,” 136–37).
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But I certainly wouldn’t feel all that comfortable using the term “harem” my­
self without a good deal of hedging. And I don’t think Beauvoir would have had 
much truck with Apter’s argument that the harem was a “gynophilic” space, 
wherever that harem was located (on Earth, in people’s heads, everywhere or 
nowhere). In volume 2 Chapter ix, “Situation et caractère de la femme,” she 
says
Many of the faults for which [women] are reproached—mediocrity, shy­
ness, pettiness, laziness, frivolity, and servility—simply express the fact 
that the horizon is blocked for them. Woman, it is said, is sensual, she 
wallows in immanence; but first she was confined to it. The slave impris­
oned in a harem does not feel any morbid passion for rose jelly and per­
fumed baths: she has to kill time somehow; inasmuch as the woman is 
stifling in a dismal gynaeceum—brothel or bourgeois home—she will 
take refuge in material comfort; moreover, if she avidly pursues sexual 
pleasure, it is often because she has been deprived of it.219
(The preceding paragraph ended, “When women are called to concrete action, 
when they identify themselves with specified goals, they are as strong and 
brave as men.”)220 Whatever the “gynophilic” pleasures available to the harem 
woman, or the bourgeois femme d’intérieur, may be, Beauvoir is calling on us to 
leave them behind.
9 Harem Trouble 2.0: The Veil
At one time I had intended to conclude this chapter by using Beauvoir’s theory 
to get to grips with French debates over the banning of Muslim headscarves. 
219 “Beaucoup des défauts qu’on leur reproche: médiocrité, petitesse, timidité, mesquinerie, 
paresse, frivolité, servilité, expriment simplement le fait que l’horizon leur est barré. La 
femme est, dit­on, sensuelle, elle se vautre dans l’immanence; mais d’abord on l’y a enfer­
mée. L’esclave emprisonnée dans un harem n’éprouve aucune passion morbide pour la 
confiture de roses, les bains parfumés: il faut bien qu’elle tue le temps; dans la mesure où 
la femme étouffe dans un morne gynécée—maison close ou foyer bourgeois—elle se 
réfugiera aussi dans le confort et le bien­être; d’ailleurs, si elle poursuit avidement la vo­
lupté, c’est bien souvent qu’elle en est frustrée” (DS 2:491).
220 “Quand on appelle concrètement les femmes à l’action, quand elles se reconnaissent 
dans les buts qu’on leur désigne, elles sont aussi hardies et courageuses que les hommes” 
(DS 1:491).
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But the writing of this book has been slow, and events have overtaken it.221 
What now seems clear (at least to me) is that “the veil” is not one thing, that as 
an abstraction it is dangerous, that as part of a “mobile army of metaphors” it 
may be empowering or the opposite, that feminist as well as anti­feminist ide­
ologies are hidden in its folds, that its meaning may be as individual as the 
woman who wears it, that the power structure which imposes it and the power 
structure which bans its wearing have an awful lot in common. To borrow 
again from Annabelle Golay’s excellent article: “In Fanon’s terms, the veil has ‘a 
historical dynamism.’”222 It is tempting to ask where Beauvoir would have 
stood in these debates, if she had lived long enough to participate in them; 
tempting, but probably dangerous. As she said in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, 
one can never know how one’s project will be taken up by others. Still, as I said 
in my introduction, Beauvoir remains the terrain on which we play out our 
own arguments about feminism, about the history of feminism, and (in this 
case) about the relationship between gender and colonialism, since it is im­
possible to understand France’s relationship to its non­white population today 
apart from its relation to its former colonies. (As British campaigners put it, 
“we are here because you were there.”) And it may be illuminating to see how 
Beauvoir’s legacy has been (once again) invoked to justify two irrevocably op­
posed and deeply held political positions.
At the height of the debate, Christine Delphy, who is Beauvoir’s heir on the 
materialist side, published a book arguing against the headscarf ban, which 
she saw as racist and Islamophobic, similar to “feminist” arguments made by 
the American government in favor of the war in Iraq.223 But at the Paris confer­
ence in January 2008 celebrating the centenary of Beauvoir’s birth, the French 
organizers announced that a prize in Beauvoir’s honor had been awarded to 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the self­styled “Voltaire noire,” whose position appears to be 
that Muslim women do need saving, and that Western enlightenment values 
221 For a good summary of the intractable issues involved, see Yasmin Rehman, “How have 
we come to this?” (reviewing Delphy, Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism After 
the War on Terror): “Very few issues attract as much attention or public discussion as the 
niqab or face veil. Is it a symbol of oppression or of minority women asserting their reli­
gious identity? In 2004, when France became the first country in Europe to introduce 
legislation banning the wearing of religious symbols in schools, the law was initially pre­
sented as a matter of laïcité and what it means to be French. This ban in schools was later 
extended to wearing of the hijab in public spaces in 2007. It was followed by a ban on face 
coverings in 2011 based on security concerns.” See also Joan Scott, The Politics of the Veil.
222 “Il existe donc, selon les termes de Fanon, ‘un dynamisme historique du voile’” (Golay, 
“Féminisme et postcolonialisme,” 412).
223 Delphy, Separate and Dominate. See also the 2006 special double issue of Nouvelles Ques-
tions Féministes.
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will rescue them from the backwardness and violence of Islam. Hirsi Ali is an 
enormously polarizing figure. At that time she was already controversial be­
cause, while a member of parliament in the Netherlands, she had supported 
restrictions on immigration, including opposing the law that had made it pos­
sible for her to gain asylum and then citizenship there herself as a refugee from 
Somalia. As a result of these public stances she had been embraced by thinkers 
who are clearly right­wing, such as the Hudson Institute in the US.224
The prize committee was headed by Julia Kristeva, who also organized the 
conference. Despite Kristeva’s earlier position in “Women’s Time” that the 
Beauvoirian feminism of the “project” had been (or ought to be) superseded by 
a poetic restructuration of the Symbolic, now she seems to embrace Beauvoir’s 
legacy, while continuing to disagree with a major part of it by insisting on 
women’s “difference” as underwritten by a Lacanian Oedipus and rooted in 
“the maternal”—a disagreement that Beauvoir would hardly have considered 
trivial. Nonetheless, there she was. The prize committee also included Elisa­
beth Badinter, whose position on the question of “the maternal” is just the op­
posite of Kristeva’s: Badinter’s book, Fausse route, makes a strong critique of 
the maternalist and essentialist strain in French feminist thinking, and claims 
the mantle of Beauvoir in this (I think rightly, though she exaggerates Beau­
voir’s view); Kristeva is more accurate when she describes her own position on 
“the maternal” as a departure from, and a criticism of, Beauvoir, though her 
claim that her departure is an advance on Beauvoir is not one I can accept.225 
Given their opposite positions about essentialized and biologized “difference,” 
it is hard for me to imagine how Kristeva and Badinter can sit down at the table 
together, but in affirming the heroic status of Ayaan Hirsi Ali they seem to have 
found common ground.
Kristeva’s prize­giving speech endorsed some positions of Hirsi Ali’s that 
raise red flags with respect to the racial and national situation of women (and 
men) in Europe today. Focusing on Beauvoir’s prioritizing of “freedom,” Kriste­
va noted that Hirsi Ali “has written numerous articles denouncing the dangers 
224 The prize was also given to Taslima Nasreen, a less well­known writer who has also been 
critical of the Islamic milieu in which she was raised. See Kristeva, “Beauvoir aux risques 
de la liberté.”
225 Ibid. Kristeva’s rather condescending statement (in her prize­giving speech) that Beau­
voir did not have access to the insights of psychoanalysis seems particularly obtuse: as 
we’ve seen, she did have access to them and lucidly rejected their normalizing and bio­
logically deterministic underpinnings. From the perspective of anyone convinced by Ju­
dith Butler’s exposure in Gender Trouble of the heteronormative grounding of Lacan’s 
theories and of their uptake by the “new French feminists,” it would seem to be Kristeva 
who is “behind the times” here, but never mind.
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of communalism, which she considers an obstacle to integration, and calling 
for a period of Enlightenment for European Islam,” and describes her as “a 
woman passionately engaged in favor of effective interaction between women 
of immigrant origin, especially Muslims, and European society.”226 Terms such 
as “integration” and “communalism” (communautarisme) may seem innocu­
ous, but in context they are code words indicating Hirsi Ali’s support for poli­
cies that have led to closed borders, lack of respect for cultural difference, and 
(it is at least arguable) Islamophobia. (And one might ask what “effective inter­
action” even means: on whose terms is this interaction to take place?)
Kristeva’s position in the sphere of real­world politics (including feminist 
politics) has always been … difficult to map (to put it as charitably as I can).227 
But Elisabeth Badinter, who has a platform as a prominent public intellectual 
in France, has been an outspoken opponent of multiculturalism there. Elsa 
Dorlin points in particular to the fact that, when invited by French legal au­
thorities to speak about the burka, Badinter called it the worst expression of 
sexism, saying “France has to protect women who want to wear une jupe (a 
skirt).”228 Badinter has spoken, not just in defense of laïcité (state secularism) 
226 “Elle est l’auteur de nombreux articles dénonçant les dangers du communautarisme, 
qu’elle considère comme un obstacle à l’intégration, et réclame pour l’Islam d’Europe une 
période des ‘Lumières’ … une femme passionnément engagée en faveur d’une interaction 
effective entre les femmes issues de l’immigration, en particulier musulmane, et la société 
européenne” (Kristeva, “Beauvoir aux risques de la liberté,” 15).
227 It is hard also to square this praise of the self­described “Black Voltaire” with the “con­
certed epistemic critique” of “Enlightenment rationality” through which Kristeva and her 
collaborators on Tel Quel rose to fame.
228 Elsa Dorlin, “The Future of Intersectionality,” delivered at 2009 Symposium at nyu titled 
“Feminism/s Without Borders?: Perspectives from France and the US.” See also Thomas 
Lancelot, writing in Le Monde: “Nonetheless, [Badinter] has quite consistently declared: 
‘Frankly, for a long time, in mainstream [de souche] French society, whether Jewish or 
Christian, one cannot say that women are oppressed’ (L’Arche, November­December 
2003). Her honesty has the merit of drawing a line in the sand. What do French women 
have to complain about since they are neither oppressed nor disadvantaged? The femi­
nist struggle is not addressed to them, but ‘to the young women of the first generation of 
new arrivals, or young women of Maghrebi origin. It is for them that one must carry on 
the struggle.’ So, patriarchy is still rife ‘down there,’ in Arab and African countries, or here 
at home but only on the outskirts (banlieue) among men and women who come from 
‘down there,’ but not really ‘here at home,’ not in the French Republic.” [Par ailleurs, con­
séquente avec elle­même, [Badinter] a déclaré: “Franchement, depuis longtemps, dans la 
société française de souche, que ce soit le judaïsme ou le catholicisme, on ne peut pas dire 
qu’il y ait une oppression des femmes” (L’Arche, novembre­décembre 2003). Sa franchise a 
le mérite de mettre les pieds dans le plat. De quoi se plaignent les Françaises puisqu’elles 
ne sont ni opprimées, ni discriminées? Le combat féministe ne s’adresse pas à elles mais 
“aux jeunes femmes de la première génération de nouveaux arrivants, ou encore aux jeunes 
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but in favor of specifically French values, of the “French exception” and “la 
France de souche,” France at its origin, the rootstock of France.
Now, the idea that some French people are “français de souche” (and that 
others are not) is a very old idea—it is Barrès, it is Maurras. It was used against 
Jews (“rootless cosmopolitans” that we were and are); it was what slapped 
Frantz Fanon in the face when he served in the French army; and it seems to be 
alive and well today. (Look, a Muslim!) It is a very powerful idea—even Simone 
Weil fell for it.229 But Simone de Beauvoir, as we have seen, did not fall for it, 
and to use her name (and her legacy) to sanction it is a bit breathtaking.
Kristeva spoke of Beauvoir’s commitment to freedom—the name of the 
prize, in fact, is “Le prix Simone de Beauvoir pour la liberté des femmes.” And 
of course Beauvoir was unabashed in her support of “freedom,” but to say so is 
merely to kick the can down the road, since “freedom” means quite a few dif­
ferent things: its mobilization by US foreign policy (remember “freedom 
fries”?) is particularly gruesome to contemplate. Kristeva was right also to say 
filles d’origine maghrébine. C’est pour elles qu’il faut le conduire” (ibid.). Le patriarcat sévi­
rait donc ailleurs, “là-bas,” dans les pays arabes et africains, en Iran et en Afghanistan, ou 
chez nous, mais seulement en banlieue chez les hommes et les femmes originaires de 
“là-bas,” mais pas “chez nous,” pas dans la République française (Lancelot, “Elisabeth Bad­
inter fait fausse route.”)]
See also Mehamed Amadeus Mack, Sexagon: Muslims, France, and the Sexualization of 
National Culture, 293: “Badinter is infamous, in some circles, for declaring that her con­
clusions about the ‘fragility’ of masculinities in Western society do not apply to men out­
side of Western civilizations, and that, if she calls for increased tolerance for the expres­
sion of masculinity at all, it is not for the excessive virilities of non­European men who 
haven’t been subjected to the same ‘emasculation.’ This analysis echoes right­wing psy­
choanalyst Michel Schneider’s comments on immigrant men.” Badinter’s concern for 
young Muslim women must be seen against the backdrop of her dismissal of many posi­
tions we would consider feminist—for instance, she denounced the Clarence Thomas 
hearings as a “witch hunt,” and much of Fausse route makes arguments against so­called 
“victim feminism” that parallel those of Christina Hoff­Sommers and Katie Roiphe. This is 
also oddly connected to anti­Americanism: see Eric Fassin, “The Purloined Gender.” (Fas­
sin’s quotation about Clarence Thomas comes from Le Nouvel Observateur, October 17–
23, 1991). Among Badinter’s many inconsistencies is her insistence that feminism itself is 
an American export and therefore “un­French.” An English translation of Fausse route was 
published by Polity Press in 2006 (with the assistance of the French Ministry of Culture), 
under the title Dead-End Feminism. Or at least, this purports to be a translation, but it is 
126 pages long, whereas the French original was 221 pages. I’m not sure any purpose 
would be served by going into this further, or explaining what a terrible book it 
indeed is.
229 See Simone Weil, L’enracinement. Apparently even Léopold Senghor fell for it: David Mac­
ey describes him as “influenced by the nationalism of Maurice Barrès, who defined the 
French national identity in terms of fidelity to the land and its dead” (Macey, Frantz 
Fanon, 179).
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that no one owns Beauvoir’s legacy: “Whatever the merits of those who are in­
spired by the works of Simone de Beauvoir, no one, neither friend nor scholar, 
can stand in for her or claim a monopoly on them.”230 But as Michèle le Dœuff 
remarked in a different context, some things are just too much.231 If Badinter’s 
idea of “freedom” purports to be a reading of “what freedom is possible to the 
woman in a harem,” it is a lamentable distortion.
Among those who were horrified on the spot by this misappropriation of 
Beauvoir’s mantle was Beauvoir scholar Karen Vintges, who, since she is her­
self Dutch, had a more acute sense than most of those present of who Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali even was. Protesting the prize in a later article written with Bart van 
Leeuwen, Vintges argues forcefully against placing Beauvoir in the tradition of 
Enlightenment “liberal” thinking.232 The question Vintges and van Leeuwen 
ask is “whether Beauvoir’s work is open to a politics of difference from the po­
sition of oppressed or marginalized groups, or whether her work endorses lib­
eral feminism, as claimed by Badinter and others.”233 And they make a good 
textual case for the former view. It is easy to find support for the authenticity of 
socially­grounded minority identities in L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947, and to 
discover scorn for liberal constructions of the self in Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté. As Vintges and van Leeuwen point out, Beauvoir there criticizes 
the Enlightenment dream of reason as “hollow”; absolute universal man, she 
says, exists nowhere, nulle part.234 It must be said, too, though, that Beauvoir 
never abandoned belief in universal human rights, in the Amnesty Interna­
tional sense of human rights, and that for her as for most people, such rights 
include bodily autonomy and self­development.
But I think we can answer Badinter and Kristeva in a less abstract way. 
Whatever may be true in the abstract about “liberal individualism,” Pour une 
morale de l’ambiguïté clearly requires us to inform ourselves about the actual 
political stakes of what we say and do, at the moment and in the place that we 
230 “[Q]uelles que soient les qualités de celles et ceux qui s’inspirent de l’œuvre de Beauvoir, 
personne (ni ami ni spécialiste) ne l’incarne ni n’en possède le monopole” (Kristeva, 
“Beauvoir aux risques de la liberté,” 11).
231 “In 1986, the Italian Communist Party asked me to lead a debate in Milan with Marisa 
Rodano on Simone de Beauvoir, in which Marisa was to say that The Second Sex is not a 
feminist book. I protested: of course, many misunderstandings of Simone de Beauvoir’s 
work are possible, but that is just too much” (Hipparchia’s Choice, 47).
232 Bart van Leeuwen and Karen Vintges, “A Dream, Dreamed by Reason … Hollow Like All 
Dreams: French Existentialism and its Critique of Abstract Liberalism.” See also Vintges, 
“Surpassing Liberal Feminism,” and A New Dawn for The Second Sex: Women’s Freedom 
Practices in World Perspective.
233 van Leeuwen and Vintges, 655.
234 pma 162, EA 112.
Chapter 5438
say and do it. The effect of awarding the prize was to legitimate Hirsi Ali as a 
feminist voice, and to ally international feminism with the forces of reaction. 
Beauvoir would never have endorsed Hirsi Ali because she would have found 
the idea of closed borders, and the argument for the superiority of European 
(read, white) culture morally, and historically, repugnant. Moreover, as I hope I 
have shown, Left and Right were meaningful terms to her, and she would have 
done the math, and come out with a different answer than Badinter’s.
In fairness, this is clearer now than it was in 2008, though all the signs were 
there.
Hirsi Ali is at present such a polarizing figure that I am unable to cite a neu­
tral source about her and can only summarize the situation by giving a range of 
views. She has certainly stated publicly that Islam is an intrinsically violent re­
ligion and has endorsed the Huntingdon doctrine of the “clash of cultures”; this 
has endeared her to the American Enterprise Institute and other clearly right­
wing groups in the US. She has repeatedly endorsed restrictions on immigra­
tion and requirements that immigrants assimilate to Western culture. Mean­
while, some on the left have gone as far as to assert that Hirsi Ali’s powerfully 
moving story of her own abuse in the name of Islam (including a forced mar­
riage from which she heroically escaped) is a fabrication.235 The well­ respected 
and usually reliable Southern Poverty Law Center accepts these claims, and 
includes Hirsi Ali (along with David Horowitz and Charles Murray) in its “Field 
Guide to Anti­Muslim Extremists.” Both Blumenthal and the splc were vitrioli­
cally attacked at the time (2015) by Hirsi Ali herself, and she was supported by 
right­wing outlets such as the National Review, which attempted to demonize 
the splc. As I said, I am not in a position to independently judge any of this. 
Around the same time Rula Jebreal, writing in Salon, did not contest the facts 
of Hirsi Ali’s own life story, but made a reasonable­sounding case that in the 
current political climate her views, and their prominence in mainstream me­
dia, were causing harm to moderate Muslims like herself. Her headline read: 
“Ayaan Hirsi Ali is dangerous: Why we must reject her hateful worldview. To 
endorse Hirsi Ali—as pundits everywhere from Fox News to network news 
have—insults and mocks a billion Muslims.”
It would appear from recent coverage in mainstream media that Hirsi Ali 
has won her argument against those who question her story; she is still consid­
ered “mainstream” enough to have a platform from which she has attacked 
Western feminists, including in The New York Times. In 2017 she cancelled a 
book tour to Australia after a group of Muslim women there protested that she 
did not speak for them: according to the Guardian, the women had “criticized 
235 See in particular Max Blumenthal, “Exposing Hirsi Ali’s Latest Deception.”
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her for past descriptions of Muslim women as docile and irrational, accused 
her of using the language of white supremacists and profiting from ‘an industry 
that exists to dehumanize Muslim women’”; Ali replied by accusing them of 
“‘carrying water’ for radical Islamic organizations like the Muslim Brother­
hood, Islamic State and Boko Haram, and stated that ‘Islamophobia is a manu­
factured term.’” Make what you will of all this: it’s certainly clear what the 
stakes are.
I am honestly not sure whether it is legitimate or not to say, hmm, the South­
ern Policy Law Center is against her, and she’s been defended by the National 
Review … I’ll go with the Left answer. But I am sure that it is a kind of reasoning 
with which Beauvoir would have been very comfortable: the ethical engage­
ments one undertakes are undertaken with others, she says, and despite the 
importance of maintaining one’s intellectual independence, it is no small mat­
ter to rethink such shared projects. The supposedly disinterested, disengaged 
intellectual who pretends to be above the fray (“both sides commit abuses … 
perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between … it’s too early to judge”) is a 
particular target of her scorn in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.
However, it’s easier to see why Hirsi Ali and Badinter are wrong than to de­
cide what a reasonable feminist position would actually be. Beauvoir’s theory 
can perhaps help us here, but only up to a point. Yasmin Rehman, in summing 
up the issues, quotes Meredith Tax in terms strikingly reminiscent of the di­
lemmas posed in Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté:
When US diplomats invoke the oppression of Muslim women to sanctify 
war, how do we practice feminist solidarity without strengthening Orien­
talism and neo­colonialism? When the US targets jihadis for assassina­
tion by drone, should human rights defenders worry about violence per­
petrated by those same jihadis or focus on violations by the state?236
One answer to this particular question, based on Beauvoir’s attitude during the 
Algerian crisis, might be that we should focus first on the wrong our own gov­
ernments are doing, since that violence is undertaken in our names, whatever 
excuse may be given. Harder to answer is a question with a similar shape, as 
laid out by Traci West in her good article about Fanon:
236 Meredith Tax, Double Bind: The Muslim Right, The Anglo-American Right, and Universal 
Human Rights, quoted in Rehman, “How Have We Come to This.” “Conversely,” Rehman 
continues, “how does one raise the points discussed by Delphy with regard to the war on 
terror, drone strikes, Guantanamo, and the denial of any discussion about the real or per­
ceived causes for terrorism, without feeding the Islamist agenda and reinforcing the Mus­
lim victim narrative?”
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Because of the colonizer’s campaign against it, the practice of wearing 
the veil became an important symbol of resistance within the struggle for 
independence. [Marie­Aimée] Hélie­Lucas articulates the problem that 
resulted for Algerian feminists who wanted to criticize this practice: 
“how, therefore, could we take up the veil as oppressive to women with­
out betraying the nation and the revolution?”237
I think Beauvoir would have refused to answer this question, just as she refused 
to pass judgment on Richard Wright for refusing to support the war effort of 
the US government, or on the colonized people who did not fight alongside the 
Allies. Here both sides of the dilemma do have merit, the demands are indeed 
incompatible, and it is for them to decide. As Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté 
reminds us, there are no recipes.
But the veil in Algeria and the veil in France are different matters; and about 
the latter, she might well have felt the need to take a position, since it was, in 
fact, the actions of her own government that were in question. She would cer­
tainly have detected the hypocrisy and bad faith of a policy that, under the 
banner of “secularism” and civic education, banned Muslim “insignia” while 
continuing to permit the display of Christian and Jewish insignia—for exam­
ple, the wearing of a cross around the neck. Her own secularism was absolute, 
and it was hard­won.238 And overall, I think she would have agreed with Elsa 
Dorlin that “intersectionality should not be an alibi, or substitute for politics of 
resistance.”239 In a late interview with Hélène Wenzel, the latter raised the is­
sue of women of color critiques, with particular reference to the issue of fe­
male genital mutilation. Here is the exchange.
Wenzel: In the States over the last decade, there has been a large increase 
in the numbers of voices raised, and in the writings emerging, from wom­
en of color. Both individually and collectively, these loud, clear, and mul­
tiethnic voices have sought to remind us—white, predominantly univer­
sity women who too often think we speak for all women and who define 
237 Traci West, “Extending Black Feminist Sisterhood in the Face of Violence: Fanon, White 
Women, and Veiled Muslim Women,” 176.
238 The communal “culture” that comes in for the greatest excoriation in The Second Sex is 
clearly Christianity, in particular Catholicism. Let’s not forget that The Second Sex was on 
the Index for many years, and that one of her own teachers wrote a book denouncing her 
from a devout, orthodox perspective. Republic or no Republic, the world Simone de Beau­
voir grew up in had elements of theocracy: we may find this hard to see but she did not.
239 Elsa Dorlin, “The Future of Intersectionality.” La force des choses also contains, at various 
points, a forthright attack on what the English call “what­about­ery.”
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feminism in our writings—that the women’s fight is much more complex 
than either we, Betty Friedan or Ms. magazine seem to think it is, and 
write about it. Is there a similar situation in France, have other voices, 
other writings begin to manifest themselves?
De Beauvoir: There aren’t many, there aren’t many women who 
speak…. Yes, there have been women who have spoken, for example, 
about the problem of excision (clitoridectomy), which is a particularly 
African problem and there have been a number of books about this … 
there have been groups, both Western and African, who have met to com­
bat the problem of excision. And there is presently much talk about this 
problem.
Wenzel: That is very interesting, because in the States, some women 
have begun to write and to speak out against these manifestos decrying 
excision. There are Black women, and African women who have begun to 
say that for Western women to look at African women’s problems….
De Beauvoir: It has nothing to do with Western women, yes, that’s it. 
I’ve heard that. But there are nevertheless African women who say that 
the problem belongs as much to Western women as to others, because it’s 
a question of human rights.
Wenzel: Exactly.
De Beauvoir: And it’s not a question … and there’s a kind of racism, on 
the contrary, in not wanting to look at these sorts of conditions…. Be­
cause that means that deep down one doesn’t care what happens to little 
black girls, and there are about thirty thousand a year who undergo exci­
sion, and to find that trivial, finally, not to deal with that, that proves that 
we think it’s fine for them, naturally. We don’t want any part of it. And it’s 
much more feminist, logical and universal, and not racist, to be involved 
in these sorts of questions.240
(I’m not unaware of post­colonial and feminist critiques of the discourse of 
“universal human rights.” As I was writing this paragraph, Donald Trump pulled 
the United States out of the UN Human Rights Council. Perhaps we’ll soon get 
to find out more about what a world without that “discourse” will look like.)
Sorry, carry on. In any case, Beauvoir’s point about “excision” was that Afri­
can women were opposed to it; they were, and they are. In the passage I used 
above from Tout compte fait, where she sees that Fanon was mistaken when he 
240 Hélène Wenzel, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir,” 16. This is the same interview where 
Beauvoir wished to speak of matters going beyond her feminist works, but Wenzel did 
not.
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thought women would be freed by the Algerian revolution, she refers to “a cou­
rageous Algerian woman who has written a book”—though I do not know 
which woman and which book she means. Perhaps it is worth returning to that 
passage in its entirety; what emerges is how fully her thinking about “women’s 
position” is embedded in a fact­based, complex understanding of the broader 
picture, including its paradoxes and tragic ironies.
A disappointment of another kind was the evolution of Algeria. Of course 
no one could look for a miracle that would suddenly bring about the 
reign of socialism and prosperity: the war had killed more than a million 
people; the finest leaders had been killed in the guerilla fighting; and the 
departure of a million Europeans [pieds­noirs] who ran the country left 
it in economic confusion. At the time when the Algerians won their inde­
pendence, eighty­five percent of the adults were illiterate. The reorgani­
zation of the economy could not fail to be a difficult task. The disaster 
foretold by the colonialists did not occur; but a third of the male working 
population is under­employed, another third unemployed altogether, 
and five hundred thousand have emigrated. The circumstances were un­
favorable for the setting up of socialism, but the leaders have made no 
serious effort in that direction whatsoever. What they have done is to in­
stall a state capitalism that has nothing socialist about it apart from the 
name. In agriculture they have not encouraged the collectivization of the 
land; in industry they have not encouraged management by the workers. 
Instead of attempting to make the masses politically conscious they have 
urged them to return to the values of the Arab, Islamic world. Unlike Tu­
nisia and Egypt, Algeria has made no attempt at checking the birthrate—
a birthrate so high that the population is increasing far more rapidly than 
its resources. The condition of women is deplorable and one of them has 
spoken out about it in a courageous book. They are given no more than a 
minimum of education, and this is justified by Muslim tradition; they still 
wear veils; and they are confined either to their father’s home or to that 
of the husband they are obliged to marry. Fanon was profoundly mistak­
en when he foretold that the Algerian women would escape from male 
oppression because of the part they had played in the war. Algeria’s for­
eign policy is held out as “progressive” and it is indeed anti­colonialist 
and anti­imperialist. But the country’s home policy is both nationalist 
and reactionary. There is nothing to show that it is likely to change its 
nature for a very long while.241
241 This analysis, and indeed these developments, are in line with Fanon’s own predictions in 
Les damnés de la terre that post­colonial society might actually not be much better than 
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And such changes as have occurred there since, she would hardly have 
welcomed.
Beauvoir certainly had no love for “the veil” as such, and sometimes, as here, 
she takes it as one index of women’s subjugation and exclusion. Edward Said 
himself has reported another such instance, in a rather mean­spirited account 
of his disappointment upon meeting Sartre and Beauvoir in 1979. The meeting 
was instigated by the Temps Modernes team, though it took place in Foucault’s 
apartment.242 Said had been hoping for a statement from Sartre denouncing 
Zionism and expressing support for the Palestinians, but found the written re­
sult of the dialogue disappointingly tepid, and described Sartre as mentally 
extinguished by age and illness and as manipulated by his acolyte, “Pierre Vic­
tor” (Benny Lévy).
Beauvoir was already there in her famous turban, lecturing anyone who 
would listen about her forthcoming trip to Teheran with Kate Millett, 
where they were planning to demonstrate against the chador; the whole 
idea struck me as patronizing and silly, and although I was eager to hear 
what it replaced. “Une déception d’un autre ordre, c’est celle que m’a fait éprouver 
l’évolution de l’Algérie. On ne pouvait certes pas escompter qu’un miracle y ferait régner 
dans un bref délai le socialisme et la prospérité; la guerre a fait plus d’un million de morts, 
les meilleurs cadres ont été tués dans les maquis, le départ d’un million de pieds­noirs qui 
contrôlaient le pays l’a laissé dans une situation économique confuse. Le jour où 
l’indépendance fut conquise, 85% des adultes étaient analphabètes. La réorganisation de 
l’économie ne pouvait être que difficile. Les catastrophes prédites par les colonialistes ne 
se sont pas produites. Mais un tiers de la population masculine active est sous­employé, 
un tiers sans emploi: cinq cent mille travailleurs ont émigré. Les circonstances n’étaient 
pas propices à l’établissement du socialisme; mais les dirigeants n’ont fait aucun effort 
sérieux en sa faveur. Ils ont instauré un capitalisme d’État qui n’a de socialiste que le nom. 
En agriculture ils n’ont pas encouragé la collectivisation des terres; dans le secteur indus­
triel, ils n’ont pas poussé les travailleurs à l’autogestion. Au lieu d’essayer de politiser les 
masses, ils les ont incitées à revenir aux valeurs arabo­islamiques. Contrairement à ce qui 
se produit en Tunisie, en Égypte, aucun effort n’a été fait pour ralentir une natalité galo­
pante telle que la population s’accroît beaucoup plus vite que les ressources. La condition 
des femmes est déplorable: une Algérienne l’a dénoncée dans un livre courageux. Au nom 
de la tradition musulmane on ne lui accorde qu’un minimum d’éducation; elle continue à 
porter le voile, elle est confinée dans le foyer de son père ou du mari qui lui est imposé. 
Fanon s’est bien trompé quand il prédisait que grâce au rôle qu’elles ont joué pendant la 
guerre les femmes algériennes échapperaient à l’oppression masculine. La politique exté­
rieure de l’Algérie se veut ‘progressiste’; elle est anticolonialiste et anti­impérialiste. Mais 
à l’intérieur elle est nationaliste et réactionnaire. Rien n’indique qu’elle doive avant bien 
longtemps changer de caractère” (tcf 561–62, asd 442–43).
242 This at first struck me as odd, given that Sartre and Foucault are positioned as antagonists 
in the usual story about “French theory.” However, where practical politics were con­
cerned, they often signed the same manifestos, and were photographed at the same dem­
onstrations … Here, a “sustained epistemic critique” had emerged. And yet…
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what Beauvoir had to say, I also realized that she was quite vain and quite 
beyond arguing with at that moment. Besides, she left an hour or so later 
(just before Sartre’s arrival) and was never seen again…. Beauvoir had 
been a serious disappointment, flouncing out of the room in a cloud of 
opinionated babble about Islam and the veiling of women. At the time I 
did not regret her absence; later I was convinced she would have livened 
things up.243
The sexism here speaks for itself.244 Beauvoir’s own account of the meeting 
with Said is considerably more generous; she agrees that Benny Lévy’s attempt 
at “dialogue” was pointless and ineffectual, but sticks to the facts.245 (This is 
243 Said, “Diary.” For some reason this story recirculates gleefully through the blogosphere 
from time to time. See Eugene Wolters, “A Bitter Disappointment,” and Yasmin Helal, “Ed­
ward Said Recalls His Depressing Meeting.” For a riposte, see Shiraz Socialist, “Anti­Orien­
talist Meets Western Feminist.”
244 I am afraid the dismissive attitude toward women intellectuals on display here is not con­
tradicted by my own memories of Said, whose office at Columbia was across the hall from 
mine in my grad school days. His obituary by friend Alexander Cockburn (“Edward Said: 
A Mighty and Passionate Heart”) includes the phrase, “even in his pettiness he was mag­
nificent”; I too remember the rages over small matters Cockburn describes (the walls of 
Hamilton Hall were hardly soundproof), but their “magnificence” eluded me. None of 
which, of course, does anything to tarnish his pioneering intellectual and political contri­
bution or diminish the fact that his death was a sad loss to the world of letters.
245 “The speeches were more or less interesting, more or less touching, but in general it was 
always the same old story—the Palestinians wanted a territory of their own and the 
Israelis— all chosen from the Left—agreed, but they wanted their security guaranteed. In 
any event, these people were intellectuals who possessed no kind of power at all. Victor 
was nevertheless exultant. ‘It’s going to be an international scoop,’ he told Sartre. He had 
to eat his words. For various reasons the issue, entitled ‘Peace Now’ after an Israeli pacifist 
movement that did not play any great part in politics, only appeared in October, and it fell 
flat. During the summer of 1980. Edward Said, whom Victor looked upon as the member 
of the conference with the greatest prestige, told some common friends that he did not 
understand why he had been made to come from America. The meeting had seemed to 
him a wretched affair while he was attending it, and even worse when he read the pro­
ceedings. But in March 1979 Sartre shared Victor’s optimism, and I did not tell him about 
my doubts” (Adieux, 113–14). [Les interventions furent plus ou moins intéressantes, plus 
ou moins émouvantes, mais en gros c’était toujours la même rengaine: les Palestiniens 
réclamaient un territoire, les Israéliens—tous choisis à gauche—étaient d’accord mais 
exigeaient des garanties de sécurité. De toute façon, il s’agissait là d’intellectuels qui 
n’avaient aucun pouvoir. Victor n’en jubilait pas moins: “Ça va être un scoop internatio­
nal,” a­t­il dit à Sartre. Il a dû déchanter. Pour diverses raisons, le numéro intitulé “La paix 
maintenant”—du nom d’un mouvement israélien pacifiste qui n’a pas joué un grand rôle 
politique—n’a paru qu’en octobre et est tombé à plat. L’été 80, Edward Saïd—qui était 
aux yeux de Victor le membre le plus prestigieux du colloque—a dit à des amis communs 
qu’il ne comprenait pas pourquoi on l’avait fait venir d’Amérique: le colloque lui avait 
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not the place to explore the developing attempts of Les Temps Modernes and of 
Lanzmann himself to find middle ground from which to support both the Pal­
estinian cause and the existence of the state of Israel; as with Sartre’s earlier 
involvements with the French Communist Party, the resulting positions would 
appear to have satisfied no one.246)
In a different context, Lanzmann’s autobiography shows Beauvoir as un­
afraid to confront Muslim men about the position of women in their own 
countries.247 But Kate Millett’s account in Going to Iran describes a rather dif­
ferent and more complex motivation for the trip, on which Beauvoir was ulti­
mately too ill to accompany her, than Said’s dismissive summary conveys. Mil­
lett had been working with a (mixed gender) group of young Iranians who 
opposed the repression of the Shah, touring American campuses to build sup­
port for attempts to topple the regime. When the revolution finally came, that 
group invited her to come to Tehran (and bring others) to bear witness and 
paru minable sur le moment même, et davantage encore quand il en avait lu le compte 
rendu. En mars 79, cependant, Sartre partageait l’optimisme de Victor, et je ne lui ai pas 
fait part de mes doutes (La cérémonie des adieux, 160).]
246 Around the time of the Six­Day War, Beauvoir wrote, “I was not in complete agreement 
with any of my friends…. As a result of my positions on the Middle East question, I almost 
always feel in an awkward position in my relations with leftist militants. I am entirely for 
the Black Panthers and I admire Cleaver’s book, Soul on Ice; but I was deeply depressed 
when he attacked the Jews in his Temps Modernes interview. I regret that the Left should 
have grown almost as monolithic as the Communist Party. A leftist must necessarily ad­
mire China without the least reservation, take Nigeria’s side against Biafra and the Pales­
tinians’ against Israel. I will not bow to these conditions. Which doesn’t prevent me from 
feeling very close to the leftists on the terrain that most closely concerns them, in the ac­
tion they carry out in France” (asd 436–37, translation altered). [Avec aucun de mes amis 
je ne me suis trouvée en parfait accord…. À cause de mes positions sur la question du 
Moyen­Orient, je me sens presque toujours en porte à faux dans mes rapports avec les 
militants de gauche. Je suis de tout cœur avec les Panthères noires, j’admire le livre de 
Cleaver, Soul on Ice; mais cela m’a attristée que dans l’interview qu’ont publiée Les Temps 
Modernes il s’attaque aux Juifs. Je regrette que le gauchisme soit devenue presque aussi 
monolithique que le parti communiste. Un gauchiste doit admirer inconditionnellement 
la Chine, prendre parti pour le Nigeria contre le Biafra, pour les Palestiniens contre Israël. 
Je ne me plie pas à ces conditions. Ce qui ne m’empêche pas d’être très proche des gau­
chistes sur le terrain qui les concerne le plus directement: l’action qu’ils mènent en France 
(tcf 553–554).]
247 Shortly after Fanon’s burial, Lanzmann remembers, the Évian accords were signed and he 
was able to visit Algerian leaders who were being held in Fresnes prison, including Mo­
hamed Boudiaf and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi. “The prisoners enjoyed considerable autono­
my within Fresnes Prison. After they were freed, we took them in for several days. Taleb, 
as I have mentioned, stayed with my sister Évelyne; others stayed with me. Simone de 
Beauvoir attempted to persuade them to abandon polygamy, and they let her talk” 
(Claude Lanzmann, The Patagonian Hare, 347–48).
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show support; as the revolutionary movement was coopted by fundamental­
ists, Millett and her companion were caught in the crossfire and expelled from 
the country.248 Beauvoir’s own attitude toward the trip is highlighted by Janet 
Afary and Kevin Anderson, in their book about Foucault’s support for the Ira­
nian revolution. They reprint the complete text of the speech Beauvoir deliv­
ered in March 1979 at a press conference in Paris, announcing the international 
delegation’s departure for Teheran. Beauvoir emphasizes that the team has 
been invited by Iranian feminists to come and show their support. Most of the 
brief text is devoted to making clear that the main purpose of the trip is to 
gather information.
We have created the International Committee for Women’s Rights (cidf) 
in response to calls from a large number of Iranian women. Their situa­
tion and their revolt have greatly moved us. We have decided to create 
this committee, which has set itself several tasks. The first one is informa­
tion. It is a matter of becoming informed about the situation of women 
across the world, a situation that to a very, very great extent is extremely 
difficult, painful, and even odious. Therefore, we wish to inform our­
selves, in very precise cases, of this situation.
We then wish to inform others of it; that is, to communicate the knowl­
edge that we have gained by publishing articles. And finally, we wish to 
support the struggle of the women who fight against the situation that 
affects them. That is the general idea of the cidf.
The first task we have taken up is a very, very burning one for today. It 
is the task of acquiring information concerning the struggle of the Irani­
an women, communicating that information, and supporting their strug­
gle. We have received an appeal from a very large number of these wom­
en. We have also seen their struggles, their fights, and their actions. We 
have appreciated the depth of their utter humiliation into which others 
wanted to make them fall, and we have therefore resolved to fight on 
their behalf.
Thus, the first practical step that will make our call to action concrete 
is a specific one. We are sending a women’s delegation to Tehran, in order 
to gather information. We have sent a telegram to [the Iranian prime 
248 Going to Iran is written in the characteristic moment­by­moment cinéma vérité style Mil­
lett first developed in Flying and put to good use in The Loony-Bin Trip and elsewhere. 
Some readers may find this experiment in radical honesty irritating—do we really need 
to know that Kate and Sophie cannot find their laundry bag?—but her use of it is consis­
tent and principled, and there is no reason to doubt her account of unfolding events.
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minister] M. Bazargan, asking him if we will see us. I say “we,” although 
for personal health reasons, I am not going. But I have many women 
friends who are going to travel to Iran on Monday. We have asked him to 
receive the delegation, but even if he does not reply, we are going anyway! 
In that case, however, it would no longer be a dialogue with a head of 
State. It would solely be an effort to gather information. Unless, of course, 
they turn us away completely, which is still a strong possibility. It is very 
possible that the mission will fail, inasmuch as they might turn it away 
the moment it arrives. Nevertheless the die will have been cast, and it is 
important to have a demonstration—on the part of a very large number 
of Western women, French women, Italian women, and others—of soli­
darity with the struggle of Iranian women.
I reiterate, however, that this is essentially an effort to gather informa­
tion, in order to put ourselves in contact with Iranian women, in order to 
know their demands and the ways in which they plan to struggle.249
As Karen Vintges comments, “[Beauvoir] thus emphasized the need to support 
Iranian women from their point of view, instead of imposing the point of view 
of Western feminists.”250
To use the terms of Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, the trip was undertaken 
in response to the “appel” (call or appeal) from others for political solidarity. 
249 Simone de Beauvoir, “Speech.” The translation, by Marybeth Timmerman, later appeared 
as part of “Short Feminist Texts from the Seventies and Eighties” in the Feminist Writings 
volume of the Beauvoir Series. Introducing the piece there, Françoise Picq notes: “In 
March of 1979, women who had participated in the demonstrations against the Shah’s 
regime and contributed to his fall, once again took to the streets of Tehran for five con­
secutive days. They were protesting against the obligatory veil. Attacked by counter­
demonstrators, they were accused of playing into the hands of counterrevolutionaries 
and being manipulated by foreign agents. International feminist solidarity had to be 
shown, in spite of hesitations from the Left. On March 16, a demonstration was organized 
in Paris with the slogans, ‘No Shah, no chador, no Russian tanks,’ ‘the Right veils women, 
the Left veils its eyes,’ and ‘Sails/veils unfurled … toward terror?’”  Translator Marybeth 
Timmerman explains the plays on words: “When spoken in French, the words for ‘shah,’ 
‘chador,’ and ‘tanks’ in the first slogan all sound similar: ‘Ni shah, ni chador, ni chars rus­
ses.’ The second slogan, ‘La droite voile les femmes, la gauche se voile la face,’ uses the 
expression ‘se voiler la face’ to mean “‘look the other way.’ The last slogan plays on the 
words ‘le voile’ (veil) and ‘la voile’ (sail): ‘à toutes voiles’ (meaning ‘full speed ahead under 
full sail’) also sounds like ‘veils for all women’”(238).
See also Simine Nouri, “Face à une misogynie hors du temps.” Beauvoir’s texts circu­
lated on the black market after being banned by the Mullahs, and influenced Maryam 
Radjavi, leader of an exiled Iranian resistance group.
250 Vintges, “Surpassing Liberal Feminism,” 20.
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But debates about how best to do this seemed to pale in the light of facts on the 
ground: the Iranian feminist resistance was utterly crushed in a matter of days. 
Alice Schwarzer, who went to Iran with the European delegation, remembered 
that her group was invited to meet with the Ayatollah on condition that they 
wear the chador. This led to a furious and seemingly interminable debate 
among the members of the delegation, which Schwarzer resolved by telephon­
ing Beauvoir in Paris; as Schwarzer told the story, Beauvoir listened to the 
whole thing and then said, “Enfin, c’est ridicule.”251
10 One Last Imaginary Dialogue, and A Few Real Ones
Perhaps at a certain point “this is ridiculous” becomes the only possible re­
sponse? That’s the approach taken by a very strange, but rather wonderful, ab­
surdist play, Madah-Sartre: The Kidnapping, Trial & Conver(sat/s)ion of Jean-
Paul Sartre & Simone de Beauvoir, written (from exile) in 1995 by the Algerian 
playwright Alek Baylee Toumi, and translated into English by the author in 
2007. The play’s conceit is that Sartre and Beauvoir come back to life to attend 
the funeral of the Francophone Algerian writer, Tahar Djaout, who in real life 
was murdered in 1993 by the Groupe Islamique Armé (gia). In Toumi’s play, 
the existentialist couple is kidnapped on the way to Djaout’s funeral by Islamist 
militants, whose leader “Madah” demands that they convert to Islam or be 
killed.252 Sartre debates with Madah, giving voice to what seem to be the play­
wright’s own views on politics, violence, atheism, foreign debt, the similarity 
between Madah and Le Pen, the hypocrisy of rape and violence in the name of 
Islam, the hijacking of the Algerian elections, and more; meanwhile Beauvoir, 
segregated with the “chadorettes” and accused by their “Chief Chador” of being 
the “master thinker of our homegrown feminists,” interrogates those who are 
251 Presentation at the 2008 conference; no written version of this informal intervention ap­
pears to exist.
252 In his introduction to the English version, James LeSueur explains that this character’s 
name is short for Mad­d­Allah, “to symbolize Islamic fundamentalists,” and that he is 
partly based on Anwar Haddam, a leader of the Islamic front (xiv). Madah’s name and 
Toumi’s title also riff on Peter Weiss’s musical play, Marat-Sade, The Persecution and As-
sassination of Jean-Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton 
Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade, and Toumi, who is also a literary scholar, 
makes numerous other references to twentieth­century French literature, here and in his 
other works.
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attempting to interrogate her and accuses her accusers of being “parrots” and 
of betraying the Algerian revolution.253
Madah/Sartre is deliberately anachronistic, to put it mildly, in that it shows 
Beauvoir and Sartre as aware of events that took place after they died. It de­
mands to be read through its own historical moment: a violent power struggle 
between Islamist militants attempting to impose sharia, and the fln govern­
ment, socialist in name but violently repressive; there were daily attacks on 
intellectuals and artists—Djaout was one of many killed or driven into exile 
around that time—and, meanwhile, the poor of Algeria were ground between 
two millstones.254 Toumi intercuts the debate scenes with a narrative featuring 
an ordinary Algerian man, a desperately impoverished taxi driver, who endures 
two unprovoked (and identical) attacks, one by the police and the other by Is­
lamic militants, and then searches futilely for medical help in a corrupt and 
impoverished hospital system: seeking thread to have his wounds stitched 
closed, he is sent to the morgue, where limbs and heads are being sewn back 
on dismembered corpses…. While the taxi driver disappears at the end of act 
six on a note of despair, for himself and for his country, act seven concludes the 
play with a hopeful fantasy. Oddly enough, the atheist Sartre admits that there 
is a heaven—he has, after all, just come from there. But it is a multicultural 
heaven where atheists are accepted, people are judged based on their earthly 
deeds, and God (much to Madah’s despair) turns out to be a woman. Beauvoir 
meanwhile convinces the chadorettes to use their veils as sails and fly away, 
and the play ends with a Berber dance and a song to “the Freewoman” and the 
female God.
As a reader, I admit to finding the ending less compelling than the debate,255 
where (among many other things) Toumi (through “Sartre”) defends the right 
of Algerian intellectuals to be considered on their own terms, not as Western­
ized dupes.256 And while Beauvoir is not afraid to lecture the chadorettes, she 
too does so mainly with reference to Algerian precedents.
253 Madah/Sartre, 58, 66.
254 Toumi introduces the English version with a “warning” against confusing “Islamism” and 
Muslim peoples—“The victims are Muslims, while the killers, the assassins, the terrorists 
are Islamists” (xx). James LeSueur’s introduction does a fine job of supplying historical 
details.
255 The reverse might well be true in performance—it’s difficult to judge.
256 “Madah: If we have Francophone intellectuals, it is because of you. They imitate you.
Sartre: You’re wrong again. If I am like this, it is thanks to one of your early ancestors. 
One of the great intellectuals of the world is Algerian. Born in Hippo­Annaba, thousands 
of years ago, the early Christian bishop Saint Augustine spoke Berber, was Berber, and 
wrote in Latin. We still have his Confessions. After him, there was Averroës in Spain, father 
of secularism … he was Muslim! And many others that you don’t know. Today there is 
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You are a bunch of parrots. There are Algerian women who have been as­
sassinated because they refused to wear it. Some were kidnapped and 
raped. Just out of respect for women like Kheira, who have been gang­
raped, or Katia, who was gunned down because she stood up, you should 
remove it.257
She rips up the veil they have given her, saying, “This is what an Italian woman 
did in front of the Ayatollah!”258 But she also argues that the Koran does not 
require the veil—“No. Isn’t it said that she must ‘cover’ herself? Clothes are 
enough”259—and that the chador is not Algerian but an imported badge of 
“international fundamentalism.” “Why don’t you wear the traditional white 
haik, the veil of Algerian women?”260
Chief Chador: Feminist propaganda. That’s the work of Kahina. Not only 
has she read your books, but now it is you who read hers…. Unbowed! She 
escaped twice … next time, she’ll pay for it.261
“Kahina” is Toumi’s name for Algerian feminist Khalida Messaoudi, whose 
book is called Unbowed: An Algerian Woman Confronts Islamic Fundamental-
ism. Like Sartre, Beauvoir is not afraid to call out the hypocrisy of claims to 
“piety”— “How many of you wear a mini skirt and a diaphragm under the 
chador?”—and in the end she says to the chadorettes, “Go see The Battle of Al-
giers. You don’t even know your own history.”262
Kateb, Mammeri, Djaout, Mimouni….They are agnostics, atheists, secular Muslims but all 
tolerant.” Madah/Sartre, 94.
It’s a stretch for me to imagine Sartre defending St. Augustine, or taking him as an in­
tellectual ancestor. Perhaps he met Augustine in heaven and changed his mind? Sartre 
did, sometimes, change his mind … or perhaps he was thinking of the influence of Augus­
tine’s Confessions on Les mots. Toumi is anyhow on firmer ground when he assumes that 
Sartre and Beauvoir would have continued to read the works of Kateb Yacine, who is men­





261 Ibid., 66. Messaoudi’s book describes death threats, and living under fatwa, but is also 
critical of American government interventions in the region. An opponent to the unequal 
“family code,” Messaoudi has since joined the Algerian government and served as Minis­
ter of Culture. The name “Kahina” originally belonged (Wikipedia tells me) to a “seventh 
century female Berber religious and military leader, who led indigenous resistance to 
Arab expansion in Northwest Africa.”
262 Ibid., 66, 67.
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“Tell me who you haunt and I will tell you who you are”?263 No, this is crazy. 
Ghosts can’t offer evidence. And “Beauvoir’s” statements about the veil in Tou­
mi’s play go far beyond anything Beauvoir herself actually said about it: the 
questions she answers in the play are not the same ones that arose in her life­
time. But it is hardly Toumi’s project to give an accurate account of what Sartre 
and Beauvoir believed and did “in real life.” (In fact, he gets some small bio­
graphical details wrong.) His project is to tell the world that Algerian feminism, 
and an Algerian nationalism that respects multiculturalism and human rights, 
are alive and well;264 and secondarily, to explore the relation between the cul­
ture of France and her former colonies in a more nuanced and multi­ directional 
way than is permitted by post­colonial orthodoxies, whether of the Left or the 
Right. But his reading of existentialism’s legacy is a plausible one, and I include 
it here as part of my project to look, not just at what lay upstream from existen­
tialist arguments, but also at what lay downstream, what could come of those 
arguments later. Perhaps Toumi’s play suggests that incompatible goods (or, 
here, competing evils) need not paralyze us.
Without myself endorsing any position, I want to spend a little more time 
exploring and historicizing what can motivate a view like Toumi’s. Around the 
time Badinter and Kristeva were awarding the Beauvoir prize to Hirsi Ali, Alge­
rian feminist Marnia Lazreg wrote a book called Questioning the Veil: Open Let-
ters to Muslim Women which made arguments rather similar to those Beau­
voir’s ghost offers in Toumi’s play. Lazreg has no love for French attempts to 
ban the veil, or for Turkish ones either; but her analysis asks younger women, 
who are taking up the veil as a signifier of religious commitment or nationalist 
pride, to think about what they are doing, to see how it connects to a larger 
social and historical picture, and to remember the generation of women from 
Muslim cultures who discarded their veils in order, she says, to “seize their 
place in the human universe.”265 She begins by explaining her own standpoint, 
making it clear that she is no Hirsi Ali.
In my previously published work, I have consistently objected to the 
manner in which Muslim women have been portrayed in books as well as 
the media…. [T]hey have been represented as oppressed by their religion, 
typically understood as being inimical to women’s social progress…. 
[and] have been described as the weakest link in Muslim societies…. 
263 One way of translating the opening line of André Breton’s Nadja.
264 Another thread in “Sartre’s” argument has to do with the problem of imposing classical 
Arabic as a “standard” on the Berber minority, to which Toumi belongs.
265 Lazreg, Questioning the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women, 2009, 50.
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Such a view made it acceptable to hail the war launched against Afghani­
stan in 2001 as a war of “liberation” of women…. In this context, any Mus­
lim woman who takes cheap shots at Islam and crudely indicts Muslim 
cultures is perceived as speaking the truth and is elevated to stardom.266
Nonetheless, feeling that she “can no longer keep quiet,” she asks Muslim wom­
en to consider the ways that veiling—even where freely chosen—can be harm­
ful to women who do it, whether they think so or not; and she also argues that 
Muslim women in France or the US who choose to “re­veil” show a failure of 
solidarity with women in Iran and Saudi Arabia where the veil, and other re­
strictions on women’s free movement and full participation, are imposed with 
severe and sometimes violent sanctions. She respects arguments based on re­
ligious conviction, particularly when a woman has been convinced by her own 
study of religious texts, rather than by social pressure, or the preference of a 
father, brother, employer, or prospective husband, or as a matter of “strategy.” 
“Nevertheless,” she writes,
[I]t is crucial that any woman who decides to wear any type of veil exam­
ine her conscience and determine whether the veil is the only manner for 
her to fulfill her spiritual needs. Because of both its role in the history of 
women’s exclusion from social life outside the home and its resilience, 
the veil is overlaid with meanings that cannot simply be brushed away 
because a woman says so. Whenever a woman wears a veil, her act in­
volves other women, including the girl child.267
For Lazreg, the meaning of the veil is always social, and historical, not just an 
individual “choice”;268 the veil, wherever it is worn, is about masculinity, male 
266 Ibid., 1. See also 60—“Banning the veil is as much a political act as is mandating it…. 
Women are held hostage equally by radical secularists and Wahabists, Islamists and Shi’i 
Muslims. None of them trusts women with the capacity to decide for themselves how to 
manage their bodies and whether to wear a veil. None of them has asked women for their 
opinion in the matter.”
267 Ibid., 11.
268 Ibid., 36. See also 128: “When a woman wears it, she garbles its meanings insofar as she 
never knows which one of these will be perceived by others as the one that she has at­
tributed to it. Ironically, as a woman thinks that she is making a clear statement by wear­
ing a veil, she loses control over its meaning. Yet she assumes all the meanings that have 
been historically associated with it.”
There’s a larger “theory of meaning” question here that is not geographically or cultur­
ally specific. Consider the survival in the usa of wedding rings (once marks of possession) 
or the custom of the bride being “given away” by her father. Is the social and historical 
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dominance. “The veil is a man’s affair before it becomes a woman’s.” “A man’s 
absorption in the details of a woman’s relation to her body is an assault on her 
dignity.” “It is difficult to extirpate the veil from the thick history of men’s 
power.”269
Lazreg never mentions Beauvoir by name, but she describes her own ap­
proach as an “an existential­philosophical standpoint that peels away the justi­
fications that women who wear it or intend to wear it usually invoke.”270 She 
provides compelling phenomenological accounts rooted in her own experi­
ence; she also introduces and interprets stories about other women from vari­
ous places and generations, in a way that feels similar to The Second Sex’s inves­
tigation of “lived experience” by the method Patricia Moynagh characterized 
as “exemplary validity.” Also like Beauvoir, Lazreg does not shrink from re­ 
interpreting what she hears.
Over the past fifteen years, I have spoken with and interviewed numerous 
women, old and young, in the Middle East, North Africa, France, and the 
United States who have worn one type of veil or another; women who 
took off their veil but felt they have to put it back on; and women who 
have been thinking of wearing one. I take these women’s arguments seri­
ously but wish to subject them to scrutiny as I am convinced that only 
rational reflection can advance women’s understanding of themselves, 
particularly in times of political turmoil.271
She excavates a number of arguments that she regards as “rationalizations,”272 
and notes that the strongest male advocates of the veil (in Algeria, in Iran) have 
done nothing to protest violent attacks against women.
meaning of these ancient customs erased because an individual woman says so? Why do 
these demeaning reminders of women’s subordination survive? Are they “resignified” in a 
subversive manner when applied symmetrically to both partners? Or when the partners 
are both women? Or do they simply take the edge off any potential threat to compulsory 
heterosexuality? “Oh, no one in the US would raise those questions.” But I just did.
269 Ibid., 57, 121, 1.
270 Ibid., 1.
271 Ibid., 11.
272 These include the idea of the veil as “protection” or “shield” against sexual harassment. 
Lazreg points out that “in practice, harm comes from men to women no matter whether 
they are practicing, veiled, or not”; what the veil “protects” is male identity and masculine 
privilege (ibid.,43). “If a woman’s veil is a symbol of modesty that protects her from sexual 
harassment, why do men not show modesty in their behavior toward women by refrain­
ing from harassing them?” Ibid., 52.
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Lazreg is particularly critical of theoretical arguments that the decision of 
younger women to veil must be respected in the name of “agency.”
This is a delicate endeavor as the risk is great that a woman’s rationale for 
wearing a veil might be discounted as a form of false consciousness, and 
her agency dismissed as illusory. As a social scientist, I cannot deny wom­
en’s agency or substitute mine for theirs on the grounds that I am more 
equipped to make sense of their motivations than they are…. However, 
agency is not a free­floating capacity independent of the social frame­
work within which it expresses itself; neither is it above questioning.273
In other words, while the question of agency is an important one, it is not 
reducible to how an individual woman feels.274 Plus, there is a remainder in 
the form of ethical and political questioning: Agency for what? Agency on 
behalf of what? In solidarity with whom? “Agency must be distinguished from 
consciousness—the capacity to see through the myriad contingencies that 
determine the ‘choice’ that a woman makes for the good.”275 The agency Laz­
reg is taking up here for herself, then, is a kind of intellectual agency: the right 
to draw conclusions, to make judgments.
Beauvoir, as we have seen, never seems to have questioned her right to de­
scribe other women’s self­understandings, however sincerely held, as complic­
it mystifications. (Insofar as women might have recognized themselves in the 
unflattering portraits she drew, this was supposed to induce them/us to 
change.)276 But Lazreg is well­aware of subsequent feminist critiques that em­
phasize women’s “agency,” and she confronts those critiques head­on, naming 
a number of feminist works, the best­known to non­specialists probably being 
Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Sub-
ject.277 Lazreg writes:
The reveiling trend coincides with an approach espoused by academic 
feminists that seeks to correct the notion that the veil is a sign of “oppres­
sion” but in reality makes oppression more intellectually acceptable. Al­
though acknowledging that veiling may reinforce gender inequality, this 
approach uncritically and unapologetically foregrounds lower­middle­
class women’s stated reasons for taking up veiling. Its proponents engage 
273 Ibid., 9.
274 Also, the question of power is not reducible to the question of (individual) agency.
275 Ibid., 74.
276 I say “us” advisedly; it is women of her own race and class background who come in for her 
scorn in volume 2.
277 Ibid., 75.
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in various degrees of sophisticated theoretical hairsplitting in order to 
excavate the operative agency assumed to be lurking behind the veil, sub­
verting its use, and turning it into a tool of empowerment. The implica­
tion is that the “oppressed” are not so oppressed after all; they have power. 
Faced with this newly discovered power frontier, the researcher does no 
more than study its manifestations.278
Questions of meaning and agency also connect to questions of “authenticity” 
and authority: which women do we listen to, and why?
In bending over backward to “give women a voice,” adherents to this ap­
proach find it necessary to dismiss the reality of women who object to 
veiling.279
There’s something deeply insulting about this. “The referent Westernization 
implies that a woman cannot think of change outside of a Western frame of 
reference.”280
Now, others have made this general point before. Lila Abu­Lughod (author 
of “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?”) has even mobilized Edward 
Said’s work to do so.
Following one of the most productive lines of thought made possible by 
Orientalism, with the division between East and West (and representa­
tion of each) to be understood not as a natural geographic or cultural fact 
but as a product of the political and historical encounter of imperialism, 
we argued that condemning “feminism” as an inauthentic Western im­
port is just as inaccurate as celebrating it as a local or indigenous project. 
The first position assumes such a thing as cultural purity; the second un­
derestimates the formative power of colonialism in the development of 
the region.281
278 Ibid., 5.
279 Ibid. The conclusion restates this even more forcefully: “The veil has been tantalizing to 
Muslims and non­Muslims, including intellectuals. Attempts to present it as a tool of em­
powerment of women rest on a dubious postmodern conception of power according to 
which whatever a woman undertakes to do is liberating as long as she thinks that she is 
engaged in some form of ‘resistance’ or self­assertion, no matter how misguided…. (ibid., 
125–26).
280 Ibid., 114.
281 Lila Abu­Lughod, “Review essay: ‘Orientalism’ and Middle East Feminist Studies,” 106. 
Written for the twentieth anniversary of Said’s book, Abu­Lughod’s piece reflects on its 
productivity for feminist thinking, beyond what its author originally envisioned. “We” 
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What makes Lazreg’s account particularly apposite to my point here is the 
historical cast of her argument.
We seldom ask ourselves how the generations of women who wore veils 
felt about them. We cannot imagine them without their veils, as if they 
had been born with them; we expect them to wear them because they 
expected to wear them. Yet they experienced a more limited existence 
because of their veils.282
And many women from the generation of Lazreg’s mother made lucid and de­
liberate choices to stop wearing veils, in their own interests and the interests of 
their daughters. In her concluding summary, “Why Women Should Not Wear 
the Veil,” the first item Lazreg lists is “the need to recapture the historic role 
that women have played as agents of change.”283 Now, Lazreg’s book is ad­
dressed to her Muslim sisters, and not to women like me—the word “letters” in 
her subtitle makes that crystal­clear—and I want to avoid any impression that 
I think I have the right to judge this question on their behalf. But if she’s right 
that “the academic sanctioning of the veil turns it into a fixture of the Muslim 
landscape rather than an evolving phenomenon,”284 then as an academic femi­
nist I do have some standing, and indeed some obligation, to consider what my 
position and approach should be.
Like Toumi, Lazreg is saying to the young women who take up the veil their 
mothers rejected, “you do not know your own history.” The particular value of 
Lazreg’s book for my own investigation is that it reminds us to hear the voices 
Beauvoir heard on her visit to Tunisia, the urban women she met at the house 
of Mr. and Mrs. E. while she was there, whom she described as “thirsty for free­
dom” (right before the passage where she shows her sympathy for the wives in 
the dark cave).285 In real life, Beauvoir’s positions were very much informed by 
the testimony and activism of an older generation of feminists from the Arab 
world; Lazreg’s discussion reminds us why she might have heard these 
here refers to a collection of essays she edited, Remaking Women: Femininity and Moder-
nity in the Middle East.
282 Lazreg, Questioning the Veil, 17.
283 Ibid., 97. The other reasons include “doing away with the physical and psychological ef­
fects of veiling; awareness of the effect of the veil in the workplace; and demystifying 
propaganda that portrays women’s desire for progress as mimicry of the ‘West’ and thus 
an offense to their culture and religion.”
284 Ibid., 6.
285 FCh 1:83–4, FCirc 64.
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“évoluées,” as they would then have been called, as authentic and legitimate 
voices, and trusted what they told her.
Among “us” “now,” this historicizing view is less well­known than Saba Mah­
mood’s critique of feminism’s “normative secularism” in The Politics of Piety, 
which many people teach as a groundbreaking text of feminist theory and an 
important corrective to the ethnocentrism that plagues US views of Islam and 
the Middle East. Karen Vintges, who likes the book, describes it as a
critique of Western feminism’s too narrow models of self and society … 
based on [Mahmood’s] study of a grassroots women’s piety movement in 
Cairo. The women participating in this Islamist movement, instead of be­
ing the oppressed creatures that Western feminists hold them to be, are 
religious agents who practice an ethical “self­cultivation” that engages 
their entire way of life. Liberal feminists with their “conceptions of the 
subject, autonomous reason, and objectivity, though which the pietists 
are understood to be lacking in faculties of criticism and reason” cannot 
imagine that Muslim women strive for completely different values: 
namely, a pious instead of a free, autonomous life.286
Mahmood herself, though, did not entirely envision this reading. In her preface 
to the 2012 edition, she wrote:
Since its publication, Politics of Piety has elicited both the praise and the 
ire of feminists: some have hailed the book for restoring agency to reli­
giously devout Muslim women hitherto denounced for their patriarchal 
proclivities. Others have condemned the book for precisely the same rea­
son: insofar as the book is read as an exposé of the “agency” of the women 
who constitute the piety movement, it is charged with leveling critical 
differences between women who are upholders of patriarchal norms 
(dangerous, supine, submissive) and those who fight these norms in the 
name of liberty and freedom (heroic subjects of history). Both these read­
ings ignore the fact that I was not interested in delivering judgments on 
what counts as a feminist versus an antifeminist practice, to distinguish a 
subversive act from a non­subversive one. While acts of resistance to rela­
tions of domination constitute one modality of action, they certainly do 
not exhaust the field of human action. Rather, the aim of this book is to 
286 Vintges, A New Dawn for The Second Sex, 62–3, quoting Mahmood, Politics of Piety, xii.
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develop an analytical language for thinking about modalities of agency 
that exceed liberatory projects (feminist, leftist, or liberal).287
So on some level, she sees both Vintges and Lazreg as missing her point.
Taken on its own terms, Mahmood’s is unquestionably a brilliant book. She 
is certainly right that identity politics will not help us understand the dynam­
ics of the piety movement, or much else. Her conclusion is especially powerful: 
she does not want to think along the logic that led to a “feminist” war on the 
Taliban, or to participate in the liberal discourse that has done even broader 
harms, in the colonial period and afterward. But what is the alternative? “By 
allowing theoretical inquiry some immunity from the requirements of strate­
gic political action, we leave open the possibility that the task of thinking may 
proceed in directions not dictated by the logic and pace of immediate political 
events.”288
In other words, we can think better (more clearly, more creatively) by brack­
eting what is actually (Beauvoir would say, “concretely”) at stake. And I’m sure 
Mahmood is right. My question is whether thinking clearly and creatively is 
the (whole) point, or whether feminist thinking (as opposed to other sorts of 
good thinking) was supposed to engage with what’s concretely at stake. The 
fact that I can’t for the life of me come up with a more “up­to­date” verb than 
engage illustrates how fully irreconcilable these two philosophical positions 
are, even before one takes up the particular disputes about Islam, secularism, 
and the veil.
Let me try to clarify this by looking at one of Mahmood’s examples, her anal­
ysis of two perspectives on the difficulties of life as a single woman in Egypt 
and of the role played by “ṣabr,” which is not just a virtue but a practice, some­
thing she describes, following Foucault, as an ethical “technique of the self.” 
Mahmood explains, “I have retained the use of ṣabr in this discussion rather 
than its common English translation, ‘patience,’ because ṣabr communicates a 
sense not quite captured by the latter: one of perseverance, endurance of hard­
ship without complaint, and steadfastness.” In the example­story, a woman 
called Nadia, who participates in the piety movement, uses the language of 
ṣabr in attempting to persuade her friend Sana to accept an offer of marriage 
from a man Sana does not much like, who already has a wife. Sana, a liberal 
Muslim, disagrees: she feels ṣabr encourages one to be passive, and prefers a 
virtue (or, if you like, a practice) she labels “self­esteem.” Sana says,
287 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, x.
288 Ibid., 196. Mahmood references Wendy Brown’s Politics Out of History here.
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Self­esteem makes you independent of what other people think of you. 
You begin to think of your worth not in terms of marriage and men, but in 
terms of who you really are, and in my case, I draw pride from my work 
and that I am good at it. Where does ṣabr get you? Instead of helping you 
to improve your situation, it just leads you to accept it as fate—passively.
Mahmood glosses their disagreement as follows:
Neither [Nadia] nor Sana, for a variety of reasons, could pursue the proj­
ect of reforming the oppressive situation they were forced to inhabit. The 
exercise of ṣabr did not hinder Nadia from embarking on a project of so­
cial reform any more than the practice of self­esteem enabled Sana to do 
so. One should not, therefore, draw unwarranted conclusions between a 
secular orientation and the ability to transform conditions of social injus­
tice. Further, it is important to point out that to analyze people’s actions 
in terms of realized or frustrated attempts at social transformation is nec­
essarily to reduce the heterogeneity of life to the rather flat narrative of 
succumbing to or resisting relations of domination. Just as our own lives 
don’t fit neatly into such a paradigm, neither should we apply such a re­
duction to the lives of women like Nadia and Sana, or to movements of 
moral reform such as the one discussed here.
At this, my heart rose (to borrow Anne Bradstreet’s phrase). Yes, Mahmood is 
right, I thought: her book has nothing at all to say about feminist questions. 
Because what about Sana? I completely accept Mahmood’s argument that al­
ways looking for “resistance” to (or “resignification” or “subversion” of) the 
norm is often an oversimplification and an annoying tic. But her suggestion 
here is that we are wrong to ask the question, even when that question is explic-
itly framed as such by the subjects themselves.289 If the ethical and methodologi­
cal imperative is to “listen to the women,” shouldn’t we listen to both of 
them?290 Moreover, the failure of any movement for “social reform,” or at least 
289 Mahmood tries to avoid describing the women she discusses as “informants,” or labelling 
what they say as “data,” in an attempt to avoid a patronizing ethnographic gaze; I appreci­
ate her reasoning, but I still can’t find a better word than “subjects”: there remains a non­
reversible relationship between the researcher and those she is writing about.
290 Isn’t Sana’s practice of “self­esteem” also an ethical technique of the self? just like Nadia’s, 
it embeds a vision of an underlying system of right and wrong, and a transpersonal sal­
vific goal, whether or not Sana as an individual will reach that goal. (Notice that in de­
scribing it, she says “you,” rather than “I,” which sketches a further step toward “we,” 
though she does not quite take that step.)
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the impossibility of either of these women participating in such a movement, 
is here taken as a given in advance. Why? As Lazreg would point out, history 
shows that such things do happen, have happened, could yet happen.
So the argument here is not really between Nadia and “Western feminists,” 
it is between Nadia and Sana. (And since both of them are Egyptian, and both 
are Muslim, can I really be giving ground to Islamophobia when I find one re­
sponse preferable, and the other, certainly understandable, but rather sad?) 
Nadia’s faith practices not only help her cope with the less than ideal features 
of her own situation, but lead her to try to talk her friend into a disadvanta­
geous marriage the friend lucidly does not want, simply because Sana is getting 
older, this is the only offer she is likely to have, and life as an unmarried woman 
is (they both agree) quite difficult. I completely accept the legitimate agentic 
rationality of both positions here. The problem is on a different level.
And indeed, there is nothing peculiar to Islam about the agency and energy 
with which the women in the daʿwa movements enact their self­subjection 
and help enforce the subjection of other women, nor about the interpretive 
dilemma this proposes for feminism. In the American Midwest, one can tune 
in to Christian radio and hear, at almost any hour, “women’s Bible study pro­
grams,” led by women for women, which do very much the same thing as the 
Egyptian daʿwa leaders and groups Mahmood describes, although the particu­
lar texts preaching women’s submissiveness to husbands and church authori­
ties are drawn from a different holy book. (When the daughters of these evan­
gelical women turn up in my classes—and they do—surely I should have 
something more to offer them than the equivalent of “well, Nadia has a point, 
too”?)291
Mahmood herself, in her brilliant description of the process of “subjectifica­
tion” (rooted in Foucault), often draws cross­cultural parallels: her book does 
not make a case based on cultural difference, not at all. But I am not sure that 
her dichotomy between “secular” vs “religious” motivations exactly names 
what’s at stake here, either. Mahmood says in the passage I quoted above that 
we “should not … draw unwarranted conclusions between a secular orienta­
tion and the ability to transform conditions of social injustice.” But do femi­
nists really draw such conclusions? The more I think about this, the more it 
strikes me as a red herring. We all know that without religious motivation there 
would have been no Gandhi and no Martin Luther King (and no Anna Julia 
Cooper). As I write, the rightness or wrongness of Trump’s gulag for migrant 
291 Feminist pedagogy asks us to be careful not to judge women’s choices. But instead, we 
judge one another for doing so. I wish I knew who authored the brilliant meme which 
captures this: “I could tell the minute I saw her how effing judgmental she was.”
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children is, bizarrely enough, being argued out in the public sphere through 
competing interpretations of the Bible; some “mainline Protestant” folks are 
putting themselves to the trouble of trying to get the Methodist church to ex­
pel Attorney General Jeff Sessions for citing the wrong chapter and verse and 
thereby misrepresenting “what Jesus would do”; meanwhile clergy from all de­
nominations are lining up to be arrested, just as they did during the Vietnam 
war, and even the nuns on the bus are up in arms….
You know, if America has a secular culture, I certainly have never succeeded 
in finding it. (Ask a Jew.) Mahmood’s work after The Politics of Piety was de­
voted to showing that “the secular” is pretty much a mirage, an argument I find 
compelling. Then too, when feminism of any stripe enjoys widespread collec­
tive success, it undoubtedly employs practices and techniques of the self, such 
as consciousness raising, group exegesis (what else are you and I doing right 
now?), revival meetings (Take Back the Night), the adoption of particular 
watchwords and, yes, articles of clothing.292 It would make more sense to me 
to say we should accord to Islamic feminisms the same respect we accord to 
Christian feminisms, and no less; and possibly, that we should accord to Is­
lamist anti­feminist women the same respect we accord to Christian evangeli­
cal anti­feminist women, and no more.
Now, when a practitioner of Mahmood’s sort of critique is asked, “what then 
would a better feminist praxis look like?” they may respond that answering that 
question is not their project, and that is fair enough.293 But when one does 
want to do some feminist work in/on the world we live in, one then falls back, 
either on one’s gut, or on an older theory.294
292 Why can’t we recognize feminist ethics as a technique of the self? And as a recognition of 
the social and communal rather than the individual? It does not often succeed, for rea­
sons Beauvoir explained, but that vision is always there, even in the most “lean in” of 
places.
293 Why then is this book so important to (American) transnational feminist theory? Perhaps 
(through no fault of Mahmood’s) because it supports the individualist self­actualization 
story parodied by The Onion: “It’s official: women now empowered by anything a woman 
ever does.” Perhaps it also meshes well with our custom that matters of religious convic­
tion must be seen as beyond debate. Whether this is because we are a secular country, or 
because we are secretly still a theocracy, I leave you and history to decide.
294 Even Judith Butler now walks under the banner of human rights, because she has come to 
care about Palestine, and feels some particular responsibility as a Jew. Is there some ver­
sion here of the “there are no atheists in foxholes” thing? There are no posthumanists in 
detention camps? There probably are, though, or will be. Your theory will not protect you 
… just as no one’s aesthetic or philosophical commitments predicted what they did when 
the Occupation came, in either direction.
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11 Last Thoughts
Where I’m going with this is that the “existentialist perspective” Lazreg shares 
with Beauvoir makes it possible to see certain things that Mahmood’s ap­
proach leaves in shadow. Nadia and Sana share a social location; they are both 
intelligent and rational; they do not differ in their understanding of the situa­
tion of single women in Egyptian society, nor do they differ in finding it a bad 
situation. They simply disagree about what Sana should do. What we see here 
is that when people from the same cultural backgrounds are faced with the 
same oppressive conditions, some people struggle against those conditions as 
best they can. Other people find reasons to give up.295
And actually, I think Mahmood herself fails to notice a form of “rational 
agency” that would have been all too clear to Beauvoir, who recognized wom­
en’s agency in many forms of action by women, not just “resistance to norms.” 
Here that recognition would have taken the form of understanding that Nadia 
did have choices, including the choice not to betray her friend. Full human 
agency involves the ability to do harm.
Am I channeling Beauvoir’s ghost here? Maybe, and that’s weird, yes. But 
the argument between Nadia and Sana maps rather well onto the argument 
between Simone and her close friend Zaza that shapes the ending of Mémoires 
d’une jeune fille rangée. Zaza’s mother wanted her to make an arranged mar­
riage, rather than an “unsuitable” love match; Zaza’s reading of Claudel (that 
same Claudel) and of other Catholic writers was convincing her that submis­
sion to her mother’s bourgeois values was required as a religious duty, and that 
her abjection was beautifully pleasing to God; and Beauvoir, raised in the same 
milieu, was like, I know you love your mother, and I respect your view, but, no. 
No. Just, no.
Harking back to the time, and the language, of the “évolués,” Lazreg’s book 
takes as epigraph a quotation from Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, 
though she inserts “women” where he had “men”:
We are not [wo]men for whom it is a question of “either­or.” For us, the 
problem is not to make a utopian and sterile attempt to repeat the past, 
but go beyond it.296
295 Years ago, when I first started teaching feminist theory, a student asked me, “what makes 
people different?” (She was thinking of her sister, who was happily conforming to a set of 
norms for women she herself found unbearably oppressive.) I don’t know, I said, feeling 
(then) like a bit of a failure for not knowing; and I’ve gone on worrying about it. But may­
be “I don’t know” is actually a good answer, and there is something to be said for the irre­
ducible singularity of each human being.
296 Lazreg, Questioning the Veil, iv.
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Still, if taken seriously this familiar idea of “dépassement” can cut more than 
one way. Because the women in France who embrace the veil as a sign of a new 
Islamic modernity might respond to Lazreg: yes, exactly; why should we be 
bound by your mother’s interpretation of the veil? That was a new day for her, 
and today is a new day for us. (In the US, the first hijab­wearing woman was 
just hired to read the news on network TV. In a context of daily public attacks, 
some of them violent, against anyone who “looks Muslim,” surely this reads as 
a victory?) Once again, there are no recipes, and context is all.
So maybe if Beauvoir came back from the dead, what she’d have to say (to be 
perfectly consistent) would be, wait, what can you tell me about what is actu­
ally going on there now?
Chapter 6
Beauvoir in China
And what is happening in China? That is a question I would really like to 
be able to answer.
simone de beauvoir, Tout compte fait1
Rather than speculate any further about what Beauvoir “would have felt” or 
might have done, suppose we go back to what she did do, and did say. I want to 
conclude my investigation of things people find embarrassing about Simone 
de Beauvoir, things she said that “we wouldn’t say now,” by looking at La longue 
marche: essai sur la Chine (1957).2 As my own book’s long march draws to a 
close, I note that the corners of Beauvoir’s œuvre are increasingly well- 
explored, with unpublished writings finding their way into print and nearly 
everything available in English: even the prestigious Pléiade series has finally 
admitted her to the French literary canon by devoting two volumes to her 
work. But Beauvoir scholars still seem to shy away from her book about China, 
and it seems worth thinking about why.3
1 An Essay on China
La longue marche began as a report on a six-week trip Beauvoir and Sartre took 
in 1955, in response to Chou En-Lai’s invitation at the Bandung Conference of 
non-aligned nations, where the first premier of the People’s Republic had chal-
lenged the world to “come and see” what the Chinese revolution had achieved. 
Beauvoir and Sartre, along with many others on the European left, took him up 
1 “Et que se passe-t-il en Chine? Voilà une question à laquelle je voudrais bien pouvoir répon-
dre” (Tout compte fait [hereinafter tcf], 562, All Said and Done [hereinafter asd], 443).
2 The English version appeared the following year; the subtitle was not “an essay on China” but 
(in the US) “A Book on China” and in the UK “An Account of Modern China.” The translation, 
by Austryn Wainhouse (better-known for his unexpurgated translations of the Marquis de 
Sade), is otherwise faithful and I have used it below, with a few minor alterations.
3 One strong exception is a very good overview article by Sandrine Dauphin, “En terre d’Icarie: 
les voyages de Simone de Beauvoir et de Jean-Paul Sartre en Chine et à Cuba” (2004). William 
McBride, in “The Postwar World According to Beauvoir,” now does a good job of providing 
general historical context, drawing comparisons with L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 and with 
the present day, and a brief but helpful discussion can be found in Karen Vintges, “Surpassing 
Liberal Feminism.”
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on it: they were among some 1,500 foreign delegates to the festivities celebrat-
ing the anniversary of the revolution in October of that year. As Leiris, who also 
went, observed, this was a “voyage engagé”—a committed, engaged voyage: “To 
participate in this organized delegation was implicitly to declare oneself a 
sympathizer.”4
What kind of book is La longue marche? Beauvoir calls it an “essay on Chi-
na,” an “étude” or study, and it runs to five hundred pages, with chapters on 
“peasants,” “the family,” “industry,” “culture,” and “the defensive struggle,” as 
well as “the discovery of Peking,” “the first of October,” and “cities of China.” 
To pigeonhole it as “travel writing” does not really work, despite some familiar 
gestures of that genre. As Sandrine Dauphin writes: “To act as a witness did not 
simply mean to describe what they had seen. It was a question of explaining 
the context of China’s revolutions, and analyzing them.”5 Dauphin quotes from 
Beauvoir’s memoirs: “I have already written the story of my journey to China. 
It was not like my other trips. It was not just a wandering, not an adventure, 
not a journey made just for the experience, but a field study in which caprice 
played no part…. It is useless to try to describe this country: it demands to 
be explained.”6 Beauvoir does insist on the primacy of what she saw with her 
own eyes, and seems scrupulous to record exactly where she went, what she 
saw, and what she thought about it at the time. However, this is not by any 
means “China Day by Day.” In contrast to her book about the US, and to the 
way she describes her travels in her memoirs, the travelogue portions of La 
longue marche are severely de-personalized, almost as if to say, my sensibilities 
are not the point here. Also, she draws just as heavily on what Americans call 
“book learning.” Upon their return to France, Sartre contented himself with 
giving a few interviews and writing a brief journalistic piece,7 and Leiris’s im-
pressions found their way diagonally into La règle du jeu, his rigorous and id-
iosyncratic experiment in radical introspection. Beauvoir, however, embarked 
on a sustained project of interdisciplinary research, comparable to the library 
work that had prepared her to write The Second Sex, and that she’d later repeat 
4 “[P]articiper à cette tournée effectuée en délégation était implicitement se déclarer sym-
pathisant” (Michel Leiris, Fibrilles, 84). See also Alex Hughes, “The Seer (Un)seen: Michel 
Leiris’s China.”
5 “Témoigner ne signifiait pas seulement décrire ce qu’ils avaient vu. Il s’agissait d’expliquer le 
contexte de ses révolutions, de les analyser” (119).
6 “J’ai raconté mon voyage en Chine. Il ne ressembla pas aux autres. Ce ne fut ni un vagabon-
dage, ni une aventure, ni une expérience, mais une étude, menée sur place sans caprice …  [I]l 
est vain de prétendre décrire ce pays: il demande à être expliqué” (Dauphin 119, quoting La 
force des choses [hereinafter FCh], 2:78–9).
7 Sartre, “La Chine que j’ai vu.”
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when writing La vieillesse (Old Age). La longue marche bears constant traces of 
her reading in history, philosophy, sociology, economics, contemporary jour-
nalism, and both classic and contemporary Chinese literature, including fic-
tion and drama. La longue marche is also, from its opening pages, a polemic, 
a no-holds-barred response to French right-wing writers who had shown sus-
picion and hostility toward the Chinese revolution. As such it belongs with 
her other political writing—for example her 1954 essay “La pensée de droite 
aujourd’hui” (Right-Wing Thought Today)8—and her editorial work for Les 
Temps Modernes.
Beauvoir is honest about her initial confusion and the limits of officially 
managed tourism, and she was honest afterward that she thought La longue 
marche was not very good, that the task she had set herself was too hard. She is 
quite clear about the limits of what she was able to find out, quite aware that 
the sights she saw had been carefully prepared for her—as she says, her hosts 
told her as much. She did not like every single thing she saw, and she did not 
believe everything she was told: the book is definitely colored by optimism, but 
“it remains to see” what will happen. Still, La longue marche is very definitely a 
political intervention in a way that The Second Sex and Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté really were not. Despite the vicious red-baiting with which La 
longue marche was received, its primary commitment was not to communism 
as such, but to anti-colonialism and to the Third World movement which, at 
least initially, was trying to be beholden to neither bloc. She writes from the 
subject position of the European non-aligned, internationalist left, the posi-
tion associated with Richard Wright and Frantz Fanon that is sometimes now 
referred to as “Bandung humanism.”
Also, while there is a great deal about women in the book, I should say that 
this is not, or not mainly, a book about women: issues of gender equality, and 
the effects on women of the traditional Chinese family, arise within the con-
text of a broader story of cultural transformation. This is not something new 
for Beauvoir, as we have seen.
A review of the timeline may be in order here. La longue marche is situated 
well after The Second Sex, but well before Beauvoir’s sustained period of public 
feminist activism in the 1970s. It stands at the beginning of the period I dis-
cussed at the start of chapter 5, the time when her activism on behalf of the 
people of Algeria meant other issues had to take a back seat: in La force des 
choses, the section where she describes her trip to China and the section where 
she describes the process of writing about it are separated by some of her 
8 First published in Les Temps Modernes in 1954, “La pensée de droite aujourd’hui” was collect-
ed the following year in Privilèges. It is translated in Political Writings of Simone de Beauvoir.
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strongest pages about the crisis in the Maghreb, the massacres she compares to 
Nazi atrocities at Oradour, and the complicity with the oppressors on the part 
of almost all the French, including the French Communist party.9 When Beau-
voir went to China, she had not yet been to Cuba—she and Sartre would go 
there five years later. He had already been to the Soviet Union—she had not; 
but she had already written Les mandarins (1954), a novel which explores in 
great complexity the responsibilities of intellectuals and the ethical difficulties 
of speaking the critical truth about a regime one supports. The question of 
whether socialist fellow-travelers should speak openly against the labor camps 
in the Soviet Union had already been resolved in the affirmative, both in litera-
ture and in life.
The paucity of in-depth scholarship about La longue marche may seem sur-
prising given the book’s importance to Beauvoir herself. She noted in her auto-
biography that writing it gave her the perspective and the tools to see beyond 
the “developed” world: “In writing it I acquired schemata, keys, which helped 
me to understand other underdeveloped countries.”10
Comparing my civilization with another, very different one, I discovered 
the singularity of traits which had seemed common to me. Simple words, 
like peasant, field, village, town, family, did not have at all the same mean-
ing in Europe or in China … [T]his trip swept away my old reference 
points. Until now, in spite of my reading and a few casual glances at Mex-
ico and Africa, I had taken the prosperity of Europe and the United States 
as the norm; the Third World only existed vaguely on the horizon. The 
Chinese masses unbalanced the planet for me; the Far East, India, Africa, 
their famine [disette], became the truth of the world, and our western 
comfort a narrow privilege.11
9 For the trip, see FCh 2:78–9, FCirc 344–46. For the writing of the book, see FCh 2:94–6, 
FCirc 357–59.
10 “J’ai acquis en l’écrivant des schémas, des clés, qui m’ont servi à comprendre les autres 
pays sous-développés” (FCh 2:96, FCirc 359, translation altered).
11 “Personellement, je tirai de cette étude un grand profit. Confrontant ma civilisation avec 
une autre, fort différente, je découvris la singularité des traits qui m’avaient paru com-
muns; des mots simples, comme paysan, champ, village, ville, famille, n’avaient pas du 
tout le même sens en Europe ou en Chine; la vision de mon propre environnement s’en 
trouva rafraîchie…. D’une manière générale, ce voyage avait balayé mes anciens repères. 
Jusqu’alors, malgré mes lectures et quelques vues cavalières sur le Mexique et l’Afrique, 
c’était la prospérité de l’Europe et des usa que j’avais prise comme norme, le Tiers Monde 
n’existant que vaguement à l’horizon. La masse chinoise déséquilibra pour moi la planète; 
l’Extrême-Orient, les Indes, l’Afrique, leur disette, devinrent la vérité du monde, et notre 
confort occidental un étroit privilège” (FCh 2:96, FCirc 358–59, translation altered).
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She even wrote in 1963, in a retrospective assessment of The Second Sex, that 
if she were to write that book “today,” she’d take the more materialist approach 
she’d used in La longue marche, and would “ground the idea of Other not on an 
idealist, a priori struggle of consciousnesses, but on scarcity and need; I did 
that in La longue marche, when I spoke of the ancient subjection of Chinese 
women.”12 Nonetheless, La longue marche is the least widely read of Beauvoir’s 
texts today, and it is overhung by an aura of embarrassment, for two sorts of 
reasons.
One set of reasons has to do with the Cold War. When the book appeared, it 
was strongly attacked both in France and in the US. Beauvoir and other “fel-
low-travelers” were described as duped by the Communists, or accused of 
knowingly covering up for Mao’s failures and excesses, or both at once. Even 
today, her argument that the Chinese experiment was “passionnante” (thrill-
ing), and that Chairman Mao was succeeding in feeding the Chinese people, 
does not go down well in the West and especially in the US, where Mao is often 
thought of as simply a monster.13
The other embarrassment, of course, has to do with the fact that La longue 
marche fails to praise Chinese culture, Chinese “difference,” in the way Western 
multiculturalism, and especially multiculturalist feminism, would now seem 
to demand. There is indeed a great deal in La longue marche that “we wouldn’t 
say now,” and (unlike L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947) it may not repay a lot of 
close reading. But I do think that if we sweep it under the rug we’re missing an 
important puzzle piece, and a further chance to redress what I’ve seen as three 
major distortions of Beauvoir’s reception in the US: our tendency to reduce 
cultural and historical differences to “race” (seen almost entirely in terms of 
Black and white); our failure to see how fully she was a woman of the Left; and 
our reluctance to appreciate her interest in empirical inquiry, in facts, not 
merely as an illustration or adjunct to philosophy or theory, but facts in them-
selves, as an urgent way of knowing the world.
As you might expect, I’m planning to show that a simple dismissal of Beau-
voir’s long and detailed study as “orientalizing” is an unhelpful oversimplifica-
tion. But I do not intend by any means to argue that La longue marche is a 
12 “[J]e prendrais dans le premier volume une position plus matérialiste. Je fonderais la no-
tion d’autre et le manichéisme qu’elle entraîne non sur une lutte a priori et idéaliste des 
consciences, mais sur la rareté et le besoin: je l’ai fait dans La longue marche, quand j’ai 
parlé de l’antique asservissement des Chinoises” (FCh 1:267, FCirc 202, translation 
altered).
13 For a discussion of monolithic American views, see Some of Us: Chinese Women Growing 
Up in the Mao Era, edited by Yueping Zhong, Wang Zheng, and Bai Di, and see also Daniel 
Vukovich, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global 
Economy.”
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neglected masterpiece.14 The book is certainly wrong about many things, and 
was outdated almost before it appeared by the rush of events. Early in the book 
Beauvoir says, “One of the major objections that is likely to be leveled against 
this book is that it will be out of date (dépassé) tomorrow. That is very true.” 
She wasn’t wrong.15 Another reason it is not much read is that it is quite boring. 
It’s full of numbers, detailed objective descriptions of factories, villages, nurs-
eries, etc., accounts of the Five-Year Plan, a long discussion of the process of 
wood-block printing, and so on. Like many visitors to China, Beauvoir com-
plained about the long, factual lectures her group was given at every stopping 
point, but sometimes the style seems to have been contagious. And it’s boring 
on purpose; it deliberately disavows the “picturesque.”16 This is not travel writ-
ing, not about charm or “local color,” it’s about hunger, scarcity, the contrast 
between the past suffering of the Chinese people under semi-colonialism, and 
the efforts toward modernization by which the Chinese were, she thought, 
building a better society. Beauvoir makes it clear in her opening pages that she 
is not visiting “the mysterious East.” “J’étais indifférente à la Chine ancienne,” 
she says.
Ancient China did not interest me much. For me, China was this patient 
epic that starts in the dark days of La condition humaine and ends on the 
First of October, 1949, in an apotheosis on the Tien An Men; China, for me, 
was this stirring and reasonable revolution which had not only delivered 
peasants and workers from exploitation, but had rid an entire land of the 
foreigners.17
14 Early responses have showed me I need to be clear about this. If readers are looking to 
discover Beauvoir beyond her usual canon, I would suggest beginning instead with 
L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 or Les belles images.
15 “Un des reproches majeurs qu’on pourrait adresser à ce livre, c’est que demain il sera dé-
passé: je le sais; mais l’histoire qui se fait en Chine est assez passionnante pour que les 
différents moments méritent d’être enregistrés” (La longue marche 25, The Long March 
28). In 1963 she judged parts of it “déjà caducs,” already obsolete (FCh 2:96, FCirc 359, 
translation altered).
16 Jean Jamin’s introduction to Leiris’s Journal de Chine aptly describes something similar, 
Leiris’s deliberate suppression of “le rêve,” of imagination, in favor of meticulously em-
pirical “field notes” (11–13). Beauvoir’s own gradual disavowal of “the picturesque” is 
marked also in Les mandarins: Henri sets off for Portugal yearning for the warmth and 
beaches of the East; what he finds is famine, and Salazar, and desperation. (The story is 
autobiographical and Beauvoir tells it elsewhere in the first person.) Sartre’s introduction 
to Cartier-Bresson’s book of photographs, D’une Chine à l’autre, begins: “À l’origine du pit-
toresque il y a la guerre” (the picturesque has its origin in war) (7).
17 “J’étais indifférente à la Chine ancienne. La Chine, pour moi, c’était cette patiente épopée 
qui commence aux jours sombres de La condition humaine et s’achève en apothéose le 1er 
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“Old China did not interest me”—indeed, she does not disguise that she 
found Chinese painting incomprehensible and all pretty much the same, and 
Chinese public monuments for the most part very ugly. China for her was a site 
of struggle.
By 1955, the Cold War polarization Beauvoir described in L’Amérique au jour 
le jour 1947 had reached new levels, in France as well as the US. Nearly all West-
ern accounts of China in the 1950s were embedded in a high stakes Politics of 
Truth that bordered on hysteria.18 And since then, a vast literature has contin-
ued to pour withering scorn on several generations of Western travelers to 
China. Beauvoir comes in for a great deal of mockery, lumped in with such 
American writers as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Anna Louise Strong, and 
the New Zealander Rewi Alley, who was an important source of information 
for her both in person (during her visit) and through his books. When The Long 
March appeared in English, one G.F. Hudson, writing for Encounter, began his 
review: “To-day the passionate pilgrims in search of the new Jerusalem go not 
to Moscow, but to Peking.”19 The whole piece is so nasty, and so scornful of 
Beauvoir for having dared to write about China in the first place, that I cannot 
stop myself from reminding you that Encounter was funded by the cia.20 (So 
much, once again, for my own attempt to get beyond Cold War politics.) Or see 
a very long very angry and dismissive response by the French comparative lit-
erature scholar René Étiemble: “Based on ignorance and arrogance, stuffed 
with as many errors as zealous lies, La longue marche is worthless….”21 Étiem-
ble’s bad faith is evident in the way he quotes her selectively and out of con-
text, his defensive display of his own pedantry through quoting of obscure 
texts and authors, his rhetorical flourishes, and his nit-picking complaints 
octobre 1949 sur la terrasse T’ien an Men; c’était cette révolution passionnée et raisonna-
ble qui avait non seulement délivré de l’exploitation paysans et ouvriers, mais libéré de 
l’étranger toute la Chine” (La longue marche 8, The Long March 10). The reference is to 
André Malraux’s 1933 novel whose title, meaning “the human condition,” is often mis-
translated as Man’s Fate; it deals in a highly fictionalized manner with an unsuccessful 
1927 uprising in Shanghai. (See tcf 212–16, asd 170–73, for Beauvoir’s revised assessment 
of Malraux, who eventually became quite right-wing, as a dishonest “mythomaniac.”)
18 Ian Birchall’s Sartre Against Stalinism makes clear how extraordinarily difficult the French 
Communist Party made it to be an independent left intellectual; this was even truer in the 
US. To take only the examples personally closest to Beauvoir, the State Department re-
fused her lover Nelson Algren a passport to come to France; their harassment of Richard 
Wright and other African-American expatriates is well known.
19 G.F. Hudson, “Mme. de Beauvoir in China,” 64.
20 See David Caute, The Fellow-Travelers: Intellectual Friends of Communism, 323–34.
21 René Étiemble, “Simone de Beauvoir, the Concrete Mandarin,” 75.
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about her writing style.22 It is hard to understand why Elaine Marks chose to 
include this piece, along with Mary McCarthy’s diatribe against L’Amérique au 
jour le jour 1947, in a 1987 collection presumably intended to increase the inter-
est and attention paid to Beauvoir’s work by American scholars.23
But it is not hard to understand why Étiemble was literally incoherent with 
rage: La longue marche attacks him by name, along with David Rousset, Robert 
Guillain (author of a 1956 polemic against Maoism called The Blue Ants),24 and 
others from the French Right. And Beauvoir doesn’t pull any punches. Her 
quarrel with the Right seems to be unfolding in real time (for instance, she re-
sponds to nasty comments French newspapers were making about their trip)25 
and her rhetorical style, almost from the get-go, makes clear she’s in this up to 
her neck. In a section called “La lutte défensive” (The Defensive Effort), she 
answers right-wing French attacks on the detention of subversives in China by 
pointing out that such things go on in France as well, reminding her readers of 
the Henri Martin affair, and of the recent detention of Claude Bourdet and 
other journalists who spoke out against the war on Algeria for “demoralization 
of the nation.”26 (The comparison of Chinese repression to the behavior of the 
French state seems less incongruous when we remember that at the moment 
she was writing Algerians and French citizens were being brutally tortured, 
both in Algeria and on French soil.) She also answers critics who complain that 
22 Étiemble especially dislikes her frequent use of the word “concrete,” which Beauvoir does 
use rather insistently, to mark that she is evaluating material gains, not ideological 
arguments.
23 Elaine Marks, ed., Critical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir.
24 The book’s French title was Six cent millions de Chinois, but “les fourmis bleues” became a 
catchphrase.
25 La longue marche 350, The Long March, 360–61.
26 La longue marche 366, The Long March 378–79. Henri Martin, a French soldier posted to 
Indochina, was jailed for protesting French attacks on the Viet Minh. Claude Bourdet was 
a hero of the Résistance who worked with Camus on Combat. His New York Times obituary 
explains the story: “On a spring dawn in 1956, when Mr. Bourdet was editor of L’Observateur, 
he was arrested at his home, handcuffed and hauled off to be strip-searched at Fresnes 
Prison, where the Gestapo had taken him upon his arrest in 1944. The 1956 seizure fol-
lowed a series of articles in which Mr. Bourdet attacked the French campaign to destroy 
the guerrillas battling for Algerian independence and condemned plans to call up 100,000 
military reservists.”
“‘One hundred thousand young Frenchmen are threatened with being thrown into the 
“dirty war” of Algeria, with losing the best years of their lives, perhaps with being wound-
ed, indeed killed, for a cause that few among them approve, in a kind of combat that re-
volts most of them,’ he wrote.”
“At sundown Mr. Bourdet was released, and in his first post-prison editorial, he observed: ‘When 
somebody rings your bell at 6 A.M. and it is the milkman, you are in a democracy’” (Law-
rence Van Gelder, “Claude Bourdet”).
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children in China are “indoctrinated” with the reminder that children are in-
doctrinated everywhere:
Mme. Rais claimed in Paris-Presse in December 1955 that all children are 
forced to enroll in the Pioneers, by concerted pressure. Mme. Berliouz 
shares with us that seeing Pioneers walking in the park brought disquiet-
ing images of Nazi youth groups into her mind. These are pure fanta-
sies…. One must have decided in advance that New China is headed by a 
totalitarian regime to be reminded of the Hitler Youth by seeing Pioneers 
running up Coal Hill or playing ring-around-a-rosy in the middle of Pei 
Hai Park. As for the “indoctrination” of the children, they are, certainly, 
taught to love their country, to want to serve it, to respect the current 
ethic, and they are educated in the ideology that corresponds to the re-
gime under which they live; and is it not the same in every other country? 
If Chinese educators are more convincing than their American col-
leagues, this, it would seem to me, ought rather to be set down to their 
credit than seen as a liability.27
Her Chinese guides take her to see a prison, which she compares favorably to 
the “model prison” she toured in the US.28 And she responds to the outrage of 
French anticommunists at the idea of Chinese citizens being exhorted to put 
their country ahead of their family by reminding them that this is also consid-
ered an ideal in France, where right-wingers “admire … those parents who with 
buttoned lip and uptilted chin smilingly see their sons risk their lives in Indo-
China, in Algeria” and where “[t]he entire Right praised the conduct of the 
27 “Mme. F. Rais affirmait en décembre 1955 dans Paris-Presse qu’une pression concertée 
contraint tous les enfants à s’inscrire comme pionniers. Mme. Berlioux nous confie qu’en 
voyant des pionniers se promener dans les parcs, elle a songé avec inquiétude aux forma-
tions de jeunesse nazies. Ce sont de purs rêveries …. Il faut avoir d’avance décidé que le 
régime de la Chine nouvelle est un totalitarisme pour évoquer les jeunesses hitlériennes 
en voyant des pionniers danser des rondes au milieu du parc Pei Haï, ou escalader en 
courant la colline de charbon.
Quant à ‘l’endoctrinement’ des enfants, certes on leur apprend à aimer leur pays, à vouloir le 
servir, à respecter la morale en vigueur, et on leur enseigne l’idéologie cor respondant au 
régime dans lequel ils vivent: n’est-ce pas ce qu’on fait partout? Si les éducateurs chinois 
sont plus convaincants que leurs collègues américains il me semble que le fait doit plutôt 
être porté à leur crédit qu’inscrit à leur passif” (La longue marche 154–55, The Long March 
159. Translation modified.).
28 La longue marche 372–73, The Long March 384–85. Readers of L’Amérique au jour le jour 
1947 will recall that on that occasion she was shown, and appalled by, the electric chair.
473Beauvoir in China
Francoist general who let his son be shot rather than surrender the Alcazar.”29 
The battle lines are very clearly drawn, and Beauvoir’s ire at these (now forgot-
ten) writers echoes the denunciations of French bourgeois hypocrisy we’ve 
seen in her work as early as Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté.
Still, some of what Étiemble says is not wrong. In hindsight one can only 
blush to read that “the power [Mao] exercises is no more dictatorial than that 
of, for example, Roosevelt.”30 Beauvoir took at face value the claims that there 
were no political prisoners and no police state, that all was going well in Tibet, 
that trials were conducted fairly, that unlike in Stalinist Russia “no citizen in 
China is bothered on account of his opinions.”31 On this last point David Caute 
observed in 1988, “out of such declarations are the tablets of folly compiled.”32 
As I said, I am not arguing that this is a good book. But it has been caught 
within, and distorted by, two different “grand narratives” about the twentieth 
century in ways that mask what was and is valuable about it. The story of Beau-
voir’s trip is the story of an honest failure, and a more interesting failure than 
an Étiemble, or a Markowitz, can let themselves see.
The fact is, events overtook La longue marche even as she was writing it. Her 
visit to China occurred before the most disastrous agricultural reforms, and 
even a critic as malevolent as G.F. Hudson admits that
[i]n one respect Madame de Beauvoir is deserving of sympathy; her so-
journ in China was in 1955–56, when the trend was toward a relaxation of 
the regime, and much of what she has written in defense of it (especially 
about the position of the Chinese intellectuals under Communism) has 
already been refuted by the intensified repression since the end of the 
“Hundred Flowers” experiment in the middle of 1957.
29 “En France on a toujours tenu pour hautement morale la subordination des sentiments 
familiaux à de nobles entreprises, et tout spécialement à la guerre. On admire que des 
parents acceptent avec le sourire de voir leurs fils risquer leur peau en Indochine, en Al-
gérie…. [Note] Toute la droite a exalté la conduite du général franquiste qui laissa fusiller 
son fils plutôt que de rendre l’Alcazar” (La longue marche 156, The Long March 160–61).
30 “[L]e pouvoir qu’il exerce n’est pas plus dictatorial que celui qu’a détenu par exemple un 
Roosevelt” (La Longue marche 414, The Long March 427). To be fair, she was probably 
thinking of the control of American economic and cultural life Roosevelt and the US cen-
tral government did, in fact, take on during the Second World War, that is, under emer-
gency conditions.
31 “Aucun citoyen en Chine n’est inquiété pour ses ‘opinions’” (La longue marche 366, The 
Long March 378).
32 Caute, The Fellow-Travelers, 347. See also Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of West-
ern Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, and Simon Leys, Essais sur la Chine.
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But he continues:
However, although she pays lip service to the proposition that “China 
must become more liberal,” there is little ground in this book for suppos-
ing that Madame de Beauvoir would be upset by any degree of coercion 
which appeared to be required for the maintenance of Communist rule 
in China.33
And that point is not right: as Sandrine Dauphin points out, when the time 
came, Beauvoir would be quite critical, as she and Sartre were of Castro once 
the “honeymoon of the revolution” there was over.34 In 1971, as part of a round-
up of the world political situation, and directly following the explanation I 
quoted above for how and why Fanon’s hopes for Algeria had been disappoint-
ed, she’d write,
And what is happening in China? That is a question I really should like to 
be able to answer. I went there in 1955 and when I came back I wrote a 
book about it. Since then I have learnt all I could about the period of “the 
hundred flowers,” the great leap forward, and the experiment of the com-
munes. Whereas the ussr advanced a model of a wealthy socialism and 
preached patience to the under-developed countries, China put forward 
a model of a poor socialism and encouraged the oppressed nations to vio-
lent action; and our sympathies went to China…. But when the Cultural 
33 Hudson, “Mme. de Beauvoir in China,” 66.
34 Beauvoir’s honest documentation of shifts in her thinking, consonant with the general 
principle that one’s political views can (and ethically should) change as situations devel-
op and as one learns more, was described at the Diverse Lineages of Existentialism con-
ference by Ofelia Schutte (for the case of Cuba) and by Robert Bernasconi (with respect 
to the US). Dauphin writes: “Nevertheless, when the moment came, Beauvoir and Sartre 
would criticize Castro and Mao…. To be sure, when the maoist editors of the French jour-
nal La Cause du Peuple were arrested in 1970, Jean-Paul Sartre assumed the role of respon-
sible editor. But what led to his support was freedom of the press and sympathy for the 
younger generation, more than genuine support for maoist thinking.” [D’ailleurs Beauvoir 
et Sartre sauront critiquer le moment venu Mao et Castro …. Lorsque nombre 
d’intellectuels se proclameront maoïstes, ils préserveront une certaine distance. Certes, 
lorsque les directeurs maoïstes de la revue La Cause du Peuple sont arrêtés en 1970, Jean-
Paul Sartre assumera la direction de la revue. Mais ce qui le conduira à ce soutien, c’est 
davantage la liberté de la presse et sa sympathie envers les jeunes qu’un réel soutien à la 
pensée maoïste (Dauphin, “En terre d’Icarie,” 120).]
See also Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revo-
lution, and the Legacy of the 1960s.
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Revolution broke out, no one could give us a convincing explanation of 
the reality that underlay the words.35
At that stage she feels unable to fully credit either the frightening and contra-
dictory stories appearing in the rightist press, or the propaganda emanating 
from the Chinese regime, or the conjectures from outside “China experts.”36 
Two friends, Kateb Yacine and Alejo Carpentier (“le grand écrivain cubain”) 
bring back disquieting eyewitness reports that images of Mao are everywhere 
and obligatory, that his Little Red Book seems to be the only book for sale, that 
loudspeakers are broadcasting its words and taxi-drivers and air hostesses re-
peating them mechanically, over and over…. Carpentier tells of seeing an “ex-
emplary worker,” a gatherer of dung, brought to the University to lecture to the 
professors.37 A formal visit by Beauvoir and Sartre to the Chinese embassy in 
Paris leaves her “none the wiser.”38 By 1970 she feels better informed, and able 
to account for what she has heard: for instance, the dung-gatherer’s lecture to 
the professors can be understood as “part of a great campaign to re-establish 
manual labor in the public esteem and to do away with the excessive prestige 
of intellectual work.” Mao’s idea of “continuous revolution” to prevent the 
hardening of bureaucracy makes sense to her.39 But she disclaims any “blind 
confidence” and retains her right to judge, for instance with respect to the Little 
Red Book’s “depressingly platitudinous elementary truths,”40 and the “dogmatic 
naïvety” of publications directed at the West.
When I am told that the workers have a right to three weeks of holiday 
but that they give them up because of their socialist enthusiasm, what 
stays in my mind is the fact that they do not take holidays: enthusiasm 
35 “Et que se passe-t-il en Chine? Voilà une question à laquelle je voudrais bien pouvoir 
répondre. J’y ai voyagé en 1955 et à mon retour, je lui ai consacré un livre. Par la suite, je me 
suis renseignée le mieux possible sur la ‘période des cent fleurs,’ le grand bond en avant, 
l’expérience des communes. Tandis que l’URSS proposait un modèle de socialisme riche 
et prêchait la patience aux pays sous-développés, la Chine proposait un modèle de socia-
lisme pauvre et encourageait les peuples opprimés à des actions violentes: c’est à elle 
qu’allaient nos sympathies. J’ai dit qu’à Helsinki, Sartre avait soutenu ses vues. Mais 
lorsque a éclaté la révolution culturelle, personne n’a pu nous expliquer de façon convain-
cante quelle réalité recouvraient ces mots” (tcf 562–63, asd 443).
36 tcf 563, asd 443–44.
37 tcf 563–65, asd 444–45.
38 tcf 565–66, asd 445–46.
39 “On le comprend à présent: cet épisode faisait partie d’une vaste campagne pour réhabili-
ter le travail manuel et refuser de surestimer le travail intellectuel” (tcf 564, asd 445n).
40 “[V]érités premières d’une décourageante platitude” (tcf 565, asd 445).
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cannot be institutionalized…. Saying that China is a paradise is all the 
more absurd since the revolution has not yet been carried through, as 
Mao himself admits. But there is no need to make a myth of China in or-
der to feel great sympathy for the country.41
As times change, one does the best one can to continue informing oneself, 
which may lead to a change in view. But is this really a reversal? She had al-
ready said, in the conclusion to La longue marche, “It is an error to judge China 
as though things were stopped.”
I have understood that, more so in China than anywhere else, there is one 
mistake you have to avoid: judging things as though they were final, fixed 
as such. In this country which is ceaselessly on the move, the present 
derives its meaning from the past it is leaving behind [qu’il dépasse], 
from the future it is ushering in.
To denigrate the regime because the standard of living there is still low 
or because capitalism yet subsists is to be unmindful of China’s situation: 
you need a place to stand if you are going to move the world, to transform 
China you must use the past as fulcrum and lever. But what aggravates 
me most is this shiny ready-made benevolence which permits certain 
travelers to extol as absolute those achievements which only make sense 
as stepping stones to something else. It is not true that a Chinese village 
is more comfortable and richer than a village in France; what is extraor-
dinary about it is the progress it represents over the villages of the past. It 
is likewise untrue that the Chinese woman is generally the most emanci-
pated in the world. It is naïve to be overawed by the fact that the Arch-
bishop of Peking openly approves of the regime; if he didn’t he’d lose his 
41 “Empêcher une nouvelle classe privilégiée de se former, donner aux masses un authen-
tique pouvoir, faire de tout individu un homme complet: je ne peux que me rallier à un tel 
programme. Cependant, je ne saurais accorder à la Chine cette confiance aveugle que 
jadis l’URSS a suscité dans tant de cœurs. La propagande des revues qu’elle destine à 
l’Occident me consterne par sa naïveté dogmatique. Si on me dit que les ouvriers ont droit 
à trois semaines de congé mais qu’ils en font sacrifice par enthousiasme socialiste, ce que 
je retiens c’est qu’ils ne prennent pas de congé: l’enthousiasme ne s’institutionnalise pas. 
Prétendre voir dans la Chine un paradis est d’autant plus absurde que, de l’aveu même de 
Mao, la révolution n’y est pas achevée. Mais il n’est pas besoin d’en faire un mythe pour se 
tourner vers elle avec sympathie” (tcf 568, asd 447–48). Her comment that one need not 
make a “myth” of China dovetails with Wolin’s less sympathetic account of what “les 
maos” were up to; unlike Beauvoir herself, they made no distinction between Mao’s origi-
nal revolution, and the upheavals of the late 1960s and early 1970s, or indeed between “les 
mythes et les faits.” But we should bear in mind too Beauvoir’s awareness that myths were 
no less powerful because of not being true.
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miter tomorrow. This rapturous enthusiasm offends me not only through 
the errors it leads to but because China deserves to be seen for what it is: 
you will sell its efforts short if you do not recognize the difficulties they 
involve. I very much fear that these perfervid bearers of good tidings with 
their travel diaries all but written up in advance will have trouble con-
vincing the folks back home. It is a pity. This moment in Chinese history 
is stirring precisely because of the as yet incomplete character of the vic-
tories it has won, because of the immensity of the obstacles it has still to 
subdue and the toughness of the struggle it is engaged in.42
This is one of the few passages Étiemble cites with approval, while regretting 
that Beauvoir did not follow through on its insight. But as I said many pages 
ago about Spelman and Deutscher, which of these utterances gets to stand as 
“Beauvoir”? One may pick and choose in good faith, or otherwise. Overall, 
Beauvoir’s relationship to China was and remained a dynamic engagement 
with a changing society, a materially-based engagement with China which 
changed in response to historical changes initiated there.
2 Reality-Testing and Cold War Frames
When I first started working through La longue marche, my idea was to find out 
“what really happened” and compare what Beauvoir said with “what we now 
know.” I was looking for an objective set of benchmarks: what could she 
42 “J’ai compris qu’en Chine, plus que partout, il y a une erreur à éviter: c’est de juger les 
choses comme si elles étaient arrêtées. Dans ce pays qui ne cesse de bouger, le présent tire 
son sens du passé qu’il dépasse, de l’avenir qu’il annonce. Dénigrer le régime sous prétexte 
que le niveau de vie y est encore bas, ou parce que le capitalisme y subsiste, c’est mécon-
naître sa situation: on ne peut transformer la Chine qu’à partir de ce qu’elle était. Mais je 
suis surtout agacée par cette bienveillance a priori qui amène certains voyageurs à ad-
mirer dans l’absolu des réalisations qui n’ont de sens que prises dans leur devenir. Il est 
faux qu’un village chinois soit plus confortable et plus riche qu’un village français: ce qui 
est remarquable, c’est le progrès qu’il constitue par rapport à ceux d’autrefois. Il est faux 
que la femme chinoise soit en général la plus émancipée du monde. Il est naïf de 
s’émerveiller parce que l’archevêque de Pékin approuve ouvertement le régime: s’il s’y op-
posait, il ne serait plus archevêque. Cet enthousiasme me choque non seulement par les 
erreurs qu’il entraîne, mais parce que la Chine mérite d’être reconnue dans sa vérité; c’est 
mésestimer ses efforts que de ne pas en voir les difficultés. Je redoute que la propagande 
de ces zélateurs ne se retourne contre eux: il sera trop clair que leur siège était fait 
d’avance. C’est dommage. Ce moment de l’histoire chinoise est émouvant justement par 
le caractère encore inachevé des victoires remportées, par la grandeur des obstacles à 
vaincre et la dureté de la lutte entreprise” (La longue marche 405–6, The Long March 419, 
translation modified, emphasis in original).
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plausibly have seen or known, how might we read her book apart from the 
Cold War context of its writing and reception. I was unprepared for the contin-
ued absence of scholarly consensus about this period of Chinese history, the 
enduring reach of incompatible frames with roots in diverging political com-
mitments, some dating from the Cold War itself and other from the 1960s. Even 
basic facts, such as how many people perished during which eras, and how 
much can be blamed on famine or flood versus how much can be attributed to 
Communism, continue to be bitterly disputed among scholars. I must leave 
such matters to be debated by others. What I can say, though, is that the writ-
ten authorities Beauvoir turned to after her return, to fill out the gaps in her 
information, appear still to be reputable authorities today; her research strat-
egy seems to have been a sound one. For instance, in her discussion of the 
peasants, she relies heavily on a 1925 book called Country Life in China by an 
American researcher named Daniel Harrison Kulp, who arrived in the 1920s on 
the coast of southern China, where he conducted anthropological and socio-
logical fieldwork. I found a 2005 article by one Zhou Daming who wrote his 
dissertation by going back to the same village, and basically concluded that 
Kulp’s conclusions were sound and can still stand, since he observed cultural 
continuities that had been interrupted from 1949 to the 1970s. Zhou describes 
Kulp’s concept of “familialism” as an influential, and still correct, foundation 
concept.
As in The Second Sex, Beauvoir draws on fictional works, such as Ding Ling’s 
Le soleil brille sur la rivière Sang kan and especially Ba Jin’s The Family, to flesh 
out her understanding of how living in China felt from the inside to those most 
directly involved. She also gives a lot of credence to the work of Pearl S. Buck: I 
was brought up to sniff at Buck as a sort of Book-of the-Month Club middle-
brow, but well-respected China scholar Charles W. Hayford, writing in 1998, 
regards her as a good, unbiased source of information.43 Some of the most 
compelling sections of La longue marche describe urban poverty and exploita-
tion, particularly in Shanghai, in the years before the Revolution: this she did 
not see, but it was described to her vividly by Rewi Alley and others, and she 
corroborated what they told her by reading in sources that appear to still be 
valued by both Chinese and non-Chinese writers. The question of whether the 
average person was actually better off after the revolution, or not, does not ap-
pear to be one I can settle. However, what I can say is that this was the main, if 
43 Daniel Harrison Kulp, Country Life in South China: The Sociology of Familialism; Zhou 
Daming, “Follow-up Investigations in Phoenix Village”; Charles Hayford, “What’s So Bad 
About The Good Earth?” See also Xiaorong Han, Chinese Discourses on the Peasant, 
1900–1949.
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not the only, question, in which Beauvoir was interested; it appeared to weigh 
more heavily for her and her companions than questions which affected intel-
lectuals more directly and narrowly, such as the future direction of literature 
and the arts.
I must say I did not expect the extraordinary vindictiveness with which 
some commentators continue to settle scores from the Cold War. I had high 
hopes when I saw that Anne-Marie Brady’s Making the Foreign Serve China: 
Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic, from 2003, included a discussion 
of Beauvoir. Brady made use of newly opened archives to trace the historical 
development of waishi, short for waijiao shiwu (diplomatic matters)—for in-
stance the training received by the cadres and interpreters, and ordinary citi-
zens who were instructed to smile at visitors. But Brady’s book is absolutely 
cynical, and in viewing all attempts at cross-cultural “friendship” as Machiavel-
lian manipulations she badly overstates her case. The sections on Beauvoir are 
a terrible misrepresentation: relying on the notoriously inaccurate biography 
by Deirdre Bair, Brady claims that Beauvoir was deliberately lying, painting a 
rosy picture of her China trip in La longue marche while sending the “truth”—
that she found China “drab and boring,” for instance—in letters to her Ameri-
can lover, Nelson Algren. In fact the phrase “drab and boring” appears nowhere 
in the (readily available) letters; most of what Beauvoir wrote to Algren about 
China is quite positive, and tracks accurately with what La longue marche has 
to say about the difficulties of “official tourism” and the reasons why she was 
nonetheless enthusiastic about the hope Mao was bringing to his people.44
Brady is especially nasty about Beauvoir’s relationship with one of her inter-
preters, the writer Chen Xuezhao, who is referred to in La longue marche as 
“Madame Cheng.” Brady quotes Beauvoir’s own enthusiastic description:
Never a word of nonsense or propaganda from her lips; she is so firmly 
convinced of the benefits conferred by the regime and its necessity that 
she has no need to tell fibs to herself or anyone else; independent, spon-
taneous, fond of laughing and fonder yet of talking, she knows nothing of 
self-censorship: witty, tranquil, her frankness in great measure made up 
for the inflexibility of most of the cadres I had dealings with.45
But, Brady claims, this account is falsified by Chen’s own memoirs:
44 A Transatlantic Love Affair: Letters to Nelson Algren, 517–18.
45 Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s 
Republic, 95.
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What De Beauvoir described as Chen’s “frankness” and “spontaneity” was 
officially sanctioned by “the leadership,” who allowed her to speak direct-
ly to the philosophers, rather than through the interpreter who accompa-
nied them at all times. As planned, this resulted in the pair finding her 
more “believable” than others they spoke to.46
However, one volume of Chen’s memoirs has been published in English under 
the title Surviving the Storm, and so I have been able to read it myself. I came 
away with a very different impression. It is true that Chen’s encounter with 
Beauvoir was much less important to Chen than it was to Beauvoir. But it seems 
unlikely that Chen’s sentiments of support for Mao were forced or feigned, 
since she was still saying much the same thing when she wrote the memoir in 
1979, by which time she had suffered terribly, first in the anti-Rightist cam-
paign, and then during the Cultural Revolution. Chen continues to talk, as she 
did to Beauvoir, about wanting to correct her faults as a bourgeois writer, to be 
more oriented to the people.47 (I gather something similar is true of Ding 
Ling.)48
Like so much of this anti-Communist literature, with its talk of “brainwash-
ing,” Brady’s work appears to subscribe to an extremely over-simplified picture 
of human subjectivity, as though people had a two-way switch in their heads 
labelled either “sincere” versus “fake,” “society” versus “self.”49 It is undoubtedly 
46 Ibid., 95.
47 Surviving the Storm was written during the period of so-called “scar literature,” when frank 
and critical accounts of the Mao period appeared as part of a reckoning with the upheav-
als of the Cultural Revolution. Despite her suffering (she was barred from Party member-
ship, forbidden to publish, assigned to menial tasks, abused verbally and physically), 
Chen seems never to have rethought her strong desire to “go to the countryside,” her insis-
tence on working directly with rural peasants rather than urban intellectuals; quite late in 
the book she observes rather acidly that if she had wanted wealth and fame she would 
never have gone to Yan’an (loc. 2126— she joined Mao there in 1940, and was among his 
earliest supporters). About the encounter with Beauvoir and Sartre, she says, “an inter-
preter accompanied us, but the leadership said I could speak to them directly.” Chen 
Xuezhao, Surviving the Storm: A Memoir, loc. 945.
48 As described by Tani Barlow in her introduction to the selected writing of Ding Ling, I 
Myself Am a Woman, and in chapter 5 of The Question of Women in Chinese Feminism.
49 Even Simon Leys’s debunking essays have uneasy moments where it is clear that some of 
the official spokespeople might actually have been as enthusiastic as they presented 
themselves as being. How would we know? Did they even know? See also Zhong et al., 
Some of Us, and Orville Schell, Watch Out for the Foreign Guests! China Encounters the 
West. Saba Mahmood’s discussion of the complexities of developing subjectivities might 
be apposite here. A similar issue about subjectivity is the theme of Beauvoir’s own late 
novel, Les belles images, set in Paris: Laurence, an advertising copywriter, wrestles with 
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true that there were many things Chen did not feel able or free to say to Beau-
voir. But we should not be too hasty to assume that we know what they would 
have been, or to see the choices the Chinese woman would have made about 
this as externally imposed. That would be a very poor model indeed for inter-
cultural feminism.
What emerges from my own reading of Surviving the Storm is a highly sym-
pathetic figure, and exactly the right person to have introduced Beauvoir to 
China. For one thing, her French was excellent—she had lived in France from 
1927–35, during which time she studied with Marcel Granet.50 But beyond this, 
there are striking parallels between the two women’s lives that must indeed 
have made for conversation. Almost exact contemporaries, both were intellec-
tual prodigies who felt stifled in traditional families; their early lives were 
marked by romantic rebellion and non-conformity, by the fear of turning into 
one’s mother and the determination to earn one’s own living. One big differ-
ence between them was that Chen found feminism, as an explicit set of ideas, 
at an early age, as a member of the New Culture movement.51 Beauvoir had to 
wait a lot longer. In China, feminism and modernity were inextricably linked in 
the eyes of even the most prominent male modernists, whereas in 1920s France 
and England the response of high male modernism to the “woman question” 
had been at best ambivalent, and sometimes openly hostile.52 Beauvoir is also 
not wrong to see that Chen had explored and was exploring some of the same 
desires, temptations, fears, moral issues that she and Sartre were confronting 
after the Second World War: a retrospective disgust with one’s earlier individu-
alist position, an understanding that one’s earlier “rebellions” had been under-
written by class privilege, and a determined commitment to write differently 
in future. Chen is in no way exoticized or patronized as an “informant”; Beau-
voir treats her, and the other French-speaking Chinese intellectuals she meets, 
in the way she treated Richard Wright and Nelson Algren on her first trip to 
the difficulty of separating her own voice from consumer culture’s incessant incitements 
to desire, even in the confines of her own private mind.
50 This is the same Marcel Granet quoted in the introduction to The Second Sex.
51 In the 1920s and 1930s she became a valued colleague and friend of well-known writers Lu 
Xun, Mao Dun, and Qiu Qiubai; her prose poems and personal essays were popular with 
young readers who were seeking vernacular alternatives to traditional Chinese culture. In 
1923 one of her first pieces, “The New Woman I Hope to Be,” won second prize in an essay 
contest sponsored by the Shanghai Shibao. According to Jeffrey Kinkley, it “argued for 
equality between the sexes, insisting that Chinese women, like [Ibsen’s] Nora, must be 
able to stand on their own two feet economically rather than depend on men” (loc. 134).
52 One might remember for instance, the surrealists’ mingled fascination and horror at the 
female body, or what happened to the feminist little magazine The New Freewoman when 
Ezra Pound took it over and renamed it The Egoist.
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America. Again this seems to have been less a “working on” than a “working 
with.”
I want to point to two particular moments of contact between them in La 
longue marche which strike me as, for lack of a better term, authentic. Chen 
explains that even though the marriage law of 1950 and the opportunity for 
women to earn their own living have liberated women in theory, many women 
continue to pursue marriage as their primary aim: “‘They have always been 
viewed as merchandise,’ Mme. Cheng said to me. ‘Well, today they’re viewing 
themselves as merchandise.’”53 A bit later, the two women are at the opera: “On 
the stage a young heroine was desperately struggling in an emperor’s lewd em-
brace. ‘That’s why Chinese women wanted the Revolution,’ Mme. Cheng said 
ardently, ‘in order to have the right to say no to that kind of thing.”’54 Now, 
Beauvoir’s denunciation of arranged marriage in La longue marche is uncom-
promising. Before we sneer at this as an example of Western bias, we could re-
member the many pages she devotes in The Second Sex to denouncing arranged 
marriage in France.55 In La longue marche, while explaining why Mao’s new 
family code of 1950—which did away with child marriage, infanticide, and 
concubinage, required the formal consent of both partners to any marriage, 
made divorce available to women as well as men and allowed widows to 
 remarry—in practice had a hard time gaining acceptance, she explains that as 
a general rule the pace of cultural change is slower than written law can enforce: 
“Even in France common custom is, on this point, less enlightened than the law; 
matches are still arranged and some marriages are pure business deals.”56
53 “‘On les a toujours traitées comme des marchandises,’ me dit Mme. Cheng, ‘alors, mainte-
nant, elles se traitent elles-mêmes comme une marchandise’” (La longue marche 144, The 
Long March 149).
54 “J’ai été frappée par une réaction de Mme. Cheng, assistant à côté de moi à un opéra où se 
déroulait une scène de viol; la jeune héroïne se défendait éperdument contre les entre-
prises d’un empereur lubrique. ‘Voilà pourquoi les femmes chinoises ont voulu la révolu-
tion,’ me dit-elle avec feu: ‘pour avoir le droit de ne pas aimer’” (La longue marche 149, The 
Long March 154). The translator omits “une scène de viol,” a rape scene.
55 We could also remember that she herself was the product of an arranged marriage, and 
saw some of its sadder results in the life of her mother. Indeed, in Mémoires d’une jeune 
fille rangée she attributes Zaza’s death to the intolerable psychological pressures of the 
bourgeois marriage system, pressures she herself escaped only because her father’s finan-
cial ruin left him unable to offer a dowry.
56 “Même en France, les mœurs sont sur ce point à la remorque du code; il existe encore des 
unions arrangées et certaines sont de véritables marchés” (La longue marche 139, The 
Long March 144). Lisa Greenwald’s recent chronicle of feminist activism in France re-
minds me that “‘familialism,’ an obsessive focus on the family as the backbone of society 
and the countervailing force to the general loss of morals and depopulation, was the offi-
cial doctrine of Vichy,” and an important target of French feminist activism in the years 
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3 Orientalisms, Anti-orientalisms, Alternatives
To turn back to the dismissive footnote in The Second Sex that has so exercised 
Markowitz and others: the Chinese history that The Second Sex omits is given 
very fully in La longue marche, and in a very similar manner to the history 
chapters of that earlier work.57 Attention is paid, not just to oppression, but to 
expressions of resistance—literary texts of all periods are mined for examples 
of both—and Beauvoir also carefully details such matters as changes to the 
family code and inheritance laws. However, I suspect her discussion of “famil-
ialism” and “feudalism” would still not satisfy Markowitz. The case of Chinese 
women provides Beauvoir with an even stronger illustration of her argument 
in The Second Sex that the history of women is inexorably linked to develop-
ments in the history of private property.58 The story she tells is indeed an evo-
lutionary story; however, it is a story of economic development (and social de-
velopments that follow from economic causes); it has nothing to do with race. 
This is not Darwin or Spencer, or even really Hegel; it is still, for better or for 
worse, Engels.59 The same syncretic or synoptic cross-cultural gaze we saw in 
her earlier work is applied here, but from the other way around. And the con-
clusion she draws from her discussion of Mao’s marriage law is the same con-
clusion she drew in The Second Sex: women’s economic autonomy is an abso-
lutely necessary condition for women’s liberation, but not a sufficient one.60
that  followed. Greenwald, Daughters of 1968: Redefining French Feminism and the Women’s 
Liberation Movement, 27.
57 La longue marche 123–59, The Long March 127–64.
58 “In every civilization the history of women’s rights is directly linked to the history of in-
heritance [footnote: As I tried to show in The Second Sex] which has evolved as a depen-
dent variable of the changing economic and social context. In China, however, what with 
the monolithic permanence of family structure from the beginning of recorded history 
down to the twentieth century, the right of succession did not alter.” [Dans toutes les ci-
vilisations, l’histoire des droits de la femme se confond avec l’histoire de l’héritage. ([Note] 
J’ai essayé de le montrer dans Le deuxième sexe), qui a évolué en fonction de l’ensemble 
des transformations économiques et sociales. Or en Chine, étant donné la permanence 
de la structure familiale, depuis le début des temps historiques jusqu’au xxe siècle le droit 
de succession n’a pas varié (La longue marche 126, The Long March 130).]
59 In fact, several central positions taken in The Second Sex—that women will only be liber-
ated by finding meaningful work to do, that the interests of women are not fully served by 
an individualist approach to “happiness”—are pretty close to what Mao said in the Yenan 
declaration, which need not imply “influence” in either direction. As I said several hun-
dred pages ago, if an idea is a good one, more than one person will have it.
60 Another similarity is that here, too, women are understood as among the greatest enforc-
ers of traditional views that are oppressive to (other) women, and indirectly to all women 
including themselves: see Beauvoir’s discussion of the role played by mothers-in-law in 
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But Markowitz does not mention Beauvoir’s 1957 repair of her 1948 omis-
sion, and seems generally uninterested in the book’s historical dimension.61 
After briefly noting La longue marche’s materialist approach, she writes: “But 
Orientalism is a hardy plant, and The Long March is, alas, itself peppered with 
a variety of Orientalist tropes: those of the Oriental despot, the absence of Chi-
nese history, the effeminate Chinese male, and the Chinese lack of energy and 
personality.” A footnote follows: “For tropes on history in The Long March, see 
35–36 and 88; on sensuality and lack of personality, see 64–65; on sex and gen-
der disorder, see 152–54 and 478; on backwardness in science and technology, 
see 203–4 and 363; and on the pre-Communist Chinese failure to be truly hu-
man, see 484.”62 Much of this is misleading: for instance, rather than “effemi-
nacy” and “gender disorder,” Beauvoir is actually discussing a lack of jealousy 
and competition shown by male university students toward their female coun-
terparts, something she found surprisingly different from the Sorbonne, and 
rather refreshing. Markowitz seems again to have proceeded by generating a 
list of isolated “problematic” sentences, most of which she distorts by taking 
them out of context.
“Tropes” are, of course, an important key to a writer’s underlying (conscious 
or unconscious) view. But are they more important than what the writer is ar-
guing, and more important than the explicit analysis and empirical exam-
ples adduced to support that argument? (Can a “trope” even be said to have 
 meaning, when detached from the argument or narrative on whose ground it 
 arises?) Again, it feels a bit unfair to lean so heavily on Markowitz, since 
 scholarship-by-search-and-replace is hardly unusual now: within the current 
consensus about feminist method, policing the texts of the past for things “we 
wouldn’t say today” is standard operating procedure. But perhaps that meth-
odological consensus itself is not beyond debate.63
However, I do not want to sugarcoat the extent to which La longue marche 
fails the current litmus tests of multiculturalism. Beauvoir shows no respect 
whatsoever for Chinese tradition; her discussion of ancient China is often dis-
missive, and she gets things wrong. She does not like the literati, calling them 
maintaining the cruelties of the “familial system,” in particular La longue marche 141, The 
Long March 135.
61 Despite the charge with which she opens her article, that scholars who overlook Beau-
voir’s “orientalism” are being ahistorical, she herself fails to note that the Long March is 
concerned not with “China” but with Mao’s revolution.
62 Markowitz, “Occidental Dreams,” 280–81.
63 Critique is, of course, indispensable; but a “search and destroy” attitude toward “tropes” 
can actually impede genuine critique, which needs to engage with what earlier writers are 
actually arguing.
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an elite culture, a court culture. She finds Chinese monuments ugly and unin-
teresting, designed for empires and not for people; she thinks the Forbidden 
City goes on and on and resembles itself, she’s particularly unimpressed by the 
ceramics;64 what she says about Chinese painting, and its failure to develop, is 
quite cringe-making. She does confirm the value of Chinese medicine, which 
she says Chiang Kai-Shek had outlawed,65 but she describes Chinese religion 
as superstition and magic.66
Confucianism and Taoism (of which she gives a somewhat confused histori-
cal account) are seen as stagnant, as having an “immanent rather than a tran-
scendent ontology.”67 As descriptive terms, scholars of religion might actually 
not disagree with that last point, but as an existentialist, Beauvoir has to argue 
that transcendence is better, and she does. She takes Chinese ideas seriously as 
ideas, as philosophy, and argues against them, pitting Kant against Confucius, 
for instance, because Kant’s individual is universal whereas Confucius’s indi-
vidual operates within a hierarchy where he must observe his place. A value 
judgment is clearly present in the critique of Taoist quietism and a Confucian-
ist conformism as “bureaucratic” (du fonctionnaire). It is not however a ques-
tion of the “sleepy East” vs the triumphant West, but rather a philosophical 
difference, argued philosophically. A view of the relation between subject and 
world as immanent rather than transcendent, as harmonious and unchanging, 
is deeply uncongenial to the existential framework of always trying to see the 
present in terms of the future project, of “devenir”: we’ve seen this framework 
since Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, and Beauvoir applies it consistently when 
she says, “it is an error to judge China as though things were stopped.”68 More-
over, the existentialist framework dovetails seamlessly with a worldview based, 
not in race, but in political economy: a cyclic, or non-linear, conception of 
time, such as she sees in Chinese philosophy, cannot provide a resource for 
modernization.69
64 La longue marche 58–63, The Long March 62–7.
65 La longue marche 345–49, The Long March 355–60.
66 La longue marche 84, 222–35, The Long March 88, 228–42.
67 La longue marche 253–62, The Long March 260–71.
68 We might also bear in mind that when Beauvoir spoke against superstition, and in favor 
of the Enlightenment, it was as an ex-Catholic who had modernized herself by leaving 
God behind, against significant opposition from her own original social milieu.
69 In an odd twist, this point was anticipated by Lorraine Hansberry, as an aside in her en-
thusiastic leftist reading of The Second Sex: “[T]oday American journalists try to find a 
desperate amusement or frivolity in the fact of the liberation of the women of China from 
the most barbaric forms of their former oppression. They cannot see that, suspending the 
liability to ‘Communist sympathy’ for a moment, a nation in fertile birth, or a renaissance, 
be it young America or ancient China, cannot afford the traditional misuse, and therefore 
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Should we produce an object called orientalism and say that this is that? 
Well, which orientalism would it then be? If one situates Beauvoir (as Markow-
itz does not do) within the history of French orientalist writing, which is in-
deed a shameful one, one can see that hers is not, for instance, the orientalism 
of a Pierre Loti. Loti arrived with the mopping-up army after the Boxer Rebel-
lion and wrote in The Last Days of Peking about “an intolerable smell of the 
yellow race, impossible to define”; he describes his delight in rolling about in 
the Empress’s bed after the sack of her palace.70 This is not that. Nor is it the 
attitude, which Richard Wolin describes as “sinophilia,” taken in the 1960s and 
1970s by the group around the journal Tel Quel, especially Philippe Sollers and 
Julia Kristeva, whose quasi-feminist 1974 book Des Chinoises makes an essen-
tialist romance of the inscrutable Chinese countenance. As Wolin writes, “Chi-
na for them was a trope”; while some good developments came out of French 
“Maoism,” particularly for Foucault, the arrogance of that encounter remains 
breathtaking, and a bit too close for comfort to the sinophiles of a previous 
generation, as Spivak shows.71
virtual uselessness of half its people. The frontier demands work, hard work, and a dedica-
tion to the future. There is not the time to clutter it with the worthlessness of the useless-
ness of women. Nothing could better indicate the artificial nature of their oppression to 
begin with. If the Communists of China have indeed ideologically elevated woman to a 
place of dignity which is beyond her mere economic status, this is hardly a point of jest, 
but one of the more inspiring developments of modern history” (Hansberry, “An Ameri-
can Commentary,” 136–37).
70 “[U]ne intolérable odeur de race jaune qui ne se peut définir” (Loti, Les derniers jours de 
Pékin, 150).
71 Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East, 20 and 114. For Wolin, “French Maoism operated at 
a dangerous remove from the reality principle. Mao’s China becomes a projection—a 
Rorschach test—for the students’ overheated revolutionary fantasies” (122). “[T]he role 
that bourgeois self-hatred played in their pro-Chinese worldview was inestimable” (137). 
See also David Macey, “Rebellion, or, Analysis,” and Eric Hayot, Chinese Dreams: Pound, 
Brecht, Tel Quel. On Kristeva specifically, see Spivak, “French Feminism in an International 
Frame,” and Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrain: British and French Orientalisms, 136–52.
Wolin’s portrait of the Tel Quel group as opportunists is not falsified by Kristeva’s own account in 
her autobiographical novel, Les samouraïs. The whole episode reminds me of Beauvoir’s 
remark about the Partisan Review boys: “They would burn down the whole world to save 
their stupid rag of a magazine” (Lettres à Sartre, 296). Beauvoir’s own view of the Cultural 
Revolution was considerably less romantic, as we saw above. And in explaining the sup-
port she and Sartre offered to the group of young activists around the journal La Cause du 
Peuple, she’d say that she sympathized with “les maos” “despite my reservations—espe-
cially, my lack of blind faith in Mao’s China” (asd 478). [Malgré quelques réserves—en 
particulier je ne saurais avoir une foi aveugle dans la Chine de Mao—je sympathise avec 
les Maoistes (tcf 607)].
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In sharp contrast, when Beauvoir celebrates the sweeping away of decadent 
Chinese customs in favor of a cleaner and more equitable modernity, she is 
echoing, not French orientalists, but the Chinese writers of the May Fourth 
movement, whose influence was still very palpable among Chinese govern-
ment leaders in 1955. This was especially true of Mao Dun, with whom she re-
cords some long conversations. Beauvoir frequently quotes and cites “the intel-
lectuals of the May Fourth movement,” particularly in her chapters on “Culture” 
and “The Family,” and she has clearly studied their works in detail.72 Beauvoir’s 
most “Hegelian” statements about “progress” and evolution are connected di-
rectly to ideas of modernity and modernization expressed by Chinese revolu-
tionaries; every one of the “orientalist tropes” Markowitz scolds in Beauvoir’s 
text can be traced to that generation, especially to the feminists (male and fe-
male) who were an integral part of the movement, and of its (very significant) 
legacy to Mao and those around him.73 What Beauvoir has to say about the 
backward or “static” nature of Chinese culture is actually quite mild compared 
to what Lu Xun, Hu Shi, Jin Tianhe, and He Jin had to say.74 And while the term 
“feudalism,” as shorthand for what must be left behind, now echoes quite odd-
ly in our (Western) ears, it is not just orthodox Mao, but part of a discourse 
pursued by nearly all intellectuals in China before 1949. These writers didn’t 
always agree about the extent to which China was still feudal, or about how 
best to address the problem, but they did agree that “feudalism,” “familialism,” 
and the long-traditional subjection of women were harmful, not just to women 
themselves, but to all of China.
72 She sent Nelson Algren a book by Lu Xun which she thought he would like: this was in 
keeping with the idea they shared of an international left-intellectual writing practice 
(see Altman, “Simone de Beauvoir as Literary Writer”). She also sent him some Chinese 
“trinkets,” despite saying in La longue marche that if she really wanted to bring back “typi-
cal objects” as souvenirs, she’d choose a spittoon and a thermos bottle of tea (La longue 
marche 418, The Long March 431–32).
73 For an account of Mao’s early writing in favor of women’s emancipation, see Delia Davin, 
“Gendered Mao: Mao, Maoism, and Women.” “Notable also are ten passionate pieces writ-
ten in response to the suicide of a young Changsha woman, Miss Zhao, who slit her own 
throat on her wedding day to escape marriage to the man to whom her parents had be-
trothed her” (197).
74 Nor was it simply a case of elite males using feminist ideas as a means to their own libera-
tion: young women themselves resisted the traditional ideology that had grounded such 
practices as footbinding and non-consensual marriage. See Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolu-
tion: China’s Struggle with the Modern World; Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlight-
enment: Oral and Textual Histories; Harriet Evans, “The Impossibility of Gender in Narra-
tives of China’s Modernity”; and Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl, and Dorothy Ko, eds., The Birth 
of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory.
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Would it not have been strange, patronizing—indeed, would it not have 
been orientalizing?—for a progressive anti-colonialist Westerner to refuse to 
listen to the vision her Chinese hosts offered of their own culture and their 
own future? If we look at her remarks on “la vieille Chine” (the old China) 
through the screen of multicultural “difference,” we may see insensitivity; if we 
look at them through the lens of political economy, we will see that she is ar-
ticulating a position in solidarity with views that, I submit, have every right to 
be understood as “Chinese.”
It is certainly the case that Hu Shi, Lu Xun, Mao Dun, many others were in-
fluenced by study in and of “the West.” And so indeed was the revolutionary 
generation, many of whom studied in France.75 But to see the May Fourth 
movement (and its Maoist legacy) as one more symptom of cultural imperial-
ism would be to deny agency and intellect to the Chinese who created it.
It would also ignore the fact that women’s official position in China in the 
1950s was well in advance of any European country at that date. One did not 
find de Gaulle or Eisenhower arguing that women held up half the sky, or if 
they had said that, they would have been referring to women’s role as dutiful 
wives and citizen mothers.76 Beauvoir’s description of the Communist com-
mitment to women, through new laws of marriage that went hand in hand 
with other attempts, such as land reform and collectivization, to break the sys-
tem of private property, is validated by my reading of more recent feminist 
China scholars: their work echoes her claims that women’s situation in China 
improved under Communism, and also corroborate her uncertainty about 
how fully these improvements would “take.” It does seem fair to say that (old) 
materialist feminism, which saw an understanding of both gender and class 
(and of the link between them) as fundamental to attempts to overthrow an 
oppressive system, at that moment was closer to being put into practice in 
China than anywhere else on earth.77
75 See Paau Shiu-lam, “The Vogue of France Among Late Ch’ing Revolutionaries.”
76 The French communists hardly offered a viable alternative: in addition to discrediting 
themselves with respect to the Soviet “labor” camps, and later the Mahgreb, the pcf 
proved extremely conservative with respect to such issues as abortion and contraception.
77 See for instance Christina Gilmartin, “Gender in the Formation of a Communist Body 
Politic,” Wang Zheng, Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the 
People’s Republic of China, 1949–1964, and Xin Huang, The Gender Legacy of the Mao 
Era: Women’s Life Stories in Contemporary China. It is good to remember that, as these 
scholars show, Maoist feminism was feminism, and that it was created and main-
tained by feminists. The story of Beauvoir and Chen Xuezhao is another data point 
here.
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Here, and throughout, I’m taking a different approach from that of Li-Hsiang 
Lisa Rosenlee, who writes in her book, Confucianism and Feminism: A Philo-
sophical Interpretation:
The term Western feminist here primarily is used to refer to an ideological 
orientation that frames Chinese women’s liberation in accordance with 
Western intellectual tradition. In this way, a feminist and/or sinologist 
who is de facto Chinese or have Chinese ancestry could fall into the cat-
egory of “Western Feminist” and a feminist who is de facto Westerner 
could fall outside of that category insofar as their ideological orientation 
is concerned. So that the empirical problem that so and so is a Westerner 
yet advocates such and such position or so and so is a Chinese yet advo-
cates such and such position can be resolved.78
This is a coherent outlook, and I am in no position to challenge her view that 
once one has peeled away Western frames there will be an authentic Confu-
cian Chineseness left to see, which once subject to “rectification” (immanent 
critique) can serve as a resource for present-day feminists. Rosenlee’s argu-
ment that Western roots for philosophical virtue ethics (Aristotle, Kant, Ni-
etzsche) are no less in need of such rectification is indisputable. That most if 
not all of the activism and gains for women that took place in early twentieth 
century China did happen to show the influence of a Western frame and an 
attack on tradition becomes a purely “empirical” issue, which Rosenlee as a 
philosopher can properly set aside. However, that activism, and the possibility 
of a changed future, is what primarily interested Beauvoir, and it is also what 
interests me.
Rosenlee’s re-analysis does find the subordination of women deeply encod-
ed in Confucian texts and practices. Whether or not “wai” and “nei” map ex-
actly onto Western “public” and “private,” women were barred from activity in 
the “wai” in ways that were harmful to them; Chinese women minded that and 
said so. Rosenlee’s history is particularly interested in moments of women’s 
resistance and agency that might be difficult for outsiders to recognize— 
narratives of “virtuous women” where women writers gave other women con-
servative advice they hadn’t followed themselves. Resistance to widow remar-
riage is a particularly interesting case where, she says, Western scholars, 
working from a view of Chinese women as helpless victims, misunderstood 
where women’s true interests lie. I am less persuaded by the argument (which 
Dorothy Ko also makes) that the history of footbinding does not show Chinese 
78 Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation, 161n1.
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women’s erotic subordination, that it was an area of women’s agency because 
women were active participants and it had a social meaning (and, in the work 
of Ko, an artistic value).79 Or rather, no, I do appreciate the agency involved: 
but I find Beauvoir’s understanding of “complicity” a better way to theorize it.
Rosenlee does not refer to La longue marche, or to what Beauvoir has to say 
about China in The Second Sex and her autobiography. But she does say that 
she has found Beauvoir’s “existentialists’ deconstruction of traditional ac-
counts of the ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ of a woman” foundationally helpful to her 
own project, in generating the problem of how “feminists [can] continue to 
use the category of ‘woman’ as a collective term to talk about gender oppres-
sion across cultural, racial, and class boundaries.”80 She returns to Beauvoir 
also at the very end of her book: “In the end, this project eventually is personal. 
Like de Beauvoir, who wrote The Second Sex in order to answer the personal 
question of what it means to be a woman, I am trying to answer to myself what 
it means to be a Chinese Confucian woman.”81
One possible conclusion one might draw is that “Confucius” will be no less, 
and no more, philosophically useful than “Hegel” or Kant: in both cases, the 
question becomes “what we make of what he made of us.” In both cases, the 
modern feminist (wherever she comes from, or lives) will have to engage in 
what Maria Lugones called “contortions,” to a quite significant degree. So per-
haps the “feminism” in feminist philosophy is what is discovered in the course 
of performing those contortions? Perhaps the contortions are the feminism?
To my mind, unless one wants to commit the absurdity of calling the May 
Fourth generation “self-orientalists,” or something (self-hating Orientals?), it 
becomes urgent once again to speak of intellectual hybridity, and of the fact 
that, as Shana Brown has put it, “modernity was created in different places … 
all maps are anachronistic.”82 Again, this is Paul Gilroy’s point, and Sam Bard-
aouil’s, about the importance of understanding modernism and modernity as 
produced through two-way (really multi-way) intellectual exchanges between 
the colonized and the metropole, and James Clifford’s point (following Leiris) 
about ethnic “authenticity” as an invented object. This seems particularly ap-
plicable to the interchanges of the 1950s: its Bandung humanist version could 
be seen, for instance, in Frantz Fanon’s denunciation of “folklore” in Les dam-
nés de la terre, or in Michel Leiris’s essay, “L’ethnographe devant le  colonialisme,” 
79 Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding and Every Step a Lotus: 
Shoes for Bound Feet.
80 Rosenlee 150, 151.
81 Ibid., 159.
82 Shana Brown, Lecture, University of Hawaii, July 2014.
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where, as we saw, he speaks precisely of the ethical and political imperative to 
stand in solidarity with the colonized subject of today, the “évolué,” rather than 
confining non-Western cultures to a zoo or museum in order for Westerners to 
appreciate and study them in their “authentic” but stagnant state. Beauvoir’s 
commitment to that dynamic is equally clear in La longue marche:
The fact that pre-Columbian art is not perpetuated in New York City ate-
liers never wrung a tear from me, nor will I shed one when Peking has 
forgotten Sung cloisonné and Ming brocade.83…
The visitor who comes to find out about China trains most of his atten-
tions upon the unusual and unique aspects of her culture; but the Chi-
nese themselves are infinitely more interested in developing the general 
knowledge they must have if they are to stand on a par with all other 
nations.84
And this connects to her attack on the right-wingers in France and Hong Kong 
who deplore the disappearance of what is picturesque and mysterious about 
“the old China”: it is westerners, who know nothing about the real China, who 
want to preserve it as a kind of mirage or utopia.
Is then China doomed willy-nilly to ape the West? The truth is that they 
are drawing from it heavily…. Many civilized Western souls bemoan this; 
convinced of their definitive superiority, the idea of China remaining 
“different” tickles their fancy. China is, they wail, going to “become banal.” 
They are very vague indeed about Chinese thought and art, their igno-
rance of the language and literature is total; but it’s this mysteriousness 
that appeals to them, it looks something like infinity; they love to dream 
83 “Je n’ai jamais déploré que New York ne perpétuât pas les arts précolombiens; je n’aurai 
pas de regrets quand Pékin oubliera le cloisonné Song ou les broderies Ming” (La longue 
marche 344–45, The Long March 355). This was not a new thought for Beauvoir, nor was it 
China-specific. See L’Amérique au jour le jour 1947 (262–83) for a similar view of Taos Pueb-
lo, where she witnessed Native Americans performing traditional dances for the enter-
tainment of tourists. Her visit to Portugal right after the war had led to a similar condem-
nation, in Pour une morale de l’ambiguité, of the dictator Salazar’s assiduous preservation 
of handicrafts and vernacular architecture at the expense of funding human welfare, de-
spite the extreme poverty in which most Portuguese were then living (Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguité 134–36, Ethics of Ambiguity 92–94).
84 “Le visiteur qui s’initie à la Chine s’intéresse surtout aux formes singulières de sa culture; 
mais les Chinois eux-mêmes sont essentiellement soucieux de développer le savoir uni-
versel qui leur est nécessaire pour s’égaler sur tous les plans aux autres nations” (La longue 
marche 349, The Long March 360).
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that in this otherwise banal world there is still a special somewhere yet 
full of unfathomable marvels. The Chinese, though, do not dream their 
culture, they live it; they sense its limitations; they also know those limi-
tations may be surmounted; they are refusing to stay put in that supposed 
wonderland to which the perhaps innocent but none the less essentially 
contemptuous admiration of certain Westerners would assign them.85
As she said at the outset, she went to China not in search of some romantic 
mysterious East, not in search of the “Other,” but in pursuit (and support) of 
political solutions. And she exposes the bad faith of those who, she says, would 
keep the Chinese peasant poor in the interest of the picturesque, those for ex-
ample who miss the “Singsong Girls” of the now demolished brothels, which in 
1920 held thousands of young women who had been kidnapped or sold by their 
indigent families;86 those who are nostalgic even for the dirt and squalor that 
have been (at least in theory) banished from Peking, which is now “aseptically 
85 “La Chine est-elle donc condamnée bon gré mal gré à copier l’Occident? Le fait est qu’elle 
s’en inspire considérablement. Elle s’est transformée socialement et économiquement 
grâce aux sciences et aux techniques occidentales: pour s’exprimer dans sa nouveauté elle 
est obligée d’emprunter aux pays qui sont en avance sur elle. Beaucoup de civilisés occi-
dentaux s’en désolent; convaincus de leur définitive supériorité, il leur plairait que la 
Chine demeurât ‘différente.’ Elle va ‘se banaliser,’ déplorent-ils. Ils ignorent tout de sa 
langue et de sa littérature, presque tout de sa pensée et de son art: mais précisément ce 
mystère prend à leurs yeux l’apparence de l’infini; ils aiment à rêver que quelque part au 
monde se perpétuent d’insondables merveilles. Les Chinois ne rêvent pas leur culture: ils 
la vivent; ils en éprouvent les limites; mais aussi ils savent que celles-ci peuvent être dé-
passées; ils refusent de se laisser enfermer dans le domaine que prétend leur assigner 
l’admiration ignorante et, en vérité, méprisante de certains Occidentaux” (La longue 
marche 352, The Long March 363, translation modified).
86 For example, in an early chapter, “The Discovery of Peking,” she describes the quarter of 
“opium dens and brothels that exist no more”: “As for the brothels, they numbered 277 in 
1920, contained 3,130 girls divided into four classes according to their youth and beauty; 
they were bought while still very young from needy families, or they were simply kid-
napped … in return for gratuities, newspapers publicized them openly … as if advertising 
a brand of laundry soap. Recounting their adventures, tourists of the period were cheer-
fully wont to extol the charm and gracious manners of those to whom they referred as 
‘Singsong girls’” (The Long March 41–2). [C’est là que se trouvaient naguère les lieux de 
plaisir et de débauche … des fumeries d’opium, des bordels qui n’existent plus…. Quant 
aux bordels, en 1920 on en comptait 377, comprenant 3,130 pensionnaires, réparties en 
quatre classes selon leur jeunesse et leur beauté; on les achetait toutes jeunes à des 
familles indigentes, ou même on les kidnappait…. [L]es journaux leur faisaient une pu-
blicité ouverte … comme s’il se fût agi d’une marque de lessive. Les touristes de l’époque 
se plaisent à vanter, dans leur récits de voyage, le charme et les manières décentes de 
celles qu’on appelait les “Sing-song girls” (La longue marche 38–9).]
493Beauvoir in China
spic and span,”87 in contrast to Naples, Lisbon, Barcelona, even Chicago and 
New York.88 But “certain aesthetes, enamored of old China, miss the flies, the 
ragged people: ‘No more beggars! why, this isn’t Peking anymore,’ one connois-
seur exclaimed to me, reproach in his tone.”89 The direction of Beauvoir’s criti-
cism here strikes me as anti-Orientalist; that term had not been invented, but 
perhaps Sartre came close to it when he praised Cartier-Bresson’s photographs 
of China as “neither lotus nor Loti.”90 I find Beauvoir’s version persuasive, and 
potentially far-reaching.
What holds together all the “fellow-traveling” literature, then and now, is the 
simple belief that there are viable political alternatives to capitalism, and that 
there is a viable role for literature and the arts to play that is not limited to shor-
ing up the economic and social interests of the bourgeoisie. From that perspec-
tive, the book’s most poignant moment occurs on the reviewing stand at the 
First of October parade: the delegation has been standing for four hours, barely 
noticing the passage of time, as thousands of dancers pay their respects to the 
Chinese leaders and celebrate the Revolution.
The parade continues. All the while watching it, we cast side-long glances 
at each other: Poles, Frenchmen, Italians, we were all bred on irony, 
taught to keep our emotions on a leash, and our sophistication includes 
the keenest unwillingness to be made a fool of; each of us wonders to 
himself whether he is all alone in feeling moved by the earnest joyous-
ness of this crowd on the march. It is a relief to hear Infeld murmur: 
“When you see that, you don’t much want to be a cynic any more.”91
87 “[R]igoureusement aseptisé” (La longue marche 40, The Long March 42).
88 “The travel agencies’ slogans which in the West define the picturesque section of the city, 
narrow and evil-smelling little streets, does not apply here,” and she contrasts Naples, 
Lisbon, Barcelona, Chicago and the Bowery: here there are no bums (The Long March 
42–3). [Le slogan qui définit en Occident les pittoresques quartiers pauvres—“rues 
étroites et nauséabondes”—n’est pas de mise ici: on n’y respire pas une mauvaise odeur. 
Ces rues ne sont pas seulement incomparables avec les venelles de Naples, de Lisbonne, 
ou de Barcelone; on n’y voit pas comme dans les allées de Chicago voler de vieux journaux 
ou fumer les poubelles; on n’y rencontre pas ces “hommes oubliés” qui traînent sur la 
Bowery de New York (La longue marche 40, The Long March 42).]
89 “Certains esthètes, amoureux de l’ancienne Chine, regrettent les mouches, les haillons: 
‘Plus de mendiants! mais ce n’est plus Pékin!’ m’a dit l’un d’eux avec blâme” (La longue 
marche 49, The Long March 52).
90 “[S]ans lotus ni Loti” (Sartre, D’une Chine à l’autre, 8). The photographs were taken in 1948 
and 1949.
91 “Le défilé se poursuit. Tout en le regardant, nous nous observons les uns les autres: Po-
lonais, Français, Italiens, nous avons tous l’ironie facile et la volonté arrêtée de n’être pas 
dupes; chacun se demande s’il est seul à se sentir touché par la sérieuse gaieté de cette 
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Leiris’s version in Fibrilles is more poetic: “And if, for once, we gave up our 
cynicism?”
4 Last Thoughts: Dateline Beijing
In 2017, Chinese scholar Min Dongchao, while noting that “traveling theory” 
still tends to move from West to East, called on feminists to move beyond Said’s 
original paradigm and pay attention to the “many other invisible discursive 
trajectories that link the development of gender theories and movements in 
the world that have so far been ignored.”92 Uncovering a few such complex 
trajectories has been my project, and like Beauvoir’s own it is not (I hope) a 
purely academic one. We might think further about how Beauvoir’s on-the-
ground feminist activism in France in the 1970s and 1980s, and everything the 
French mlf owes her for that work, was informed by what she learned in and 
about China. As with her other travels, we might see her less as “bringing theo-
ry,” and more as seeking it. (“Not only has [Kahina] read your books, but now it 
is you who read hers”?) Of course she would not have said “theory”: that is not 
her word, but ours. In La force des choses she said China had given her “sche-
mata” and “keys” (des schémas, des clés); when she sent Kate Millett’s delega-
tion off to hear what Iranian feminists had to say, she spoke more simply of 
informations. But how does this look from the other side?
In the fall of 2016, I travelled to Beijing to present an earlier version of this 
chapter at a conference of historians. Afterwards, several members of the audi-
ence expressed surprise: they had expected from my title (“Beauvoir in China”) 
that I would speak about Chinese translations and reception of The Second Sex; 
that Beauvoir herself had traveled to China in the 1950s, none of the Chinese 
historians knew. It seemed unlikely to me that Beauvoir’s own work had had 
any significant impact on China. Certainly she did not actively seek to do so. As 
she describes it, the flow went in the other direction, and it was French readers 
she had sought to influence with La longue marche, to mobilize European sup-
port for China in the context of anti-colonialist struggle. But like Beauvoir, I 
went home and went to the library, and it turned out there was more to know.
foule en marche. Nous sommes soulagés d’entendre Infeld murmurer: ‘Quand on voit ça, 
on n’a plus envie d’être cynique’” (La longue marche 414–15, The Long March 428).
92 Min Dongchao, Translation and Travelling Theory: Feminist Theory and Praxis in China, 4. 
Min’s book helpfully connects flows of theory to recent flows of capital in service of eco-
nomic “development.”
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The current feminist scene in China is too dynamic and complex to charac-
terize briefly,93 and (also like Beauvoir) I am limited to what I can read in Eng-
lish. So what follows is more a sketch than a full account. But from what I can 
tell, Beauvoir did have an influence; her reception was rather paradoxical; and 
again, the dimension of time has been key.
In 1955, Beauvoir reported, few Chinese had read her work (or Sartre’s): they 
were invited as prominent intellectuals whose international cultural capital 
made their public support valuable.94 Later the regime’s denunciation of 
“bourgeois feminism” as a “poisonous Western weed” blocked any uptake of 
her work. But after Mao’s death, when the backlash against the Cultural Revo-
lution increased receptiveness to “joining the international track” (in connec-
tion with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms), Beauvoir does seem to have re-
ceived attention from intellectuals and students.
The irony is this. Beauvoir herself had valued her Chinese experience be-
cause it helped clarify and develop the marxist-materialist side of her analysis. 
But in the 1980s Chinese feminists found her ideas helpful in detaching the 
women’s movement from Maoist marxism, which they identified with the 
(now discredited) regime that had led to Cultural Revolution turmoil, and also 
in detaching their feminism from the activities of the All-China Women’s Fed-
eration, which had functioned as an arm of the State. Beauvoir was embraced 
(especially by Li Xiaojiang, a highly influential writer and founder of the aca-
demic discipline of women’s studies in China), as a theorist of woman’s differ-
ence, as having drawn attention to the particular condition and experience of 
women, in ways that had been silenced by Maoist doctrines like “what men 
can do, women can do.” In an article analysing successive translations of The 
Second Sex (in both Mainland China and Taiwan), Nicki Liu Haiping explains,
For Li Xiaojiang, a pioneer of Chinese feminism, Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex was attractive, not for its theme of “second sex,” but for its theme of 
woman. For her, there was nothing earth-shattering about the observa-
tion of women’s inferiority. However, for “woman” to appear in a book ti-
tle in the early 1980s in China was refreshing…. [It] came at a time when 
93 For two very interesting, and very different, accounts, see Leta Hong Fincher, Betraying 
Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China and Xin Huang, The Gender Legacy of the 
Mao Era: Women’s Life Stories in Contemporary China.
94 Chen Xuezhao had read The Second Sex—an ex-boyfriend who had stayed in France had 
sent it to her—but her comment in her autobiography is limited to wondering why he 
had done so.
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Chinese women were looking for something to support their struggle to 
break away from the grip of class theory.95
Dai Jinhua, another pioneering Chinese feminist, who found The Second Sex 
life-changing when she came across it in 1979, noted in retrospect (2001):
From a historical point of view, it is not hard to see that the appearance 
of Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe and feminist theory in China 
was in fact situated in multiple mismatches with societal reality…. A seri-
ous dislocation herein was that Chinese feminists of the 1980s used the 
term “female gender/second sex” to highlight the existence of gender dif-
ference rather than to reveal the absurdity of gender fundamentalism. 
They used it to break away from women’s anonymous status under the 
principle that “men and women are the same.”96
Many theorists, including Min Dongchao (taking off from Said), have empha-
sized the productive value of misreading.97 But Li’s emphasis on difference in 
Beauvoir’s account of women’s experience is not really a misreading; or at 
least, it is no more of a misreading than those in the US who read Beauvoir as 
a liberal “equality feminist” indifferent to the specifics of women’s embodi-
ment. Beauvoir scholars increasingly discuss the complexity of her phenome-
nological picture of women’s embodied experience.98 And indeed, early in the 
introduction to The Second Sex, Beauvoir did say, “It is clear that no woman can 
claim without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex,”99 although as Toril Moi 
noticed, the first English translation simply left that sentence out.
However, the earliest Chinese translation of The Second Sex (done in Taiwan, 
imported to the Mainland) was incomplete in the other direction: it omitted 
the entirety of volume one, and included only the second volume, “Women’s 
95 Nicki Liu Haiping, “Manipulating Simone de Beauvoir: A Case Study of the Chinese Trans-
lations of The Second Sex,” 89.
96 Dai Jinhua, “Traces of Time: Simone de Beauvoir in China,” 184, 185.
97 See also Tani Barlow’s complex discussion of feminism as “catachresis,” in The Question of 
Women in Chinese Feminism, and Xiaomei Chen, Occidentalism. Li’s uptake of Beauvoir as 
a difference feminist is ironic, but perhaps no more so than than the way US feminists 
have embraced Mao’s slogan, “women hold up half the sky,” “the iron girl” ideal many 
Chinese women found oppressive rather than “empowering.”
98 See for instance Sara Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference. See also 
Toril Moi, What is a Woman? for a discussion of how poorly Beauvoir’s view maps onto 
1980s essentialism/contructionism debates in the US.
99 “Il est clair qu’aucune femme ne peut prétendre sans mauvaise foi se situer par-delà son 
sexe” (DS 1:13). See Toril Moi, “While We Wait.”
497Beauvoir in China
Lived Experience.”100 Could this help explain why Chinese feminists empha-
sized her account of female embodied subjectivity, rather than the philosophi-
cal critique she lays out in the introduction to volume one, which has been 
emphasized (indeed perhaps overemphasized) in Anglophone philosophical 
work?
It is the mark of a complex and fecund work of theory to sustain different 
interpretations. Still, there are limits, and Beauvoir would certainly not have 
agreed with what Li made of her account of sexual difference.101 Li describes 
women’s difference as essentially rooted in biology, especially in maternity; she 
argues that men and women evolved separately, and that “nature” thus re-
quires different but complementary roles; she called on women to emphasize 
their femininity, and to take advantage of the new availability of female subjec-
tivity through consumer culture. This has led Tani Barlow to characterize Li as 
a “market feminist”; Min Dongchao describes Li’s corrective focus on the cre-
ation of feminine subjectivity more gently as part of a “cultural turn,” a turn 
away from politics. More recently, Song Shaopeng has outlined ways Li’s work 
dovetails with neo-liberalism.102
100 See Haiping for details and close analysis. See also two short pieces from the 2008 anthol-
ogy, (Re)découvrir l’œuvre de Simone de Beauvoir: Sophie Zhang, “Beauvoir et la Chine” and 
Xin Miao, “Simone de Beauvoir et Le deuxième sexe en Chine.” The earliest Chinese trans-
lations were based on Parshley’s English version, and so was the first “complete” one, by 
Tao Tiezhu in 1998. Sophie Zhang spoke with his widow, who told her that Tao (not unlike 
Parshley) had died of exhaustion (“meurt d’épuisement”) soon after it appeared. (“Un ca-
marade homme, dévoué à la cause des femmes! Nous lui rendons hommage” says Zhang 
[337]). The first Chinese translation directly from French, by Kelu Zhang, was published 
in Shanghai in 2011.
101 The refusal of biological determinism, and rejection of femininity, seem basic to her the-
ory; I am extrapolating also from her negative reaction to the “difference feminisms” of 
Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous.
Stepping back from the paradox of Li’s reading, I notice another: US feminists virtu-
ously goading one another to ritually denounce Beauvoir’s “orientalism” at more or less 
the same time as Chinese feminists are deploying her work in ways they find productive.
102 See Li Xiaojiang, “Economic Reform and the Awakening of Chinese Women’s Conscious-
ness,” originally published in Chinese in 1988; Barlow, The Question of Women in Chinese 
Feminism, 255–301; Li Xiaojiang, “With What Discourse Do We Reflect on Chinese Wom-
en.” This last article, published in 1999, lays out very clearly and cogently why various 
Western feminist terms and ideas (such as “equality,” “the personal is political,” and “lib-
eration”) cannot easily be used in Chinese feminism, because of their Maoist history and 
resonances. See also Sharon Wesoky, “Bringing the Jia Back into Guojia: Engendering Chi-
nese Intellectual Politics.” Sharon Wesoky has kindly shared her student’s translation of 
Song Shaopeng, “Capitalism, Socialism, and Women,” which appeared in Chinese on the 
website Open Times.
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In retrospect, Chinese feminists (including Li herself) seem to have seen the 
limitations of this approach. As Dai Jinhua continues:
In the midst of the prelude to a profound social transformation at a dif-
ferent time in a different place, people could not predict where this pro-
cess of saying farewell to the Cultural Revolution era, burying the social-
ist system and ending the rule of totalitarianism was going to lead 
China…. People could not predict that burying the socialist system did 
not necessarily mean burying and seeing off totalitarian rule forever. 
They could even less predict that this new process of capitalization 
pushed forward by a “communist party” was going to come at the inevi-
table expense of women’s collective interest.103
To paraphrase Beauvoir, it is an error to view feminist theory as though things 
were stopped.104
I said in my introduction, speaking of Beauvoir’s reception in France and 
the US, that some scholars and activists praised Beauvoir as a feminist of 
equality, others as a feminist of difference, while others have damned her for 
being precisely one or the other of those things. Something similar appears to 
be true in China; or at least, she remains, internationally, a ground on which 
these questions are asked. Might this oscillation possibly suggest that there is a 
third way? or that when the pendulum swings too far in either direction, she 
can help to swing it back? Or, in any case, that without providing recipes—for 
anything—she reminds us to continue asking these questions, which we will 
have to answer for ourselves?
Min Dongchao’s book proposes an “alternative traveling theory” that will 
work harder at fully understanding reception contexts, both spatially and tem-
porally: uptake of a theory in a different place and/or time implies that it fills a 
need there, and then; but the need it fills at the point of reception may be quite 
different from the need it was created to fill. “Most literature on traveling theo-
ry deals with the discursive issue,” she points out, but “[t]heories, especially 
103 “Traces of Time,” 184. Neo-liberalism in China has led to losses both for poor women (who 
have been deprived of the basic livelihood and safety net provided under communism) 
and for educated women, who face discrimination in the job market and the consequenc-
es of sexualization in the private sphere.
104 Interestingly, while both Dai in (2001) and Min (in 2014) end their analyses by lamenting 
the absence of socialist feminism from the current Chinese scene—an absence such the-
orists as Song Shaopeng are currently addressing—they do not see, or do not emphasize, 
the socialist dimensions of Beauvoir’s own writing, any than most French or American 
readers have done.
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feminist theory, do not just travel to and in academic circles; they also travel to 
larger social movements.”105 On this view, that an account can become “dated” 
is a mark of its value, of the degree to which it is engaged with what is urgently 
real, with facts as well as myths.
Of course engaging with “facts” as they unfold in real time runs the risk of 
getting things terribly wrong, either because of one’s own blind spots or simply 
because things change. But I hope even readers who do not feel any special ur-
gency about “being fair to Beauvoir” will nonetheless see some value in the risks 
she took: the risk of listening to and trusting her sources, and the risk of hope.
What would happen if we read “dated” feminist works in that same spirit, 
not with “the hermeneutics of disapproval,”106 but with an eye to possible alli-
ances and collaborations? what “chosen projects” might we then discover that 
we and they actually share? What if we focused less on the adequacy of various 
“frameworks” and more on what could be seen by looking inside the frame? 
What if the “datedness” of older works became, not a reason to dismiss them, 
but a spur to learn (and teach) more history?
Min’s own chapter on Beauvoir adds yet another twist. After detailing the 
importance of Beauvoir’s work to general Chinese developments in the late 
1980s, and to her own developing understanding of feminism, she tells us some-
thing else: conversations with Chinese feminists have confirmed her suspicion 
that that the influence of The Second Sex did not include many people actually 
reading it. (As I said at the outset, that has been equally true in the US.)
This would not, by the way, have bothered Beauvoir. Her support for the 
1970s generation of feminists, both in France and the US, was wholehearted 
and enthusiastic. But when John Gerassi asked her in 1976 about the fact that 
“Many people, especially in America, consider it [The Second Sex] the begin-
ning of the contemporary feminist movement,” she countered, “I don’t think 
so,” pointing out that most 1970s activists were too young to have read the book 
when it appeared. “They may have become feminists for the reasons I explain 
in The Second Sex; but they discovered those reasons in their life experiences, 
not in my book.”107
...
105 Min Dongchao, 6, 4.
106 The phrase is Susan Fraiman’s.
107 John Gerassi, “The Second Sex: Twenty-five Years Later (Interview with Simone de Beau-
voir),” 79. She was even blunter in 1983 when Liliane Lazar asked whether she thought La 
vieillesse had changed French attitudes to old age. She replied, “Non, je ne pense pas du 
tout. Je ne pense pas qu’un livre puisse vraiment changer les choses.” (Not at all. I don’t 
think a book can really change things.)  “Conversation avec Simone de Beauvoir,” 11.
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And yet, books do matter.
In the spring of 2015, a group of young women were arrested in Beijing for 
protesting sexual harassment; after an international campaign of support, they 
were released. One member of their group, Xiao Meili, wrote an Op-Ed piece 
for the New York Times in which she credited Beauvoir by name.
When I was growing up in the 1990s in Sichuan Province, I found many 
cultural traditions and practices puzzling. At home, I addressed my 
mother’s parents as “waipo” and “waigong,” or “outside grandma” and 
“outside grandpa,” because I was told that my father’s family mattered 
more. In school, my teachers held higher academic expectations for boys 
than they did for girls because they believed boys were smarter than girls. 
…. Many universities openly excluded girls from majors such as marine 
engineering and geological exploration…. I constantly saw want ads that 
either excluded women or specified that women applicants needed to be 
tall and attractive…
Many took this entrenched discrimination for granted, but I didn’t. As 
a sophomore in college, I became interested in feminism and began read-
ing Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex and other famous feminist 
works. Like a nearsighted person with new glasses, I began to see clearly, 
and many of the things that puzzled me growing up were explained by 
feminism….108
It would be difficult to disentangle what is “Chinese” and what is “Western” in 
Xiao Meili’s account, either in the discrimination she describes or in the femi-
nist impulse to re-vision and resistance. Perhaps disentangling that is not re-
ally the best use of anyone’s energy. And if, for once, we gave up our cynicism?
Of course “we” wouldn’t say that “now.”
If not now, when?
Meryl Altman
December 31, 2019
108 Xiao Meili, “China’s Feminist Awakening,” Op-Ed, New York Times, May 13 2015.
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